A person is said to cause an effect “voluntarily” when he causes it by means whereby he intended to cause it, or by means which at time of employing those means, he knew or had reason to believe to be likely to cause it. (lihat PP v. Khiew Bu Poh [2019] 4 CLJ 660; Abd Razak Dalek v. PP [2010] 2 CLJ 956). Rayuan Jenayah No: B-05(M)-300-06/2018 21 [34] Dalam kes PP v. Pham Ti Tuyet Mai [2019] 6 CLJ 325, Mahkamah ini melalui Mohd Zawawi Salleh, HMR (sekarang HMP) telah menyatakan kedudukan terkini mengenai pembelaan kemabukan dadah seperti berikut: “[30] This court notes that at the very first opportunity, the respondent already raised the defence of insanity and remained steadfast that she was deprived of intelligence at the time of commission of the offence. Therefore, the respondent’s defence of insanity was not a mere afterthought. [31] That, however, it is not the end of the matter. Learned DPP submitted that it was clear from the evidence adduced that it was the respondent who voluntarily consumed the ecstasy pills in large quantity. Self-induced ecstasy pills is not a defence under the law. [32] It is trite that the absence of the legally relevant capacities due to voluntary intoxication from alcohol or drugs is not considered as basis for insanity defence as stated in s. 85(ii)(a) of the PC (See PP v. Mohd Nor Riza Mat Tahar [2009] 4 CLJ 691). It can only be considered as a basis for a defence when substance had been administered to the accused involuntarily. The underlying moral and legal principle for this exception is the premise that an insane should only be excused from punishment because of his or her lack of control over the presence of the mental illness and because the mental illness was brought on due to external circumstances. Thus, individuals who “voluntarily” take substance leading to the deprivation of relevant capacities should be held responsible for their actions. However, mental illness which are the direct effect of psychoactive substances such as ecstasy are considered as a basis for insanity defence under the law. [33] Before departing with this instant appeal, we must emphasise that the granting of absolution of criminal liability on the basis of insanity should be done with utmost care and circumspection as the court must keep its Rayuan Jenayah No: B-05(M)-300-06/2018 22 guard against murderers seeking to escape punishment through a plea of insanity. The case at hand, however, does not indicate that the defence of insanity was merely used as a convenient tool to evade culpability. Conclusion [34] We are satisfied that the learned trial judge had made the correct decision based on the applicable law and the evidence adduced before him in acquitting the respondent on the ground of insanity, and in making the order under s. 348(1) of the CPC.” [35] Begitu juga pembelaan hilang akal kerana kemabukan dadah dalam kes di hadapan kami telah dibangkitkan sejak kes pendakwaan lagi bukanlah satu pembelaan yang difikirkan terkemudian. Keputusan dalam kes Pham Ti Tuyet Mai [supra] telah disahkan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan. [36] Dalam kes PP v. Aldwin Rojas Saz [2019] 1 LNS 806, juga melibatan kemabukan dadah, Mahkamah ini melalui penghakiman Abdul Rahman Sebli, HMR memutuskan mengenepikan sabitan terhadap tertuduh atas sebab hilang akal kerana kemabukan dadah yang diakui dan dipersetujui oleh pihak pendakwaan. Kami petik penghakiman dalam kes tersebut seperti berikut: “[48] Having found that the respondent was insane by reason of intoxication from Methamphetamine use when he committed the acts, what the learned trial judge should have done was to follow the procedure prescribed by section 348(1) of the CPC, which was to acquit the respondent of the two charges and to order that he be kept in safe custody in such place and manner as she thought fit and thereafter to report the case for the orders of the Yang di-Pertua Negeri of Sabah. Rayuan Jenayah No: B-05(M)-300-06/2018 23 [49] There was no necessity for the learned judge to call upon the respondent to enter his defence to the two charges as urged upon bv the learned DPP in his submissions at the close of the prosecution case, for the simple reason that the defence of insanity by reason of intoxication under section 85(2)(b) of the Penal Code had already been established, and in fact conceded by the prosecution. [50] It is true that under section 105 of the Evidence Act 1950 (“the Evidence Act”), the burden was on the appellant to prove unsoundness of mind; but to call upon him to enter his defence on the murder charge merely to discharge his burden of proof would, in the circumstances, be a total waste of time, not to mention the futility of the exercise as both the prosecution and the defence did not dispute that the respondent was insane by reason of intoxication from Methamphematine use at the time he committed the offences. That burden had already been discharged at the close of the prosecution case by the prosecution’s own evidence. [51] The order for the respondent to enter his defence to the charges would be justified if there was no evidence of his mental condition at the prosecution stage of the case and the prosecution had proceeded on the basis that he was not insane within the meaning of section 85(2)(b) of the Penal Code at the time he committed the offences. In that event, the respondent would of couse be given the liberty to call his own expert witness or witnesses to prove his defence of insanity. But that was not the case in the present appeal. [52] Having said that, we must commend the prosecution for doing the right thing, which was to call expert medical evidence to show the mental state of the respondent at the time he committed the offences, instead of insisting that it was for the respondent to do so if and when his defence was called. This spared the respondent from having to discharge his burden of proof under section 105 of the Evidence Act. Rayuan Jenayah No: B-05(M)-300-06/2018 24 [53] With regard to the learned judge’s decision to amend the murder charge under section 302 to a charge under section 304(b) of the Penal Code and then proceeding to convict him of the offence on his plea of guilty, we find it to be an error in the face of her finding that although the respondent did commit the act complained of, but by reason of insanity due to intoxication from Methamphetamine use, his act was covered by the defence under section 85(2)(b) read with section 84 of the Penal Code.” [37] Dalam kes rayuan di hadapan kami, hakim bicara telah bersetuju setelah menerima keterangan SP10 di akhir kes pendakwaan bahawa Perayu dalam keadaan hilang akal akibat kemabukan dadah dan tidak tahu perbuatannya salah di sisi undang-undang semasa melakukan pembunuhan terhadap si mati, namun hakim bicara memerintahkan Perayu untuk membela diri atas alasan Perayu menghisap dadah secara sukarela. Di akhir kes pembelaan, hakim bicara sekali lagi mengulangi kesilapan yang sama. Walaupun puas hati Perayu tidak mengetahui perbuatannya salah di sisi undang-undang, namun telah mensabitkan Perayu dengan pertuduhan atas sebab Perayu menghisap dadah dengan sukarela. Dalam penghakimannya, hakim bicara telah tersalah arah dirinya apabila memutuskan berikut: “Masalah yang dihadapi oleh Tertuduh ialah terlalu bergantung kepada dadah sehingga ia membawa kemudaratan kepada dirinya sendiri. Keadaan sedemikian tidak boleh dijadikan sebagai alasan serta perisai untuk dia melepaskan dirinya setelah ia melakukan suatu kesalahan berlawanan dengan undang-undang. Jika pun hendak dikatakan ia berupa suatu penyakit, penyakit itu dialah juga yang menjadi puncanya. Dia sendiri yang jadi penyebabnya. Dia sendiri yang mencarinya. Sikapnya serta tabiatnya yang mengambil dadah sejak berumur 20 tahun seperti yang dinyatakan oleh SP10 serta dari pengakuan Tertuduh Rayuan Jenayah No: B-05(M)-300-06/2018 25 sendiri, serta mengaku yang dia peminum alkohol yang tegar, adalah merupakan sesuatu yang dilakukan olehnya dengan secara sukarela. Oleh itu, tabiatnya itu tidak wajar dijadikan sebagai perisai bagi melindungi dirinya dari tuduhan undang-undang. Melalui pengamatan saya di sepanjang kes ini berlangsung pula, saya mendapati Tertuduh tidak menunjukkan sebarang sifat tidak siuman, hilang pertimbangan serta agresif. Ini kerana tiadanya kesan dadah serta tiadanya kesan alkohol. Malah sewaktu kes pembelaan, dia dapat membacakan text keterangannya (D33) dengan begitu cermat, jelas, tekun serta lancar. Suaranya juga tidak tersekat-sekat. Ini semua menunjukkan tanpa pengaruh dadah, kesemuanya elok. Dapat dirumuskan bahawa apabila berada di dalam pengaruh dadah serta alkohol, pertimbangan yang waras akan hilang dalam sekelip mata. Undang-undang tidak dapat mengiktiraf keadaan sedemikian bagi dijadikan sebagai alasan bagi mewajarkan seseorang melakukan apa jua kesalahan.” [38] Hakim bicara telah salah arah apabila hanya menitikberatkan kepada insiden-insiden yang berlaku selepas kejadian sedangkan apa persoalan yang lebih utama ialah sama ada Perayu telah hilang akal pada masa perbuatannya menyerang si mati. [39] Kesilapan hakim bicara ini pernah dibincangkan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan Singapura dalam kes Tan Chor Jin v. PP [2008] 4 SLR (R) 306 melalui penghakimannya seperti berikut: “24. We are of the view that the two concepts – viz, unsoundness of mind in s 84 on the one hand and insanity by reason of intoxication in s 85(2)(b) on the other – are indeed different. One should not be too astute to attribute statutory superfluousness to Parliament where the use of the word “insane” in s 85(2)(b) is concerned. Section 85(2)(b) refers to a different basis for exoneration from that afforded by s 84 as the former is grounded on intoxication-induced insanity. In contrast, the unsoundness Rayuan Jenayah No: B-05(M)-300-06/2018 26 of mind embraced by s 84 refers to an abnormal state of mind that covers diseases and deficiencies of the mind, both of which are invariably permanent conditions. The reference “temporarily or otherwise” in s 85(2)(b) is neither accidental nor superfluous. These words do not refer merely to the temporary symptoms or effects of intoxication. Rather, they refer to an abnormal state of mind that can, inter alia, be transient. In short, s 85(2)(b) reinforces the point that an otherwise normal person can, under the influence of drink or drugs, become so intoxicated that he becomes legally “insane”. This condition of insanity can be transient, as opposed to the unsoundness of mind envisaged in s 84, which must be permanent.” [40] Dalam kes PR lwn. Sidibe Mariame [2013] 4 MLRA 1; [2013] MLJU 1609, tertuduh dipaksa menelan kapsul-kapsul berisi dadah untuk dibawa keluar negara telah menjadi tidak siuman apabila beberapa kapsul tersebut telah pecah di dalam perutnya. Mahkamah telah menerima pembelaan mabuk dadah dan hilang akal yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pembelaan dan tertuduh telah dilepas dan dibebaskan daripada pertuduhan memperedarkan dadah-dadah tersebut. Keputusan pembebasan tertuduh telah disahkan oleh Mahkamah atasan.