Lee Teck Tiong v LIM Kim Hin (CB-22NCvC-13-06/2022)

Harapan untuk memperolehi suatu keuntungan di dalam pelaburan adalah salah satu matlamat pelabur. Keputusan untuk membuat satu pelaburan adalah bergantung kepada keyakinan 12/08/2025 12:25:59 CB-22NCvC-13-06/2022 Kand. 106 pelabur terhadap keuntungan yang boleh diperolehi daripada sesuatu pelaburan tersebut. Inilah yang berlaku di dalam kes ini.

Plaintif adalah seorang pelabur yang mengharapkan hasil pelaburannya itu akan memberikan laba keuntungan. Pada tahun 2016 satu syarikat yang dikenali sebagai Syarikat Miracle Land Holdings Berhad telah mengadakan satu Angle Fund Raising. Plaintif telah mendepositkan wang sejumlah RM 1 juta ke dalam akaun Malayan Banking Berhad Temerloh. Syarikat Miracle Land Holdings Berhad telah mengeluarkan satu sijil saham nombor 302 bertarikh 26.08.2016 untuk mengakui bahawa Plaintif merupakan pemegang 54,735 unit saham biasa dalam syarikat tersebut.

Pada sekitar bulan Jun 2016 Defendan dikatakan telah menandatangani satu surat jaminan bertarikh 06.06.2016 di mana Plaintif mendakwa Defendan telah mengakuanji bahawa Defendan akan membeli balik kesemua saham yang dikeluarkan oleh Syarikat Miracle Land Holdings Berhad sekiranya Plaintif ingin menjual saham-sahamnya apabila tamat tempoh masa 6 tahun. Surat jaminan itu adalah seperti berikut:

Plaintif menyatakan bahawa apabila telah sampai tempoh 6 tahun itu dan setelah Plaintif ingin menjual saham-saham itu kepada Defendan ia tidak dapat dilaksanakan. Malahan Plaintif menyatakan bahawa terdapat kemungkiran surat jaminan bertarikh 06.06.2016 tersebut.

Defendan di dalam pernyataan pembelaannya menafikan surat jaminan bertarikh 06.06.2026 dan menyatakan surat jaminan tersebut adalah tidak sah dan terbatal. Asas kepada dakwaan tersebut ialah tiada terdapatnya balasan (consideration) dalam surat jaminan tersebut. Malahan sekiranya ada balasan ia adalah balasan yang lalu (past consideration). Defendan juga menyatakan bahawa Plaintif bukannya pihak kepada kontrak jaminan di antara Defendan dan Syarikat Miracle Land Holdings Berhad.

Plaintif telah memberikan keterangan manakala Defendan-Defendan telah mengemukakan empat orang saksi dalam kes ini.

Plaintif menyatakan melalui pernyataan saksinya menyatakan bahawa Defendan pada 13.01.2016 yang pada masa itu didakwa sebagai Pengarah Urusan Miracle Land Holdings Berhad telah menghantar kepada Plaintif sesalinan e-brosur melalui aplikasi WhatsApp berkenaan dengan peluang pelaburan. Plaintif juga menyatakan Defendan telah menghantar video bertajuk Asean Entrepreneurs Roadshow melalui pautan WhatsApp tersebut. Pada 21.03.2016 terdapat sesi pertemuan di antara Plaintif dan Defendan di Setia Walk, Puchong. Defendan dikatakan telah membuat representasi kepada Plaintif bahawa syarikat Miracle Land Holdings Berhad akan mewujudkan dan membangunkan kawasan kediaman dan perdagangan. Defendan mengikut Plaintif telah memberi jaminan bahawa syarikat Miracle Land Holdings Berhad akan memperolehi keuntungan yang tinggi pada tahun-tahun akan datang. Defendan juga memberi jaminan bahawa Plaintif akan memperolehi keuntungan 8 % setiap tahun daripada jumlah pelaburan yang dibuat oleh Plaintif.

Plaintif menyatakan bahawa representasi yang dibuat oleh Defendan itu adalah pendorong utama yang menyebabkan Plaintif membuat keputusan untuk melabur dalam syarikat tersebut.

Plaintif juga menyatakan pelaburan itu dibuat ekoran daripada komitmen yang dibuat melalui surat jaminan kepada Plaintif yang menyatakan bahawa Defendan akan membeli semula semua saham syarikat sekiranya Plaintif ingin menjualnya selepas daripada tempoh 6 tahun. Defendan juga dikatakan akan membayar keseluruhan jumlah pelaburan dengan faedah 8 % setahun dan bagi tempoh 6 tahun yang kesemuanya berjumlah 48 %. Plaintif mengakui bahawa dia ada menerima sijil saham daripada syarikat nombor 302 bertarikh 26.08.2016 bagi 54,735 unit saham biasa.

Plaintif bersandarkan kepada surat jaminan bertarikh 06.06.2016 di klausa (b) menyatakan bahawa dia boleh menghantar surat kepada Defendan untuk Defendan melaksanakan terma-terma di dalam surat jaminan tersebut. Kegagalan Defendan berbuat demikian menyebabkan Plaintif menyatakan dia layak untuk mendapatkan kembali atau menguatkuasakan perjanjian surat jaminan tersebut.

Semasa pemeriksaan utama Plaintif menyatakan seperti yang berikut berkenaan dengan dengan hubung kait surat jaminan tersebut dengan keputusan Plaintif membuat pelaburan: “LEE And then there’s a letter of guarantee that comes with the later on and with stamping. If you can see there is a letter of guarantee and with the stamping with Mr Lim that come to see me in January and give me the promise and tell me that. And that is the key of the decision making. If let’s say we do any investment, if there is a capital guarantee, we definitely will go for it. And this investment and as promised by Mr Lim, is not only capital guaranteed and there is an annual return of 8 %. You just tell anybody here, anyone will go for it if there is capital guarantee with interest returns some more and with dividends as well. So that means for us as an investor, when you look at here, I think the key that make me to invest this, is not this. It’s the letter of guarantee with 8 % return and it’s actually stamped up. And when he told me that that’s been stamped, I even more confidence because when agreement, as a businessman, when agreement has been stamped, that means there is a legal things already come in.”

Seterusnya Plaintif juga menyatakan pendiriannya berkenaan dengan surat jaminan tersebut seperti yang berikut: “LEE When you become a Miracle Land shareholder, I think it’s very clearly stated if you want to quit after six years, so someone will buy it and you can see that. But maybe they won’t put in the name yet. That’s why I said, it always come back to the letter of guarantee. That’s the key of the investment not about this brochure, sorry. I just make myself clear. This e-brochure doesn’t make me to do investment and I actually rejected. I didn’t see him when he come. And he keep approaching me for second time. And when he meet me on 21st of January and when he tell me that this will be, don’t be afraid of this. This is has been assured and it has been promised. So and later a letter of guarantee will come to you. So I think that is the key that make me to do investment into this company, And in this kind of brochure, definitely there is no one will put their name in and give you a guarantee that someone will responsible for that. There’s nothing happen in any brochures. If I am a businessman – ”

Penelitian kepada keterangan Plaintif berkaitan dengan surat jaminan tersebut dan tindakan yang dilakukan oleh Defendan terhadap Plaintif, Plaintif menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “FT If the Defendant had committed to issue you a letter of guarantee and 34 a personal guarantee, undertaking at a later date, you would have 35 asked him to confirm this commitment in writing, correct? You are a 36 businessman – LEE I didn’t because he promised this letter of guarantee will come automatically with the stamping later on. FT I put it to you that you did not ask him to confirm in writing because he did not say it. LEE He did.”

Defendan dalam keterangannya menafikan bahawa dia ada membuat surat jaminan tersebut terhadap Plaintif. Sebaliknya Defendan menyatakan bahawa surat jaminan tersebut ialah di antara Defendan dengan Miracle Land Holdings Berhad bagi membeli kembali saham-saham daripada Plaintif. Malahan semasa ceramah-ceramah yang diberikan kepada pelabur- pelabur, Defendan tidak pernah menjanjikan bahawa Defendan akan membeli kembali saham-saham itu daripada Plaintif.

Defendan menyatakan dalam keterangannya semasa pemeriksaan balas berkenaan dengan kandungan surat jaminan tersebut dan mengapakah surat jaminan itu disediakan seperti yang berikut: “CHRIS Baik. Jadi, soalan seterusnya saya, sila rujuk kepada J4(6) penyata 19 saksi anda. Encik kata surat jaminan tersebut hanya adalah antara anda dengan Miracle Land dan adalah Plaintif bukan satu pihak dalam surat jaminan tersebut. Jelaskan. ALAN Sebab pengarah-pengarah dia risau. Jadi, saya pun janji kalau selepas enam tahun tak listing, saya akan beli dengan investor-investor yang bising. Tapi, itu saya janji dengan Miracle Land. Saya bukan janji dengan Plaintif. Saya pun tak pernah janji dengan Plaintif semasa saya buat presentation sebab itu surat jaminan selepas dia invest banyak bulan baru syarikat kasi dia. Lagipun, itu surat bukan dari saya. Saya pun tak pernah kasi itu surat pada Plaintif. Plaintif angkat dengan, saya pun tak tahu dia angkat dengan staf yang mana satu. Saya pun tak tahu. CHRIS Ok. Jadi, soalan seterusnya saya, Encik rujuk kepada muka surat 9 penyata saksi anda di J4(7). Encik sekali lagi Encik kata surat jaminan tersebut tidak sah kerana Miracle Land tidak memberi balasan untuk surat jaminan tersebut. Jelaskan. ALAN Selepas saya terima surat saman, saya pun terkejut sebab dia orang saman saya bukan saman Miracle Land. Sebab itu saya pun ambil itu surat pergi jumpa lawyer saya. Saya tanya dia kenapa dia orang sue, sama saya. Saya bukan ada pernah kasi surat ini dan saya punya lawyer cakap “Alan, ini tak ada balasan. Ini tak sah.” Dia cakap dengan saya sebab saya, kita bukan lawyer. Jadi, apa yang lawyer kata saya pun sangat setuju dan percayalah. Itu yang saya diberitahu tiada balasan.”

Saksi Defendan Kedua (SD 2) iaitu Pengerusi Syarikat Miracle Land Holdings Berhad telah memberikan keterangan dan menyatakan berkenaan dengan surat jaminan tersebut dan menyatakan bahawa jaminan tersebut adalah kepada Miracle Land Holdings Berhad bukannya kepada Plaintif. Ia dinyatakan seperti yang berikut: “TLK Ok, sekarang kita rujuk kepada soalan dan jawapan di 9. 9, penyata saksi ya. Ok, jika kami sekarang rujuk balik kepada Ikatan C yang tadi, surat jaminan tersebut di muka surat 1 dan 2. So, di Soalan dan Jawapan No. 9, Dato' hanya nyatakan bahawa Miracle Land, ok, menerima surat daripada Defendan dan seterusnya membatalkan surat jaminan yang diberikan kepada mereka kerana tiada sah, tiada balasan. Ok. Saya cadangkan kepada Dato' surat jaminan ini bukan jaminan kepada Miracle Land, tetapi kepada Plaintif. Setuju atau tidak? DN Tak setuju. TLK Adakah Dato' setuju dengan saya bahawa menurut pada surat ini ya, hanya terdapat dua nama sahaja iaitu nama Defendan di atas dan seterusnya dengan nama Plaintif? Setuju? DN Setuju. TLK Dan juga adakah Dato' setuju dengan saya bahawa surat jaminan ini adalah untuk merekodkan janji-janji ataupun terma-terma terhadap pelaburan Angel Fund ini? Setuju?

SD 2 juga menyatakan bahawa telah terdapat pembatalan dibuat terhadap surat jaminan tersebut atas alasan ianya tidak sah setelah syarikat Miracle Land Holdings Berhad mendapat nasihat daripada peguam.

SD 3 iaitu Pengurus Am Miracle Land Holdings Berhad telah memberikan keterangan di Mahkamah yang menyatakan dia adalah individu yang bertanggungjawab menyediakan surat jaminan tersebut. SD 3 telah menjelaskan secara panjang lebar berkenaan dengan terma-terma dalam surat jaminan tersebut seperti yang berikut: “TLK Ok. Sekarang kita rujuk kepada muka surat 1 Ikatan C ini ya. Di barisan yang “All the share” tadi. Ok. “All the share” itu, barisan empat yang mula dengan “30/04/2016” kemudian sambung “Should the 5 shareholder desire to sell them six year after the share has been registered in the shareholder name provided that.” Ada nampak? Betul. Ok. Kemudian continue dengan Klausa A ya. Ya. Klausa A ada cakap “The shareholder must sell all his share in the company en bloc, that is to say his initial share together with all bonus share subsequently issued to him via all fund raising exercise and not only a part thereof.” Ok. Soalan saya, yang tadi saya rujuk, adakah Pn Lee setuju dengan saya bahawa surat jaminan ini ia diisukan dan telah ditandatangan oleh Defendan adalah untuk tujuan membeli balik saham Miracle Land daripada pemegang saham iaitu Plaintif dalam kes ini kalau Plaintif ingin menjual saham ini selepas enam tahun? Tak setuju. Tidak setuju? Ok. Jika tidak setuju maksudnya Pn Lee cakap Plaintif sebagai pemegang saham tidak boleh menjual share dia? Jual saham dia selepas enam tahun? Tak setuju. Tidak setuju? Ok. Jika tidak setuju maksudnya Pn Lee cakap Plaintif sebagai pemegang saham tidak boleh menjual share dia? Jual saham dia selepas enam tahun? Melainkan dia cari Miracle Land, Miracle Land akan maklumkan kepada Mr Lim. Mr Lim ambil maklum baru Mr Lee ini boleh tuliskan kepada Mr Lim. Ok. Di mana dinyata terma tersebut dalam surat ini? Boleh tunjuk? Tak ada. Tak ada? Ini dalam perbincangan antara – Saya tak kira perbincangan. Saya hanya tahu ada tak bagi penjelasan bahawa perlu maklumkan Miracle Land baru boleh beli semua ini? Ada tak dinyatakan dalam surat ini? Surat ini tak ada. Tak ada. Tapi masa – Ok. Tak apa. Surat tak ada kan? Kamu confirm tak ada kan? Dan saya juga katakan kepada kamu, yang tadi saya ada baca Klausa A dan atas punya barisan 4 tersebut. Jikalau Plaintif ingin menjual sahamnya selepas enam tahun, Plaintif haruslah menjual balik kesemua sahamnya secara en bloc dalam syarikat Miracle Land kepada Defendan. Betul? Ikut betul perenggan A, Item A. Ok. Sekarang kita rujuk balik penyata saksi Pn Lee ya. Soalan dan Jawapan 7(2) di muka surat 3. Di perenggan 7(2) barisan akhir kedua. Dari atas ya, dari bawah. Sorry. “Dia sendiri akan membeli saham-saham pelabur-pelabur yang bising tersebut.” Di sini saya katakan kepada kamu, kamu bermaksud Defendan sendiri akan membeli balik saham-saham bagi pelabur-pelabur yang bising. Betul? Jika atas permintaan Miracle Land, betul. Di mana ada nyata atas permintaan di soalan – Saya – Jawapan, bukan. Dengar dulu, Pn Lee. Sekarang saya secara spesifik 37 rujuk 7(2). Ok. 7(2) cakap dia sendiri akan – JUDGE Lim Kim Hin ini membeli bagi pihak apa ini, membeli daripada pelabur-pelabur tersebut bukannya Miracle Land. Mengapa ya? Yang Arif, boleh ulang soalan? JUDGE Mengapa dalam surat ini, mengapa perlu Lim Kim Hin membeli daripada apa ini, pelabur-pelabur dan bukannya Miracle Land yang membeli? Mengapa perlu Lim beli? Sebab masa itu selepas Angel Fund raising tamat, so, ada perbincangan antara pengarah-pengarah dengan Mr Lim. Pengarah kata risau takut nanti enam tahun tak dapat listing jika ada pelabur bising macam mana? So, Alan masa itu janji jika ada orang bising, Alan janji akan beli. Itu sebab itu Alan janji kepada Miracle Land. Jika atas permintaan Miracle Land ada kata minta Alan beli saham pemegang shareholder tersebut lah, so, Alan perlu beli lah. Sebab Alan janji kepada pengarah-pengarah jangan risau. Jika ada, Alan setuju atas permintaan Miracle Land, Alan akan belikan. Maksudnya Alan janji kepada pengarah Miracle Land. Jika atas permintaan pengarah Miracle Land untuk Alan failkan jaminan dia, so, Alan perlu ikut lah. Tapi Miracle Land tak pernah dapat apa-apa makluman dari shareholder kata nak jual share. JUDGE Ya. Teruskan, Tuan. Tapi tidak perlu melibatkan nama pelabur dalam surat jaminan 2 tersebut? Betul. Betul. Tetapi dalam kes ini, saya rujuk balik ya, muka surat 1 dan 2. Nama pelabur ada dinyatakan sebagai pemegang saham. Setuju? Betul. Betul saya tulis surat ini, tulis – Jadi, saya katakan kepada kamu penjelasan kamu bahawa ini merupakan satu jaminan antara Defendan dan Miracle Land – Betul. Adalah tidak benar. Setuju atau tidak? Tidak. JUDGE Sebab itu soalan daripada peguam tadi mengapa nama Lee Teck Tiong ini mesti ada dalam surat ini sekiranya perjanjian itu di antara Lim dengan Miracle. Miracle Land. JUDGE So, mengapa wujud nama Lee Teck Tiong ini, Puan? Sebab semasa saya buat surat, terlalu ramai shareholder particular semua berlainan. Waktu itu saya fikir cara terbaik buat surat adalah saya asingkan semua. Sebab mereka punya nama, IC, dengan tarikh cek, amaun cek semua berlainan. Waktu itu saya fikir ini cara terbaik. Itu sebab saya masukkan asing-asing. Saya tak dapat senaraikan semua dalam satu list lah. JUDGE Baik. Itu sebab saya tuliskan “the said shareholder” lah. Ok. Tak apa. Kita teruskan. So, tadi saya ulang balik soalan saya yang merujuk kepada penyata saksi ya. Jawapan 7(2). Kamu sendiri sini ada nyatakan bahawa Defendan iaitu Alan Lim sendiri akan membeli saham-saham pelabur-pelabur yang bising tersebut. Betul? Betul. Jadi, jikalau kita cross-refer balik kepada surat jaminan di muka surat 10 1 dan juga 2, ia juga jelas bahawa Defendan merupakan pihak yang perlu membeli saham Plaintif jikalau syarikat Miracle Land tidak disenaraikan dalam bursa saham dalam tempoh, selepas tempoh enam tahun. Setuju? Jika atas permintaan Miracle Land. Tak. Setuju atau tidak? Tidak. Sebab kamu asyik cakap jikalau terdapat permintaan Miracle Land. Tetapi dalam, saya tidak jumpa di mana-mana dokumen ada menyatakan syarat tersebut. Setuju? Sini tak nyatakan. Tak ada dalam mana-mana dokumen. Jika boleh, kamu boleh tunjukkan kepada Mahkamah yang mulia ini. Ada tak syarat yang menyatakan jaminan ini hanya berkuat kuasa jikalau terdapat permintaan oleh Miracle Land? Sebab saya – Ada atau tidak? Tak ada.”

Sementara itu SD 4 iaitu salah seorang bekas Pengarah Syarikat Miracle Land Holdings Berhad juga turut memberikan keterangan dan menyatakan bahawa tujuan surat jaminan tersebut seperti yang berikut: “TLK Ok. Tadi jawapan di Soalan 4 Dato' nyatakan bahawa surat ini sebenarnya surat jaminan kepada syarikat. Ini jawapan Dato' kan? Ok. dan soalan saya adakah Dato' setuju dengan saya bahawa perkataan yang digunakan di sini “Hereby guarantee to buy from” nama Plaintif dia sebenarnya bukan jaminan kepada syarikat tapi janji ataupun jaminan kepada Plaintif? Setuju atau tidak? DH Tak setuju.”

Penelitian kepada keterangan kedua-dua pihak dan dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan adalah jelas bahawa isu utama dalam kes ini ialah penentuan sama ada surat jaminan yang telah dinyatakan di perenggan 3 di atas adalah melibatkan pihak Plaintif dan Defendan atau pihak lain. Sekiranya Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa surat jaminan itu adalah berkaitan dengan pihak Plaintif dan Defendan, adakah terdapat pemecahan terma-terma kontrak di dalam surat jaminan tersebut. Pada hemat Mahkamah inilah dua isu utama yang timbul dalam kes ini.

Penelitian kepada surat jaminan tersebut jelas tertera dua nama iaitu Defendan dan Plaintif. Oleh itu Mahkamah perlu melihat apakah yang dimaksudkan suatu kontrak jaminan. Hakikat kontrak jaminan telah dinyatakan dengan menarik dalam Sinnadurai Law of Contract, 4th Edition yang memetik Anson’s Law of Contract (29th Edn) di muka surat 80 seperti yang berikut: “In a contract of guarantee there must be always three parties in contemplation: a principle debtor (whose liability may be actual or prospective), a creditor, and a promisor (guarantor) who promises to discharge the debtor’s liability if the debtor should fail to do so. The guarantor’s liability is therefore secondary to that of the principle debtor. In a contract of indemnity, however, the promisor is primarily liable, either alone or jointly with the principle debtor, and undertakes to discharge the liability in any event whether or not the principal debtor makes default.”

Penelitian kepada duluan kehakiman yang berkaitan dengan undang-undang kontrak jaminan dapat membantu Mahkamah ini untuk memahami apakah sebenarnya yang dimaksudkan dengan satu kontrak jaminan. Ini misalnya dapat dilihat dalam kes Re Conley (trading as Caplan & Conley), Ex parte The Trustee v Barclays Bank Ltd; Re Conley (trading as Caplan & Conley), Ex parte The Trustee v Lloyds Bank Ltd, [1938] 2 All ER 127. Dalam kes tersebut Lord Greene MR menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “ …. The earliest definition of guarantee which I have been able to discover in any legal work is contained in Fell's Treatise on the Law of Mercantile Guaranties and of Principal and Surety in General (2nd Edn), published in 1820. A guarantee is there defined as follows, at p 1: 'A guarantee is a promise to answer for the payment of some debt, or the performance of some duty, in case of the failure of another person, who is, in the first instance, liable to such payment or performance.' It was enforceable by a special action on the case (p 31). De Colyar on Guarantees (3rd Edn), p 1, defines a guarantee as follows: 'A guarantee is a collateral engagement to answer for the debt default or miscarriage of another person.' In Rowlatt on Principal and Surety (2nd Edn), p1, the definition of a surety is: 'one who contracts with an actual or possible creditor of another to be responsible to him by way of security, in addition to that other, for the whole part of the debt.' In Smith's Mercantile Law (13th Edn), p 546, a guarantee is defined as: 'a promise to answer for the payment of some debt, or the performance of some duty, in case of the failure of another person, who is himself, in the first instance, liable to such payment or performance.' In Halsbury's Laws of England (Hailsham Edn), Vol 16, p 3, a guarantee is defined as: 'an accessory contract, whereby the promisor undertakes to be answerable to the promisee for the debt, default, or miscarriages of another person, whose primary liability to the promisee must exist or be contemplated.' All these definitions (with the possible exception of that quoted from Rowlatt on Principal and Surety) appear to postulate the existence of a personal liability of the surety or guarantor in respect of the matter guaranteed. …”

Begitu juga dalam kes Moschi v Lep Air Services LTd [1973] AC 331 dinyatakan seperti yang berikut: “It is because the obligation of the guarantor is to see to it that the debtor performed his own obligations to the creditor that the guarantor is not entitled to notice from the creditor of the debtor's failure to perform an obligation which is the subject of the guarantee, and that the creditor's cause of action against the guarantor arises at the moment of the debtor's default and the limitation period then starts to run. It is also why, where the contract of guarantee was entered into by the guarantor at the debtor's request, the guarantor has a right in equity to compel the debtor to perform his own obligation to the creditor if it is of a kind in which a court of equity is able to compel performance: see Ascherson v. Tredegar Dry Dock and Wharf Co. Ltd. [1909] 2 Ch. 401. It is the existence of this right on the part of the guarantor that accounts for the rule laid down by Lord Eldon in Samuell v. Howarth (1817) 3 Mer. 272, 278 and approved by your Lordships' House in Creighton v. Rankin (1840) 7 Cl. & F. 325, 346 that where the creditor, after the guarantee has been entered into, gives a contractual promise to the debtor to allow him time to pay the guaranteed debt, the guarantor is discharged from his obligation to the creditor. This is because the creditor by altering the debtor's obligation to him has deprived the guarantor of his equitable right to compel the debtor to perform his original obligation to the creditor, which was all that the guarantor had guaranteed. In contrast, the guarantor is not discharged by the mere voluntary forbearance of the creditor to take steps to obtain timeous performance by the debtor of the obligation which is the subject of the guarantee; for this does not affect the guarantor's equitable right to compel the debtor to perform it. It follows from the legal nature of the obligation of the guarantor to which a contract of guarantee gives rise that it is not an obligation himself to pay a sum of money to the creditor, but an obligation to see to it that another person, the debtor, does something; and that the creditor's remedy for the guarantor's failure to perform it lies in damages for breach of contract only. That this was so, even where the debtor's own obligation that was the subject of the guarantee was to pay a sum of money, is clear from the fact that formerly the form of action against the guarantor which was available to the creditor was in special assumpsit and not in indebitatus assumpsit: Mines v. Sculthorpe (1809) 2 Camp. 215.”

Sementara itu di bawah seksyen 79 Akta Kontrak telah memperihalkan berkenaan dengan kontrak jaminan seperti yang berikut: “79 "Contract of guarantee", "surety", "principal debtor", and "creditor" A "contract of guarantee" is a contract to perform the promise, or discharge the liability, of a third person in case of his default. The person who gives the guarantee is called the "surety"; the person in respect of which default the guarantee is given is called the "principal debtor", and the person to whom the guarantee is given is called the "creditor". A guarantee may be either oral or written.”

Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Bank Pembangunan Malaysia Bhd v Spring Hill Bioventures Sdn Bhd [2020] 4 MLJ 42 menyatakan seperti yang berikut berkenaan dengan perjanjian jaminan: “[32] Under a contract of guarantee, there must be three parties involved: the surety, principal debtor/borrower and the creditor. A contract of guarantee is therefore an undertaking to guarantee the obligations of a named principal. In this regard, a contract of guarantee is essentially a collateral contract by which a guarantor/surety undertakes to answer for the default of the principal debtor/borrower who is to be primarily liable to the creditor. The guarantor therefore only owes a secondary obligation to the creditor to make good the particular defaults of the principal debtor (see the cases of South East Asia Insurance Bhd v Nasir Ibrahim [1992] 2 MLJ 355 and Yeoman Credit Ltd v

Berkenaan dengan sama ada perlunya terdapat balasan dan pemakaian seksyen 80 Akta Kontrak telah dinyatakan dalam kes South East Asia Insurance Bhd v Nasir Ibrahim [1992] 2 MLJ 355 dan Yeoman Credit Ltd and Another [1961] 2 All ER 294 dan tidak diperpanjangkan perbincangannya di sini. Ini adalah disebabkan ianya sudah jelas dan nyata serta mantap prinsip undang-undang berkaitan dengannya.

Setelah memahami dan meneliti sedikit sebanyak tentang undang-undang berkaitan dengan jaminan, persoalannya sekarang ialah adakah surat jaminan tersebut adalah di antara Plaintif dan Defendan.

Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa dalam surat jaminan tersebut nama yang tertera adalah Plaintif dan Defendan. Apa yang dapat difahami daripada keterangan pihak Plaintif ialah berdasarkan kepada surat jaminan tersebut dan representasi yang dikatakan telah diberikan oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif, maka Plaintif telah membuat keputusan untuk membuat pelaburan sebanyak RM 1 juta dalam syarikat Miracle Land Holdings Berhad dan itu menyebabkan setelah tamat tempat 6 tahun tidak ada apa-apa tindakan pelaburan seperti yang dijanjikan oleh syarikat Miracle Land Holdings Berhad itu maka Plaintif telah menggunakan surat jaminan di antara Plaintif dan Defendan untuk menguatkuasakan terma-terma yang terdapat dalam surat jaminan tersebut.

Sebaliknya dalam keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak Defendan dan saksi-saksi Defendan menyatakan bahawa jaminan itu adalah di antara pihak Plaintif dan Miracle Land Holdings Berhad yang mana syarikat tersebut adalah syarikat Defendan seperti yang dinyatakan dalam keterangan yang menyatakan bahawa ini adalah jaminan bagi pihak Defendan untuk membeli kembali saham-saham daripada pelabur-pelabur sekiraya dalam tempoh 6 tahun itu pelaburan tidak dapat dilakukan.

Dalam hal ini seperti yang dinyatakan dalam kes-kes berkenaan dengan dengan kontrak jaminan, adakah dalam perkara ini Mahkamah perlu memberikan perhatian dan membezakan di antara keputusan Plaintif untuk membuat pelaburan berdasarkan representasi-representasi yang diberikan oleh pihak Defendan dengan jaminan di antara pihak dalam dokumen yang dikemukakan sebagai surat jaminan tersebut. Ia adalah satu perkara pada hemat Mahkamah ini perkara yang perlu dibezakan kerana jaminan yang ada dalam surat tersebut dan juga keterangan-keterangan menunjukkan bahawa Defendan telah membuat persetujuan dan jaminan kepada pihak syarikat Miracle Land Holdings Berhad untuk mendapatkan dan membeli kembali saham-saham daripada pelabur yang akan sekiranya selepas 6 tahun tidak dapat dilakukan melalui pelaburan tersebut.

Persoalannya adakah priviti kontrak di antara Plaintif dan Defendan berkaitan dengan surat jaminan tersebut. Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan dalam surat jaminan tersebut nama yang tertera adalah adalah Plaintif dan Defendan. Mahkamah ini perlu meneliti keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan dan memutuskan sama ada pihak Plaintif telah berjaya membuktikan tuntutannya terhadap Defendan seperti yang dikehendaki di bawah seksyen 101 Akta Keterangan 1950 bahawa kontrak jaminan itu adalah antara Plaintif dan Defendan yang akan menyebabkan sekiranya terdapatnya apa-apa pemecahan kepada terma-terma tersebut ia akan memberi hak kepada Plaintif untuk mendapatkan haknya seperti yang terdapat dalam terma dalam surat jaminan tersebut.

Adalah menjadi prinsip undang-undang kontrak yang termaklum bahawa perlu ada priviti kontrak di antara pihak-pihak. Secara mudahnya priviti kontrak membawa maksud sesuatu kontrak itu tidak boleh dikuatkuasakan oleh seseorang yang bukan pihak di dalam kontrak tersebut. Ia telah dirumuskan dengan menarik dan tepat di dalam Sinnadurai Law of Contract, Fifth Edition, Volume 1, LexisNexis 2023 di muka surat 227 seperti yang berikut: “The doctrine of privity of contract is that as a general rule, a contract cannot confer rights or impose obligations on strangers to it, i.e person who are nor parties to it. Persons who are not parties to a a contract cannot generally speaking invoke or enforce any of the terms therein against the actual contracting parties or other strangers to the contract…”

Mahkamah ini juga mendapat panduan daripada keputusan daripada kes Kepong Prospecting Ltd & Ors v Schmidt [1968] 1 MLJ 170 berkenaan dengan priviti kontrak ini apabila Lord Wilberforce menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “The real question which arises as to this agreement is whether it could be enforced by Schmidt who in his personal capacity was not a party to it. In the first place there can, in their Lordships' view, be no doubt that if the agreement were governed by English Law, Schmidt would be unable to enforce it. Their Lordships need, on this point, do no more than state their agreement with the judgment of the Federal Court which correctly stated the law from well-known passages in the opinions of the House of Lords in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915] AC 847 at p 853 and Scruttons Ltd Midland Silicones Ltd [1962] AC 446 at p 468. But it was suggested that in this respect the law of Malaysia differed from the law of England in admitting the principle of jus quaesitum tertio. Their Lordships are of opinion that the appellant company failed to make good this contention. Their Lordships were not referred to any statutory provision by virtue of which it could be said that the Malaysian law as to contracts differs in so important a respect from English law. It is true that section 2(d) of the Contracts (Malay States) Ordinance gives a wider definition of “consideration” than that which applies in England particularly in that it enables consideration to move from another person than the promisee, but the appellant was unable to show how this affected the law as to enforcement of contracts by third parties, and it was not possible to point to any other provision having this effect. On the contrary paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (e) support the English conception of a contract as an agreement on which only the parties to it can sue.”

Prinsip ini juga dijelaskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Dae Hanguru Infra Sdn Bhd v Baldah Toyyibah (Prasarana) Kelantan Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2022] 4 MLJ 51 seperti yang berikut: “[52] In law, a binding contract with one party cannot bind another party without any proper novation being made to bind that new party. The Court of Appeal correctly concluded that there cannot be a binding agreement between the first defendant and the plaintiff even if there was a binding agreement between the first defendant and the CDJV.”

Keputusan dalam kes Kepong Prospecting Ltd & Ors v Schmidt (supra) telah disimpulkan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Suwiri Sdn Bhd v Government of the State of Sabah [2008] 1 MLJ 743 dengan menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “In Schmidt v Kepong Prospecting Ltd & Ors [1964] MLJ 416 the Federal Court recognized the application of the doctrine of privity of contract in Malaysia that a person who is not a party to a contract cannot take advantage of provisions of the contract. In this case, the appellant assisted one Tan to obtain a prospecting permit where Tan promised to pay the appellant a tribute of 1% of the selling price of iron sold. Subsequently an agreement in 1954 was made between a company and Tan under which the company took over Tan’s obligation to pay the 1% tribute. The appellant was not a party to this agreement. In 1955, an agreement was made between the company and the appellant where the company agreed to pay the appellant the 1% tribute. The appellant claimed for the tribute but the company argued that the 1954 agreement was not enforceable as the appellant was not a party to it. The Federal Court agreed with the company where the 1954 agreement could be enforced only by the company or Tan; who were the only parties to the contract.”

Kepentingan priviti kontrak dalam satu kontrak adalah dapat menentukan sama ada seseorang itu layak untuk mengambil tindakan terhadap individu yang lain berdasarkan kepada suatu kontrak. Malahan ia juga boleh menjadi penentu kepada penguatkuasaan peruntukan-peruntukan lain di bawah Akta Kontrak. Sekiranya seseorang itu tidak mempunyai priviti kontrak maka ia boleh menghalang daripada individu tersebut menguatkuasakan haknya di bawah Akta Kontrak itu sendiri. Ini dapat dilihat dalam kes Badiaddin bin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 393 seperti yang berikut: “It is necessary to bear in mind that s 66 of the Contracts Act does not create a cause of action. It only confers a discretionary remedy in the nature of restitution to be exercised by the court within the ambit of the section and within the principles of the law of contract. First, it must be borne in mind that the respondent/chargee had entered into two separate and distinct agreements with two different persons — the first with Ismail (the borrower) and the second with the appellants/chargors (the landowners) who in compliance with the requirement of the respondent gave a third party security for the loan by granting the respondent a registered charge over their Malay reservation land. From the loan agreement and the charge documents, the appellants/chargors were not a beneficiary of the loan. Neither Ismail nor the respondent was under any contractual obligation to give any part of the loan to the appellants, but there was evidence that Ismail did give some money from the disbursement of the loan to the appellants. In my view, since the appellants/chargors were not party to the loan agreement, s 66 cannot be invoked against them. Under that section, the party who is bound to restore any advantage received or to make compensation for such advantage should be construed as ‘any person’ who is a party to the agreement and has received any advantage pursuant to the terms or conditions of the invalid contract, but not otherwise. To extend the meaning of ‘any person’ in s 66 to strangers to the agreement would be in violation of the elementary principle of contract. Since the loan agreement was strictly between the respondent and Ismail, the court had no jurisdiction to order the appellants to pay under s 66 merely because he had received a fraction of the loan money from Ismail. The appellants were not a party to the loan agreement and as such there was no question of repayment by them either by way of restitution of benefit or compensation. As indicated earlier on, s 66 does not create a cause of action. It provides an equitable remedy which the court can order in favour of an innocent party against another party to an agreement who had received benefits under it although the agreement is found unenforceable by law. In this case, the appellants/chargors were not a party to the loan agreement. Their only role was to provide security for the loan, without any right to any money payable under the loan or the right to tell the respondent to whom or in what manner the loan should be disbursed. In accordance with the terms of the loan agreement, the whole loan of RM400,000 was in fact disbursed on the sole instruction of Ismail, borrower. The fact that Ismail had used the loan money received from the respondent to pay other people, including the appellants, could not make them parties or privies to the contract so as to enable the court to bring them within the ambit of s 66. The principle of tracing in the law of trust should not be applied in ordinary relationship between a financier and its customer. It would be absurd for instance to hold that if part of the loan had been used to settle Ismail's grocery bills then the grocer could be ordered to restore the money to the respondent under s 66. The truth of the matter is that only Ismail was a party and had received benefits under the loan agreement with the respondent. In any event, the loan agreement as distinct from the third party charge is perfectly valid and enforceable by law. Applying the principle of severability, the effect of the illegal charge was merely to downgrade the borrowing by Ismail from a secured to an unsecured loan. What was discovered to be void was the charge transaction between the appellants and the respondent, and as third party chargors, the appellants did not receive any ‘benefit’ within the meaning of s 66, either under the charge or the loan agreement. In the circumstances, remedy ordered by Mustapha Hussain J under s 66 was invalid as it was made without or in excess of jurisdiction. Since the judgment under s 66 was invalid, it follows that the order of sale of the appellants’ land to satisfy the said judgment must equally fall to the ground, apart from being in violation of the prohibition imposed by s 13 of the Enactment.

Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah ini juga mengambil perhatian dalam kes ini ia melibatkan tiga pihak iaitu Plaintif, Defendan dan Miracle Land Holdings Berhad. Adakah ini memberikan hak kepada Plaintif untuk menuntut kepada Defendan di atas kegagalan untuk melaksanakan surat jaminan tersebut? Mahkamah ini mendapati terdapat panduan yang menarik yang diberikan dalam kes Ambank (M) Bhd v Razshah Enterprise Sdn Bhd [2010] 2 MLJ 585 yang melibatkan perjanjian jaminan. Ia boleh membantu Mahkamah ini menimbangkan sama ada disebabkan terdapatnya satu surat jaminan maka Plaintif boleh menguatkuasakan haknya. Fakta di dalam kes tersebut dapat dilihat di para 1 seperti yang berikut: “ … This case had a chequered history and this can be seen from the background facts of the case as follows:

By way of a loan agreement dated 6 July 1983, the plaintiff agreed to grant a term loan of RM2.4m to Wan Mokhar bin Wan Endut (‘the borrower’) upon the terms and conditions stipulated therein.

On 16 June 1983, the defendant as a guarantor executed a first legal charge over its land comprising of 53 pieces of land held under qualified titled deeds HS(D) 6975/81 to 7027/81 — all in the Mukim of Hulu Kinta, Perak (‘the said lands’) to secure repayment of the loan and interest thereon together with all other sums and moneys that may become payable by the borrower under the said charge.

Under the terms of the said loan the borrower was to service the monthly interest payments and was required to repay the principal in one lump sum within two years from the date of the drawdown — and that would be by 8 July 1985.

The borrower had defaulted in payment and was indebted to the plaintiff in a sum in excess of RM2.7m as principal and interest on or about 8 July 1985.

By letter dated 7 October 1985, the plaintiff agreed to restructure the repayment of the principal sum upon the request of the borrower. The revised terms were subject to the borrower updating all the interests outstanding.

The borrower did not comply with the obligations as contained in the plaintiff's letter to him dated 7 October

With this non-compliance, the arrangement contained in the letter lapsed and it became unenforceable.

By letter dated 12 May 1986 addressed to the borrower and the defendant, the plaintiff through its then solicitors demanded payment of the balance outstanding sum unpaid to the plaintiff and that came to RM3,215,129.18 calculated as at 18 March 1986.

The borrower requested to extend the repayment due date of the principal outstanding and the plaintiff by letter dated 10 July 1987 agreed to the borrower's request. The revised terms were expressly subject to the borrower updating all the outstanding interests which came up to RM219,734.39 based on the principal outstanding sum of RM1,169,734.39.

By the same letter dated 10 July 1987, the plaintiff also gave notice to the borrower in regard to the following changes:

that the interest rate (‘the prescribed rate’) has been reduced from 15%pa on monthly rests to 4.5%pa above the plaintiff's base lending rate with effect from 1 May 1987; and

(ii) that damages on late payment (additional interest) had been reduced from 0.05% per day to 0.0493% with effect from 1 February 1987 and that with effect from 1 July 1987 it would be computed at 3% above the prescribed rate.

The borrower failed to update all the outstanding interests as required by the plaintiff in the plaintiff's letter dated 10 July 1987.

By way of a letter dated 29 April 1988 from the plaintiff's solicitors to the defendant, the plaintiff demanded payment of the sum of RM1,218,629.84 owing by the borrower as at 31 March 1988 together with interest at 14%pa from 1 April 1988.

The defendant failed not only to effect the full payment of the amount outstanding but had also committed a breach of the terms of the said charge.

The said breach continued for a period of more than seven days and this prompted the plaintiff through its solicitors to cause a statutory notice in Form 16D dated 27 May 1988 to be issued against the defendant requiring the latter to remedy the said breach within a further period of seven days from the service thereof, failing which an order for sale would be applied for. On 30 May 1988, the Form 16D notice was served on the defendant.

On 9 July 1988 the plaintiff commenced Originating Summons No 31–653 of 1988 in the High Court at Ipoh (‘the charge action’) for an order for the sale of the said lands.

On 14 December 1992 the charge action was heard by the late Mohtar Abdullah J (as he then was). The learned judge found that there was a ‘cause to the contrary’ and that an order for sale should not be granted at that stage of the proceedings. The learned judge also directed, inter alia, that the proceedings to be continued ‘as if the cause or matter had been begun by writ’ pursuant to O 28 r 8(1) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘RHC 1980’).

On 16 July 1998, Pajan Singh Gill J (as he then was) ordered, inter alia, that the statement of agreed facts and the statement of the issues in dispute be filed together with the written submissions and that all these must be exchanged between the parties.

On 30 June 1999 Pajan Singh Gill J (as he then was) directed counsel on both sides to address the issue of whether the matter was res judicata and could not be heard any further.

On 29 July 1997, Pajan Singh Gill J (as he then was) held that the doctrine of res judicata applied and he dismissed the plaintiff's application for an order for sale and he too dismissed the defendant's counterclaim.

Aggrieved by the decision that was handed down on 29 July 1997, both parties lodged an appeal.

On 24 September 2003, the Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeals and remitted both the plaintiff's charge action and the defendant's counterclaim to the High Court for case management on 1 December 2003 with ancillary directions for parties to file and serve their respective pleadings.

The plaintiff filed its statement of claim dated 6 October

The defendant filed its statement of defence and counterclaim dated 21 October 2003. The plaintiff then filed its reply and defence to the counterclaim dated 11 November 2003.

By way of summon in chambers dated 17 December 2003 the plaintiff sought to strike out the counterclaim of the defendant under O 18 r 19 of the RHC 1980 and under the inherent jurisdiction of the court.

The senior assistant registrar dismissed the plaintiff's application to strike out the defendant's counterclaim.

On appeal, the High Court allowed the plaintiff's application to strike out the defendant's counterclaim.

On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the defendant's appeal was allowed and the defendant's counterclaim was restored before the High Court.”

Isu yang perlu diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Ambank (M) Bhd v Razshah Enterprise Sdn Bhd (supra) tersebut adalah seperti yang berikut: “[2] There is only one question posed for the determination of this court in the appeal as follows: Whether a person (or other entity) who is not a party to an agreement or arrangement between two other persons can maintain an action or proceeding against one of the two other persons for a breach of the said agreement or arrangement.”

Seterusnya Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “[10] We would like to state here by reference to the question posed in this appeal, it is apparent the plaintiff has already treated that the defendant as an entity was not a party to the agreement or arrangement entered into between the plaintiff and the borrower. If that is the case then the answer that follows would naturally be that the defendant cannot maintain an action against the plaintiff. It is true in this case that the High Court allowed the plaintiff's application to strike out the defendant's counterclaim based on the ground that the defendant was not a party to the loan agreement and hence the defendant has no locus standi to commence the counterclaim against the plaintiff. However on appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the defendant's appeal and found as a fact that the loan agreement is in the nature of a contract of guarantee in which the defendant is a party. The defendant therefore has the locus standi to commence the counterclaim against the plaintiff. In this regard it is our considered view that the question posed has not been properly framed as it does not relate to a matter in respect of which a determination has been made by the Court of Appeal.”

Walau bagaimanapun dalam kes ini Mahkamah mendapati bahawa walaupun nama Plaintif dinyatakan dalam surat jaminan tersebut namun ia bukannya pihak yang terlibat dalam pelaksanaan jaminan tersebut. Apa yang Mahkamah dapat lihat dalam dokumen itu ialah Defendan membuat perjanjian dengan Miracle Land Holdings Berhad akan membeli saham-saham tersebut daripada Plaintif. Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan Plaintif akan terkesan dengan tindakan Defendan atau kegagalan Defendan untuk melaksanakan surat jaminan tersebut. Namun Mahkamah ini berpendapat ia tidak melibatkan perjanjian di antara Plaintif dan Defendan bagi membolehkan Plaintif menguatkuasakan terma-terma di dalam surat jaminan tersebut walaupun Plaintif terkesan dengan tindakan yang dilakukan oleh pihak Defendan. Fakta dalam kes ini berbeza dengan kes Ambank (M) Bhd v Razshah Enterprise Sdn Bhd (supra). Kendatipun ia melibatkan perjanjian jaminan.

Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan Plaintif sudah pasti akan kecewa dengan tindakan Defendan yang tidak dapat membeli saham-sahamnya seperti yang telah dipersetujui di antara Defendan dan Miracle Land Holdings Berhad. Ia akan menyebabkan Plaintif kerugian wang yang telah dilaburkan dengan pembelian saham-saham tersebut. Ia juga akan menyebabkan Plaintif tidak dapat melaksanakan atau tidak mendapat apa-apa remedi kerana tiada hubungan kontraktual di antara Plaintif dan Defendan.

Keprihatinan Mahkamah dan rasa simpati terhadap Plaintif dalam kes ini tidak dapat mengatasi prinsip undang-undang berkaitan dengan priviti kontrak dan undang-undang kontrak keseluruhannya. Akhirnya, Mahkamah berpendapat tuntutan pihak Plaintif adalah ditolak dan tuntutan balas juga ditolak.

Berdasarkan kepada fakta dan keterangan dalam kes ini Mahkamah berpendapat adalah adil dan munasabah untuk tiada sebarang perintah kos diberikan dalam kes ini. Bertarikh: 12 hb. Ogos 2025 (ROSLAN BIN MAT NOR) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR Peguam Bagi Pihak Plaintif : Chua Chia Ying Tetuan Nazri Aziz Masura Mak & Tan Kuala Lumpur Peguam Bagi Pihak Defendan : Francis Tan Jeng Lok dan Norhamizah Mustafa Tetuan Rosni, Francis Tan & Ho. Temerloh, Pahang Darul Makmur