[12] It was further contended that the Applicant had taken all reasonable steps to engage with the 1st and 2nd Respondent. It gave a clear timeline for their response. In view of the Applicant’s action, a final and definitive position was only known on 31.03.2025 when the time frame expired. Hence, time began only when the decision was final. Analysis and decision [13] The law on mandatory compliance with the time frame to apply for judicial review is well settled. Before an application for judicial review can be entertained, compliance with the procedure laid down is imperative. Failure to observe the period stipulated in Order 53 of the Rules of Court 2012 goes to jurisdiction. (See: Mersing Omnibus Co Sdn Bhd v Minister of Labour & Manpower & Anor [1983] 2 MLJ 54, Abdul Rahman bin Abdullah Munir & Ors v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Anor [2008] 6 MLJ 704, Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri v Genting Malaysia Bhd [2025] 2 MLJ 822 (CoA)). [14] The same point was reiterated in Wong Kin Hoong & Anor (suing for themselves and on behalf all of the occupants of Kampung Bukit Koman, Raub, Pahang) v Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor. [2013] 4 MLJ 161 where the Federal Court held, In conclusion, we are of the view that the time frame in applying for judicial review prescribed by the Rules is fundamental. It goes to jurisdiction and once the trial judge had rejected the explanation for the delay for extension of time to apply for judicial review, it follows that the court no longer has the jurisdiction to hear the application for leave for judicial review. Whether the application has merits or not, is irrelevant. [15] Order 53 rule 3(6) Rules of Court 2012 provide that an application for judicial review shall be made within three months from the date when the grounds of application first arose or when the decision is first communicated to the applicant. The court may, upon an application, extend the time specified in rule 3(6) if it considers that there is good reason for doing so. (O. 53 r.3(7)) [16] The issue of compliance with the time frame to file judicial review proceedings is independent of the merits of the Applicant’s case. Even if the Applicant has on the facts, a good case, the non-compliance with O. 53 r. 3(6) goes to the jurisdiction of this court to hear the application for the reliefs sought. Consequently, the application for leave cannot be entertained. [17] The letter of appeal dated 17.3.2025 relied on by the Applicant is marked as exhibit “LHK-7”. It is addressed to the Minister of Housing and Local Government. The Applicant inter alia, expressed its disappointment with the various extensions that had been granted to the 3rd Respondent resulting in dashed hopes of taking delivery of vacant possession on an earlier date. The letter ended with a demand for a response to its letter within 14 days, failing which it shall deem the Minister to have rejected its appeal. [18] An application for judicial review is essentially a challenge to a decision. (See: O. 53 r. 2(4)). The intitulement to the present action states in no uncertain terms that 5 letters of the 2nd Respondent is the subject-matter of the present proceedings. These are the decisions that are sought to be impugned; the last being that contained in letter dated 29.11.2024, giving the 3rd Respondent until 21.11.2025 to deliver vacant possession. These then, are the operative dates for computation of the 90 days in O. 53 r. 3(6)). [19] The contention that time begins to run only from 31.3.2025 when 14 days expired, is untenable. There is no statutory provision for appeal to the Minister. The Applicant’s reliance on this date is misconceived. In the same manner, the reliance on Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri v Yayasan Buah Pinggang Kebangsaan Malaysia [2024] 4 MLJ 288 is equally misplaced. [20] The facts in Yayasan Buah Pinggang Kebangsaan Malaysia (supra) are clearly distinguishable from the present case. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is self-explanatory as to the factual matrix upon which its judgment was premised on. It held, [32] But here, it is quite clear from the matrix of facts that although LHDN decided to revoke the tax exemption status per letter dated 29 August 2019, albeit wrongly relying on s 148(b)(iii) of the Income Tax Act 1967 (when it should be s 148(b)(ii) of the Act) — they nevertheless conducted themselves in such a manner as to demonstrate quite unequivocally that they were willing to, and did reconsider or review their earlier decision. Hence, LHDN’s letter dated 24 December 2019 to NKF requesting for further information/input and thereafter, the meeting on 12 February 2020. [33] In our view, the circumstances here are such that LHDN’s earlier decision cannot be considered to be decisive as the decision maker LHDN had expressly, overtly or impliedly or by conduct, agreed to and did, reconsider or review the earlier decision. As such, for purposes of judicial review, time only started running from the later decision, albeit, that it re-iterated or re-confirmed and maintained the earlier decision. The position we take is that where the public authority’s conduct indicated a willingness to reconsider its earlier decision, then time runs from the later decision. [34] In this regard, we agree with and endorse the principle which was enunciated by the Singapore Court of Appeal in the case of Per Ah Seng Robin and another v Housing and Development Board and another [2016] 1 SLR 1020 at paras [51] and [52]. These paragraphs from the Singapore Court of Appeal’s judgment are instructive and read relevantly as follows: [51] For the purposes of calculating the three-month period stipulated in O 53 r 1(6), time generally starts to run from the date of the decision sought to be impugned (see Teng Fuh Holdings at [16]-[17]), or, where the decision is borne out of a multiple-step decision process, from the date of the final step in that process (see Chiu Teng at [36]). But, this is not an inflexible or unyielding rule. Time may start to run later where the respondent’s conduct indicates a willingness to reconsider its earlier decision, and in cases where there is delay, it is always open to the applicant to attempt to persuade the court that it has a satisfactory explanation for the delay. (However, as we mentioned earlier at [46] above, it may be that the delay exception does not apply where the applicable time limit is prescribed by written law, as opposed to the three-month period stipulated in O 53 r 1(6).) [21] There are no facts before this court evidencing the 1st and 2nd Respondents conduct indicating a willingness to reconsider the impugned decision. The factual scenario is entirely different here. [22] Additionally, there is no merit in the contention that a no-response can be considered a deemed decision. This position was dealt with by the Court of Appeal in Abdul Rahman bin Abdullah Munir & Ors v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Anor [2008] 6 MLJ 704 where it was held, To say that the decision was only made on 5 January 2005 after the first respondent had failed to revert to their letter of 22 December 2004, is fallacious. We also find it ludicrous for the appellants to hold the view that a decision was only arrived at when the first respondent failed to respond to the one-week time period ultimatum in their letter. The latter was not duty-bound to respond to what we feel, corresponded to a threat. Thus, our view is that no decision was made by the first respondent pursuant to that letter. No decision need in fact be made as it was already made earlier. An application for a judicial review under O 53 of the RHC is intended to impugn a decision. This is central to any judicial review. The appellants contended that there was a ‘deemed decision’ by the first respondent made on 5 January 2005 when it failed to revert to the appellants’ letter of 22 December 2004. It is thus crucial to first identify definitely what the decision is that is sought to be impugned. This has to be the actual date (see Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor Dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1). The appellants’ interpretation towards the first respondent’s non-response to their letter makes no sense and far stretching one’s imagination. This would give rise to an artificial meaning to the word decision. The date of the decision too becomes fictitious which makes the computation of the statutory time limit under O 53 of the RHC indeterminable. [23] Learned Federal Counsel drew my attention to the recent decision of the Federal Court in Peguam Negara v UEM Land Berhad, an appeal filed vide Case no: 01(I)-14-05/2025. The Federal Court held, “On the issue whether there was a decision that is amenable to judicial review, we conclude that there is no available decision because a deemed decision at the behest of the Respondent is not a decision within the ambit of Order 53. In the instant case, it cannot be said that the Minister refused or omitted to make a decision because he was never accorded a reasonable opportunity to do so. A time line was simply thrust on the Minister arbitrarily and it was then deemed to amount to a refusal or omission. That is insufficient in our view.” This then puts paid to the Applicant’s contention that time runs from the expiry of the deadline given. [24] In any event, the extensions were given to the 3rd Respondent. The alleged decision upon the expiry of the time frame was not part of the impugned decisions in this judicial review proceedings. Therefore, there cannot be any question of reconsidering the decision on all the extensions as insisted by the Applicant. The decision had already been made earlier, on the application of the 3rd Respondent. The approvals for extension had been issued. The Applicant had no basis to expect any response from the 1st and 2nd Respondent. [25] The Applicant had, probably out of abundance of caution, included a prayer for extension of time to file the leave application. However, upon perusing through the affidavit in support its application, there are no reasons furnished to explain the delay to satisfy the court that an extension ought to be granted. (See: O. 53 r 3(7)). [26] The situation here is on all fours with the Court of Appeal case of Tan Sri Abdul Aziz bin Zainal (applying for himself and on behalf of Jawatankuasa Sementara Permohonan Memansuhkan Akta Bank Rakyat) & Ors v Lembaga Pengarah Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Bhd & Ors [2023] 6 MLJ 776 where the court held. Upon perusing the three affidavits filed by the applicants that can be sieved through the appeal records, we find that there is no explanation at all for the delay. The only ground that has been considered by the LHCJ in his decision is actually not a direct explanation by the applicants on the delay. It is just an inference based on the action taken by the applicants upon receiving the second rejection letter from second respondent. In fact, not a single paragraph in those affidavits gave reason why they were late in filing the application. Conclusion [27] In summary, the Applicant has failed to comply with the requirement in O. 53 r.3(6) Rules of Court 2012. The application for leave was filed out of time. There is also no explanation given for the delay. In the circumstances, this court has no jurisdiction to grant the leave application. [28] Accordingly, enclosure 1 is dismissed with costs of RM 3,000.00 to the Attorney General’s Chambers. Dated: 27th December 2025 -sgd-Alice Loke Yee Ching Judge High Court Kuala Lumpur Counsel for Applicant: Loke Wei Lun Tetuan Joseph Yeo Counsel for Respondents: FC Saravanan a/l Kuppusamy