Lee Rodger Meiklejohn v 1. ) Ranjeet Singh Sidhu (WA-22NCC-503-07/2024)

RANJEET SINGH SIDHU

TAN SRI SYED MOHD YUSOF BIN TUN SYED NASIR

GURMEET KAUR A/P GURCHARAN SINGH

G&P SOLUTIONS SDN BHD

ROTHCHILDS CAPITAL (I) SDN BHD

G & P RESOURCES SDN BHD

MANIBALAN KUTTY A/L RAGAVAN

SATPAL SINGH A/L JEGIR SINGH (NRIC NO.: 760529-07-5531) ... DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 131) INTRODUCTION [1] Before the court is an application by the Second Defendant (“D2”) to strike out the Plaintiff's claim against D2 pursuant to Order 18 Rule 19(1)(a) of the Rules of Court 2012 and/or the inherent jurisdiction of this court. D2 seeks orders that the Writ and Statement of Claim both dated 18.7.2024 be struck out against D2, and that the Plaintiff's suit against D2 be struck out with costs. [2] After careful consideration of the materials before the court, I find that the application should be allowed for the reasons set out below. BACKGROUND FACTS [3] The Plaintiff, a British citizen, claims to have been induced to invest GBP10,000,000.00 in a company called Vasseti Berhad (“VB”) by way of Redeemable Cumulative Convertible Preference Shares (“RCCPS”) between October 2010 and April 2011. [4] The First Defendant (“D1”) was the Group Managing Director of VB at the material time, while D2 was a director and the Group Chairman of VB from 16.4.2010 until 29.6.2012, as stated in the RCCPS prospectus. [5] The Plaintiff claims that in 2010, D1 convinced him to invest in VB through RCCPS, representing that this investment would yield dividends at the rate of 10% per annum, that VB would undergo a capital market listing on a leading stock exchange, and that the RCCPS could later be redeemed in cash or converted into shares in a related listed company. [6] To convince the Plaintiff to invest, D1 allegedly represented to the Plaintiff that D2, a prominent businessman with an honorary title in Malaysia, was the Group Chairman and a director of VB, and that D2 had invested in 30% of VB's shares. D1 reportedly produced a Malaysian newspaper report dated 21.8.2010 as purported evidence of D2's investment. [7] The Plaintiff alleges that D1 instructed him to remit the investment amount to the Fourth Defendant's (“D4”) account, assuring him that D4 had the necessary licenses and approvals in Malaysia to process international investment proceeds into local Malaysian companies, including VB. [8] According to the Plaintiff, once the investment amount was paid into D4's bank account, the funds were immediately withdrawn by D1 in cash and were never remitted to VB as intended. The Plaintiff claims that part of the investment amount was also transferred from D4 to the Fifth Defendant (“D5”). [9] The Plaintiff's first direct interaction with D2 allegedly occurred in 2015 during a corporate social event in Kuala Lumpur, approximately four years after the investment was made. The Plaintiff alleges that during this meeting, D2 assured him that he had significant investments in Vasseti (UK) Plc (“VUK”) and that D1 was his long-term and reliable business partner. [10] The Plaintiff's claim against D2 is for fraud, misrepresentation, and dishonest assistance, alleging that D2 deceived him regarding D2's purported investment in VB, deceived him about D1's reputation and credibility, and provided dishonest assistance to D1 to procure the investment amount knowing that it would not be used for the authorised purpose. RESPECTIVE PARTIES' SUBMISSIONS Second Defendant's Submissions [11] D2 contends that the Plaintiff's Statement of Claim fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action against D2 and should be struck out. D2 argues that the Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts showing that D2 made any representation or took any action towards the Plaintiff prior to the Plaintiff's investment in VB. [12] D2 submits that the Plaintiff and D2 had no direct dealings prior to 2015, which was four years after the Plaintiff had made the investment between October 2010 and April

D2 argues that it is impossible for any post-contractual communications to affect the Plaintiff's pre-contractual decisions, making the Plaintiff's claim for fraud and misrepresentation against D2 an impossibility and obviously unsustainable. [13] D2 further argues that the Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead the elements of dishonest assistance, including that D2 owed a fiduciary duty to the Plaintiff or that D2 derived any benefit from the alleged fraud. D2 contends that merely being a director and shareholder of D4 does not establish a fiduciary relationship between D2 and the Plaintiff. [14] D2 also submits that the reliance on a UK High Court judgment, Zavarco UK Plc v Ranjeet Singh Sidhu [2021] EWHC 1526 (Ch) (“the UK High Court Judgment”), is irrelevant as it is a separate case that does not form part of these proceedings, and this court is not able to consider evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses from that case. Plaintiff's Submissions [15] The Plaintiff contends that he has adequately pleaded his cause of action against D2 in the Statement of Claim. The Plaintiff argues that D2's involvement in the fraudulent scheme is established both through D2's individual actions and by virtue of his positions in D4 and D5, which were allegedly used as conduits for the investment amount. [16] The Plaintiff submits that his cause of action is not premised solely on pre-contractual misrepresentations but also on dishonest assistance and knowing receipt, which are post-contractual acts that do not require direct pre-contractual dealings between the Plaintiff and D2. [17] The Plaintiff maintains that the issues raised require viva voce evidence and determination of facts through a full trial, as they involve complex questions of fact and cannot be summarily disposed of. The Plaintiff argues that his claim is not obviously unsustainable and should be allowed to proceed to trial. THE TEST FOR STRIKING OUT [18] The principles governing applications under Order 18 Rule 19(1)(a) of the Rules of Court 2012 are well established. In Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36, the Supreme Court held that a striking out application should only be allowed in plain and obvious cases where a claim is, on the face of it, obviously unsustainable. [19] The Federal Court in Tan Wei Hong & Ors v Malaysia Airlines Bhd & Other Appeals [2018] 9 CLJ 425 further clarified that a striking out order should not be made summarily if there is an issue of law that requires lengthy argument and mature consideration, or if there is an issue of fact that is capable of resolution only after taking viva voce evidence during trial. [20] In applying these principles to the present case, I must determine whether, taking the Plaintiff's pleadings at their highest, the Plaintiff has disclosed a reasonable cause of action against D2, or whether the claim is obviously unsustainable. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS OF THE COURT Whether the Plaintiff Has Disclosed a Reasonable Cause of Action Against D2 for Fraud and Misrepresentation [21] D2 argues that the Plaintiff's claim for fraud and misrepresentation against D2 is an impossibility, given that the Plaintiff and D2 had no direct dealings prior to 2015, which was four years after the Plaintiff had made the investment. [22] The Plaintiff contends that his claim is not based solely on pre-contractual misrepresentations but includes post-contractual acts of dishonest assistance and knowing receipt. [23] Fraud and misrepresentation are well-defined causes of action under Malaysian law. Section 17 of the Contracts Act 1950 defines “fraud” as including acts done with intent to deceive or to induce a person to enter into a contract. Similarly, Section 18 defines “misrepresentation” as including assertions not warranted by the information of the person making it, which mislead another to their prejudice. [24] A critical element of both fraud and misrepresentation is that they must have induced the party to enter into the contract. If the alleged fraud or misrepresentation occurred after the contract was formed, it cannot logically have induced the party to enter into that contract. [25] In the present case, the Plaintiff's Statement of Claim expressly states at paragraph 22: “In 2015, the Plaintiff again flew to Kuala Lumpur and met with D1. D1 assured the Plaintiff that his Investment Amount was still intact in the form of ordinary shares of Vasseti (UK) Plc. During his stay in Kuala Lumpur, D1 further introduced the Plaintiff to D2 during a corporate social event.” [26] The Statement of Claim further states at paragraph 23: “D1 informed the Plaintiff that D2 was a prominent businessman with the honorary title of “Tan Sri” in Malaysia. During the meeting, D2 assured the Plaintiff that he had significant investments in the ordinary shares of Vasseti (UK) Plc too and that D1 was his long term and reliable business partner.” [27] This fact - that the first direct interaction occurred in 2015, approximately four years after the investment was made between October 2010 and April 2011 (as stated in paragraph 18 of the Statement of Claim) - is not in dispute. Therefore, any direct representations made by D2 to the Plaintiff during or after 2015 could not have induced the Plaintiff to make his investment in 2010-2011. [28] The Plaintiff argues that D1 made representations about D2 to the Plaintiff before the investment, which induced the Plaintiff to invest. However, these were representations made by D1, not by D2. For D2 to be liable for fraud or misrepresentation, the Plaintiff must plead and prove that D2 made the representations or that D2 authorised or was complicit in D1 making those representations on D2's behalf. [29] The Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts showing that D2 authorised D1 to make any representations on D2's behalf, or that D2 was aware of or complicit in D1's representations about D2 to the Plaintiff before the investment was made. The mere fact that D1 mentioned D2's name or position, or showed a newspaper article about D2, does not establish D2's liability for fraud or misrepresentation. [30] In fact, the Plaintiff has not pleaded any direct communication or connection between D2 and the Plaintiff before the investment was made. The pleaded facts show only that D1 mentioned D2 to the Plaintiff, not that D2 played any active role in inducing the Plaintiff to invest. [31] The Plaintiff seeks to rely on an alleged admission by D2 as shown in the UK High Court Judgment that the statement about him investing 30% in VB was a deception to attract investors. However, this alleged admission, even if proven, does not establish that D2 made any representation to the Plaintiff, or that D2 authorised or was complicit in D1's representations to the Plaintiff before the investment was made. [32] Furthermore, the UK High Court Judgment is about a separate case that does not form part of these proceedings. This court is not able to consider evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses from that case. The Plaintiff cannot rely on alleged findings or admissions from that case as establishing D2's liability in this case without pleading the underlying facts that would establish D2's liability independent of that case. [33] For these reasons, I find that the Plaintiff has failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action against D2 for fraud or misrepresentation. Any claim based on fraud or misrepresentation is obviously unsustainable and bound to fail. Whether the Plaintiff Has Disclosed a Reasonable Cause of Action Against D2 for Dishonest Assistance and Knowing Receipt [34] D2 submits that the Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead the elements of dishonest assistance, including that D2 owed a fiduciary duty to the Plaintiff or that D2 derived any benefit from the alleged fraud. D2 contends that merely being a director and shareholder of D4 does not establish a fiduciary relationship between D2 and the Plaintiff. [35] The Plaintiff argues that his claim includes dishonest assistance and knowing receipt, which are post-contractual acts that do not require direct pre-contractual dealings between the Plaintiff and D2. [36] Dishonest assistance and knowing receipt are equitable causes of action recognised in Malaysian law. In SRC International Sdn Bhd & Anor v Dato' Sri Mohd Najib bin Hj Abd Razak [2022] 10 MLJ 95, Mohd Arief Emran JC (as he then was) elaborated on the elements of dishonest assistance by quoting from Jaya Sudhir a/l Jayaram v Dato' Sri Timor Shah Rafiq & Ors [2020] MLJU 2197, which stated: “[339] The learned editors of the 19th Edition of Underhill and Hayton, Law of Trusts and Trustees, pp 1293–1294, state as follows: Elements of liability as a dishonest assistant

98.47 To make a defendant personally liable for dishonest assistance in a breach of trust or other fiduciary duty it is necessary to establish:

a breach of trust or fiduciary duty;

assistance by the defendant in the breach;

a causal link between and a gain to the defendant, depending on the remedy which is sought; and (4) a dishonest state of mind on the part of the assistant.” [37] Similarly, in Ooi Meng Khin v Amanah Scotts Properties (KL) Sdn Bhd [2014] 6 MLJ 488, the Court of Appeal explained that knowing receipt requires that the recipient's state of knowledge must be such as to make it unconscionable for them to retain the benefit of the receipt. The court, referring to Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd and another v Akindele [2001] Ch 437, stated at paragraph [22]: “the learned Lord Justice had stated the test in determining precisely the degree of knowledge for the recipient of trust property, to be fixed with liability, to be as follows, namely, [T]the recipient's state of knowledge must be such as to make it unconscionable for him to retain the benefit of the receipt.” [38] The court further cited Justice VK Rajah JA's explanation in George Raymond Zage III and another v Ho Chi Kwong and another [2010] 2 SLR 589 at paragraph [23]: “As candidly acknowledged by Nourse LJ when he formulated the test in Akindele

(23), unconscionability is a malleable standard that is not free from difficulty in its application. The degree of knowledge required to impose liability will necessarily vary from transaction to transaction... actual knowledge of a breach of trust or a breach of fiduciary duty is not invariably necessary to find liability, particularly, when there are circumstances in a particular transaction that are so unusual, or so contrary to accepted commercial practice, that it could be unconscionable to allow a defendant to retain the benefit of receipt. The test of unconscionability should be kept flexible and be fact-centered.” [39] Both causes of action require the pleading of specific facts that establish the elements of the cause of action. It is not sufficient to merely assert that the defendant provided dishonest assistance or received funds with knowledge that they were obtained in breach of trust or fiduciary duty. The pleadings must contain sufficient particulars to identify the precise nature of the claim being made. [40] In the present case, the Plaintiff has pleaded at paragraph 44.3 of the Statement of Claim that “D2 had provided dishonest assistance to D1 to procure the Investment Amount from Plaintiff knowing fully well or had reasonable grounds to believe that the Investment Amount would not be or was not utilised for the authorised purpose.” However, this is merely a conclusion, not a statement of fact. The Plaintiff has not pleaded any specific facts showing how D2 provided assistance to D1, or what knowledge D2 had at the relevant time. [41] The Plaintiff argues that D2 was a director and shareholder of D4 and D5, which allegedly received the investment amount but never transferred it to VB as intended. However, the Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts showing that D2, in his personal capacity, received any of the investment amount, or that D2 personally took any action to assist in diverting the investment amount from its intended purpose. [42] The Plaintiff has also not pleaded any facts showing that D2 owed a fiduciary duty to the Plaintiff. The mere fact that D2 was a director and shareholder of D4 and D5 does not establish a fiduciary relationship between D2 and the Plaintiff. A director owes fiduciary duties to the company, not to third parties who deal with the company. Unless there are special circumstances creating a fiduciary relationship, a director is not personally liable for the actions of the company. [43] Furthermore, the Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts showing that D2 derived any personal benefit from the alleged fraud. While the Plaintiff alleges that the investment amount was received by D4 and D5, he has not pleaded any facts showing that D2 personally received any of those funds, or derived any other benefit from the alleged fraud. [44] Even if D2 had knowledge of the alleged fraud (which the Plaintiff has not specifically pleaded), knowledge alone is not sufficient to establish liability for dishonest assistance or knowing receipt. There must be active assistance or personal receipt, which the Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded against D2. [45] The Plaintiff seeks to rely on a Skype conversation between the Plaintiff and D1, in which D1 allegedly admitted that the investment amount passed through D4 and D5. However, this alleged conversation involves only the Plaintiff and D1, not D2. Any admissions made by D1 in that conversation would not bind D2 or establish D2's personal liability. [46] For these reasons, I find that the Plaintiff has failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action against D2 for dishonest assistance or knowing receipt. The pleadings lack the necessary particulars to establish the elements of these causes of action against D2 personally, as distinct from D4 or D5 as corporate entities. The Significance of the 2015 Meeting Between the Plaintiff and D2 [47] The Plaintiff contends that during a meeting in 2015, D2 confirmed the false representations about his investment in VB, which is evidence of D2's complicity in the original scheme. [48] D2 argues that any representations made in 2015, four years after the investment, could not have induced the Plaintiff to make the investment and thus cannot form the basis of a claim for fraud or misrepresentation. [49] The Plaintiff's pleadings regarding the 2015 meeting are found at paragraphs 22-25 of the Statement of Claim. According to paragraph 22: “In 2015, the Plaintiff again flew to Kuala Lumpur and met with D1. D1 assured the Plaintiff that his Investment Amount was still intact in the form of ordinary shares of Vasseti (UK) Plc. During his stay in Kuala Lumpur, D1 further introduced the Plaintiff to D2 during a corporate social event.” [50] Paragraph 23 states: “D1 informed the Plaintiff that D2 was a prominent businessman with the honorary title of “Tan Sri” in Malaysia. During the meeting, D2 assured the Plaintiff that he had significant investments in the ordinary shares of Vasseti (UK) Plc too and that D1 was his long term and reliable business partner.” [51] Paragraph 24 provides: “D2 further told the Plaintiff not to worry about his Investment Amount with D1 as he had also invested in Vasseti Berhad's shares as reported in the news. D2 then referred the Plaintiff to the same news report that D1 had showed the Plaintiff before in convincing the Plaintiff to transfer the Investment Amount to D4.” [52] Paragraph 25 states: “However, the truth is that D2's purported investment in Vasseti Berhad as reported in the news never existed nor happened. The relevant news in the said newsreport is a fake news. D2 knew that the news was fake as he never invested in Vasseti Berhad. Yet he asked the Plaintiff to place weight on it and continue trusting D1 that his Investment Amount was valid and safe.” [53] Even taking these allegations at their highest, they do not establish a cause of action against D2 for the following reasons: a) As previously discussed, any representations made in 2015 could not have induced the Plaintiff to make his investment in 2010-2011, and thus cannot form the basis of a claim for fraud or misrepresentation. b) The alleged assurances given by D2 in 2015 that the Plaintiff's investment was safe do not constitute dishonest assistance in procuring the investment, which had already occurred four years earlier. c) The Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts showing that D2 knew or had reason to believe in 2015 that the investment amount had not been properly utilised, or that D2's assurances were false or dishonest. d) The mere fact that D2 referred to the same news report that D1 had previously shown the Plaintiff does not establish that D2 knew or was complicit in any fraud perpetrated by D1 in 2010-2011. [54] The Plaintiff argues that the 2015 meeting is evidence of a continuing fraudulent scheme in which D2 was complicit. However, the Plaintiff has not pleaded any specific facts showing how D2's actions in 2015 constituted dishonest assistance in relation to the original investment, or how they resulted in any further loss to the Plaintiff beyond the original investment. [55] Furthermore, the Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts showing that D2's actions in 2015 were causally connected to any specific loss suffered by the Plaintiff. By the Plaintiff's own account, the investment amount had already been diverted from its intended purpose years before the 2015 meeting. [56] For these reasons, I find that the Plaintiff's pleadings regarding the 2015 meeting do not disclose a reasonable cause of action against D2 for fraud, misrepresentation, dishonest assistance, or knowing receipt. The Adequacy of the Particulars Pleaded Against D2 [57] D2 submits that the Plaintiff has failed to plead adequate particulars of the fraud, misrepresentation, or dishonest assistance allegedly committed by D2. [58] The Plaintiff contends that he has pleaded in detail the facts of the cause of action against D2, including D2's individual involvements and his involvements by virtue of his positions in D4 and D5. [59] Order 18 Rule 12(1)(a) of the Rules of Court 2012 states: “(1) Subject to paragraph (2), every pleading shall contain the necessary particulars of any claim, defence or other matter pleaded including, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing words-

particulars of any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default or undue influence on which the party pleading relies” [60] The purpose of this requirement is to give the opposing party fair notice of the case they have to meet. [61] In Rokiah bt Suhaili v Emly Batu ak Bagang & Ors [2014] 7 MLJ 452, the High Court dealt with a plaintiff's claim for the return of land that was sold through a power of attorney, where the plaintiff alleged fraud and misrepresentation against the defendants. The court held that Order 18 Rule 12(2) requires that particulars of fraud or misrepresentation must be given in pleadings. Ravinthran JC (as he then was) stated that “the three paragraphs directed against the third and fourth defendant are general averments only which are singularly lacking in particulars.” The court emphasised that when fraud is alleged, parties must provide specific factual details, observing that “It is not enough to swear, 'I say I owe the man nothing'... you must give such an extent of definite facts pointing to the fraud as to satisfy the judge that those are facts which make it reasonable that you should be allowed to raise that defence.” The court further noted that particulars of fraud must include “the nature and extent of each alleged misrepresentation” and “particulars showing by whom and to whom it was made, and whether orally or in writing, and if in writing, identifying the relevant document.” [62] In the present case, the Plaintiff's specific allegations against D2 are primarily found in paragraphs 43-44 of the Statement of Claim. Paragraph 43 states: “D2 is a close business partner of D1. From 16.04.2010 until 29.06.2012, D2 was also the director and the Group Chairman of Vasseti Berhad as stated in the RCCPS prospectus of Vasseti Berhad. D2 also holds 300,000 shares in D4 amounting to 30% of the entire ordinary share of D4.” [63] Paragraph 44 states: “44. D2 has committed fraud, misrepresentation and dishonest assistance against the Plaintiff in the following circumstances:-

44.1 Deceptively and dishonestly deceiving the Plaintiff of his purported investment in the same product of Vasseti Berhad which did not happen;

44.2 Deceptively and dishonestly deceiving the Plaintiff of the reputation and credibility of D1;

44.3 D2 had provided dishonest assistance to D1 to procure the Investment Amount from Plaintiff knowing fully well or had reasonable grounds to believe that the Investment Amount would not be or was not utilised for the authorised purpose;” [64] These paragraphs provide general allegations but no specific factual details about what D2 did, to whom, when, where, or how. [65] These paragraphs do not provide the specific particulars required for allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, or dishonest assistance. They do not identify what specific representations D2 made, or what specific actions D2 took to assist D1 in any fraud. They do not identify when, where, or how D2 made any representations or took any actions. [66] The only specific interaction between D2 and the Plaintiff alleged in the Statement of Claim is the 2015 meeting, which occurred four years after the investment was made. As previously discussed, any representations made at this meeting could not have induced the Plaintiff to make his investment in 2010-2011. [67] The Plaintiff seeks to rely on D2's status as a director and shareholder of D4 and D5 as establishing D2's personal liability. However, it is a fundamental principle of company law that a company has a separate legal personality from its directors and shareholders. As held in Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1896] UKHL 1, a director or shareholder is not automatically liable for the actions of the company merely by virtue of their position. [68] The Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts that would justify piercing the corporate veil to hold D2 personally liable for the actions of D4 or D5. There are no allegations that D2 used D4 or D5 as a mere façade to perpetrate a fraud, or that D2 personally directed or authorised any wrongful acts by these companies. [69] For these reasons, I find that the Plaintiff has failed to plead adequate particulars of the fraud, misrepresentation, or dishonest assistance allegedly committed by D2, as required by Order 18 Rule 12(1)(a) of the Rules of Court 2012. The Relevance of the UK High Court Judgment [70] The Plaintiff seeks to rely on an alleged admission by D2 in a UK High Court case that the statement about him investing 30% in VB was a deception to attract investors. [71] D2 submits that this UK High Court Judgment is irrelevant as it is a separate case that does not form part of these proceedings, and this court is not able to consider evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses from that case. [72] The Plaintiff's reference to the UK High Court Judgment is found at paragraphs 6.1-6.3 of the Plaintiff's Reply to D2's Defence. Paragraph 6.1 states: “D2 voluntarily admitted in UK court that the statement about him investing 30% in VB is a deception to attract investors. A UK Court Judgment in which the UK High Court recorded evidence of D2's confession as follows;” [73] The Reply then includes a lengthy quote from the UK judgment which I will summarise rather than reproduce in full: The UK High Court recorded that D2 (referred to as “Mr Nasir”) admitted he invested no money in VB despite news reports stating otherwise, and when questioned about misleading journalists, he acknowledged it was “part of the image.” [74] Paragraph 6.2 clarifies: “In the above UK High Court judgment, 'Mr Sidhu' is D1 of this Suit whilst 'Mr Nasir' is D2 of this Suit. On the other hand, to minimise confusion to the Court, Dato Singh as referred to in the above UK High Court's judgment is not D1 and is not a party to this Suit.” [75] Paragraph 6.3 concludes: “In summary, the UK High Court has recorded D2's admission that the news of D2's purported investment in VB was deliberately spread by D1 and D2 to the media in order to fraudulently, deliberately and systematically mislead and lure more prospective investments including the Plaintiff's Investment Sum.” [76] However, the Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts showing how this alleged admission in a separate case establishes D2's liability in this case. The Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts showing that D2 was directly involved in inducing the Plaintiff to invest in VB, or that D2 knew or intended that the Plaintiff specifically would rely on the news report. [77] The fact that D2 may have admitted in another case that the news report was misleading does not establish that D2 made any representation to the Plaintiff, or that D2 authorised or was complicit in D1's representations to the Plaintiff before the investment was made. [78] Furthermore, the UK High Court Judgment is about a separate case that does not form part of these proceedings. This court is not able to consider evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses from that case. The Plaintiff cannot rely on alleged findings or admissions from that case as establishing D2's liability in this case without pleading the underlying facts that would establish D2's liability independent of that case. [79] For these reasons, I find that the allegations regarding the UK High Court Judgment do not assist the Plaintiff in establishing a reasonable cause of action against D2 in this case. Whether This Case Is Suitable for Summary Disposition [80] The Plaintiff contends that the issues raised require viva voce evidence and determination of facts through a full trial, as they involve complex questions of fact and cannot be summarily disposed of. [81] D2 submits that this is a clear case where the Plaintiff's claim is obviously unsustainable and bound to fail, and thus should be struck out summarily. [82] In Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur & Anor [2016] MLJU 12, the Federal Court observed that a striking out order should not be made if there is an issue of fact that is capable of resolution only after taking viva voce evidence during trial. However, the court also emphasised that the test for striking out is whether the claim on the face of it is “obviously unsustainable”. [83] As noted by the Federal Court, if one has to go into lengthy and mature consideration in detail of the issues, then the matter is not appropriate to be struck out summarily. However, if the lack of a sustainable cause of action is apparent on the face of the pleadings, then a striking out order is appropriate. [84] In the present case, the lack of a sustainable cause of action against D2 is apparent on the face of the pleadings for the reasons discussed above. The Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts showing that D2 made any representations to the Plaintiff before the investment was made, or that D2 authorised or was complicit in D1's representations. The Plaintiff has also not pleaded any facts showing that D2 personally provided dishonest assistance or received any funds with knowledge that they were obtained in breach of trust or fiduciary duty. [85] These are not issues that require viva voce evidence or determination of facts through a full trial. They are fundamental deficiencies in the Plaintiff's pleadings, which show that the Plaintiff has not disclosed a reasonable cause of action against D2. [86] The Plaintiff argues that he should be allowed to proceed to trial to attempt to prove his case against D2. However, as noted by the Supreme Court in Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd, the purpose of Order 18 Rule 19(1)(a) is to prevent a party from being “unnecessarily troubled and harassed in a litigation” when the plaintiff's cause of action is obviously unsustainable. [87] In the present case, allowing the claim against D2 to proceed to trial would unnecessarily trouble and harass D2 in litigation where the Plaintiff's cause of action is obviously unsustainable for the reasons discussed above. [88] For these reasons, I find that this is a clear case where the Plaintiff's claim against D2 is obviously unsustainable and bound to fail, and thus should be struck out summarily. CONCLUSION AND ORDER [89] For the reasons set out above, I find that the Plaintiff has failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action against D2 for fraud, misrepresentation, dishonest assistance, or knowing receipt. The Plaintiff's claim against D2 is obviously unsustainable and bound to fail. [90] Accordingly, the Second Defendant's application to strike out the Plaintiff's claim against the Second Defendant under Order 18 Rule 19(1)(a) of the Rules of Court 2012 (Enclosure 131) is allowed. [91] The Writ and Statement of Claim both dated 18.7.2024 are struck out against the Second Defendant. [92] The Plaintiff's suit against the Second Defendant is struck out with costs to be paid by the Plaintiff to the Second Defendant. 13 August 2025 ATAN MUSTAFFA YUSSOF AHMAD Judge Kuala Lumpur High Court (Commercial Division) Counsel: For the Plaintiff: Syamsul Azhar Ab Aziz with Sasha Nameera Sabtu (Messrs Brindta & Co.) For the 2nd Defendant: Kenneth Koh with Sahain Nada Puthucheary (Messrs Xavier & Koh Partnership)