Lee Kok Sun v Ravichanthiran A/L Ganesan (JA-17D-1-05/2022)

The Appellant also sought that all disciplinary proceedings against the Respondent relating to the Appellant’s complaint on 25.8.2017 be reheard. Brief background [3] Sometime in or around 2013, the Appellant appointed the Respondent’s legal firm to represent the Appellant’s company namely L & L Brother Engineering Services Sdn Bhd (“LLBES”) to file 2 suits against a company by the name of Tan Chang Yong Holdings Sdn. Bhd. (“TCYH”) to recover a sum of RM1,672,310.95 for the refurbishment and renovation works done at Plaza Century Hotel and another sum of RM158,500.00 for the consultancy charges. These suits were filed at the Johor Bahru High Court and Johor Bahru Sessions Court vide Civil Suit No: JA–22NCvC–69– 04/2014 and Civil Suit No: JA–A52NCvC–32–04/2014, respectively. However, both suits were later consolidated and heard together at the Johor Bahru High Court. The total claim was RM1,955,815.90 (“1st Suit”). S/N UnhyyC4MqkqWhhdhr29ZnQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3

The Respondent agreed with the legal fee of RM50,100.00 for the 1st Suit (“1st Bill”).

On 28.5.2015, the Johor Bahru High Court allowed the Appellant’s 1st Suit.

On 2.6.2015, the Respondent forwarded bills for the sum of RM186,000.00 and RM31,000.00 to the Appellant for the 1st Suit (“2nd Bill”).

On 10.6.2015, TCYH filed an appeal against the decision of the Johor Bahru High Court to the Court of Appeal vide J-02(NCvC)(W)–1016– 06/2015.

On 24.6.2015, the Respondent sent another claim for a sum of RM102,000.00 to the Appellant for the same 1st Suit (“3rd Bill”). Upon receiving the 3rd Bill, the Appellant wrote to the Respondent on 29.6.2015 inquiring about the claim. After several negotiations, in July 2015, both parties agreed to a legal fee of RM102,000.00 for the 1st Suit.

Back to the appeal filed by TCYH, the Respondent agreed to represent LLBES for an agreed legal fee of RM20,000.00.

On 8.8.2016, TCYH’s appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal. TCYH then proceeded to file a notice of motion for leave to appeal to the Federal Court against the Court of Appeal decision. S/N UnhyyC4MqkqWhhdhr29ZnQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4

In the interim, TCYH proceeded to file an application at the Court of Appeal seeking for a stay of execution of the High Court decision pending the disposal of leave to appeal filed at the Federal Court.

On 19.10.2016, the Court of Appeal granted the stay of execution order after it was consented by both parties.

As agreed in the consent order for the stay of execution, Messrs. Lau Kok Guan Liana & Kuan (“LKGLK”) then held the full Judgment Sum of RM1,960,000.00 as the stakeholders.

On 14.8.2016, vide a letter dated 14.8.2016 sent by the solicitors for TCYH, Messrs. JR Tey & Co. (“JRTC”) which the copy of the letter extended to the Appellant, the Respondent was informed that TCYH and LLBES agreed that a sum of RM200,000.00 from the total Judgment Sum was to be released in advance through LKGLK and to be paid to the Respondent (as solicitors for LLBES) in consideration for the granting of the stay of execution order pending the disposal of TCYH’s motion for leave to appeal.

On 17.8.2017, three days prior to the hearing of leave to appeal at the Federal Court, the Appellant and LLBES had issued a termination notice to the Respondent stating that the latter’s legal services were no longer required and instead the Appellant had appointed Messrs. Shaik Adam & Co (“SAC”) to take over the conduct of the case at the Federal Court. The Appellant also alleged in the notice that the Respondent had obtained the stay of execution order in the Court of Appeal on 19.10.2016 without the instructions and consent from the Appellant and LLBES. S/N UnhyyC4MqkqWhhdhr29ZnQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5

On the same day, SAC filed a notice of change of solicitors of which the Respondent alleged was done without obtaining his prior consent. SAC also wrote a letter to the Respondent requiring him to sort out his legal fees directly with the Appellant.

On the next day (18.8.2017), the Respondent filed the Notice of Motion at the Federal Court to restrain SAC from taking over conduct of the Federal Court case.

On 21.8.2017, TCYH’s motion for leave to appeal was dismissed by the Federal Court. On the same day, SAC issued another letter to the Respondent stating that all legal charges due by the Appellant to the Respondent were settled.

On 25.8.2017, the Appellant lodged the following complaints to the DB:

the Respondent’s legal fees in the 1st Suit were never agreed by the Appellant; and

the Respondent took RM200,000.00 from the Judgment Sum without the Appellant’s consent or knowledge. [20] A few weeks after the Appellant’s complaint to ASDB, TCYH filed a legal suit (“TCYH Suit”) at the Johor Bahru High Court against a few parties including the Appellant, LLBES, SAC and the Respondent for a claim for conspiracy to injure TCYH. The Respondent then filed a counter-claim against the Appellant, LLBES, SAC and a few others for the outstanding legal S/N UnhyyC4MqkqWhhdhr29ZnQ fees of RM150,000.00 for the 1st Suit, RM200,000.00 for the Court of Appeal matter and RM100,000.00 for the Federal Court matter. [21] During the TCYH Suit, the Respondent handed over a set of documents to the court which among others were e-mails allegedly sent by the Appellant to the Respondent consenting to the Respondent to take the sum of RM200,000.00 from the Judgment Sum as the Respondent’s legal fees. However, the Appellant denied sending the alleged emails. [22] The Appellant suspected that those e-mails were fabricated and then sent them to Cyber Security Malaysia (“CSM”) to obtain a report on the authenticity of the alleged e-mails. CSM later confirmed that those e-mails were highly likely not authentic. [23] On 17.2.2019, the Appellant lodged another complaint against the Respondent to the DB attaching the CSM report. However, this complaint has yet to be heard by the DB. [24] On 28.2.2019, the High Court dismissed the TCYH Suit with costs. [25] On 27.9.2019 and 4.10.2019, the Respondent filed two suits at the Johor Bahru Sessions Court against the Appellant, LLBES and SAC vide Civil Suit No: JA–A52NCvC–275–09/2019 and JA-A52NCvC-280-10/2019, respectively to claim for the legal fees amounting to RM200,000.00 which was due and owing to the Respondent and Messrs. G Ravi. S/N UnhyyC4MqkqWhhdhr29ZnQ [26] On 27.1.2021, the Johor Bahru Sessions Court dismissed the Respondent’s suits for the legal fees and allowed the counter–claim of the Appellant, LLBES and by SAC. In short, the sum of RM200,000.00 must be returned to the Appellant. [27] On same day, dissatisfied with the Sessions Court decision, the Respondent appealed to the High Court and the appeal is pending to be heard. Hearing of the Appellant’s complaint [28] On 26.4.2019, the Appellant’s complaint was heard by the Disciplinary Committee (“DC”) of the Majlis Peguam Malaysia. The hearing was attended by the Appellant, Shaik Saleem (the Appellant’s solicitor), Chua Sia Cher (LLBES’s subcontractor), the Respondent and C Sivasankar (the Respondent’s solicitor). The DC hearing was conducted by Tan Sui Huat as the chairman while Saw Lay See and Prof. Dr. Sankaran Ramanathan as members. [29] On 10.5.2019, the DC made the following findings: “The Committee’s finding is as follows: Respondent is guilty of misconduct for charging fees which are grossly excessive in all the circumstances and gross disregard to his client/complainant’s interest. RM200,000.00 was to be paid to Complainant to be refunded to Defendant in the event the Federal Court allows the Defendant’s appeal. S/N UnhyyC4MqkqWhhdhr29ZnQ RM200,000.00 was a conditional payment and cannot be treated by Respondent as his fees. No bills for the RM200,000.00 was given to the Complainant to justify his fees. Respondent has the opportunity to present his bills for RM200,000.00 vide his letter of explanation dated 17/1/2018 but failed to do so. At hearing, Respondent claimed that copy of bill for RM200,000.00 was enclosed in letter dated 17/1/2018. However on hearing day, Respondent was still unable to produce bill. Committee unanimously agreed that no bill for RM200,000.00 was ever issued and Respondent’s claim that bill was enclosed in his letter dated 17/1/2018 was just an afterthought. As at 3/5/2019, Respondent was still unable to produce bill for RM200,000.00. Disciplinary Committee unanimously recommend that –

Respondent be reprimanded; and

Respondent be fined RM20,000.00”. [30] However, on 26.3.2022, after having considered the report made by the DC and the written submissions from the Respondent dated 11.3.2022 and 24.3.2022, the DB rejected the DC’s findings of liability and recommendation on punishments for fine and reprimand against the Respondent. S/N UnhyyC4MqkqWhhdhr29ZnQ [31] The DB Order is as follows: [32] In a nutshell, the Appellant sought this court’s appellate intervention based on the following errors allegedly committed by the DB, inter alia:

the DB accepted a new evidence from the Respondent during its hearing; and

the DB failed to request the Appellant to be present on 26.3.2022 for the hearing before the DB and to rebut the submissions filed by the Respondent. The DB also failed to request the Appellant to produce further documents or evidence before dismissing the Appellant’s complaint. Law on intervene the finding of disciplinary board [33] S. 103E(1) of the LPA allows any party aggrieved by any decision made by the DB to appeal to the high court. The subsection reads – Appeal from the final order or decision of the Disciplinary Board 103E. (1) Any party aggrieved by any final order or decision made by the

(a)

under paragraph 100(1)(a), (3)(a) or subsection 100(7), (8) or

(15); or

under section 103D, shall have the right to appeal to the High Court within one month of the receipt of the notification of that order or decision. [34] Although the law permits the DB’s decision to be appealed, the scope of s. 103E(1) of the LPA was explained in a plethora of cases including Dinesh Kanavaji a/l Kanawagi & Anor v Ragumaren a/l N Gopal (Majlis Peguam, Intervener) [2018] 2 MLJ 265, Keith Sellar v. Lee Kwang & Another Appeal [1980] 1 LNS 36; [1980] 2 MLJ 191, Gana Muthusamy v. Tetuan LM S/N UnhyyC4MqkqWhhdhr29ZnQ Ong & Ors [1998] 4 CLJ 878; [1998] 3 MLJ 341, Bar Malaysia v. Mohd Fadli Shuib & Anor [2014] 1 LNS 1934 and Majlis Peguam v. Mohinder Kaur Balbir Singh Deol [2011] 1 LNS 1910, where it was stated that the courts should only interfere with the decision of the DC/DB in the following limited circumstances, namely –

when the findings are manifestly perverse;

the DC/DB had failed as right of thinking members of the Bar to give due consideration to the facts of the case and the conduct of the solicitor complained against; and

there had been breach of natural justice. Preliminary objections by the Appellant [35] During the hearing of this appeal, the Appellant raised the following preliminary objections:

the Respondent’s affidavit in reply dated 15.6.2022 was filed after the time given by the Registrar i.e before or on 14.6.2022 and no application for extension of time to file the affidavit was filed by the Respondent; and

the Respondent’s additional affidavit in reply should be disregarded as this contravened with the instruction given by the Registrar that no any additional affidavit in reply was to be filed. S/N UnhyyC4MqkqWhhdhr29ZnQ [36] On the 1st preliminary objection, it is always trite that the granting of extension of time is discretionary to be exercised by the judge in each particular case (see Tong Kim Soo v. Tirai Prospektif Sdn Bhd [2020] 3 CLJ 353) and the most important factor to be considered is the length of the delay. In the present appeal, I find that the delay was only one day and is clearly no inordinate delay by the Respondent in filing the affidavit. Further, I find that there is no prejudice shown by the Appellant of the delay. [37] On the 2nd preliminary objection, I find that the main purpose of the Respondent filed his additional affidavit was to enable him to adduce the fact that the reply made by CSM on the authenticity of those e-mails was received by the Respondent on 24.6.2022. [38] It is trite that preliminary objections solely based on non-compliance are disallowed and barred from being raised as provided under O. 2 r. 3 of the Rules of Court 2012 which states as follows: Preliminary objection for non-compliance of rules not allowed (O. 2, r. 3)

A Court or Judge shall not allow any preliminary objection by any party to any cause or matter or proceedings only on the ground of non-compliance of any provision of these Rules unless the Court or Judge is of the opinion that such non-compliance has occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice or occasioned prejudice that cannot be cured either by amendment or an appropriate order for costs or both. [39] The Court of Appeal in Kejora Aman Sdn Bhd v. HMS Corporation Sdn Bhd [2016] 6 CLJ 1 held that – S/N UnhyyC4MqkqWhhdhr29ZnQ "[14] In our view the preliminary objection ought to be dismissed. In this case the non-compliance with the rules is only a technical non-compliance which does not cause any prejudice to the respondent. It is pertinent to note the three enclosures are related and they were heard together and disposed of at the same time by the learned JC. Moreover in the notice of appeal the appellant had clearly specified which and what decision is being appealed against. There is no ambiguity and the respondent is not misled. Under O. 2 r. 1(1) of the ROC the effect of non-compliance is only an irregularity and shall not nullify the proceedings, any step taken in the proceedings, or any document, judgment or order therein. Foremost the court must consider the overriding interest of justice and not just the technical compliance of the rules..." [40] I agree with the Respondent that the reason given by him to file the additional affidavit is genuine and for the interest of justice as well as has not occasioned any substantial miscarriage of justice. In light of above, I dismiss the Appellant’s preliminary objections. Analysis on the Appellant’s appeal [41] For the 1st ground of appeal, the Appellant averred that the DB accepted a new evidence from the Respondent during its hearing which was never produced during the DC hearing on 26.4.2019. The Appellant argued that invoices dated 2.6.2015, 8.8.2016 and 21.8.2017 were only forwarded by the Respondent on 5.5.2019 (2 weeks after the hearing at the DC). Therefore, the Appellant submitted that the DB’s acceptance of the invoices which were not produced during the DC hearing was wrong in law. [42] On this note, it was agreed by both parties that the impugned invoices were forwarded by the Respondent to the DC on 5.5.2019 and the DC’s S/N UnhyyC4MqkqWhhdhr29ZnQ decision was made 5 days later i.e on 10.5.2019. Further, it is no doubt that these invoices amounting to RM200,000.00 were emailed to the DC Chairman on 6.5.2019 and forwarded to the DC Chairman’s office on 7.5.2019. In short, the existence of the invoices was not something new as the DC Chairman was in the know about the evidence from those invoices when he stated “as at 3.5.2019, the Respondent was still unable to produce the bill for the RM200,000.00”. [43] Premised from these facts, it is my view that the DC Chairman had made a blatant mistake for not taking into account the said invoices in the DC decision on 10.5.2019 albeit they were forwarded to him on 6.5.2019. The position would be different if the invoices were forwarded after the decision had been made. Thus, I find that such DC’s mistake was a sheer denial of natural justice to the Respondent. [44] At this point I find instructive the Federal Court case of Majlis Peguam Malaysia v. Rajehgopal Velu & Anor [2017] 2 CLJ 493; [2017] 1 MLJ 596 where it was stated by Ramly Ali FCJ in the following passage: [31] At the outset, it must be stressed that disciplinary proceedings against a solicitor under the LPA are not proceedings in a criminal court of law. The proceedings although quasi-judicial in nature need not emulate the strict adversarial procedure practised in a criminal court (see: Jerald Allen Gomez v. Shencourt Sdn Bhd; Majlis Peguam (Intervenor) [2006] 1 CLJ 88; [2006] 2 MLJ 343). On this point, we agree with Abdull Hamid Embong J (as he then was), in Jerald Allen Gormez (supra) when His Lordship commented: "To say that, in the absence of such procedures, the Disciplinary Committee should adhere strictly to S/N UnhyyC4MqkqWhhdhr29ZnQ the procedures in the proceedings of a criminal court, would be implying some requirements not intended by statute." [32] The rules of natural justice in disciplinary proceedings should not be governed by the adversarial system of justice of criminal courts but should be inquisitorial or investigatory in nature. Inquisitorial or investigative proceedings are not inconsistent with the rules of natural justice (see: Federal Court's decision in Lembaga Jurutera Malaysia v. Leong Pui Kun [2008] 6 CLJ 93; [2009] 2 MLJ 36). [33] It is a trite principle that a Disciplinary Committee of a professional body is entitled to conduct its disciplinary hearing in respect of a member of the body in whatever way it deems appropriate provided that the method or manner it adopts is not in breach of any specific provisions of the relevant statutes or regulations and does not result in a denial of natural justice to the member concerned. [34] In Lim Ko & Anor v. Board of Architects [1965] 1 LNS 96; [1966] 2 MLJ 80, the Federal Court held, inter alia, that the proceedings of disciplinary tribunals or committees conducting an inquiry are by no means bound by the strict rules which apply to criminal trials. A legalistic approach is not appropriate in those proceedings. The same principle was adopted by the Federal Court in Tan Hee Lock v. Commissioner For Federal Capital & Ors And Another Appeal [1973] 1 LNS 152; [1973] 1 MLJ 238; Tanjong Jaga Sdn Bhd v. The Minister of Labour and Manpower & Anor [1987] 2 CLJ 119; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 368; [1987] 1 MLJ 124; and by the Court of Appeal in Hj Ali Hj Othman v. Telekom Malaysia Bhd [2003] 3 CLJ 310; [2003] 3 MLJ 29. [45] It is clear that the non-acceptance of the invoices by the DC due to the fact that they were submitted after 3.5.2019. But the fact remains that the invoices are in existence and not something fabricated. It is my view that the S/N UnhyyC4MqkqWhhdhr29ZnQ error made by the DC was corrected by the DB by accepting those invoices as evidence. Further, being a body entrusted with the statutory power to review the DC’s finding, the DB is entitled to accept any evidence which it thinks is not in breach of any specific provisions of the relevant statutes or regulations and does not result in a denial of natural justice to the member concerned. In light of this, the Appellant’s argument is flagrantly a non-starter. [46] The 2nd ground raised by the Appellant is on the DB’s failure to request the Appellant to be present on 26.3.2022 for the hearing before the DB. Instead, the DB considered the Respondent’s submissions dated 11.3.2022. These submissions were filed 2 years after the hearing before the DC. The DB also failed to request the Appellant to rebut the submissions filed by the Respondent during the hearing before the DB. At the same time, the DB failed to request the Appellant to produce further documents or evidence before dismissing the Appellant’s complaint. The Appellant submitted that if the Appellant’s presence was allowed, the Appellant could have adduced relevant evidence rebutting the Respondent’s averments. [47] On this issue, it is clear that there is no mandatory provision in the LPA requiring the attendance of any party during the hearing of the DB unless if it finds that its order is likely to be adverse against an advocate and solicitor (against the Respondent for that matter). S. 103D(4) of the LPA states – Consideration by the Disciplinary Board of the report of the Disciplinary

(1) After consideration of the report of the Disciplinary Committee, the Disciplinary Board may make an order affirming or rejecting the finding or recommendation of the Disciplinary Committee and if the Disciplinary Board rejects the finding or recommendation of the Disciplinary Committee, the Disciplinary Board shall record the reason for the rejection.

The Disciplinary Board may in appropriate cases impose a greater or lesser penalty or punishment than that recommended by the Disciplinary Committee.

Where the Disciplinary Board does not agree with the finding or recommendation of the Disciplinary Committee, the Disciplinary Board shall make such other order as it deems just.

Before the Disciplinary Board makes an order that is likely to be adverse against an advocate and solicitor under subsection (2) or (3), it shall notify the advocate and solicitor of its intention to do so and give him a reasonable opportunity to be heard.

Where the Disciplinary Board makes an order that the advocate and solicitor should make restitution to the complainant, it may stipulate the time within which such restitution ought to be made. [48] Believing that its order is likely to be adverse against the Respondent, the DB by referring to subsections 103D(2) and (4) of the LPA, sent a notice requiring the Respondent and not the Appellant to attend the hearing on 26.3.2022 and gave him a reasonable opportunity to be heard. [49] In Darshan Singh Khaira v. Zulkefli Hashim; Majlis Peguam Malaysia (Intervener) [2018] 1 LNS 1934, Azizah Haji Nawawi J (now JCA) held that– S/N UnhyyC4MqkqWhhdhr29ZnQ [32] Under sub-s. 103D(4), the DB is required to notify the advocate and solicitor of its intention to make an order that is likely to be adverse against him under sub-s. 103D(2) or (3) and give him a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Subsections 103D(2) & (3) is applicable where the DB does not agree with the findings or the recommendations of the DC and seeks to impose a greater or lesser penalty or punishment than that recommended by the DC. Therefore, the requirement of giving a reasonable opportunity to be heard to the appellant before the DB makes a decision is when the DB does not agree with the findings and recommendations of the DC. [50] Thus, it is my view that the DB’s action for not requiring the Appellant to be present during its hearing and to make submissions does not invalidate the Board’s decision since there is no requirement under the law for the DB to require all parties to attend its hearing. [51] This is fortified by s. 100(1)(b) of the LPA which allows the DB to request only advocate and solicitor concerned to submit his explanation. The section says –

Inquiry into application or complaint

Where a written application or complaint is made or referred to the Disciplinary Board, the Disciplinary Board shall, if it is satisfied that —

there is no merit in the application or complaint, dismiss the application or complaint and notify the complainant and the advocate and solicitor of its decision; or

there is merit in the application or complaint —

post or deliver to the advocate and solicitor concerned a copy of the application or complaint together with all supporting documents, if any, furnished to the

(ii) request the advocate and solicitor to furnish his written explanation in quadruplicate together with supporting documents, if any, within fourteen days of the request or within such longer time as the Disciplinary Board may allow. [52] On the issue of the failure of the DB to require the Appellant to produce further documents or evidence before dismissing the Appellant’s complaint, it is no doubt that subsection 100(12) of the LPA authorizes the DB to request such further documents either from the complainant or the advocate and solicitor. The subsection states –

The Disciplinary Board may, at any stage after an application or a complaint has been received, require the production of such further documents or explanations from either the complainant or the advocate and solicitor or both or from such other person as the Disciplinary Board may require, and the parties to the application or complaint shall be provided with all such documents or explanations. [53] Nevertheless, such request in s. 100(12) of the LPA is clearly not a mandatory and the DB is given the discretion to exercise the power when necessary. The omission on the DB’s part for not calling any document from the Appellant to rebut the Respondent’s explanation would not in any manner render the action has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. S/N UnhyyC4MqkqWhhdhr29ZnQ [54] It has to be noted that the LPA is a piece of legislation to regulate the disciplinary matters specifically for members of the Bar. The disciplinary proceedings in the LPA were drafted in such a way to be different and not subject to the rigid and strict adversarial procedures as in any ordinary court of law. In this contact, undoubtedly the main issue before the DB was in relation to the invoices. It is my view that once the Respondent had proven the existence of the invoices, there is no longer significance for the DB to request the Respondent’s response. In the upshot, the Appellant’s argument is untenable for the DB’s finding be intervened. Conclusion [55] It is important to note that the legal profession is an honourable profession whose members are expected to conduct themselves honourably. Any complaint of misconduct lodged against them, they are tried by their own peers. Members of the DB are senior members of the profession and makes findings of fact as well as decisions. Thus, I can do no better than echo the dictum of Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as His Lordship then was) in Gana Muthusamy (supra), as follows: It is primarily for members of the Bar to decide what amounts to conduct unbecoming of an advocate and solicitor in particular circumstances, according to standards established by members of that honourable profession. Courts must necessarily exercise caution when entertaining an appeal in which the central question is whether particular conduct is unprofessional and cases meriting curial interference will be rare. Otherwise it will be the court and not the profession that will determine the yardstick of professional behaviour. S/N UnhyyC4MqkqWhhdhr29ZnQ [54] In the premise of the foregoing, I find that the Appellant failed to establish to the Court that the existence of any merit in the appeal warranting this court’s appellate intervention. Thus, I dismiss the Appellant’ appeal in Enclosure 1 with costs. Dated: 4.4.2023 -SIGNED - (SHAMSULBAHRI BIN HAJI IBRAHIM) Judicial Commissioner, High Court, Johor Bahru Counsels: For the Appellant – C. Sankaran (M. Maithily with him); Messrs C. Sankaran & Co. For the Respondent – Shereena Gill; Messrs. G. Ravi Cases referred to: • Bar Malaysia v. Mohd Fadli Shuib & Anor [2014] 1 LNS 1934 • Darshan Singh Khaira v. Zulkefli Hashim; Majlis Peguam Malaysia (Intervener) [2018] 1 LNS 1934 • Dinesh Kanavaji a/l Kanawagi & Anor v Ragumaren a/l N Gopal (Majlis Peguam, Intervener) [2018] 2 MLJ 265, • Keith Sellar v. Lee Kwang & Another Appeal [1980] 1 LNS 36; [1980] 2 MLJ 191, • Kejora Aman Sdn Bhd v. HMS Corporation Sdn Bhd [2016] 6 CLJ 1 • Gana Muthusamy v. Tetuan LM Ong & Ors [1998] 4 CLJ 878; [1998] 3 MLJ 341 • Majlis Peguam v. Mohinder Kaur Balbir Singh Deol [2011] 1 LNS 1910 • Majlis Peguam Malaysia v. Rajehgopal Velu & Anor [2017] 2 CLJ 493; [2017] 1 MLJ 596 S/N UnhyyC4MqkqWhhdhr29ZnQ • Tong Kim Soo v. Tirai Prospektif Sdn Bhd [2020] 3 CLJ 353 Legislations referred to: • Legal Profession Act 1976 - s. 100(1(b) & (12), 103D(4), 103E(1) • Rules of Court 2012 - O. 2 r. S/N UnhyyC4MqkqWhhdhr29ZnQ