The car shall at all times be properly parked, in the said lot and within the designated area, The occupant whose designated car park lot is found wrongfully occupied by another car, is advised to report to the security guards. Any vehicles parked in te areas other than the designated car park lot will be clamped or towed away at the vehicle owner expense without prior warning . Any damage caused will be the responsibility of the owner”. [36] The evidence shows that the Plaintiff’s wife’s vehicle was indeed parked at an undesignated area, and the Plaintiff admitted that the location was not one of his six 9 | P a g e allocated parking bays. The Plaintiff also conceded that he had been verbally reminded on previous occasions about the parking regulations. [37] The Plaintiff’s argument of tacit consent or acquiescence cannot succeed. The mere fact that the Defendant had not previously enforced the rule against him does not amount to a permanent waiver of its right to do so. The doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked to perpetuate a continuing breach of a lawful regulation. [38] As for the allegation of malice or selective enforcement, the Plaintiff has adduced no credible evidence to support this contention. The Plaintiff’s allegation of personal animosity with the current chairman remains speculative and unsupported by independent evidence. No other witnesses were called to corroborate his claim that other vehicles were similarly parked but left unclamped. [39] On the contrary, the Defendant’s witnesses (SD1 and SD2) testified consistently that the clamping was carried out in accordance with established House Rules and standard procedure after the Plaintiff refused to comply with prior instructions. Their evidence was unshaken in cross-examination and is supported by contemporaneous records. [41] The Court therefore accepts the Defendant’s evidence that the clamping was a lawful enforcement measure, undertaken pursuant to its statutory duty to regulate parking within the condominium premises. [42] Having found earlier that the Plaintiff has no locus standi to bring this action, the question of whether the clamping was wrongful or otherwise is, in any event, academic. Nonetheless, even on the merits, the evidence does not establish any wrongful, illegal, or malicious act on the part of the Defendant. On another note, this Court finds that the Defendant’s act of clamping the vehicle WVR 995 was lawful, justified, and carried out in accordance with the House Rules and the Strata Management Act 2013. The Plaintiff’s allegation of malice and selective enforcement is without merit. 10 | P a g e ISSUE (c): Whether the Defendant is estopped from clamping the Plaintiff’s wife’s vehicle as the Plaintiff was permitted to park at the undesignated place near the Plaintiff’s parking lots. Plaintiff’s Contention [43] The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant is estopped from clamping the vehicle because he had been parking the said Porsche at the same undesignated area for almost eight years without any objection or warning from the Defendant. He argues that the Defendant’s longstanding inaction amounted to implied consent or acquiescence, creating a legitimate expectation that he could continue to park there. [44] The Plaintiff further asserts that several previous management committees, including the one under his own chairmanship, were aware of his practice of parking there but never took enforcement action. The Defendant’s sudden decision to clamp the vehicle, he argues, was arbitrary, unfair, and contrary to the principle of consistency. [45] The Plaintiff therefore submits that by its conduct, the Defendant is now estopped from denying the existence of such permission or implied consent, and any enforcement action amounts to unfair treatment and abuse of discretion. Defendant’s Contention [46] The Defendant disputes the Plaintiff’s reliance on estoppel. It submits that the House Rules are clear and binding, and no committee or management has the power to waive or override them by acquiescence. [47] The Defendant asserts that even if the Plaintiff had parked at the undesignated area for several years, such tolerance does not confer a permanent right or create any form of estoppel against lawful enforcement. The Defendant also maintains that the Plaintiff, as a former chairman, was fully aware of the House Rules and cannot now claim ignorance or implied consent. 11 | P a g e [48] The Defendant further submits that no representation or assurance was ever made to the Plaintiff that he could park outside his designated lots. Hence, there is no factual or legal basis for estoppel to arise. The Defendant also contends that the Plaintiff does not come to court with clean hands, having himself knowingly breached the same parking rules he once enforced against other residents. Court’s Analysis and Finding [49] The doctrine of estoppel, whether by representation or conduct, requires clear proof that one party has made a representation on which the other has relied to his detriment. Mere silence, inaction, or tolerance cannot by itself constitute a representation unless it was intended to induce reliance. [50] The evidence before this Court does not establish that the Defendant or its representatives had at any time expressly permitted the Plaintiff to park at the undesignated spot. The Plaintiff’s reliance on long usage and lack of enforcement does not, in law, constitute an assurance or representation capable of founding an estoppel. [51] The House Rules, which prohibit parking outside designated bays, have remained in force throughout. Any past tolerance by the management cannot override or nullify these binding rules. The law is settled that there can be no estoppel against a statute or statutory duty. [52] The Court agrees with the Defendant’s submission that the Plaintiff does not come to equity with clean hands. The evidence shows that he was fully aware of the rules, having previously chaired the Defendant’s management committee, and yet chose to disregard them for his personal convenience. A party who knowingly breaches the same rules he once enforced cannot invoke equitable relief such as estoppel in his favour. 12 | P a g e In the Court of Appeal case of Eastern Properties Sdn Bhd v Hampstead Corporation Sdn Bhd [2007] 6 CLJ 538, Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as His Lordship then was), made the following observations: “..[14] It is beyond argument that equitable doctrines are not to be dealt with in a rigid fashion. They are, by their very nature, flexible and meant to be applied in such a fashion as produces a just result on the facts and circumstances of a given case. But there are certain basic threads that have been woven into the fabric of equitable doctrines through the pronouncements in the leading cases on the subject. One of these is that a supplicant who prays in aid equitable assistance must himself or herself be not guilty of equitable misconduct. This is sometimes put in the form of the maxim: He who comes to equity must come with clean hands. So, a contract breaker cannot successfully invoke the remedy of specific performance. So too, a trespasser may be unable to restrain the true owner of land from denying him access. Likewise, a tenant who is guilty of a breach of a covenant in his lease may be refused equitable relief from forfeiture. These are all but individual illustrations of the basic fabric..” [53] The Plaintiff’s plea of estoppel therefore fails both on the facts and in law. The Defendant’s subsequent enforcement of its rules cannot be characterised as inconsistent, oppressive, or unfair. [54] Accordingly, this Court finds that the Defendant is not estopped from clamping the vehicle WVR 995. The Plaintiff’s reliance on past tolerance is misconceived, and the enforcement action taken by the Defendant was lawful and proper, consistent with its statutory duties and the principles of equity. 13 | P a g e ISSUE (d): Whether the Defendant has unlawfully disclosed the Plaintiff’s personal information to a third party without the Plaintiff’s prior consent Plaintiff’s Contention [55] The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant unlawfully disclosed his mobile number to a third party, who later contacted him with abusive remarks. He claims that this disclosure was made by or with the knowledge of the Defendant’s chairman, Mr. Wong Peng Kok,(SD2) in breach of the Personal Data Protection Act 2010 (PDPA). Defendant’s Contention [56] The Defendant denies any such disclosure and submits that the allegation is unsupported by evidence. The Plaintiff has not identified the caller, produced any record of disclosure, or shown that the Defendant was the source of the information. The Defendant maintains that residents’ data are kept confidential and not shared with outsiders. Court’s Analysis and Finding [57] The burden lies on the Plaintiff to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the Defendant disclosed his personal data without consent. However, there is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, linking the Defendant or its officers to the alleged disclosure. The Plaintiff’s assumption that the caller must have obtained his number from the Defendant is purely speculative. [58] The Defendant’s witnesses credibly testified that residents’ information is kept confidential. The Plaintiff’s claim, being unsubstantiated and based on conjecture, cannot stand. [59] In the circumstances, this Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to prove any unlawful disclosure of personal data by the Defendant. This allegation is therefore without merit and dismissed. 14 | P a g e ISSUE (e): Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to damages, apology, and other reliefs as claimed Plaintiff’s Contention [61] The Plaintiff seeks damages for the alleged wrongful clamping of the vehicle, loss of use, and emotional distress, as well as a public apology from the Defendant. He also claims RM200 per day from the date of clamping until the removal of the clamp and interest thereon. Defendant’s Contention [62] The Defendant submits that the Plaintiff is not entitled to any relief, as he has failed to establish liability on all pleaded grounds. The Defendant contends that the claim for loss of use is untenable, as the Plaintiff is not the registered owner of the vehicle. Further, there is no legal basis for an award of damages or an order compelling an apology. Court’s Analysis and Finding [63] In view of this Court’s findings that the Plaintiff lacks locus standi and that the Defendant’s act of clamping was lawful, there is no legal or factual foundation for any claim of damages or other relief. Even otherwise, the Plaintiff has not proven any actual or quantifiable loss on the balance of probabilities. [64] The claim for loss of use must fail, as the Plaintiff is not the owner of the vehicle and has no legal right to claim damages on its behalf. The claim for emotional distress is equally unsupported by evidence, and there is no legal basis to compel a public apology. 15 | P a g e Conclusions [65] Having appraised with the established and entrenched legal principles, the relevant provision of the law, the testimony of the witnesses, documentary evidence, and the written submission made by both parties, on the balance of probabilities, this Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to establish any entitlement to damages, apology, or other relief. His claims are therefore dismissed in their entirety with the costs of RM8,000.00 to be paid to the Defendant. Dated: 9th October 2025 zarifah ............................................... Sessions Court Judge, Klang Sessions Court,