Though both appellants were shocked and scared during the arrest, the raiding officer SP10 confirms that this is a normal reaction when your bedroom is raided. [17] The learned counsel of both the accused further contended that Raymond and Weason were arrested in Jelutong Report 7244/18 in which their photos were shown to both accused. Therefore, since Raymond and Weason arrest was said to be related and connected the factual matrix and defence of both the accused, the counsel submitted that both Raymond and Weason should have been offered or called to negate the defence of the accused. Since neither were offered to the defence nor called by the prosecution, failure to do so leaves the defence unrebutted and falls short of proving the case beyond reasonable doubt. This was said to invite an adverse inference against the prosecution. There were also two (2) sworn version of events lingering and unresolved which the defence submitted that the defence's sworn version must be negated. Therefore, the benefit of the doubt should be given to both the accused and adverse inference be raised against the prosecution under Section 114[g] of the Evidence Act 1950. In this regard, the defence counsel relied on the case of Public Prosecutor v. Chia Leong Foo [2000] 6 MLJ 705, PP v. Raja Sharif [2009] 1 LNS 509 and the case of PP v. Iskandar Mohammad Yusof [2006] 6 CLJ 379. [18] The public prosecutor, on the other hand submitted that based on the evidences before the Court, the prosecution had successfully proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. The Appellants have control and custody over the drugs as well as having knowledge of their existence and an inference can be made that the Appellants have possession against the drugs. [19] It was submitted further that SP13's testimony has supported that the accused had occupied the premise before the raid based on the confiscation of the document "work completion advice form SN: A370396" by SP13 in master bedroom which stated the date of completion by TIME communication company was on 17.10.2018 and this form was signed by the First Accused. [20] The prosecutor also submitted that even though the defence evokes the existence of other occupants who live in the premise before the raid, but from the evidence of SP13 which was based on his investigation, there was no other occupants nor the nominees "Raymond" and "Weason" who live in the premise. In addition, SP12's testimony also supports that an inspection of another room was made and it was found that there were no traces of other occupants. Evidence by SP9, SP10, SP3 and SP13 were also clear and consistent stating that clothes seized by SP13 were in the same closet where the bag containing drugs were found. [21] On the issue of unidentified DNA profile, the learned public prosecutor submitted that although SP1 states that there is a mixed profile of minor contributors which cannot be conclusively identified and there are case items that where the DNA profile is weak/inconclusive for comparison DNA, it just means that the DNA profile is not enough for making comparisons or incomplete for interpretation and instead of meaning the existence of other occupants/third parties who occupy the premise. [22] On the failure of SP5 to identify both accused, it was submitted by the prosecution that SP4 as a home agent who manages the rental between both the accused with SP5 has positively identify the them and confirm the house was rented to both the accused and rental agreement in the name the Second Appellant since 08.10.2018. [23] Furthermore, it was also submitted by the learned prosecutor that the drugs weighing 77.8 grams & Methamphetamine weighing 1517.3 grams certainly not for personal use. The total weight prove that it is for distribution purposes and in fact the packaging were intended to facilitate distribution and indicates it is for commercial purposes. OUR DECISION [24] The crux of the Appellants' argument is that on the issue of control and custody over the drugs whereby their contention was that there were other persons who have access to the Premise (i.e. Raymond and Weason). We have considered this but we find that the prosecution had proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. From the evidence of the Prosecution witnesses, namely SP12 and SP13, shows that there were no other occupants in the Premise. [25] Not even that, SP4 also had positively identify and confirm that the Premise was rented to both the accused and rental agreement in the name of the Second Appellant since 08.10.2018. Thus, this is not the case where the Appellants only has momentary custody of the bags full of drugs. Both the Appellants live in the Premise with the bags in their control and custody. It is difficult for us accept the Appellants' defence that the bag belongs to other occupants when the bag itself was found in their own room and in the closet that they kept their personal belongings. [26] In the circumstances, we are of the view that the Appellants had failed in their defence about the existence of Raymond and Weason. We are guided by the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Sathya Vello v Public Prosecutor [2022] 4 MLJ 111 which held as follows: [96] But the rule does not apply where a statute presumes a fact 'unless the contrary is proved'. Thus, where statutory presumptions such as the ones in s 37(d) and s 37(da) of the DDA come into play, it is not sufficient for the accused to merely cast a reasonable doubt in the trial court's mind as to whether or not the presumed facts exist. The accused must affirmatively prove by admissible evidence that the presumed facts do not exist, and the standard of proof is the civil standard of proof, ie proof on the balance of probabilities: see Public Prosecutor v Yuvaraj. In Miller v Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372 Lord Denning explained what constitutes sufficient discharge of the burden of proving a case on the balance of probabilities: If the evidence is such that the tribunal can say 'We think it more probable than not' the burden is discharged, but if the probabilities are equal, it is not." [27] From the facts of these appeals, we find that the Appellants failed to show the admissible evidence regarding the existence of Raymond and Weason. It comes to our mind that how the subsequent tenant can actually know about the previous tenant. We have also perused the Jelutong Report 7244/18 (see Record of Appeal Vol.3 in Encl. 19 at page 111.pdf), and we only find Weason's name in that report without Raymond. Interestingly, the report was about the arrest of few names on 01.11.2018 at the address located at No.21 Changkat Minden Jalan 2, 11700 Gelugor Pulau Pinang. So, the only coincidence here is that both the Appellants and the person names Weason were arrested at the same date. But this fact is not enough to show that the drugs found with the Appellants at the Premise belongs to Weason. [28] Based on the aforesaid reasons, we find that the learned High Court judge did not fall into error in the event he negated the involvement of Raymond and Weason. As such, the learned High Court Judge was correct in his finding that the defence failed to cast doubt with regard to the presumption of drug trafficking under section 37(da)(iiia) and (xvi) of the DDA. [29] Having perused the appeal records, the grounds of judgement of the learned High Court Judge and the submissions by parties both oral and written, we unanimously find that there is no merit in the Appellants' appeals on conviction. There is no reason for us to disturb the finding by the learned High Court Judge. We find that the learned High Court Judge was correct in his finding that a prima facie case was established by the prosecution at the end of the prosecution case and that the prosecution had successfully proven its case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt at the conclusion of the trial. We are also of the view that based on the settled principles of law on common intention, there was sufficient evidence to infer common intention of both the appellants. Hence, the decision of the learned High Court Judge in convicting the appellants on the charges read with section 34 of the Penal Code was not wrong. [30] Therefore, all appeals on conviction are hereby dismissed. [31] With regard to the sentence, following the abolishment of s 39B(2A) of the DDA by the Abolishment of Mandatory Death Penalty Act 2023 [Act 846], the court is no longer bound only by the conditions stated in that provision to pass a sentence of life imprisonment. Since we are of the view that these appeals before us are not exceptionally serious and outweighed the mitigating factors, we find that life imprisonment and whipping should be the preferred sentence. According to section 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 1953 [Act 345] which was amended in 2007, where any person is treated as having been sentenced or is hereafter sentenced to imprisonment for life, such sentence shall be deemed for all purposes to be a sentence of imprisonment for thirty years. This provision, when read together with section 15 of Act 846, allows this Court to impose sentence of not less than 30 years and not more than 40 years. CONCLUSION [32] It was for all the reasons above stated that we dismissed both the Appellants' appeal and affirmed the conviction. We agree to set aside the sentence to death by hanging imposed by the High Court. We sentence the Appellants with 30 years imprisonment for the first charge and also 30 years imprisonment for the second charge. Both sentences to run concurrently. Pursuant to section 289 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it provides that females, males sentenced to death and males above the age of 50 shall not be whipped. -sgd- (AZMAN BIN ABDULLAH) Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Putrajaya Date of Decision : 22 November 2023 Grounds Issued : 6 June 2024 Legal Representation For the Appellant : Hussaini bin Abdul Rashid [Messrs Hussaini & Co. (Penang)] For the Respondent : Mohd Fuad bin Abdul Aziz [Attorney General's Chambers]