(iii) Whether the learned Trial Judge erred in law and in fact in finding that the Appellant had simultaneously committed the offence of actual trafficking under section 2 of the DDA and “presumed trafficking” under section 37(da) of the DDA. Findings [9] Foremost, it is our finding that the prosecution in this instant matter had succeeded in proving a prima facie case against the Appellant. We are satisfied that the substance seized from the appellant is dangerous drugs based on the evidence of PW2 which was unchallenged. [10] With respect to the elements of custody, control, and possession of the impugned drugs, we are satisfied that PW6, in the course of conducting the search upon the Appellant, detected a lump on the anterior part of the Appellant’s abdomen prior to the Appellant being handed over to PW4 for further examination at the KLIA2 Narcotics Office. Pursuant to that examination, PW4 recovered a plastic wrapping and two bandages, within which were concealed six transparent packets containing the drugs in question. [11] We find no reason to doubt the veracity of PW6’s and PW4’s testimonies. Both witnesses gave clear, consistent, and credible accounts of the events in question. PW6’s testimony regarding the discovery of the lump on the Appellant’s abdomen was corroborated by PW4’s subsequent recovery of the plastic wrapping and bandages concealing six transparent packets of drugs. Their evidence is mutually reinforcing and free from material inconsistencies, thereby establishing a reliable chain of custody. [12] In our assessment, the testimonies of PW6 and PW4 demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that the Appellant was in possession and control of the impugned drugs. The sequence of events, beginning with PW6’s initial detection and culminating in PW4’s recovery of the concealed packets, leaves no room for speculation or doubt. The prosecution has thus discharged its burden of proof in relation to the elements of custody, control, and possession. [13] Accordingly, we are satisfied that the findings of fact made by the Trial Judge were properly grounded in credible evidence, and we see no basis upon which to disturb those findings. [14] We are further satisfied that the element of knowledge on the part of the Appellant concerning the impugned drugs was duly established by operation of the presumption of mens rea possession under section 37(d) of the DDA. The presumption arises where an accused is shown to be in physical possession of the drugs, and it is incumbent upon the accused to rebut such presumption by credible evidence. In the present case, the testimonies of PW6 and PW4 clearly demonstrate that the drugs were deliberately concealed, wrapped, and bandaged at the front part of the Appellant’s abdomen. Such concealment is not consistent with innocent possession and strongly supports the inference of knowledge. [15] The Appellant has failed to adduce any evidence capable of displacing this statutory presumption. Mere denial or assertion of ignorance cannot suffice to rebut the presumption, which requires cogent and credible explanation. In the absence of such rebuttal, the presumption stands unrebutted, and the element of knowledge is thereby established beyond reasonable doubt. [16] Accordingly, we find that the prosecution has successfully proven not only custody, control, and possession, but also the requisite mens rea on the part of the Appellant. The learned Trial Judge was correct in its application of section 37(d) of the DDA, and we see no basis to interfere with Her Ladyship’s findings. [17] On the totality of the evidence, we are satisfied that the impugned drugs, which were concealed by the Appellant, were intended to be conveyed to a destination for the purpose of trafficking. The quantity involved, namely 1,508.9 grams of methamphetamine, is substantial and, in our view, strongly indicative of trafficking rather than personal consumption. We are further of the view that the manner in which the drugs were concealed demonstrates a clear intention to evade detection, thereby reinforcing the inference of trafficking. First Issue [18] We now turn to the first issue. It is the Appellant’s contention that the flagrant incompetence of his trial counsel resulted in a breach of his fundamental constitutional right to a fair trial. It was argued that the trial counsel failed to advance the Appellant’s defence, which was only advanced for the first time by the Appellant himself during his sworn testimony after he was called upon to enter his defence before the learned Trial Judge. [19] The Appellant’s testimony, it was submitted, clearly encapsulated the defence of an innocent carrier and the involvement of one Mr. Wang, also referred to as Huang Chunsheng (in Chinese Pin Yin), and may be summarised as follows: a. The Appellant happened to know and befriend Mr. Wang/Huang Chunsheng in his hometown in China; b. Mr. Wang later invited the Appellant to visit Malaysia, undertaking to cover all expenses; c. Upon arrival in Malaysia, Mr. Wang introduced the Appellant to a purported business opportunity involving the sale of Chinese traditional medicine in Jakarta; d. Mr. Wang requested the Appellant to convey certain transparent packets, said to contain Chinese traditional medicine, to Jakarta; e. Mr. Wang assured the Appellant that the packets contained only premium traditional medicine and would be harmless even if inspected by authorities; f. The Appellant agreed to Mr. Wang’s request upon receiving these assurances, in the hope of securing a future employment opportunity; and g. The Appellant only became aware of the true nature of the contents, namely methamphetamine, upon his arrest at the Kuala Lumpur International Airport. [20] It was further submitted that the particulars of Mr. Wang/Huang Chunsheng were immediately disclosed to the Investigating Officer (PW8) following the Appellant’s arrest, with the assistance of an interpreter. Huang Chunsheng was accordingly included as part of the investigation. Documentary evidence, including the Appellant’s flight ticket from Hong Kong to Malaysia on 5 January 2018 and from Malaysia to Jakarta on 8 January 2018 (Exhibit P70), corroborated that the tickets were purchased by Huang Chunsheng, who was also confirmed as a passenger on the Hong Kong–Malaysia flight. [21] Counsel for the Appellant contended that, had the trial counsel conducted the proceedings professionally and ethically, the defence narrative would have cast reasonable doubt in the mind of the learned Trial Judge, particularly regarding whether the Appellant had knowledge of the true contents of the transparent packets secured around his waist. [22] It was further submitted that the alleged flagrant incompetence of the trial counsel, as outlined above, deprived the Appellant of his constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial under Article 5(1) of the Federal Constitution, thereby occasioning a serious miscarriage of justice. [23] Having considered the totality of the evidence, we are of the view that the Appellant’s contention is without merit. It is undisputed that the impugned drugs were found physically secured around the Appellant’s abdomen, wrapped and bandaged in a manner that unmistakably establishes his possession of the drugs. The Appellant could not have shut his eyes to what was obvious. The learned Trial Judge had stated: “[66] OKT boleh nampak kandungan dadah tersebut di dalam plastik lutsinar, lalu ditutup dengan “wrapping” serta dua bandage. Keadaan dadah tersebut tidaklah seperti serbuk perasa. …….. [70] Di dalam kes kita, OKT sebenarnya mengetahui bahawa barang kes tersebut adalah dadah dan bukannya serbuk perasa. Tiada sebab OKT untuk menyorok dadah tersebut di perut sekiranya ia bahan perasa. OKT sebenarnya mempunyai pengetahuan tentang dadah tersebut, yang mana ia jelas dapat dilihat dalam plastik lutsinar. Cara dadah tersebut disorok dengan menggunakan “wrapping” dan “bandage” menunjukkan OKT ada pengetahuan tentang dadah tersebut.” [24] It must be noted that at the defence stage, the Appellant’s contended that the packets contained seasoning powder and not premium traditional medicine as stated in the written submission of his counsel herein. [25] Even if the defence of an innocent carrier had been put forward during the prosecution’s stage, or if Mr. Hwang/Huang Chunsheng had been investigated in greater detail, the elemental fact of possession remains unchallenged and cannot be reasonably disputed by the Appellant. [26] Possession, in the circumstances of this case, is a matter of direct and incontrovertible fact. The evidence leaves no room for doubt that the Appellant was in physical control of the methamphetamine, and any alternative narrative concerning Mr. Hwang is wholly incapable of displacing this fundamental element. In these circumstances, the Appellant was rightly called upon to enter his defence, as the presumption of mens rea in respect of possession is plainly applicable. We are of the view that the alleged omissions of the trial counsel, even if they were to be assumed arguable, could not have occasioned any miscarriage of justice, nor did they, in any manner, impinge upon the Appellant’s constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial. [27] Having considered the totality of the evidence, we are satisfied that the Appellant cannot be regarded as an innocent carrier, but is, in fact, a trafficker. The Appellant had every opportunity to ascertain for himself the nature of the items he was conveying. Any person placed in similar circumstances would inevitably have questioned why purportedly “premium traditional medicine” or seasoning powder should be concealed, wrapped, and bandaged so as to be strapped around one’s abdomen. Such conduct is wholly inconsistent with that of an innocent carrier and strongly indicative of knowledge and intent on the part of the Appellant (see: Pendakwa Raya v Herlina Purnama Sari [2016] MLJU 1824). Second and Third Issues [28] We take the second and third issues together. From our examination of the notes of proceedings, it is our finding that, at the close of the prosecution’s case, the learned Trial Judge had clearly explained to the Appellant that he was called upon to enter his defence in respect of the presumption of mens rea possession under section 37(d) of the DDA and that it was incumbent upon him to rebut such presumption. The learned Trial Judge in her judgment stated: “[47] Mahkamah menggunapakai anggapan di bawah seksyen 37 (d) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 menunjukkan bahawa OKT mempunyai pengetahuan dadah tersebut serta milikan dibaca bersama seksyen 2 Akta yang sama untuk definisi pengedaran apabila dadah berbahaya yang disorokkan di bahagian hadapan perut tertuduh dengan jumlah yang banyak tidak mungkin untuk kegunaan tertuduh sendiri. Ia adalah untuk pengedaran oleh tertuduh kepada pihak ketiga.” [29] We further find that the learned Trial Judge did not make any finding that the Appellant was simultaneously in mens rea possession and in “presumed possession” of the dangerous drugs under section 37(d) of the DDA, as suggested by learned counsel. Nor did Her Ladyship make a concurrent finding that the Appellant had committed the offence of actual trafficking under section 2 of the DDA and “presumed trafficking” under section 37(da) of the DDA. [30] In the circumstances, we are satisfied that the argument advanced on these issues are misconceived and wholly without merit. Conclusion [31] In conclusion, we find ourselves in agreement with and uphold the decision of the learned Trial Judge in respect of the conviction entered and the sentence passed. [32] The Appellant’s appeal was therefore dismissed. Dated: 24 January 2026 Sgd Noorin Binti Badaruddin Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia LIST OF COUNSELS: Counsels for Appellant: