Liberty General Insurance Berhad (Dahulunya Dikenali Sebagai Am General Insurance Berhad)(No. Syarikat: 44191-P) v 1. ) Gunalan A/L Gopal (AA-12B-17-07/2023)

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YESU STEVEN A/L GUNALAN …APPELLANT

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AM GENERAL INSURANCE BERHAD (COMPANY NO: 44191-P) …RESPONDENTS IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT IPOH IN THE STATE OF PERAK DARUL RIDZUAN, MALAYSIA CIVIL APPEAL NO.: AA-12B-17-07/2023 BETWEEN LIBERTY GENERAL INSURANCE BERHAD (COMPANY NO: 197801007153) (FORMERLY KNOWN AS AM GENERAL INSURANCE BERHAD COMPANY NO: 44191-P) … APPELLANT

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YESU STEVEN A/L GUNALAN …RESPONDENTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION [1] This appeal arises from the decision of the Sessions Court Judge (SCJ) in a case involving an alleged motor vehicle accident between motorcycle, Registration No. AGR 2563, ridden by the 1st Respondent, and motorcar Registration No. PGY 4006, owned by the 3rd Respondent. The Appellant, AM General Insurance Berhad, is the insurer of motorcar Registration No. PGY 4006 and was named as an intervener in the Sessions Court proceedings. The Appellant asserts that no collision took place between the two vehicles and alleges that the Respondents conspired to submit a fraudulent insurance claim. [2] The Appellant contends that the SCJ erred in her findings by failing to consider critical evidence, which included contradictions in the testimonies of the Respondents, medical reports suggesting a different cause of injury, and the absence of physical damage to the vehicles involved. The Appellant further argues that the SCJ’s assessment of the evidence overlooked key aspects of the case, including the timing of the police reports, the Respondents’ conduct following the alleged accident, and inconsistencies in the narrative provided by the 1st Respondent. [3] The Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that a collision did occur on the 17th of October 2016, and the injuries sustained by the 1st Respondent were a direct result of the collision between his motorcycle and the 3rd Respondent’s motorcar. The 1st Respondent claims that his motorcycle was struck from behind by the 3rd Respondent’s vehicle, causing him to lose control and fall into a drain, resulting in injuries for which he sought medical treatment at two different hospitals. The 2nd Respondent, the 3rd Respondent’s passenger, supports the 1st Respondent’s version of events. [4] The SCJ found in favour of the 1st Respondent, dismissing the Appellant’s claim of fraud and conspiracy. The SCJ relied on the testimony of the 1st Respondent and medical evidence from Hospital Tapah, concluding that the collision had occurred and that the Appellant had failed to prove the alleged fraud. [5] The present appeal requires this Court to reconsider whether the evidence supports the conclusion that a collision occurred and whether the Appellant’s allegations of fraud and conspiracy were adequately addressed by the SCJ. BACKGROUND FACTS [6] The incident in question allegedly took place on 17.10.2016. According to the 1st Respondent, he was riding his motorcycle, bearing registration number AGR 2563, when he was struck from behind by the 3rd Respondent’s motorcar, registration number PGY 4006. As a result of the collision, the 1st Respondent claimed that he lost control of his motorcycle and was thrown into a drain. He sustained injuries and sought medical treatment at Hospital Tapah and later at Hospital Raja Permaisuri Bainun, Ipoh, Perak. [7] The 2nd Respondent, who was driving the motorcar at the time, did not lodge a police report immediately after the incident. It was only nine months later that the 2nd Respondent filed a report, explaining that he had offered compensation to the 1st Respondent in the immediate aftermath of the incident, which he believed would settle the matter. The 1st Respondent, however, lodged his police report one month after the alleged accident, stating that he was dissatisfied with the 2nd Respondent’s offer. [8] The Appellant, as the insurer of the 3rd Respondent’s motorcar, disputes that any collision took place between the two vehicles. The Appellant alleges that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents conspired to file a fraudulent insurance claim, presenting several grounds to support this allegation:-

The 1st Respondent’s injuries were the result of a fall caused by him skidding on a slippery road, as indicated by medical reports from Hospital Raja Permaisuri Bainun;

(ii) The 1st Respondent was intoxicated at the time of the incident, as noted in the medical report from Hospital Tapah, raising doubts about his ability to recall the events accurately;

(iii) The 1st Respondent did not know the 3rd Respondent personally, yet he was able to provide the police with the registration number of the 3rd Respondent’s motorcar, leading to suspicions about the source of this information; and

(iv) There was no damage to the rear of the 1st Respondent’s motorcycle, which would be expected if the motorcycle had been struck from behind by a motorcar. [9] The SCJ, after evaluating the evidence, found in favour of the 1st Respondent, concluding that a collision had indeed occurred and dismissing the Appellant’s claim of collusion and fraud. The SCJ’s decision was based on the credibility of the 1st Respondent’s testimony, supported by corroborating evidence from other witnesses and the actions of the 2nd Respondent, who offered remuneration to the 1st Respondent following the incident. ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED [10] Key issues requiring determination are as follows:-

Whether the SCJ erred in her consideration in determining the issue of collision between the 1st Respondent’s motorcycle and the 2nd Respondent’s motorcar;

(ii) Whether there was collusion between the Respondents to file a fraudulent insurance claim. THE LAW [11] It is trite law that an appellate court would be very reluctant and hesitant to disturb a finding of fact made by trial judge whom had the audio and visual advantage of observing and assessing witnesses testifying before him, something which the appellate court does not possess. Nevertheless, it would be open to an appellate court to interfere with the finding made by a trial judge if such finding was not supported by evidence or the decision was against the weight of the evidence or there was no proper judicial evaluation of the evidence or there was misdirection in law or the trial court had fundamentally misdirected itself. [12] The principles of the law with regard to appeal was clearly explained by the Court of Appeal in the case of P'ng Hun Sun v. Dato' Yip Yee Foo [2013] 1 LNS 320 as follows:- “When the finding of the trial judge is factual, however, the fact finder's decision cannot be disturbed on appeal unless the decision of the fact finder is plainly wrong (see China Airline Ltd v. Maltran Air Corp Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [1996] 3 CLJ 163); Zaharah bt A. Kadir v. Ramuna Bauxite Pte Ltd & Anor [2011] 1 LNS 1015, Kyros International Sdn Bhd. v. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri [2013] 1 LNS 1). The findings of fact of the trial judge can only be reversed when it is positively demonstrated to the appellate court that -

by reason of some non-direction or mix-direction or otherwise the judge erred in accepting the evidence which he or she did accept; or

in assessing and evaluating the evidence the judge has taken into account some mater which he or she ought not to have taken into account, or failed to take into account some matter which he or she ought to have taken into account; or

it unmistakenly appears from the evidence itself, or from the unsatisfactory reasons given by the judge for accepting it, that he or she cannot have taken proper advantage of his or her having seen and heard the witnesses' or

in so far aside judge has relied on manner and demeanour, there are other circumstances which indicate that the evidence of the witnesses which he or she accepted is not credible, as for instance, where those witnesses have on some collateral matter deliberately given an untrue answer.” [13] In a civil dispute, the burden of proof lay throughout on the Plaintiff to prove the various allegation levelled against the Defendant. It is plain that the legal burden to prove on allegation lies on the party making the assertion (see Sections 101 to 103, Evidence Act, 1950). The evidential burden does not shift to the Defendant until and unless a prima-facie case is made out on the pleaded cause of action. The initial onus of proving the case is always on the plaintiff (Sarkar Law of Evidence 16th edn at 1593). [14] In International Times & Ors v. Leong Ho Yuen [1980] 1 LNS 31; [1980] 2 MLJ 86, Salleh Abas FCJ (as he then was), delivering the judgment of the court, said that the first sense of the expression "burden of proof" in s. 101 is the burden to establish the case which rests throughout on the party who asserts the affirmative of the issue, while the second sense of the expression "burden of proof" in s. 102 is the burden to adduce evidence: “For the purpose of this appeal it is necessary to bear in mind the distinction between the two senses in which the expressions burden of proof and onus of proof are used (Nanji & Co v. Jatashankar Dossa & Ors AIR 1961 SC 1474-1478 and Raghavamma v. Chenchamma AIR 1964 SC 136-143). The first sense, signified by the expression burden of proof such as referred to in s. 101 of the Evidence Act is the burden of establishing a case and this rests throughout the trial on the party who asserts the affirmative of the issue. The appellants in the present appeal relied on justification and fair comment. Therefore, the burden of proving these defences rests entirely upon them (Gatley on Libel and Slander 7th Ed, paras 351 and 354). The second sense referred to as onus of proof, on the other hand, relates to the responsibility of adducing evidence in order to discharge the burden of proof. The onus as opposed to burden is not stable and constantly shifts during the trial from one side to the other according to the scale of evidence and other preponderates. Such shifting is one continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. According to ss. 102 and 103 of the Evidence Act, if the party with whom this onus lies whether initially or subsequently as a result of its shifting does not give any or further evidence or gives evidence which is not sufficient, such party must fail. It is this onus that we are concerned with in the present appeal.” [15] The "burden of proof" in s. 101 is the burden to establish a case which rests throughout on the party who asserts the affirmative of the issue. The "burden of proof" in s. 102 is the burden to adduce evidence, to make out or rebut the claim and this burden shifts from one side to the other according to the weight of the evidence. To differentiate the sense used, the "burden of proof" in s. 101 is "burden of proof", while the "burden of proof" in ss. 102 and 103 is dubbed "onus of proof". In some jurisdictions, the s. 101 "burden of proof" is labelled "legal burden" while the s. 102 burden of proof" is referred to as "evidential burden" (see Letchumanan Chettiar Alagappan (as Executor to SL Alameloo Achi (Deceased) & Anor v. Secure Plantation Sdn Bhd). [16] Bearing the above principles in mind, I return to the facts of the present case. The 1st question which requires determination of this court was whether there was in fact a collision between the 1st Respondent’s and 3rd Respondent’s vehicles. On this issue, the 1st Respondent bears the initial burden of proof to prove the issue in the affirmative. CASE ANALYSIS THE ISSUE OF COLLISION [17] The primary issue revolves around whether the alleged collision actually took place. In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the balance of probabilities. The 1st Respondent bears the burden of proving that the accident occurred as he alleged. The SCJ found that the 1st Respondent’s testimony was credible and that the evidence presented was sufficient to conclude that a collision occurred. [18] The SCJ had decided that the Investigation Officer’s (IO) inability to determine whether or not an accident occurred between the two vehicles is not conclusive proof that accident did not occur between the two vehicles. [19] The SCJ had in her decision placed significant reliance on the 1st Respondent’s testimony and medical reports from Hospital Tapah, indicating treatment for injuries sustained from an alleged motor vehicle accident on the same day as follows:-

the plaintiff in this case received treatment 2 times at Tapah Hospital on the same day the accident occurred which was on 17.10.2016 where the First Respondent was taken to Tapah Hospital Emergency Department at 7.09 am to receive treatment. The First Respondent is said to be under the influence of alcohol upon arrival at the Hospital;

(ii) On the same day at 8.38pm, the First Responder was sent to the emergency department of Tapah Hospital a second time by ambulance and at that time, the hospital received information "alleged motor vehicle accident with motorcar" and this was stated in the Tapah Hospital Medical Report dated 21.10.2020;

(iii) The SCJ found that for the first time treatment, the history was not taken from the First Respondent, so the SCJ could not make a conclusive decision that this accident was a "motorbike skidded";

(iv) The SCJ stated that based on the testimony of SP1 and SP2, the SCJ could not decide that this accident was the result of a skidded motorbike because there was no evidence before the Court to prove how and from whom the history was obtained while the First Respondent was said to be in a difficult state due to the influence of alcohol and there was no documentation who gives the patient's history to the doctor. [20] The SCJ found that the 1st Respondent’s testimony was credible and consistent with other evidence, including the police reports and the actions of the 2nd Respondent, who offered remuneration to the 1st Respondent following the incident as follows:-

The SCJ stated that the version of the 1st Respondent where he stated that he saw the motorcar hit him as he fell into the drain was supported by the testimony of the IO ("SP4") where SP4 stated that both parties involved had lodged a police report. On 23.11.2016, when SP4 went to the Plaintiff's house and took the POL55 statement, the Plaintiff informed SP4 of the Defendant's motorcar number and wrote down the Defendant's motorcar number himself;

(ii) Based on SP4's testimony where he stated that based on his investigation, the motorcar driver filed a police report belatedly because he had paid RM500 to the 1st Respondent and the 2nd Respondent had agreed not to file a police report. The SCJ found this testimony consistent with the recording of the 1st Respondent's statement where he made a police report because he was not satisfied with the offer of RM200 made by the motorcar driver;

(iii) The court finds this to be consistent with the 1st Respondent’s uncle (“SP8”) evidence where SP8 had stated that the driver had offered RM200 as settlement sum at the Hospital. [21] This Court, however, finds that the evidence raises significant doubts about the occurrence of the alleged collision. Several aspects of the 1st Respondent’s account, as well as the medical evidence, suggest that the 1st Respondent’s injuries may have been caused by a different mechanism, namely a skid rather than a collision. [22] The medical reports from Hospital Raja Permaisuri Bainun, Ipoh, Perak and Hospital Tapah provide significant information regarding the 1st Respondent's condition following the accident. Hospital Raja Permaisuri Bainun's letter indicates that the 1st Respondent was involved in an accident due to slippery road conditions which contradicts the claim of a collision. [23] The medical reports are a critical piece of evidence in this case. First, the medical reports from Hospital Raja Permaisuri Bainun and Hospital Tapah indicate that the 1st Respondent was intoxicated at the time of the incident and that his motorcycle skidded. The report from Hospital Raja Permaisuri Bainun, Ipoh, Perak explicitly states that the 1st Respondent’s injuries were the result of a skid caused by a slippery road. This directly contradicts the 1st Respondent’s claim that he was hit from behind by a motorcar. [24] The SCJ dismissed the significance of the medical report particularly regarding the 1st Respondent’s intoxicated state on the basis that no conclusive blood alcohol test was available to determine the level of his intoxication. [25] This reasoning, the Appellant argues, overlooks the significance of the hospital’s observations regarding the 1st Respondent’s intoxicated state and its potential impact on his ability to ride safely. [26] The SCJ's decision not to rely on the absence of conclusive medical evidence of blood alcohol level is justified as intoxication requires robust proof. However, the medical reports indicating the 1st Respondent's intoxicated state and his own admission of alcohol consumption present a compelling case for considering intoxication as a factor in the accident. The SCJ's emphasis on the absence of blood alcohol level tests may overlook the broader context provided by the medical reports and the 1st Respondent's statements. [27] It is in my considered view that the visible signs of intoxication noted in the medical reports, including dizziness and incoherence, are sufficient to raise doubts about the 1st Respondent’s ability to recall the events of the incident accurately and should have been given more weight. Intoxication, even without a specific blood alcohol level, can significantly impair one’s ability to ride a motorcycle safely. [28] The admission by the 1st Respondent that he consumed alcohol the night before the incident, coupled with medical reports stating he was under the influence of alcohol at the time of treatment, strengthens the argument that he was intoxicated during the accident. His ability to ride a motorcycle despite feeling dizzy and intoxicated raises serious concerns about his capacity to operate the vehicle safely. [29] The Appellant contends that the SCJ’s failure to adequately consider the medical reports as credible evidence contravenes the principle of best evidence which requires the court to consider and give due weight to the most reliable and direct evidence available, thus leading to an erroneous conclusion. [30] The SCJ’s dismissal of the medical evidence overlooked the relevance of these indicators. The intoxication evidence is critical in assessing the 1st Respondent’s reliability and judgment during the incident. [31] The medical evidence, combined with the 1st Respondent’s admission of alcohol consumption, suggests that his account of the accident is unreliable. The SCJ’s assessment of this evidence was thus flawed. [32] This Court finds that the medical evidence, particularly the reports from both hospitals, should have been given greater weight in the SCJ’s assessment. The 1st Respondent’s intoxicated state, combined with the report of skidding, suggests that the injuries were not caused by a collision, but rather by a fall resulting from the 1st Respondent’s own actions. [33] The Appellant also presented evidence that the 1st Respondent’s motorcycle showed no signs of damage to the rear, which would be expected if it had been struck from behind by a motorcar. The absence of such damage casts further doubt on the 1st Respondent’s version of events. [34] In cases involving motor vehicle accidents, physical damage to the vehicles is often a critical piece of evidence in determining whether a collision occurred. In this case, the Appellant presented photographs of the 1st Respondent’s motorcycle, showing no damage to the rear of the vehicle. This absence of damage is significant, as it suggests that no collision took place between the motorcycle and the motorcar. [35] The SCJ dismissed the photographs as being of poor quality and insufficient to prove that no collision occurred. However, this Court finds that the absence of physical damage is a crucial factor that should have been given more weight. If the 1st Respondent’s motorcycle had been struck from behind by a motorcar, it is reasonable to expect that some damage would be visible on the rear of the motorcycle. The absence of physical damage thus remains a significant factor that should not have been disregarded. [36] The absence of damage to the rear of the 1st Respondent's motorcycle is pivotal. The SCJ dismissed this absence as immaterial, but such lack of damage casts doubts on the occurrence of a rear-end collision as claimed. [37] The absence of damage to the rear part of the 1st Respondent’s motorcycle directly contradicts his claim of being hit from behind. This discrepancy significantly undermines the credibility of his account and suggests that the accident may not have occurred as described. [38] The inconsistencies in the 1st Respondent’s account, the medical evidence indicating that he skidded rather than being hit, and the absence of physical damage to the motorcycle all point to the conclusion that the alleged collision did not occur. [39] The above evidence supported by the evidence from Hospital Raja Permaisuri Bainun which stated that the 1st Respondent skidded due to a slippery road surface, demonstrates a clear contradiction to the 1st Respondent’s claim of being hit from behind. This letter, dated 1.11.2016, supports the Appellant’s assertion that the accident did not occur as alleged. [40] The SCJ had in my considered view failed to adequately consider the absence of damage to the motorcycle, which is a critical piece of physical evidence. This oversight is a significant error, as it goes directly to the heart of the 1st Respondent’s claim. The SCJ’s dismissal of this absence of damage as immaterial was incorrect, given its importance in corroborating or refuting the occurrence of the accident. ALLEGATION OF COLLUSION AND FRAUD [41] The Appellant alleges that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents conspired to file a fraudulent insurance claim. Collusion and fraud are serious allegations that require clear and convincing evidence. [42] The factors require proving to successfully establish a case of conspiracy was as laid down in the Court of Appeal case of Seow Hoon Hin v. Hartalega Holdings Berhad & 4 Ors [2019] 1 LNS 779 as follows:- “[205] Although Renault SA was an appeal that arose out of an application to strike out, the views expressed by the Court of Appeal are equally relevant: ...The gist of the tort of conspiracy is not the conspirational agreement alone but that agreement plus the overt acts causing damage (Marrinam v. Vibart [1963] 1 QB 234, affirmed [1963] 1 QB 528]...The statement of claim should describe who the several parties and their relationship with each other. It should allege the agreement between the defendants to conspire, and state precisely what was the purpose or what were the objects of the alleged conspiracy and it must then proceed to set forth, with clarity and precision the overt acts which are alleged to have been done by each of the alleged conspirators in pursuance and in furtherance of the conspiracy, and lastly, it must allege the injury and damages occasioned to the plaintiff thereby (The Common Law Library-No. 5- Precedents of Pleadings - s. 26-Conspiracy)... [206] Further, the Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff must prove the following elements, that there is: [a] an agreement between two or more persons ( that is an agreement between Tan Chong and others); [b] an agreement for the purpose of injuring Inokom and Quasar; [c] that acts done in execution of that agreement resulted in damage to Inokom and Quasar; [d] damage is an essential element and where damage is not pleaded the statement of claim may be struck out. (See also the case of Muniandy a/l Nadasan & Ors v. Dato' Prem Krishna Sahgal & Ors [2016] 1 LNS 592; [2016] 11 MLJ 38) [43] I am mindful that in cases of fraud and/or conspiracy, direct evidence of such conduct are not always available and that the court may consider surrounding circumstances and conduct of parties to infer fraud and/or conspiracy as was held in the case of MGG Pillai v. Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & Other Appeals [1995] 2 CLJ 912; [1995] 2 MLJ 493:- “Conspiracy is a tort that is not always capable of proof by direct evidence. Like so many other facts, an agreement to do an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means may be established by evidence of circumstances from which such an agreement may be inferred.” [44] The same principles were reiterated in the case Cubic Electronic Sdn Bhd (In Liquidation) v. MKC Corporate & Business Advisory Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2016] 3 CLJ 676 where the Court of Appeal had stated that in cases of conspiracy, the plaintiff is never required to show the existence of the arrangements between the conspirators in the nature of an express agreement, whether formal or informal. As is often the case, the agreement or combination is to be inferred from the evidence (see also the case of Kwan Ngen Wah & Ors v. Hiew Kon Fah & Ors and other appeals [2019] 6 CLJ 722). [45] Reference was further made by this Court to another Court of Appeal case of Khoo Teng Chye v. Cekal Berjasa Sdn Bhd v. Anor [2015] 6 CLJ 449 where it was held as follows:- “It is also well settled that in the absence of an express admission of a conspiracy, an agreement to injure has to be established in the vast majority of cases by circumstantial evidence. .... Conspiracy as a whole is brought about in secrecy and the proof of the same by adoption of evidence direct, is really an impossible feat in most of the cases, though in the rarest of rare occasion, the possibility of obtaining such evidence is there. As such the conspiracy may be proved in most of the cases, by process of inference or induction from relevant facts and circumstances.” [46] The Appellant had in this case relied on several factors to support its claim of collusion. First, there is the delayed filing of police reports by both the 1st and 2nd Respondents. The 1st Respondent lodged his report one month after the incident, while the 2nd Respondent waited approximately nine months. Such delays are unusual in cases involving motor vehicle accidents, where prompt reporting is typically expected. [47] The Appellant also points to inconsistencies in the 1st Respondent’s statements regarding how he came to know the registration number of the 3rd Respondent’s motorcar. In his police report, the 1st Respondent stated that he knew the 3rd Respondent, but during the trial, he claimed that he had only seen the 3rd Respondent and was not personally acquainted with him. This contradiction raises suspicions about the accuracy of the 1st Respondent’s account. [48] Additionally, the Appellant argues that the offer of compensation by the 3rd Respondent to the 1st Respondent immediately after the incident suggests that the parties may have reached a private agreement, only for the 1st Respondent to later file a police report and pursue an insurance claim. The 3rd Respondent admitted to offering RM500 to the 1st Respondent as compensation, which the 1st Respondent rejected, stating that it was insufficient to cover his medical expenses. [49] While the offer of compensation by itself is not necessarily indicative of fraud, it raises questions about the nature of the relationship between the parties and the motivations behind the filing of the insurance claim. [50] The Appellant’s claim of collusion is further supported by the absence of physical evidence corroborating the 1st Respondent’s account of the collision. As noted earlier, the lack of damage to the rear of the motorcycle, combined with the medical reports indicating that the 1st Respondent skidded, suggests that the alleged collision did not occur. [51] The Appellant argues that the combined inconsistencies, delays, and lack of physical evidence point towards a collusion between the Respondents to file a fraudulent insurance claim. [52] The 1st Respondent’s delay in lodging a police report raises questions about the credibility of his account. If the accident had occurred as he described, it would be reasonable to expect that he would have reported the incident promptly. The fact that he waited one month to file a report, coupled with the 3rd Respondent’s delay of nine months in lodging his report, suggests that there may have been other motives at play. [53] It is in my considered view that the inconsistencies in the Respondents' accounts, such as the 1st Respondent's shifting explanations about how he obtained the vehicle registration numbers, suggest coordination. Additionally, the significant delay in filing police reports is unusual and raises suspicions of fabrication. [54] The fact that the 2nd Respondent offered to compensate the 1st Respondent following the incident, despite there being no clear evidence of a collision, raises further suspicion. [55] The Appellant's argument that these factors indicate fraud and conspiracy is compelling. It is thus my conclusive finding that the cumulative evidence presented by the Appellant meets the standard of probability, suggesting collusion and fraud. [56] It is also in my observation that the testimonies of the Respondents contain numerous inconsistencies. The 1st Respondent initially stated that he knew the 2nd Respondent, but later claimed they were not friends. Additionally, the timeline regarding when and how the 1st Respondent learned of the 2nd Respondent’s vehicle number is contradictory. There were also varying statements regarding who managed the motorcycle repairs. The inconsistencies in the Respondents’ testimony raises questions about the credibility and reliability of his account. These inconsistencies, highlighted during the trial, were downplayed by the SCJ but are material in assessing the overall credibility of the 1st Respondent’s version of events. [57] The SCJ's dismissal of these discrepancies as immaterial was erroneous. The Appellant has shown that these inconsistencies are significant and impact the credibility of the Respondents’ testimonies, supporting the Appellant’s argument of a fabricated story. CONCLUSION [58] Upon a detailed analysis of the evidence and legal principles, this Court finds that the SCJ erred in her assessment of the facts and the law. The inconsistencies in the 1st Respondent’s account, the delayed filing of police reports, the medical evidence indicating that the 1st Respondent skidded due to intoxication, and the absence of physical damage to the vehicles all point to the conclusion that the alleged collision did not occur. [59] The evidence presented by the Appellant raises serious doubts about the legitimacy of the Respondents’ insurance claim. The cumulative effect of the inconsistencies and contradictions in the Respondents’ statements, combined with the lack of corroborating physical evidence, supports the conclusion that the claim was not genuine. [60] In light of the above, this Court allowed both of the appeal and sets aside the decision of the Sessions Court. Thus, the Respondents’ claim is dismissed with costs of RM6,000.00 is to be paid by the Respondents to the Appellant for each case. Dated: 07.10.2024 Bagi Kes No.: AA-12B-17-07/2023 Tetuan Abdul Rahim & Co bagi pihak Perayu Peguamcara & Peguambela Bilik No. 12A-07 & 12A-08 Tingkat 12A, Plaza Permata Jalan Kampar Off Jalan Tun Razak 50400 Kuala Lumpur Tel:

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