Lee Zhen Chun v Dennis Academy Plt (JA-A72NCC-1518-09/2024)

This writ action, in essence relates to the Plaintiff's Claim against the Defendant for an amount of RM 5,940.00 in unpaid wages for January 2024, along with statutory EPF and SOCSO contributions besides interest at 5% per annum on all awards from the date of the writ of summons until full settlement.

At the conclusion of the trial, this Court found that the Plaintiff has not succeeded in proving his case against the Defendant and therefore dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim with costs to the Defendant as per scale. The following is this Court's ratio scripta in deciding such.

This suit was instituted by the Plaintiff in pursuit of his demand of the so-called unpaid wages, along with statutory EPF and SOCSO contributions for arrears of salary for January 2024.

In this suit, the Defendant is a limited liability partnership (PLT) engaging in the business of theatre production, singing group and orchestra entertainment services, event management and/or organisation and personal development courses.

The Plaintiff meanwhile is an individual, employed by the Defendant, taking the position of Production Manager wherein the scope of his job includes taking photos and videos, editing and promoting the videos through various platforms on social media.

The Plaintiff began his role in July 2020. Subsequently, he received formal salary increments effective in 2022 and 2023, bringing his monthly salary to RM5,940.001.

The Defendant contends that the relationship was mutually terminated on 31st December 2023, and that a farewell gathering was held on 5th January 2024. The Plaintiff denies this, stating that he continued to work through January 2024 and only terminated the relationship on 7th February 2024, due to the Defendant’s failure to pay his January wages.

In January 2024, one Tee Yew Soon (Dennis) (DW1) had issued instructions to the Plaintiff via WhatsApp on a financial/investment related video to be uploaded at TikTok. Allegedly, DW1 had directed the Plaintiff for a professional portrait for a business event poster. The Plaintiff then conducted a photography shooting for DW1 at the Defendant’s office (Tropez office) whereby DW1 allegedly instructed Plaintiff to edit the photos.

As a result, Plaintiff then demanded payment for January 2024 as his salary and stopped working for the Defendant. Plaintiff then formally issued a termination letter2 and terminates the relationship due to nonpayment of wages. The Defendant then issued a public “Formal Notification” in what seemed like an attempt to clear their position on this matter3.

It is to be noted that before filing of this civil suit, the Plaintiff had lodged a complaint to Jabatan Tenaga Kerja (JTK). As a result, 1 Page 11 & 19 of Common Bundle of Documents 2 Page 22 of Common Bundle of Documents 3 Page 65-68 of Common Bundle of Documents JTK found the Plaintiff’s complaint "unfounded" on the basis that the employer claimed the work ended in December 2023, but also advised the Plaintiff that he could file a case if he had further proof. Dissatisfied with that, the Plaintiff then filed this instant suit before this Court.

At trial, the Plaintiff himself testified as Plaintiff’s sole witness (PW1: Lee Zhen Chun) whereas the Defendant’s two witnesses were: a) Tee Yew Soon (DW1) : WSSD-1 b) Aervint Lee Cun Yin (DW2) : WSSP-2

The following documents have been filed and referred to throughout the proceedings:- a) Bundle of Pleadings (Encl 9) - A b) Common Bundle of Documents (Encl 16) - B

For the record, the Plaintiff on 9th June 2025, had unilaterally filed an Additional Bundle of Documents (Encl 18) (hereinafter referred to as “additional Bundle”). In regards to that, before the commencement of the trial, the Defendant’s solicitor raised an objection on the basis that the filing was done before obtaining leave of this court via an application, and in contravention of the Court’s Pre-Trial Case Management (PTCM) directions particularly the “unless order” direction by the previous Magistrate on 24th January 2025 that parties are to complete (and file) Bundle of Documents 3 weeks before the trial date, and to file Witness Statements 2 weeks before the trial date.

According to the Defendant’s solicitor, objection was made earlier to the said filing via letter and no actions were taken by the Plaintiff to properly adduce the Bundle (filing of a formal application to the Court). Noticeably, the said correspondence between the parties were not brought to the Court’s attention. To allow the admission of the said bundle at this stage of the proceeding would need the Defendant to require more time to examine voluminous documents that was included in the bundle.

In reply to that on the trial date, the Plaintiff submitted that they did in fact follow the PTCM directions by filing all the relevant documents before the trial date that was earlier fixed on 23rd & 24th June 2025 (which was vacated due to the Defendant’s solicitor’s health condition). Further, it was contended that filing of an interlocutory application to admit this Bundle would only incur unnecessary costs and time.

Crucially, it is to be noted that the Common Bundle of Documents (Encl 16) (hereinafter referred to as “CBOD”) was filed on 21st January 2025 and there was a gap of almost 5 months between the filing of the additional Bundle (Encl 18). The Plaintiff’s solicitors’ reason for this – this case was conducted by an ex-colleague of the same firm and he/she may have felt that those documents (namely the full WhatsApp conversation) are not needed for the purpose of the trial.

In ruling on the issue of admission of this Bundle, this Court is minded of the wise words of YA Zaleha Zahari JCA (as Her Ladyship then was) in the case of Item Industrial Engineering Sdn Bhd & Ors v Bank Utama (M) Bhd [2015] 3 MLJ 254 and should 6 be read in-extenso as such: “[44] The duty of an advocate and solicitor is to assist the court by presenting documentary evidence in the most convenient manner. In preparing for trial it was incumbent upon parties to prepare agreed and non-agreed bundles of documents. Bundles are made for the convenience of court and parties to facilitate a speedy trial. Documents crucial to the plaintiff’s claim should be held out. If agreed, to set them out in a proper bundle and paged in order of date. If not agreed, then copies should be made available, bound and paged in another bundle.

Whilst I agree that strict and slavish adherence to forms and rules can sometimes hinder the administration of justice, one however must also bear in mind that these forms and rules should not be disregarded for no reason whatsoever since they embody the experience of the courts over the years in the course of speedy and efficient administration of justice. Non-compliance precluded a party in breach from tendering the documents except by leave of court. ……

There clearly has been an inordinate and inexplicable delay as to why the documents in the supplementary bundle of documents were not introduced earlier. The documents were always in the possession of the plaintiff but did not find it fit to file the same….

Counsel for the plaintiff clearly has not been diligent in preparing the plaintiff’s case. Diligence means earnest and meticulous pursuit towards the attainment of one’s goal. The plaintiff’s counsel has, in my considered opinion, adopted a lackadaisical attitude in the preparation of his case and guilty of indolence. The question of denying the plaintiff the right to produce those documents does not arise. The plaintiff has only itself to blame for the predicament it had found itself in. Justice was not only to the plaintiff but also to the defendants. I am of the view that the objection taken by the defendants’ counsel should have been sustained. Not having obtained leave of the court, the plaintiff should not have been allowed to introduce additional witnesses as a matter of course, and for such witnesses to refer to the documents listed in the supplementary bundles filed at mid-way through trial also as a matter of course.

I am compelled to conclude that the learned judge had arrived at his decision on evidence the veracity of which remains suspended. The evidence led by additional witnesses by reference to the documents listed in the supplementary bundle of documents must be expunged from the court record. They should not have been taken into consideration…

Applying the above to the present facts, this Court is of the view that this additional Bundle (Encl 18) should not be allowed at this stage where it will certainly be prejudicial to the Defendant as they had prepared for trial on the basis that the earlier CBOD (Encl 16) has been filed as agreed upon by both parties. Especially, without 8 clear directions from the Court in regards to the admission of this additional Bundle (Encl 18) as the issue was not brought to the Court’s attention earlier.

Further, as reiterated above, there is an inordinate and inexplicable delay as to why this additional Bundle were not introduced earlier and/or the documents be included in the CBOD. The reason provided by the Plaintiff’s solicitor does not in my view justify such delay on the part of the Plaintiff in introducing the additional Bundle. They had ample time from the onset of the case as it was merely a WhatsApp conversation that is supposed to be well available to the Plaintiff.

This Court’s concern as it has always been, is a speedy and efficient administration of justice, and bearing in mind that the philosophy behind the new regime of civil procedure is simply to attend a ‘just, expeditious and economical’ disposal of an action (refer the case of Christopher Ak Bandi @ Josny v Tumbung Ak Nakis & Anor (Jamil Bin Sindi, Third Party) [2016] 4 MLJ 100). In that tone, this Court finds that the Plaintiff failed to justify the inordinate and inexplicable delay as to why these additional documents/Bundle (Encl 18) were not introduced earlier and as such, would not admit the same in these proceedings.

From the Plaintiff’s submission, in brief, the Plaintiff, asserts that the Defendant, had fundamentally breached their employment 9 contract by failing to pay his January 2024 salary of RM5,940.00. His submission argues that the Defendant’s various defences— that he sued the wrong entity, that he resigned in December 2023, and that he performed no work in January—are unsubstantiated and contradicted by documentary evidence. Proof of Employment Relationship [22] The Plaintiff argues that a clear contract of service existed between the parties based on several factors: i. Documentary Evidence: The Defendant issued formal salary increment letters in 2021 and 2022 on its own letterhead, signed by its partner (DW1), explicitly describing the Plaintiff as "permanent staff" and "Production Manager". Furthermore, monthly payslips from 2022 and early 2023 identified "Dennis Academy PLT" as the employer. ii. Statutory Presumption: Under Section 101C of the Employment Act 1955, an employment relationship is presumed because the Plaintiff was under the Defendant's control, used company-provided equipment (professional cameras and a laptop), and his work was integral to the Defendant's financial literacy business. iii. Admission of Tenure: A "Formal Notification" issued by the Defendant’s founder in February 2024 used terminology like "employed with us" and "Employment Tenure" to describe the relationship. Continuation of Work in January 2024 [23] The Plaintiff categorically denies the Defendant's claim that he resigned on 31st December 2023. The Plaintiff provides several points to prove he remained an active employee as such: i. WhatsApp Evidence: Logs from 5th January to 9th January 2024, show DW1 giving specific professional instructions regarding TikTok video titles for the core business and requesting a professional portrait shoot of the Plaintiff for future marketing use. ii. Work Location: The photography session on 9th January 2024, took place at the Defendant’s Tropez office, which matches its registered business address. iii. Entitlement to Remuneration: As a permanent employee with a fixed monthly salary, the Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to his full wages as long as the contract remained active and he was ready to serve. According to the Plaintiff, he only formally terminated the relationship on 7th February 2024, following the Defendant's failure to pay his January wages. Rejection of the "Wrong Entity" Defence [24] The Plaintiff further contends that the Defendant and Dennis Education Academy Sdn Bhd operate as a single economic entity. He supports this by noting that both entities share the same business address, identical logo designs, and unified management. He argues that a mere administrative transfer of payroll to the Sdn Bhd in early 2023 does not absolve the PLT of 11 its liability as the original employer of record. Challenges to the Defendant’s Credibility [25] The Plaintiff further characterizes the Defendant's lead witness (DW1) as evasive and unreliable. He highlights that DW1 admitted to authoring increment letters but then inexplicably denied their contents regarding the Plaintiff's position and salary start dates. According to the Plaintiff, DW1 damagingly testified that the Defendant manufactured payslips to help the Plaintiff deceive a financial institution for a housing loan, an admission rendering his testimony untrustworthy.

Finally, on the findings of JTK that initially labelled the Plaintiff’s claim "unfounded," the Plaintiff contends that it was a merely a preliminary finding based solely on the Defendant's unverified claim that work ended in December 2023. Having provided full trial evidence before this Court, the Plaintiff maintains that he has discharged the burden of proof to sustain his claim for RM 5,940.00, statutory EPF/SOCSO contributions, and interest as pleaded in his Statement of Claim.

On the other hand, the Defendant, Dennis Academy PLT, argues that the Plaintiff’s claim for unpaid wages in January 2024 is entirely without merit and should be dismissed. In brief, the Defendant’s submission focuses on three primary pillars: that the Plaintiff sued the wrong legal entity, that the professional relationship terminated in December 2023, and that the Plaintiff failed to prove he performed any work during the period in 12 question (January 2024 – 7th February 2024). The "Wrong Party" Defence [28] The Defendant contends that the Plaintiff has no cause of action against them because the employer-employee relationship, as it existed in 2023, was with Dennis Education Academy Sdn Bhd, and not the Defendant (Dennis Academy PLT). The Defendant asserts that since early 2023, all salary payments and statutory contributions (EPF/SOCSO) were handled exclusively by the Sdn Bhd entity.

They argued that the Plaintiff was fully aware of this change, as his bank statements and payslips from March to December 2023 clearly identified Dennis Education Academy Sdn Bhd as the payer. In that regards, the Defendant maintains that these are distinct legal entities and that the Plaintiff’s failure to sue the entity that actually paid his wages is fatal to his claim. Termination of Relationship [30] The Defendant asserts that the "collaboration" with the Plaintiff officially ended on 31st December 2023. They claim that after discussions with the company’s General Manager, the Plaintiff agreed to end the fixed-salary arrangement at the close of 2023. In pursuant to that, a social gathering was held on 5th January 2024 at a restaurant and this event was characterized by the Defendant as a farewell/appreciation event where they discussed potentially moving to a project-based (case-to-case) collaboration for the future, rather than a continuation of employment.

The Defendant further highlighted that the company had publicly announced on social media as early as November 2023 that there would be no seminars or programs held in 20244, meaning there was no work available for a Production Manager to perform. Failure to Prove "Work Done" [32] It is to be noted that central to the Defendant’s defence is the legal definition of "wages" under Section 2 of the Employment Act 1955, which defines them as payments for "work done". In that context, the Defendant argued that the Plaintiff provided no evidence— such as raw footage, edited files, or social media uploads—to show that he indeed performed his duties (eg: recording, editing, or administration) in January 2024.

During the trial, the Defendant pointed out that the Plaintiff had admitted that he had no proof of working the standard 9-to-6 hours during that month. On the Plaintiff’s contention that the DW1 instructed the Plaintiff to carry out some works in relation to a TikTok video and the photography session on 9th January 2024, the Defendant explained that the WhatsApp interactions in January 2024 were personal favours or friendly assistance requested by the DW1 as the Plaintiff at that point of time still had the company’s camera equipment in his possession. Labor Office (JTK)’s Finding [34] The Defendant places significant weight on a letter from the Jabatan Tenaga Kerja (JTK) Johor Bahru dated 13th March 2024. 4 Page 37-38 of Common Bundle of Documents Following an investigation, JTK initially labelled the Plaintiff's complaint as "unfounded" (tidak berasas) as he could not provide concrete proof of work performed between January 1 and February 8, 2024. Legal and Statutory Arguments [35] Apart from that, the Defendant emphasizes that the legal burden lies entirely with the Plaintiff to prove his claim on a balance of probabilities, which they argued that he failed to do so. The Defendant further argues that, according to Section 2(b) of the Employment Act 1955, statutory contributions such as EPF and SOCSO are specifically excluded from the legal definition of "wages" and therefore cannot be claimed as part of unpaid salary.

The Defendant too, noted that the Plaintiff had refused to return the company equipment, including cameras and hard drives, which eventually necessitated a police report5 for their recovery of the same.

As a result of all these, the Defendant strenuously objected the Plaintiff’s claim and prayed to this Court for the Plaintiff’s claim to be dismissed with cost.

In order therefore to adjudicate the matter, it is of utmost importance for this Court to determine the direction of which the balance of probabilities tilts. After presenting the facts and, if disputed, the evidence provided by each party, a Plaintiff is 5 Page 34-36 of Common Bundle of Documents 15 deemed to have proven his case if the balance of probabilities leans in his favor. The burden then shifts on the Defendant to rebut the same.

Albeit the fact that many exposition been given by the higher courts as well as the apex court in regards the burden of proof in civil trials, suffice for this Court to quote the judgment of His Lordship David Wong CJSS (as he then was) in the Federal Court case of TR Sandah ak Tabau & Ors (suing on behalf of themselves and 22 other proprietors, occupiers, holders and claimants of native customary rights (NCR) land situated at Rumah Sandah and Rumah Lajang, Ulu Machan, 96700 Kanowit, Sarawak) v Director of Forest, Sarawak & Anor and other appeals [2019] 6 MLJ 141 as such: “[19] It is trite that denials and putting the plaintiff to strict proof does not change the standard of proof required in civil cases, which remains as upon a balance of probabilities and is upon the party who relies on that fact to succeed (ss 101, 102 & 103 Evidence Act 1950). An assertion that is inherently improbable contributes nothing to the balance. But any evidence that is admitted into evidence, however little it may be, adds to the balance, and if there is no evidence adduced to contradict and outweigh it, it is accepted that he has discharged the burden of proof that is upon him. The key word in the phrase ‘balance of probabilities’ is not the word ‘probabilities’, but the word ‘balance’. This explains the principle of the shifting of the balance, that once a plaintiff has adduced some evidence that is not incredible, the burden shifts to the other party to adduce evidence to contradict it. He needs to adduce only sufficient 16 evidence to outweigh the evidence adduced by the plaintiff. But if he fails to do so, then the balance of probabilities is in favour of the plaintiff.” [40] This position was reiterated in multiple cases and at this juncture, this Court finds guidance in the case of Pioneer Conglomerate Sdn Bhd v Tenggara Kapital Sdn Bhd [2021] MLJU 2607 wherein the High Court has briefly explained the concept of the burden of proof in civil cases as follows: “[39] In a civil case the plaintiff bears both the legal and evidential burden of proof (See: sections 101 and 103 Evidence Act 1950). The legal burden is imposed by law and remains with the plaintiff throughout the trial and never shifts to the defendant. On the other hand, the evidential burden moves to and from between the plaintiff and the defendant depending on the state of the evidence introduced at any one stage of the trial, and unless and until the plaintiff discharges his evidential burden by establishing a prima facie case, there is no burden on the defendant to prove his defence, no matter how weak his defence might be.” [41] Therefore, in order to determine the outcome of the Plaintiff's action against the Defendant in this case, it is of utmost importance for this Court to analyze the evidence and exhibits presented by the parties together with the testimony given by the witnesses of both parties to determine the direction where the balance of probabilities tilts.

From the pleadings of both parties, particularly Encl 14, a number of issues had been identified to be tried. But as the Plaintiff’s claim is merely for the salary of January 2024 amounting to RM 5,940.00, the most important issue of all would be whether there were any works done by the Plaintiff for the Defendant which falls within the employment in January 2024.

While that is the overriding issue in this trial, other subsidiary issues of significance require this Court to deal with the questions such as: i. Whether the Plaintiff was appointed as Production Manager by the Defendant since July 2020; ii. Whether the Defendant was the employer of the Plaintiff; iii. Whether the Plaintiff continued to work with the Defendant until February 2024; iv. If the answer to the above is yes, whether the Plaintiff is entitled to unpaid wages for January 2024 (RM5,940.00) and statutory contributions (KWSP & PERKESO); v. Whether the Plaintiff have a valid cause of action against the Defendant.

These issues will hereunder be dealt with next, albeit not necessarily in the order they appear above. Some of the issues too will be combined as not to cause any redundancy.

Before I deal with the laws and principle applicable relating to the Plaintiff’s claim, be it noted that the Plaintiff, dissatisfied with the decision of this Court has filed an appeal to the High Court notwithstanding the fact that his claim in principle is for an amount of RM 5,940.00.

Pertaining to that, reference is made to section 28 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, which reads: "28. Civil appeals from subordinate courts

No appeal shall lie to the High Court in any of the following cases:

subject to any other written law, from a decision of a subordinate court in any civil cause or matter where the amount in dispute or the value of the subject matter is ten thousand ringgit or less except on a question of law;

where a subordinate court dismissed any application for a summary judgment;

where a subordinate court dismissed any application to strike out any writ or pleading; and

where a subordinate court allowed any application to set aside a judgment in default." [47] It should be noted that the Plaintiff's claim involves an amount of RM 5,940.00, which falls below the statutory threshold of RM 10,000.00. This means that, according to the provisions of the law, in general, the Plaintiff is barred from filing an appeal to the High Court on this matter, unless there is a question of law that needs to be decided by the High Court. [48] In that context, the burden is on the Plaintiff to raise any questions of law for determination by the High Court at the appellate stage as this Court, being the trial court, has made findings of fact based on the evidences and testimonies properly brought before this Court. Plaintiff’s Cause of Action [49] Overall, it is evident that the Plaintiff's cause of action against the Defendant is for unpaid salary of RM 5,940.00. Further, it was agreed by both parties that there was no employment contract that was entered into between the Defendant and the Plaintiff6. As such, the Plaintiff invokes the presumptions under Section 101C

& (2) of the Employment Act 1955, wherein it was provided that in the absence of a written contract, an employer-employee relationship is presumed if one of the criteria are met. [50] For convenience, the relevant provisions are herein reproduced: “Presumption as to who is an employee and employer 101C. (1) In any proceeding for an offence under this Act, in the absence of a written contract of service relating to any 6 Agreed Facts (Encl 13) category of employee under the First Schedule, it shall be presumed until the contrary is proved that a person is an employee—

where his manner of work is subject to the control or direction of another person;

where his hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another person;

where he is provided with tools, materials or equipments by another person to execute work;

where his work constitutes an integral part of another person’s business;

where his work is performed solely for the benefit of another person; or

where payment is made to him in return for work done by him at regular intervals and such payment constitutes the majority of his income.

For the purpose of subsection (1), it shall be presumed until the contrary is proved that a person is an employer—

where he controls or directs the manner of work of another person;

where he controls or directs the hours of work of another person;

where he provides tools, materials or equipments to another person to execute work;

where the work of another person constitutes an integral part of his business;

where another person performs work solely for his benefit; or

whether or not payment is made by him in return for work done for him by another person.” Whether the Plaintiff was appointed as Production Manager by the Defendant since July 2020 and thus, whether the Defendant was the employer of the Plaintiff? [51] To answer this question in issue, this Court refers to salary increment letters dated 25th December 2021 and 26th December 2022 under the Defendant’s letterhead “Dennis Academy PLT”. These letters explicitly describe the Plaintiff as “permanent staff” and his position as “Production Manager”. [52] Besides that, another documentary evidence that supports this Plaintiff’s contention is a document titled “Formal Notification” dated 12th February 2024 that confirms the Plaintiff’s employment. Interestingly, this particular document was issued by Dennis Education Academy Sdn Bhd. However so, the letter also states that the Plaintiff was “employed with us from July 1, 2020, to December 31, 2023” and further refers to this period as his “Employment Tenure”. [53] Hence, it can be seen that during that period of time, the salary increment letters were issued by Dennis Academy PLT. Monthly payslips for the year 2022 and part of 2023, too explicitly state the Defendant “Dennis Academy PLT” as the Plaintiff’s employer7. Given so, it is unreasonable for the Defendant to contend that the Plaintiff was in fact “collaborating” with Dennis Education 7 Pages 12-21 of Common Bundle of Document Academy Sdn Bhd and the nature of the relationship between the Plaintiff and the Sdn Bhd company was mere collaboration as this contradicts their own documentary evidence. [54] As such, it is agreed that the Plaintiff’s status as a permanent employee is not a matter of mere oral assertion but it is grounded upon formal documents issued by the Defendant itself. Relationship Between the Defendant (Dennis Academy PLT) and Dennis Education Academy Sdn Bhd [55] At this juncture, this Court is of the opinion that the relationship between the Defendant (Dennis Academy PLT) and Dennis Education Academy Sdn Bhd should be clarified as the Defendant’s primary defence (as stated earlier) is that the Plaintiff has sued the wrong party. [56] To begin with, the most crucial document that could shed a light on this is the SSM Search8 of the Defendant. It is interesting to note that in page 9 of the CBOD, it clarifies that the Dennis Education Academy Sdn Bhd is a partner of the Defendant’s company. This justifies the fact that some of the abovementioned documents were issued by the Defendant per se, while some were issued by the Sdn Bhd company. [57] Premised on that, the Plaintiff contended that even if the Sdn Bhd company is the entity who continued to pay for the Plaintiff’s salary from early of 2023, a mere administrative transfer of payroll from one entity (Dennis Academy PLT) to another (Dennis Education 8 Pages 6-9 of Common Bundle of Documents Academy Sdn Bhd) does not alter the fundamental employment relationship that exists between the Plaintiff and the Defendant established since July 2020. [58] This gave rise to the question of whether the Defendant is a proper party for the action to be brought against and whether there is a cause for the lifting of the corporate veil. [59] Comparing the documents by both these companies as enclosed in the CBOD, this Court finds that indeed: both entities share the same business address; and the logo design on the letterheads of both entities is identical. This gave rise to the inference that both these companies seem to be placed under the same management and are deemed to operate as a single economic unit and entity. [60] The Plaintiff finds support in the Court of Appeal case of Sri Maju Sarata Ekspres Sdn Bhd v. Segar Munusamy & Ors [2026] 1 CLJ 306 in submitting that companies operating under unified leadership with shared resources are to be treated as a single integrated unit. This Court concurs. [61] Further, I am minded of the principle that a company is a separate legal entity from its shareholders and other companies, as a nailed principle from the decision of the House of Lords in Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22. [62] Nevertheless, in the above-mentioned case of Sri Maju [supra], the Court of Appeal further referred to the case of Hotel Jaya Puri Bhd v National Union of Hotel, Bar & Restaurant Workers & Anor [1980] 1 MLJ 109 and the more recent Federal Court case of Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] 3 MLJ 622; [2021] 4 CLJ 821 in reiterating the principle that the veil of incorporation can be lifted when the justice of the case so demands. [63] This Court deems it necessary to reproduce an excerpt of the judgment of Justice Collin Sequerah JCA (as he then was) in the case of Sri Maju [supra] as the facts mentioned can be relevantly mirrored and applied to the instant case before this Court: “[16] That case has shown that the corporate veil may be lifted where it is shown that the company is being used as a facade to conceal true facts, commit fraud, or evade legal obligations. The burden of proof rests on the party seeking to lift the veil to demonstrate clear evidence of such improper use. [17] The question therefore arises as to whether Sri Maju, Aneka, Azra, and Germuda, despite being separate legal entities, should be treated as a single employer under the banner of Sri Maju for the purposes of this legal action. [18] The appellant argues that there is no statutory or common law basis to deviate from the principle of separate legal entities. They assert that each respondent’s employer is clearly defined in their respective contracts, and payments made by other group companies were merely done for administrative convenience and does not alter the contractual relationships. [19] The stark realities however painted a very different picture. The evidence indicated that Sri Maju, Aneka, Azra, and Germuda were managed under a unified leadership and operate with a cohesive management structure. The Sri Maju logo was on the uniforms of the employees and vehicles. [20] The pay slips issued to the employees were by Sri Maju notwithstanding that some of them were employees of other companies within the group. [21] The prevailing circumstances alluded to above strengthened the perception that the employees were in fact working for a single employer. [22] It showed that these companies functioned as a single integrated unit and thus had blurred the lines between the formal legal separation of the entities. [23] The sum total of the evidence and the circumstances showed that Sri Maju, Aneka, Azra and Germuda operated as a single and unified entity with shared resources, branding and administration including a common payroll system. [24] We therefore agree with the finding of the learned High Court judge (‘HCJ’) that the respondents have successfully discharged the burden of proof in showing that all these companies in fact operated as a single economic unit and entity. [25] This was therefore a fit and proper case for the lifting of the corporate veil in the circumstances with the result that Sri Maju was properly treated as the employer of all 36 respondents. [64] Applying the principle as aforesaid, this Court too believes that this is a proper case for lifting of the corporate veil in finding that the Defendant (Dennis Academy PLT) and Dennis Education Academy Sdn Bhd indeed operated as a single economic unit and entity and thus is the employer of the Plaintiff in the absence of a written contract of service, within the ambit of section 101C of the Employment Act 1955. [65] Hence, the Defendant’s “Wrong-Party” and “Collaboration” defence should not hold water where this Court finds that the Plaintiff rightfully have a valid cause of action against the Defendant. Whether the Plaintiff continued to work with the Defendant until February 2024 and whether the Plaintiff is entitled to unpaid wages for January 2024 (RM5,940.00) and statutory contributions (KWSP & PERKESO) [66] To this Court, the issues elaborated above were rather the set-up to the main issue in question of this suit. Having found the above issues in favour of the Plaintiff, this Court moves on to deal with the primary issue of whether there was any work done by the Plaintiff for the Defendant in January 2024. [67] Flowing from the Plaintiff’s pleadings, his claim against the Defendant is for his unpaid arrears of salary of RM 5,940.00 as well as statutory contributions required to be paid by the Defendant as the employer including EPF (KWSP) and SOCSO (PERKESO) contributions. [68] This roots back to the definition of ‘wages’ as provided under Section 2 of the Employment Act 1955 as such: “ "wages" means basic wages and all other payments in cash payable to an employee for work done in respect of his contract of service but does not include-

the value of any house accommodation or the supply of any food, fuel, light or water or medical attendance, or of any approved amenity or approved service;

any contribution paid by the employer on his own account to any pension fund, provident fund, superannuation scheme, retrenchment, termination, lay-off or retirement scheme, thrift scheme or any other fund or scheme established for the benefit or welfare of the employee;

any travelling allowance or the value of any travelling concession;

any sum payable to the employee to defray special expenses entailed on him by the nature of his employment;

any gratuity payable on discharge or retirement; or

any annual bonus or any part of any annual bonus.” [69] Here, section 2(b) of the said Act as above should also be carefully looked at as this defeats the Plaintiff’s claim for EPF (KWSP) and SOCSO (PERKESO) contributions, statutorily. In that premise, the Plaintiff's claim which include EPF and SOCSO are not included within the meaning of "Wages" as defined above, and as such should be dismissed. [70] Further to that, the term ‘work done in respect of his contract of service’ should be given a proper evaluation in deciding the Plaintiff’s claim of RM 5,940.00. [71] This Court takes guidance on the Supreme Court case of Lee Fatt Seng v. Harper Gilfillan [1980] Sdn Bhd [1988] 1 CLJ Rep 156 as follows: “It seems that the words "work done" in the definition of "wages" are used so as to stress on the requirement that the remuneration must be for work done in respect of the contract of service of the employee concerned, so that any payment made to him by the employer ex gratia, not for work done or to be done, and not in connection with the contract of service, is not part of the wages.” [72] In the instant case, the Defendant contended that the Plaintiff has admitted that there is no other evidence to show that there was any "works done" for January 2024 at all except for the photography session suggested by the Plaintiff himself and not at the Defendant's direction. [73] The cross-examination sessions were quoted by the Defendant’s solicitor to point out the followings: i) No evidence that the scope of work has been done. Cross Examination of PW1 9 Peg.Def: Rujuk mukasurat 24 Ikatan B. Setuju bahawa ini surat daripada pejabat Tenaga Kerja Johor Bahru? SP1: Setuju Peg.Def: Bahagian pertama boleh bacakan? SP1: Sudah baca Peg.Def: (Dibacakan). Setuju bahawa Pejabat Tenaga Kerja Johor Bahru juga mempunyai kesimpulan yang sama seperti saya katakan pada kamu tadi? SP1: Tidak setuju Peg.Def: Setuju bahawa hasil siasatan itu menunjukkan aduan kamu tidak berasas? SP1: Tidak setuju Peg.Def: Setuju bahawa itu memang apa yang dinyatakan dalam surat tadi? SP1: Setuju Peg.Def: Di perenggan kedua, Pejabat Tenaga Kerja menyatakan sekiranya kamu mempunyai bukti kamu dinasihatkan untuk fail di Pejabat Tenaga Kerja Johor Bahru lagi, setuju? SP1: Setuju 9 Page 36-37 Notes of Evidence Peg.Def: Setuju bahawa kamu tidak berikan apa-apa bukti selepas itu? SP1: Setuju ii) No evidence of video recording and editing in January 2024. Cross Examination of PW1 10 Peg.Def: Setuju kalau mahkamah pada hari ini, kamu ada buat rakaman, suntingan dan penyiaran gambar atau video seperti yang kamu katakan di soalan 4, 5, 6 penyata saksi kamu? SP1: Tidak setuju Peg.Def: Tunjukkan pada saya? SP1: Tiada iii) No evidence of the Plaintiff working from 9 am to 6 pm. Cross Examination of PW111 Peg.Def: Di soalan 6, kamu setuju bahawa kamu tidak ada bukti yang kamu kerja pukul 9 pagi hingga 6 petang, setuju? SP1: Ya saya setuju Peg.Def: Kamu pun setuju kamu tak dapat tunjuk pada Mahkamah kamu telah bekerja sepanjang Januari 2024 dari pukul 9 pagi hingga 6 petang? SP1: Ya saya setuju 10 Page 26 of Notes of Evidence 11 Page 29 of Notes of Evidence *** Peg.Def: Setuju bahawa soalan 24-26 itu tidak menunjukkan bahawa kamu kerja dari pukul 9 pagi hingga 6 petang? SP1: Setuju Peg.Def: Begitu juga dalam Q&A 24-26 tidak menunjukkan kamu membuat suntingan atau post di media sosial? SP1: Setuju [74] On the other hand, the Plaintiff contended receiving instructions from DW1 via WhatsApp12, and according to the Plaintiff, the works done fall within the scope of employment. [75] From the series of cross-examination that was exhibited, as the Defendant contended, it can be seen that: a) On 5th January 2024, DW1 did not give instructions to the Plaintiff. However, it was the Plaintiff who asked DW1 and it was not DW1’s own request nor representing the Defendant. b) DW1 has invited the Plaintiff to meet to discuss how to collaborate further. (This is a glaring statement to show that the Plaintiff is no more employed by the Defendant.) c) On 7th January 2024, it is clear that DW1 only requested the photos in the Plaintiff's possession that were taken before that. It was the Plaintiff himself who suggested taking the 12 Page 28-31 of Common Bundle of Documents photos for DW1. [76] From all these, as well as the testimony given by DW1, it can be deduced that DW1 merely accepted the Plaintiff's proposal on the basis of his belief that the Plaintiff was only helping him because of his good relationship with the Plaintiff, apart from the fact that the Plaintiff was still in possession of the Defendant company’s equipment. [77] Not just that, the documents exhibited, namely the Defendant’s letter to the Plaintiff dated 17th March 202413, Formal Notification dated 12th February 202414 and DW2’s police report dated 12th & 13th March 2024 respectively15 constantly rings one fact, that the Plaintiff had ceased to work under the Defendant’s employment effective 31st December 2024. [78] The fact that there was a farewell held for the Plaintiff on 5th January 2024 was corroborated by DW2’s testimony in Court, and this could not be successfully rebutted by the Plaintiff, except for one letter dated 19th March 202416 only in reply to the Defendant’s letter dated 17th March 2024. [79] In contrast, it was clear from the WhatsApp conversation between the Plaintiff and DW1 that they planned to discuss on further collaboration on 5th January 2024, after the termination of the Plaintiff. 13 Pages 57-58 of Common Bundle of Documents 14 Pages 65-68 of Common Bundle of Documents 15 Pages 34-36 of Common Bundle of Documents 16 Pages 32-33 of Common Bundle of Documents [80] To sum up, from the exhibited documents and the testimony of the witnesses, this Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to prove that he has performed his scope of work for the Defendant in January 2024; and that there has been any work done for the Defendant for the month of January 2024. To this Court, the works or rather assistance requested by DW1 from the Plaintiff was personal and should not fall within the definition of “works done in respect of his contract of service” with the Defendant. [81] As such, to demand a whole month’s salary amounting to RM 5,940.00 for a work done on DW1’s personal capacity would be unjust to the Defendant. In that context, the Plaintiff’s claim for the said amount as an unpaid wage for the month of January 2024 should rightfully be dismissed, and this Court decides so. CONCLUSION [82] On a final note, it is undeniable that this is an unfortunate situation for the Plaintiff where he has had to drag the Defendant to a trial in Court to obtain the money he is claiming, more so when the claim in general (with due respect) is not a huge sum of money. Furthermore, he has had to spend a lot of costs (including costs in the Magistrate's Court and also at the appeal stage) to claim what was assumed to be his unpaid wage. [83] However, this Court is of the opinion that the Plaintiff's claim against the Defendant up to this stage is unfounded and unfitting to be allowed, especially based on the available evidence before this Court. [84] Thus, after having evaluated the totality of the evidence, this Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to prove his case against the Defendant on the balance of probabilities. [85] In view of the foregoing analysis and reasons, the Court hereby rules that the Plaintiff's claim against the Defendant is dismissed with costs to the Defendant as per scale. Dated 5th July 2026 (DHILIP NAIR A/L R.N. ATCHUTHAN) MAJISTRET MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET SIVIL (3), JOHOR BAHRU Counsel/Solicitor: For the Plaintiff: Ms. Lee Peggie & Ms. Chong Wen Ni Messrs Alan Kang & Co. 5th Floor, Plaza Prima, 5-06, Jln Klang Lama, Taman Goodwood, 58200 Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur. For the Defendant: Mr. Tan Chi Sian Messrs C.S. Tan & Partners Unit 312, 3rd Floor, Block C (Lobby 6), Damansara Intan, No. 1, Jalan SS 20/27, 47400, Petaling Jaya, Selangor. Cases referred to:

Item Industrial Engineering Sdn Bhd & Ors v Bank Utama (M) Bhd [2015] 3 MLJ 254

Christopher Ak Bandi @ Josny v Tumbung Ak Nakis & Anor (Jamil Bin Sindi, Third Party) [2016] 4 MLJ 100)

TR Sandah ak Tabau & Ors (suing on behalf of themselves and 22 other proprietors, occupiers, holders and claimants of native customary rights (NCR) land situated at Rumah Sandah and Rumah Lajang, Ulu Machan, 96700 Kanowit, Sarawak) v Director of Forest, Sarawak & Anor and other appeals [2019] 6 MLJ 141

Pioneer Conglomerate Sdn Bhd v Tenggara Kapital Sdn Bhd [2021]

Sri Maju Sarata Ekspres Sdn Bhd v. Segar Munusamy & Ors [2026]

Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22

Hotel Jaya Puri Bhd v National Union of Hotel, Bar & Restaurant

Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] 3 MLJ 622; [2021] 4 CLJ 821

Lee Fatt Seng v. Harper Gilfillan [1980] Sdn Bhd [1988] 1 CLJ Rep 156 Legislation referred to:

Employment Act 1955 [Act 265]

Evidence Act 1950 [Act 56] Date of Decision: 4th May 2026