Any person stating himself, in writing, to be a creditor of the bankrupt may personally or by agent inspect this statement at all reasonable times and take any copy thereof or extract therefrom, but any person untruthfully so stating himself to be a creditor shall be guilty of a contempt of court and shall be punishable accordingly on the application of the Director General of Insolvency.”. [Emphasis added] [15] The JC was in consonance with the objection raised by the DGI that it is the statutory duty of a bankrupt to submit their SOA. It was argued by the JC that the failure of the JDs to do so is fatal to this application whereby the JC submitted that the JDs’ application should not hold water due to this defiance. [6] [16] The usage of the word “shall” in section 16 connotes the mandatory nature of a bankrupt to submit their SOA to the DGI, failing which the bankrupt shall be guilty of a contempt of court and may be punished accordingly. [17] However, the Court finds that JDs should not be discredited just because they have failed to submit his SOA to the DGI, and thus the application should not be heard on its merits. [18] Having said so, this Court needs to put justice before technical non-compliances. In that context, this Court concurs with the JC that the failure of the JDs to submit his SOA to the DGI was an act of non-compliance to the rules. However, the proper ramification to the non-compliance should be that the JDs be in contempt of Court or any other proper punishment under the discretion of the Court. [19] In the grounds of judgment of DR, the learned DR was of the view that it is the administrative procedure taken by the DGI and the Court should not have not interfered with such procedure. This Court is agreeable with the DR on this point. However, the Court disagrees with the view of the DR that the Court cannot hear the Application to annul the Bankruptcy Order until their contempt is purged by the JDs. The cases cited by DR, such as Chung Fui Chu v Foo Ho Cheng and Another Case [2010] MLJU 423 and the case of ESPL (M) Sdn. Bhd. v Harbert International EST Sdn. Bhd. [2003] 2AMR 724 can be distinguished as there was an interim order or contempt proceedings against the JDs and the courts held their applications will not be heard until the contempt have been purged. In the present case, there is no contempt proceedings brought by DGI against the JDs despite the final reminder has been sent [7] to the JDs and until the date of hearing of the Applications by DR on 22.8.2022 and this Court on 12.7.2023 respectively. [20] Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the failure of the JDs to submit their SOA to the DGI should not stifle them from filing this application to nullify the Bankruptcy Order given against them. If their applications are dismissed just because of non-compliance with requirements under section 16 of 360, the JDs would be deprived of avenues to discharge themselves from being a bankrupt and thus will render them forever bankrupt due to the non-compliance of the rules and failure of the DGI to take contempt proceedings against them. Moreover, in the present case, the Company has settled the outstanding EPF contributions for the sum of RM357,330.00 on 15.6 2022. Therefore, it would not fair for the JDs to be continued adjudged bankrupt. Whether the director can be annulled bankrupt after the Company’s debt has been settled [21] It is trite that directors of limited companies are protected from personal liability for the Company debts due to the doctrine of corporate veil. However, to what extent can the directors be held responsible for the Company’s debt? [22] The issue before this Court is whether JDs being bankrupt should be allowed to nullify the Bankruptcy Order against them when the Company has paid off the all the outstanding EPF contributions to JC. JC has contended that by allowing the annulment of the Bankruptcy Order, it will wipe off the record of bankruptcy and the effect is that JDs will put in the position as if there is no adjudication. JC has cited the case of Sardar Mohd. Roshan Khan v Perwira Affin Bank Bhd. [2010] 4 MLJ [8] 285 to support their contentions. JC has urged this Court to ask relevant questions for an order of annulment as it has far reaching consequences. JC also urged the Court to take into account whether JDs have complied with sections 16, 32, 38, 72 of Act 340 and also Rule 164 of the insolvency Rules 2017 [P.U (A) 305/2017]. [23] The Court is bound by the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Sardar Mohd. Roshan Khan (supra) at page 297 where the Federal Court has stated in the judgment that – “Granting an order for annulment is discretionary in nature. The court will have to consider all the facts and circumstances before deciding whether to grant an order annulling the adjudication order. The court should also note all implications that might occur before exercising such discretion and make such order. The court has to be satisfied of the facts disclosed in the affidavit supporting the erstwhile bankrupt's application to annul his bankruptcy (see Williams and Muir Hunter on Bankruptcy and Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Ed) Vol 3 para 458).”. [Emphasis added] [24] The Court is aware of the consequences of annulment under subsection 105(1) of Act 360. However, the Court would like to distinguish the facts of the case Sardar Mohd. Roshan Khan (supra), with the present case. In the case of Sardar Mohd. Roshan Khan (supra), the appellant has obtained an annulment order from the High Court after he has paid off his debts to Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri and the other creditors. The issue before the court is whether the judgment he obtained against the bank was unenforceable as the judgment was obtained when he was a bankrupt. In the presence case, the issue is whether the JDs can seek to annul the Bankruptcy Order after the Company has paid all the debts to JC. Therefore, the decision of the Federal Court is in fact [9] allow the Court to exercise its discretion to decide the matter based on case to case basis. [25] JC also had objected the Application based on the reasons that the JDs being directors of the Company were jointly and severally liable pursuant to section 46 of the Employees Provident Fund Act 1991 [Act 452] which provides that— “Where any contributions remaining unpaid by a company, a firm or an association of persons, then, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act or any other written law, the directors of such company including any persons who were directors of such company during such period in which contributions were liable to be paid, or the partners of such firm, including any persons who were partners of such firm during such period in which contributions were liable to be paid, or the office-bearers of such association of persons, including any persons who were office-bearers of such association during such period in which contributions were liable to be paid, as the case may be, shall together with the company, firm or association of persons liable to pay the said contributions, be jointly and severally liable for the contributions due and payable to the Fund.”. [Emphasis added] [26] The Court is agreeable with the contentions of JC that the director will be held jointly and severally under Act 452 based on the Court of Appeal decision in the case of Ong Kim Chuan v Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Pekerja [2009] 6 CLJ 586 and the Federal Court decision in the case of Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v Edwin Cassian Naggapan [2021] 5MLJ 253. However, the Court would like to distinguish the facts of Ong Kim Chuan (supra) with the present case. In the case of Ong Kim Chuan (supra), the bankruptcy proceedings was initiated against the directors of the company after the company has been wound up. [27] In the present case, the proceeding against the JDs was rooted [10] from the Sessions Court in which Judgment In Default (“JID”) was recorded against them. Subsequently, Bankruptcy Order dated 11.5.2021 was also recorded without their attendance. The Bankruptcy Order was obtained by default against the JDs in respect of the outstanding contributions to the employees owed by the Company and their liabilities were based on the statutory provisions under Act 452. It is significant to note that the JC proceeded to file the Bankruptcy Notice personally against the JDs, without any actions or executions commenced against the Company beforehand. [28] The JDs argued that the JC should have ensured that other avenues were contemplated first before resorting to commence bankruptcy proceedings against the directors of the Company. [29] Pertaining to this, the JDs argued that the position of the directors is akin to that of a guarantor to a debt owing by the debtor. Under Act 360, the guarantors are protected under subsections 5(3),(4),(5) and (6) of the Act. As such, the directors should not be held liable for the company’s debts. [30] The JDs also submitted that that no attempts were taken by the JC to enforce the judgment debt against the Company and as such, it is improper to use bankruptcy proceedings as an enforcement action when the mode of execution and enforcement were available to the JC against the Company. The JC should ensure that other avenue of enforcement is contemplated first before resorting to commencing bankruptcy proceedings against the directors of the Company and the JC had abused the process of the Court by doing so. [31] In this regard, reference is made to subsection 5(4) of Act 360 [11] which provides that – “(3) A petitioning creditor shall not be entitled to commence any bankruptcy action—