Lee Teck Tiong v LIM Kim Hin (CB-22NCvC-13-06/2022)

Plaintif di dalam penyataan tuntutan memohon satu deklarasi bahawa surat jaminan bertarikh 06.06.2016 adalah sah dan boleh dikuatkuasakan. Defendan juga dikehendaki membayar RM1,480,600.00 sebagai harga belian saham berkaitan dengan surat jaminan tersebut. Plaintif juga memohon agar Defendan dikehendaki menandatangani kesemua surat cara dan dokumen-dokumen berkaitan pindahan saham tersebut. Kos pemindahan saham itu ditanggung oleh Defendan. 15/02/2023 15:41:12 CB-22NCvC-13-06/2022 Kand. 53

Defendan di dalam penyata pembelaannya menafikan ada menandatangani surat jaminan bertarikh 06.06.2016 tersebut. Defendan menyatakan beliau bukannya pihak di dalam sebarang perjanjian dengan Plaintif. Sekiranya wujud perjanjian jaminan tersebut, ia adalah tidak sah disebabkan Plaintif tidak menyediakan balasan (consideration) kepada kontrak tersebut. Di samping itu balasan yang lalu (past consideration) yang bercanggah dengan Akta Kontrak 1950.

Defendan juga mengemukakan tuntutan balas terhadap Plaintif untuk satu deklarasi bahawa surat jaminan tersebut adalah batal dan tidak boleh dikuatkuasakan. Defendan juga memohon satu deklarasi bahawa Defendan-Defendan tidak berkewajipan untuk membeli saham-saham tersebut daripada Plaintif.

Defendan memohon supaya writ dan penyataan tuntutan pihak dibatalkan atas alasan ia tidak mendedahkan apa-apa kausa tindakan yang munasabah. Di samping itu tindakan ini adalah mengaibkan, remeh dan menyusahkan serta satu penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah.

Di dalam affidavit sokongan En. Lim Kim Hin dinyatakan bahawa beliau tidak terikat dengan surat jaminan bertarikh 06.06.2016 tersebut. Defendan tidak menafikan bahawa beliau ada menandatangani surat 3 jaminan tersebut. Surat jaminan itu tidak sah di sisi undang-undang disebabkan tiada penghutang utama di dalam kes ini.

Sebaliknya Plaintif melalui affidavit En. Lee Teck Tiong menyatakan beliau telah diberikan representasi melalui e-Brochure yang dihantar kepada Plaintif melalui WhatsApp seperti yang dikemukakan di eksibit “LTT-01”. Berdasarkan kepada representasi dan surat jaminan oleh Defendan tersebut serta lawatan Plaintif ke lapangan pada 14.03.2016, Plaintif bersetuju untuk mengambil satu saham di dalam Angel Investment tersebut. Ini dinyatakan di perenggan 9 para (i) affidavit En. Lee Tek Tiong.

Plaintif juga mendakwa surat jaminan berkenaan di eksibit “LTT- 07” adalah dikeluarkan oleh Defendan. Defendan menyatakan bahawa melalui carian di Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia (SSM) didapati bahawa Defendan telah meletak jawatan daripada Miracle Land Holdings Berhad yang terlibat di dalam perlaburan ini. Oleh itu sebagai pihak yang memberikan janji, kegagalan Defendan untuk melaksanakan dan menunaikan janji di dalam surat jaminan tersebut menyebabkan Plaintif mempunyai kausa tindakan terhadap Defendan.

Prinsip yang mantap telah digariskan oleh mahkamah atasan di dalam permohonan untuk membatalkan tindakan di bawah A. 18 k. Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah (KKM) 2012 yang tidak perlu diulang sebut di dalam kes ini. Adalah mencukupi mahkamah ini untuk merujuk 4 kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v. United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36.

Dalam kes ini mahkamah perlu berhati-hati dan tidak terkeliru semasa meneliti dan memutuskan tuntutan dalam kes ini. Mahkamah sewajarnya memutuskan sama ada kes ini adalah sesuai untuk diberikan pembatalan tindakan di bawah A. 18 k. 19 KKM 2012. Bagi memutuskan sedemikian, mahkamah perlu melihat surat jaminan di eksibit “LTT-07” itu adalah suatu surat tersebut mempunyai asas kepada kewujudan kausa tindakan Plaintif terhadap Defendan.

Peguam Defendan berhujah bahawa tiada balasan yang bercanggah dengan seksyen 26 Akta Kontrak 1950. Oleh itu tiada kontrak jaminan yang boleh dijadikan asas kepada kausa tindakan Plaintif terhadap Defendan. Sebaliknya jika mahkamah berpendapat terdapat balasan ia adalah balasan yang lalu (past consideration). Beliau telah menukilkan keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes South East Asia Insurance Bhd v Nasir Ibrahim [1992] 1 MLRA 304; [1992] 2 MLJ 355. Walau bagaimanapun mahkamah perlu mengambil perhatian bahawa kes South East Asia Insurance Bhd v Nasir Ibrahim (supra) tersebut adalah berkaitan dengan kontrak ‘indemnity’. Ini dapat dilihat di dalam muka surat 361 seperti berikut: “Although it is often difficult to determine whether a given instrument is a guarantee or an indemnity, a relevant consideration is that an indemnifier, unlike a surety, is not discharged by the creditor giving time to the principal debtor (see Way v Hearn 8). In this case, we noticed that 5 the indemnity shall continue to remain in force notwithstanding any agreement to extend the period of liability of the party to be indemnified as a guarantor. We are therefore of the view that the said instrument in this case is a contract of indemnity and not a contract of guarantee so that s 80 of the Contracts Act 1950 and cases concerning consideration for a guarantee referred to by the learned judge need not be considered by us.”

Balasan di dalam undang-undang kontrak telah dinyatakan dengan jelas di dalam kes Currie and Others v MISA [1875] 10 Exch. 153 seperti berikut: “The giving time is only one of many kinds of what the law calls consideration. A valuable consideration, in the sense of the law, may consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility, given, suffered, or undertaken by the other.”

Dalam konteks Akta Kontrak 1950 penjelasan A. Mohaimin Ayus di dalam buku Law of Contract in Malaysia Volume 1, Sweet & Maxwell Asia dinyatakan seperti berikut: “The key to the doctrine of consideration in Malaysia is laid down under s 2(d) of the Contracts Act 1950. The provision states that, when, at the desire of the promisor the promise or any other person –

has done or abstained from doing,

does or abstains from doing, or

promises to do or to abstain from doing, Something, such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise. Thus consideration can be executory, a promise to do something; executed, an act of doing something; or past, an act having done something or having abstained from doing something, by the offeree, at the desire or request of the offeror, in return of the act or promise made by the offeror. “[E]very promise or a set of promises, forming the consideration for each other, is an agreement.” “[A]n agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void.” On the other hand, “an agreement enforceable by law is”, obviously, “a contract. “Any contractual obligation must be such as is enforceable by law. It must be a legal obligation and not merely moral, social, or religious. The absence of consideration is fatal to the existence of a contract, except where an agreement is made under s. 26 of the Contracts Act 1950.” [13] Perjanjian tanpa balasan adalah batal dan tidak boleh dilaksanakan, Roscorla v Thomas [1842] 3 QB 234. [14] Dalam kes Guthrie Waugh Bhd v. Malaippan Muthucumaru [1972] 1 MLJ 35, Mahkamah Tinggi menyatakan: “Section 2(d) of the said Ordinance constitutes what may be called the key to the doctrine of "consideration" under our law as applicable "within the Malay States only." It stipulates that if:–

at the desire of the promisor,

the promisee or any other person,

has done or abstained from doing or promises to do or abstains from doing something,

such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise. In the States where the Contracts Ordinance is applicable it is obvious that a unilateral declaration is not enough to make a contract and that no question of a contract under seal arises unless the matter is covered by section 26(a) of the Contracts Ordinance. Clause (g) of section 2 again enunciates that an agreement not enforceable by law is void. In other words an agreement can be a contract only when it is enforceable by law. In fact the word implies a valid contract and unenforceable agreements cannot be contracts. If the agreement is enforceable it becomes a contract but not so if it is unenforceable. The contractual obligation must be such as is enforceable by law. It must be a legal obligation and not merely moral, social or religious.” Guthrie Waugh Bhd v. Malaiappan Muthuchumaru [1972] 2 MLJ 62 (Mahkamah Persekutuan) telah dinyatakan seperti berikut: “I have already said, there was no reference to the cheques in the deed because the deed superseded them. The consideration for the deed was not stated in it, but it was for that very reason that the plaintiffs had their statement of claim amended so as to aver the consideration. Evidence as to the circumstances under which the deed came to be executed was rightly allowed to go in. Once that evidence was in and it was unrebutted, consideration was proved up to the hilt. The deed was in respect of the past debts of the defendant. How then can it possibly be said that the deed was not for any past consideration? As regards forbearance to sue, there was ample evidence from which it could be implied, and there were clear indications in the evidence of an express request not to sue. With great respect to the learned judge, the deed was not without consideration as understood in our law which he himself had correctly stated earlier in his judgment. I agree that the fact that the deed is under seal makes no difference whatsoever. That obviously was the reason why the plaintiffs made no point about it. I regret to say that I find myself unable to agree with the learned judge when he says that all that the defendant can be said to have undertaken was a moral obligation and no more. The plaintiffs' claim may not have been simple, straightforward and indisputable on their original statement of claim, but on the facts pleaded in their final statement of claim, especially in relation to consideration for the deed, and more than substantiated by the unrebutted evidence for the plaintiffs, the claim certainly became so, so that the plaintiffs were clearly entitled to judgment.” [15] Dalam menangani isu sama ada balasan yang lalu boleh menyebabkan sesuatu perjanjian jaminan itu tidak dapat menjadikan perjanjian jaminan suatu yang sah telah tidak ada penentuan kehakiman yang jelas. Ini telah dinyatakan oleh Visu Sinnadurai dalam bukunya Law of Contract 4th Edition Vol. 1 LevisNexis 2011 di halaman 175 seperti berikut: “As stated earlier, there is a dearth of authority from the superior courts as to whether past consideration is good consideration in contracts of guarantees. In the absence of a clear pronouncement from the superior courts, the views expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of South East Asia Insurance Bhd Nasir Ibrahim may throw some light on the thinking of the Supreme Court. This case dealt with a contract of indemnity and not guarantee. As will be seen below, a contract of indemnity differs from a contract of guarantee.” [16] Ini juga dinyatakan oleh KY Low di dalam bukunya The Law of Guarantees in Singapore and Malaysia 2nd Edition yang dipetik oleh Visu Sinnadurai di dalam buku yang sama seperti berikut: “It is submitted that the correct approach should have been to consider section 2(d) first and then proceed to consider section 80. As for the relationship between section 2(d) and section 80, the writer is of the view that section 80 should be read in conjunction with and ancillary to section 2(d). This seems a reasonable interpretation to take and it certainly avoids unnecessarily making benefit to the principal debtor a legal requirement. Though the ‘desire’ requirement will be necessary on this view, it should usually not be difficult to fulfil. Section 2(d), it is submitted, remains the yardstick for valid consideration for a guarantee and should have been the one applied to the Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor case. There was no need to search for benefit to the principal debtor. The search for consideration in this case (as in most cases involving bank guarantees) should have focused on consideration moving from the principal debtor to the surety. Until clarified by subsequent decisions, the legal position in this area remains confused and unsettled.” [17] Oleh itu kedudukan undang-undang berkenaan balasan yang lalu bagi perjanjian jaminan adalah masih terbuka dan tidak boleh diputuskan hanya berdasarkan kepada affidavit-affidavit yang dikemukakan oleh pihak-pihak di dalam kes ini. Ia tidak boleh menjadi asas untuk menyatakan bahawa pihak Plaintif tiada langsung mempunyai kausa tindakan terhadap Defendan disebabkan perjanjian tersebut dikatakan tidak mempunyai balasan atau mempunyai balasan yang lalu. Kedudukan Perjanjian Jaminan [18] Seksyen 79 Akta Kontrak 1950 telah memperihalkan perjanjian jaminan seperti berikut: “79 “Contract of guarantee”, “surety”, “principal debtor”, and “creditor” A "contract of guarantee" is a contract to perform the promise, or discharge the liability, of a third person in case of his default. The person who gives the guarantee is called the "surety"; the person in respect of which default the guarantee is given is called the "principal debtor", and the person to whom the guarantee is given is called the "creditor". A guarantee may be either oral or written.” [19] Sementara itu seksyen 80 Akta Kontrak 1950 pula memperuntukkan berkenaan dengan balasan bagi perjanjian jaminan seperti berikut: “80 Consideration for guarantee Anything done, or any promise made, for the benefit of the principal debtor may be a sufficient consideration to the surety for giving the guarantee. ILLUSTRATIONS

B requests A to sell and deliver to him goods on credit. A agrees to do so, provided C will guarantee the payment of the price of the goods, C promises to guarantee the payment in consideration of A's promise to deliver the goods. This is a sufficient consideration for C's promise.

A sells and delivers goods to B. C afterwards requests A to forbear to sue B for the debt for a year, and promises that, if he does so, C will pay for them in default of payment by B. A agrees to forbear as requested. This is a sufficient consideration for C's promise.

A sells and delivers goods to B. C afterwards, without consideration, agrees to pay for them in default of B. The agreement is void.” [20] Peguam Defendan yang bijaksana berhujah bahawa bagi memastikan terdapatnya kontrak jaminan mesti terdapat tiga pihak iaitu peminjam, pemberi pinjam dan penjamin. Apa yang dikatakan oleh pihak Defendan ialah terdapatnya peminjam utama (principal debtor). Beliau telah menukilkan kes Bank Pembangunan Malaysia Bhd v Spring Hill Bioventures Sdn Bhd [2020] 4 MLJ 42 dan memetik perenggan (32) kes tersebut yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “[32] Under a contract of guarantee, there must be three parties involved: the surety, principal debtor/borrower and the creditor. A contract of guarantee is therefore an undertaking to guarantee the obligations of a named principal. In this regard, a contract of guarantee is essentially a collateral contract by which a guarantor/surety undertakes to answer for the default of the principal debtor/borrower who is to be primarily liable to the creditor. The guarantor therefore only owes a secondary obligation to the creditor to make good the particular defaults of the principal debtor (see the cases of South East Asia Insurance Bhd v Nasir Ibrahim [1992] 2 MLJ 355 and Yeoman Credit Ltd v Latter & Anor [1961] 2 All ER 294).” [21] Walau bagaimanapun dalam kes tersebut adalah didapati bahawa Mahkamah Rayuan berpendapat mahkamah tidak wajar melihat kepada label yang digunakan di dalam satu perjanjian tersebut tetapi perlulah melihat kesemua dokumen-dokumen dan keterangan yang boleh diterima bagi mementukan bentuk dokumen dan jenis dokumen tersebut bagi memutuskan apakah perjanjian atau perhubungan di antara pihak-pihak dalam kes tersebut. Malahan menyatakan bahawa dan membuat dapatan di perenggan [41] seperti berikut: “[41] We find that the learned judge, having considered the evidence before the court, had rightfully found that s 79 does not require an express third contract between the principal debtor Alpha Biologics and the surety respondent for it to constitute a contract of guarantee. Further, the learned judge had correctly inferred by looking at the letter of offer from the appellant dated 6 December 2005 and 30 May 2006, which was addressed to Alpha Biologics, that it was the appellant creditor who had made the request to the borrower Alpha Biologics to provide the letters of undertaking and not the appellant creditor who had made the request directly to the respondent surety. By implication, the learned judge had inferred, which inference was correct, to come to the conclusion that the suretyship must have been undertaken at the request of Alpha Biologics. This thus satisfied the requirement that the request from the principal debtor or borrower to the surety need not be done expressly but can be implied, as in this case, from the surrounding circumstances of the case.” [22] Oleh yang demikian dalam kes ini mahkamah perlu meneliti kepada dokumen surat jaminan yang dikemukakan sebagai ‘LTT-07’ tersebut. Apa yang jelas ialah surat tersebut melibatkan pihak Plaintif Lee Teck Tiong yang dinamakan sebagai syarikat yang daripada mana untuk membeli saham-saham tersebut. Ia ditandatangani oleh Defendan. Persoalannya ialah adakah dokumen tersebut tidak mewujudkan terdapatnya perhubungan di antara pihak Plaintif dan Defendan? Ianya adalah berbeza sekiranya tiada langsung penglibatan Plaintif atau Defendan di dalam surat tersebut. [23] Isu sama ada surat tersebut adalah suatu jaminan atau terdapat perlanggaran terma-terma oleh pihak Plaintif atau Defendan akan diputuskan berdasarkan merit kes di dalam perbicaraan sekiranya ia diteruskan. Namun ia tidak boleh menolak perhubungan di antara pihak Plaintif dan Defendan. Oleh itu mahkamah berpendapat bahawa ini bukannya satu keadaan kes yang jelas dan nyata untuk membatalkan tindakan oleh Plaintif terhadap Defendan sehingga mewajarkan penggunaan A. 18 k 19 KKM 2012. Ia juga tidak berjaya untuk melepasi ujian seperti yang dinyatakan dalam kes Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v. United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd (supra). Oleh itu permohonan Defendan adalah ditolak. KM 9 [24] Ini adalah permohonan oleh pihak Defendan untuk mendapatkan penghakiman terus terhadap tuntutan balas ke atas Plaintif iaitu untuk suatu perintah bahawa perjanjian jaminan di antara Plaintif dan Defendan adalah tidak sah dan tidak mempunyai kesan undang-undang. Defendan juga memohon supaya Plaintif tidak dibenarkan untuk meminta Defendan untuk meneruskan segala persetujuan yang dinyatakan di dalam surat jaminan tersebut bagi Defendan membeli saham-saham daripada pihak Plaintif seperti yang dinyatakan di dalam surat jaminan tersebut. [25] Alasan permohonan tersebut adalah sama dengan permohonan Defendan di KM 7 iaitu surat perjanjian jaminan tersebut adalah tidak sah di sisi undang-undang dan tidak boleh dikuatkuasakan. [26] Berdasarkan kepada prinsip undang-undang yang jelas berkenaan dengan penghakiman terus yang tidak wajar diulang lagi di sini seperti di dalam kes Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail & Ors [1992] 1 MLJ 400. Mahkamah berpendapat penelitian kepada affidavit-affidavit yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif dan Defendan dan kepada surat jaminan itu sendiri serta sama ada ketidakpatuhan kepada akta kontrak seperti yang dinyatakan oleh pihak Defendan menjadikan kontrak jaminan tersebut adalah tidak sah di sisi undang-undang adalah satu isu boleh bicara yang memerlukan kepada perbicaraan. Ia tidak boleh diselesaikan dengan hanya meneliti kepada dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan dalam affidavit. [27] Akhirnya KM 7 dan KM 9 ditolak dengan kos sebanyak RM1,500.00 bagi KM 7 tertakluk kepada fi alokator dan RM1,500.00 untuk KM 9 juga tertakluk kepada fi alokator. Bertarikh: 15hb. Februari 2023 (ROSLAN MAT NOR) PESURUHJAYA KEHAKIMAN MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi Pihak Plaintif Chua Chia Ying Tetuan Foo Hiap Siong & Co Kuala Lumpur Bagi Pihak Defendan Francis Tan Jeng Lok dan Norhamizah Mustafa Tetuan Rosni Francis Tan & Ho Temerloh, Pahang Darul Makmur