LEONG CHUAN TRADING (M) SDN. BHD. v NG KWEE SIM (Berniaga atas nama dan gaya NKS Jaya Trading (No Pendaftaran Perniagaan. 200403057601/MA0078482-U) (MA-24NCvC-107-04/2026)

This is an ex parte Originating Summons (Enclosure 1) by which the Plaintiff, as judgment creditor, applies pursuant to Order 47 rules 6 and 7 of the Rules of Court 2012 and sections 334, 335 and 336 of the National Land Code 1965 for a prohibitory order over land held by the Defendant under State Lease Title PN 29190, Lot 6291, Mukim Kesang, Daerah Jasin, Negeri Melaka ("the land"). The proposed order would prohibit the Defendant, for a period of six months, from transferring, charging, leasing, effecting any dealing with, or otherwise altering any interest in the land pending execution proceedings.

The order is sought to preserve the land pending execution. The Plaintiff has obtained a judgment against the Defendant in the Sessions Court at Melaka, and the prohibitory order is the step by which the land is to be held available, free of fresh dealings, so that it may in due course be sold in execution to satisfy that judgment.

Although the judgment to be enforced is that of the Sessions Court, the application is properly before this Court. A prohibitory order is, by definition, an order of the High Court: the expression "Court" in the National Land Code 1965 means the High Court in Malaya. The forum is therefore not in question.

The application is supported by the affidavit of Ko Mok Chuan affirmed on 15 April 2026 (Enclosure 4), and by the affidavits of consent of Kelly Ko Kar Yee (Enclosure 2) and Ng Siew Pheng (Enclosure 3), each affirmed on the same date, by which the two other directors of the Plaintiff authorise the deponent to make this application on the company's behalf. No question arises as to the Plaintiff's authority to proceed.

The real controversy is narrow. The matters that ordinarily found a prohibitory order a judgment, and a judgment debtor holding an interest in land that is to be sold in execution are not, on the affidavit evidence, in contention. What requires consideration is the legal significance, if any, of a restriction in interest endorsed on the State lease, which restrains transfer or lease of the land save with the consent of the State Authority. The central question is whether that restriction bears upon the power, or the propriety of its exercise, to make the order sought.

The facts material to this application are established by the affidavit of Ko Mok Chuan in Enclosure 4 and the exhibits to it. They are not met by any competing affidavit, the application being made ex parte against a judgment debtor who has not appeared.

The Plaintiff is a company incorporated under the Companies Act 2016. The Defendant is an individual carrying on business as a sole proprietor under the name and style of NKS Jaya Trading.

On 7 April 2026, the Plaintiff obtained judgment in default of appearance against the Defendant in the Sessions Court at Melaka in Civil Suit No. MA-A52NCC-24-02/2026. By that judgment, exhibited as "KMC-2" to Enclosure 4, the Defendant was ordered to pay the Plaintiff RM129,047.15 computed as at 4 February 2026, together with interest at the rate of 5% per annum from the date of judgment until full settlement, and costs of RM1,291.00. The deponent affirms that the judgment sum remains unpaid and unsatisfied.

The Defendant is the sole registered proprietor of the land. This appears from a private search of the register conducted on 8 April 2026 and exhibited as "KMC-3" to Enclosure 4. The land is held under State lease PN 29190, Lot 6291, Mukim Kesang, Daerah Jasin, Negeri Melaka, measuring 244 square metres, for a term of 99 years expiring on 1 October 2102. The Defendant holds the whole of the proprietorship as to a 1/1 share.

The private search records that a charge in favour of Public Bank Berhad, registered on 25 February 2015, was discharged on 18 August 2021. As at the date of the search, the land carried no subsisting charge, lien or caveat.

The private search further records, under the head of restriction in interest, an endorsement to the effect that the land may not be transferred or leased except with the consent of the State Authority, that restriction being excepted in the case of the first transfer or lease. The history of dealings shown in the same search discloses that the land has already passed by transfer more than once — from the local authority to a company, and from that company to the Defendant in 2015. It is this restriction that gives rise to the only question of substance in the application.

The originating summons and the supporting and consent affidavits were filed on 15 April 2026. The application is made ex parte, and is determined on the affidavit of Ko Mok Chuan and its exhibits. C. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

Three questions arise for determination:

whether the threshold prescribed by section 334 of the National Land Code 1965 is satisfied, that is, whether there is land, or an interest in land, held by a judgment debtor that is to be sold in execution proceedings;

whether the restriction in interest endorsed on the State lease precludes the grant of a prohibitory order, or otherwise bears upon the exercise of the Court's discretion; and

whether the requirements attending an ex parte application of this kind the propriety of proceeding without notice, and the duty of full and frank disclosure are met. [14] The first is a threshold question. The second is dispositive of the real controversy. The third governs the manner in which the discretion is to be exercised. D. GOVERNING LAW AND FRAMEWORK [15] A prohibitory order is a creature of statute. Section 334 of the National Land Code 1965 defines it as an order, made pursuant to rules of court by a court of competent jurisdiction, prohibiting a judgment debtor from effecting any dealing with land or an interest in land "held by a judgment debtor [that] is to be sold in execution proceedings". The definition fixes both the occasion for the order an intended sale in execution and its content a prohibition on dealings. [16] The remaining provisions of the Chapter complete the scheme. By section 335, a prohibitory order is ineffective until entered by the Registrar on the register document of title; it is that entry which gives the order its operative effect against the land. Section 336 prescribes the effect of the order once entered, namely, to prohibit the registration of any instrument of dealing executed by the proprietor, save a certificate of sale. By section 338(1), a prohibitory order lapses upon the expiry of six months from its date unless extended by an order of court entered before that period expires. [17] Two features of the statutory vocabulary are material. First, "Court" in the National Land Code 1965 means the High Court in Malaya; the jurisdiction to make a prohibitory order is reposed in this Court. Secondly, "dealing" is defined to mean a transaction with respect to alienated land effected under the powers conferred by the Code, but it expressly does not include any prohibitory order. A prohibitory order is therefore not, in law, a dealing. That distinction proves significant below. [18] The procedure by which the order is sought and made is that prescribed by Order 47 rules 6 and 7 of the Rules of Court 2012, being the rules of court to which section 334 refers. The Code and the Rules operate together: the Code confers and defines the jurisdiction, and the Rules prescribe the procedural mechanism for its exercise. E. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION

The Section 334 Threshold [19] The first question is whether the statutory threshold is met. The principle is that a prohibitory order under section 334 is confined to cases "where land or an interest in land held by a judgment-debtor is to be sold in execution proceedings": Hon Ho Wah & Anor v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1994] 1 MLRA 140 (SC). That statement marks the boundary of the jurisdiction; it restates the statutory limitation rather than enlarging it. [20] Applied to the present case, each element of the threshold is established by the affidavit of Ko Mok Chuan and its exhibits. There is a judgment debtor: the Defendant, against whom judgment was entered on 7 April 2026 (exhibit "KMC-2"). There is an interest in land held by that debtor: the Defendant is the sole registered proprietor of the State lease (exhibit "KMC-3"). And the land is to be sold in execution: the order is sought, as the deponent affirms, as the preliminary step to realising the land in satisfaction of the unpaid judgment. The threshold in section 334 is accordingly satisfied. [21] For completeness, the location of the judgment in the Sessions Court raises no difficulty. The prohibitory order is sought in this Court, which is the only court competent to make it. The jurisdiction conferred by the Code is not displaced by the circumstance that the judgment to be enforced was given by a subordinate court. What the Code requires is a judgment debtor holding an interest in land that is to be sold in execution, and that requirement is met.

The Restriction in Interest [22] The substantial question is the effect of the restriction in interest endorsed on the State lease. The endorsement restrains the Defendant from transferring or leasing the land save with the consent of the State Authority. The question is whether that restraint stands in the way of a prohibitory order. [23] In my judgment it does not, and for a reason that lies in the statutory scheme itself. A prohibitory order is not a dealing. The Code defines "dealing" so as to exclude a prohibitory order in terms. The restriction in interest operates upon dealings specifically, upon transfer and lease. The making and entry of a prohibitory order effects neither a transfer nor a lease; it effects no dealing at all. It freezes the land; it does not move it. The restriction and the order therefore operate upon different planes, and the former presents no obstacle to the latter. [24] That conclusion is reinforced by the function of the order. The purpose of a prohibitory order is protective and preliminary: it preserves the land in the judgment debtor's name, unencumbered by fresh dealings, so that it remains available for execution. Far from offending the restriction in interest, the order is consonant with it. Both restrain the proprietor from dealing with the land the one by order of court, the other by condition of title. [25] A further argument must be confronted, lest the analysis appear to pass it by. It might be said that, because the land cannot be transferred without the consent of the State Authority, it is not land that "is to be sold in execution proceedings" within section 334, so that the threshold fails. That contention cannot be accepted. The restriction does not render the land incapable of sale in execution; it conditions any transfer upon consent. Whether, at the stage of sale, the consent of the State Authority must be obtained before a certificate of sale issues or a purchaser is registered is a question that arises, if at all, under section 337 and at the point of sale. It is not a question that falls for decision on this application, and it would be premature to resolve it now. I hold only that the restriction does not, of itself, defeat the threshold or preclude the order. The point is otherwise left open.

Ex Parte Propriety and Disclosure [26] It remains to consider the requirements attending an application made without notice. Two matters arise: whether it is proper to proceed ex parte, and whether the duty of full and frank disclosure has been discharged. [27] As to the first, an application for a prohibitory order is, by its nature, appropriately made ex parte at first instance. The order exists to forestall dealings that would defeat execution. To require notice to the judgment debtor before the order takes effect would invite the very mischief the order is designed to prevent, by affording the debtor the opportunity to transfer or encumber the land in the interval. Proceeding ex parte is therefore consistent with the protective purpose of the order; and the limited duration fixed by section 338(1) tempers the absence of notice, for the order lapses within six months unless extended upon a further application to the Court. [28] As to the second, an applicant who proceeds ex parte must make full and frank disclosure of all matters material to the application, including those that might tell against it. That duty is discharged here. The restriction in interest the one matter capable of being said to bear against the application is not concealed. It appears on the face of the private search exhibited as "KMC-3", which is before the Court. The deponent's statement that the land is free of charge, lien or encumbrance is, moreover, accurate: the only charge ever registered was discharged in 2021, and a restriction in interest is a condition of title rather than an encumbrance. There has been no material non-disclosure.

Exercise of Discretion [29] The discretion to make the order falls to be exercised in light of the foregoing. The judgment remains unsatisfied. The land is the identified asset against which execution is intended. No competing registered interest appears on the private search, and no third party stands to be prejudiced by an order that merely preserves the status quo. The order sought is of limited duration and limited effect. In these circumstances the discretion is properly exercised in favour of granting the order. F. CONCLUSION [30] The threshold under section 334 of the National Land Code 1965 is satisfied, there being a judgment debtor who holds a registered interest in land that is to be sold in execution. The restriction in interest endorsed on the State lease does not preclude the order, a prohibitory order being no dealing and the restriction operating only upon dealings; whether the consent of the State Authority will be required at the stage of sale is a distinct question, not now arising, which I have left open. The application is properly made ex parte, and the duty of disclosure has been met. It follows that the order sought ought to be granted. G. ORDERS OF THE COURT [31] Accordingly, I make the following orders:

A prohibitory order is granted in respect of the whole of the land held under State lease PN 29190, Lot 6291, Mukim Kesang, Daerah Jasin, Negeri Melaka, prohibiting the Defendant, Ng Kwee Sim (NRIC No. 761005-04-5037), trading as NKS Jaya Trading, from transferring, charging, leasing, effecting any dealing with, or otherwise altering any interest in the said land, for a period of six (6) months from the date of this order.

Pursuant to section 335 of the National Land Code 1965, the Registrar of Titles, the District Land Administrator, or other appropriate registering authority shall enter this order on the register document of title to the land, so that it takes effect against the land.

By operation of section 338(1) of the National Land Code 1965, this order shall lapse upon the expiry of six months from its date unless extended by a further order of court entered before that period expires.

The Defendant, as judgment debtor, shall bear the costs of this application as costs in the execution, to be taxed unless agreed.

Liberty to apply. Dated 3 July 2026 (MELAKA) Lawyer For Applicant : Cik Adiba Nabila binti Kamaruddin Tetuan William Chua, Kon & Associates Peguambela dan Peguamcara Tingkat 3, No. 55 & 57, Jalan Abdullah, 84000 Muar, Johor.