Liew Chui Har v 1. ) Liew Chui Har (WA-22NCVC-416-07/2020)

1.

... Defendants (in the Original Action) And Between LOW WEE WEE ... Plaintiff

1.

(as partners under the name and style of Zenith Face & Body Wellness) ... Defendants (in the First Defendant’s Counterclaim) And Between ... Plaintiff

1.

TAN CHAP (as a partner under the name and style of Messrs Tan Chap & Associates)

MESSRS TAN CHAP & ASSOCIATES ... Defendants (in the Second Defendant’s Counterclaim) 2

The Plaintiff (“P”) filed an application vide Enclosure 55 (“Enc 55”) for an interim injunction or preservation order against the 2nd Defendant (in the original action) (“D2”).

Enc 55 was made pursuant to Order 29 rule 1 and rule 2 and Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012, section 25(2) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 read together with paragraph 6 of its Schedule, section 50 and section 51 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the court.

Enc 55 prayed for the following orders:

that D2 be restrained from disposing or dealing with his property known as Lot No. 163-B, Level 2 within the building duplex terrace home forming part of the development known as Amansiara @ Jalan Ipoh (“Property”) until final judgment or full disposal of this suit;

in the alternative, an order for the preservation of the Property by ordering D2 to deposit all relevant transfer documents of the Property (“Property Documents”) with the court or an independent third party law firm mutually agreed and appointed by the parties until final judgment or full disposal of this suit. The Property Documents may include but is not limited to the 3 originals of the title deed, sale and purchase agreement, loan facility agreement, deed of assignment, power of attorney and the deed of receipt and reassignment relating to the Property;

alternatively, in the event that the Property has been sold at a consideration above the sum of RM280,000 (being the agreed value of the Property), an order for D2 to deposit the purchase price with the court or an independent third party law firm mutually agreed and appointed by the parties until final judgment or full disposal of this suit;

or in the event that the Property has been sold at a consideration below the sum of RM280,000, an order for D2 to deposit or pay the total sum of RM280,000 or otherwise, to secure the said sum with the court or an independent third party law firm mutually agreed and appointed by the parties until final judgment or full disposal of this suit.

D2 is the husband of the 1st Defendant (“D1”). D1 and D2 are collectively referred to as the “Defendants”.

Enc 55 was made on an ex parte basis. Since I was not convinced of its urgency, I directed that Enc 55 be heard inter partes. Pending the inter partes hearing, I granted an ad interim injunction. After the inter partes hearing, I dismissed Enc 55. These are the grounds of my decision. Plaintiff’s case 4

P contends that she paid RM500,000 (“Said Sum”) as a loan (“Loan”) to the Defendants to set up a business called Zenith Face & Body Wellness (“Zenith”). The Loan was purportedly given to D1 through D2.

P says she has no intention to become a partner of Zenith. But was only registered as one in reliance on D1’s representation that making P a partner is a temporary arrangement and that P would merely be a nominal partner. Further, that the Loan will be repaid by the Defendants within one year.

When dispute arose between P and the Defendants, it prompted P’s concerns that the Loan will not be repaid. P insisted on repayment of the Loan. From negotiation on how the Loan is to be repaid, P claims that the Defendants are not in the financial position to repay the Loan.

It was then agreed that D2 will transfer the Property to P as part settlement of the Loan. A settlement agreement (“Settlement Agreement”) was drawn up by Mr Tan Chap of Messrs Tan Chap & Associates (“Solicitor”). However, the Settlement Agreement was never signed.

The Property Documents were deposited with the Solicitor allegedly for the purpose of perfecting the transfer of the Property. P initiated this action when D2 refused to execute and perform his obligations under the Settlement Agreement.

The Statement of Claim (“SOC”) prayed for the following reliefs:

as against D2: 5

a declaration that the Settlement Agreement is valid and enforceable;

(ii) an order for specific performance of the Settlement Agreement;

(iii) an order that D2 transfers the Property within one month from the date of the order;

(iv) if D2 fails to comply with (iii) above, the Registrar of the High Court be authorised to sign the relevant transfer documents in order to transfer the Property to P;

damages;

(vi) a declaration that D2 bears all the losses and claims against P pertaining to Zenith;

alternatively, as against D1:

payment of RM500,000;

(ii) damages;

(iii) an order for dissolution of Zenith;

(iv) a declaration that D1 bears all the losses and claims against P pertaining to Zenith;

alternatively, as against the Defendants:

a declaration that D1 is a partner of Zenith;

(ii) a declaration that the Defendants have contravened the Partnership Act 1961;

(iii) a declaration that the Defendants bears all the losses and claims against P pertaining to Zenith;

(iv) payment of RM500,000 by the Defendants jointly and severally;

damages for conspiracy;

(vi) an order for dissolution of Zenith. 6 Defendants’ case

The Defendants contend that there is no such Loan from P. And that P is a true partner in Zenith. On 25.3.2019, P and D2 formed Zenith as a partnership with equal contribution of 50% each. The Said Sum was paid by P as an investment and capital contribution to Zenith.

D1 avers that she was employed as General Manager of Zenith on account of her experience in the beauty and wellness business. In her Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, D1 made a counterclaim for:- (a) arrears of salary owing to her by Zenith and (b) monies she paid towards the operational expenses of Zenith.

In his Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, D2 made a counterclaim against P for damages for breach of duties as a partner of Zenith. D2 also made a counterclaim against the Solicitor for damages for failure to return the Property Documents.

According to the Defendants, P is attempting to recover her investment in the failed partnership which is Zenith. One year into the partnership, P wanted to exit the partnership. In order to recover her unsuccessful investment, P for the first time alleges that the Said Sum is a Loan and wanted repayment of the same. In truth, no such Loan exists.

P then alleges that D2 had agreed to settle the Loan by transferring the Property to P or her nominee. According to the Defendants, P attempted to obtain collateral for the Loan by making D2 execute the Settlement Agreement. P wanted security that she will be repaid her investment in the partnership. To achieve her means, P engaged the 7 services of the Solicitor. The Solicitor drew up the Settlement Agreement and other related agreements.

The Defendants say that the Settlement Agreement is a sham. The real reason behind the Property becoming entangled in the dispute was due to a proposal for both partners to inject additional capital into Zenith. D2 had intended to sell the Property and use the sale proceeds to be injected into Zenith. But P subsequently changed her mind about injecting further funds into Zenith. As such, the proposed injection of additional capital was aborted. Since no additional capital contribution was required, D2 decided not to proceed with the sale of the Property. P however had her own ulterior motive and took advantage of the situation to recover her investment in Zenith.

When P learnt of D2’s intended sale of the Property, she had offered to buy the Property. It was in the context of a contemplated sale of the Property that D2 deposited the Property Documents with the Solicitor. However, when the proposed injection of funds into Zenith was aborted, D2 no longer needed to sell the Property in order to raise the requisite funds. As such, D2 requested the Solicitor to return the Property Documents. Interpleader action

Instead, the Solicitor filed an interpleader application vide Kuala Lumpur High Court Suit No. WA-24NCvC-980-07/2020 to determine the manner of disposal of the Property Documents (“Interpleader OS”). At the hearing of the Interpleader OS on 6.4.2021, I ordered the Solicitor to return the Property Documents to D2. 8

Three days later, P filed Enc 55 on 9.4.2021. According to P, the Property is an integral part or is a subject matter of the instant suit. In the SOC, P prayed for a declaration that the Settlement Agreement is valid and enforceable, and for the Property to be transferred.

The Settlement Agreement was to be entered into between D2 and P. According to the Settlement Agreement, the following agreements are to be executed simultaneously between D2 and one Ong Kia Lok, who is the daughter of P (“Daughter”):

a sale and purchase agreement between D2 and Daughter relating to the Property (“SPA”);

a deed of assignment from D2 to Daughter;

an irrevocable power of attorney by D2 in favour of Daughter.

Daughter is not a party in the instant suit. Pursuant to clause 4 of the Settlement Agreement, the Property is to be transferred to Daughter by way of the SPA. The Defendants complain that P is attempting to extend the rights of a non-party (i.e. Daughter) through the Settlement Agreement. They contend that a non-party cannot seek or benefit from an equitable relief or any form of reliefs from the court through a party. As such, the Defendants argue that Enc 55 is an abuse of the process of court and should be dismissed. 9

Further, despite P’s averment that she had given the Loan to D1, the Settlement Agreement was confined to D2. D1 being the one who purportedly took the Loan is not named as a party in the Settlement Agreement. According to the Defendants, this raises suspicion as to why D1 being the proper person is not made a party to the Settlement Agreement. The answer suggested by them is that the Settlement Agreement is a sham document. P is attempting to create collateral or security through the Settlement Agreement to recover her investment in an unsuccessful partnership.

Finally, none of the aforesaid agreements were executed by any of the parties named therein.

In deciding whether to grant the interim injunction or preservation order sought by P, I follow the approach laid down by the Court of Appeal in Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v Mohd Noor bin Abdullah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 193 at 206-207.

Firstly, I ask whether there is a bona fide serious issue to be tried. Bearing in mind that the pleadings and evidence are incomplete at this stage. I refrain from making any determination on the merits of the claim or the defence. I am to identify the issues raised and decide whether these are serious enough to merit a trial. If I find that no serious question is disclosed, that is the end of the matter and the injunction is refused. On the other hand, if I find that there are serious questions to be tried, I would move on to the next step. 10

Secondly, having found that an issue has been disclosed that requires further investigation, I must consider where the justice of the case lies. In making this assessment, I must take into account all relevant matters. I must weigh the harm that the injunction would produce by its grant against the harm that would result from its refusal. If I conclude that P would suffer greater injustice if relief is withheld, then I would be entitled to grant the injunction. Similarly, if I conclude that D2 would suffer the greater injustice by the grant of an injunction, I would be entitled to refuse relief.

Thirdly, I am mindful that the remedy that I am asked to administer is discretionary. It is intended to produce a just result for the period between the date of Enc 55 and the trial proper. And intended to maintain the status quo. Accordingly, I would be entitled to take into account all discretionary considerations. Such as delay in the filing of Enc 55. Or any adequate alternative remedy that would satisfy P's equity, such as an award of monetary compensation in the event that he succeeds in establishing his claim at the trial.

Having undertaken this line of enquiry, I declined to grant the interim injunction or preservation order sought by P. In my opinion, the balance of convenience lies in favour of D2. Greater harm would result from the grant of an injunction as compared with its refusal. Maintaining the status quo here means not restraining D2 from his right to deal with the Property. Granting the interim injunction or preservation order would have the opposite effect of maintaining the status quo. Furthermore, I am of the view that damages is an adequate remedy. My reasons are as follows. Serious issue to be tried 11

I am satisfied that there are serious issues to be tried in the instant suit. Firstly, the character of the payment of the Said Sum is disputed. On the one hand, P avers that the Said Sum was given as a Loan. On the other hand, the Defendants aver that the Said Sum was an investment and capital contribution by P as a partner of Zenith.

Secondly, P asserts that D2 agreed to transfer the Property towards part settlement of the Loan. However, D2 asserts that the Property was to be sold (if at all) only for the purpose of utilising the sale proceeds towards capital contribution to Zenith. This was on the back of an agreement by both parties to increase their respective capital contribution in Zenith.

Thirdly, the Settlement Agreement raises a bona fide serious issue to be tried. P contends that D2 agreed to offer the Property as part settlement of the Loan vide the Settlement Agreement. This contention finds support in the affidavit affirmed by the Solicitor in the Interpleader OS. The Solicitor being the one who drew up the Settlement Agreement and the SPA. However, D2 claims that the Solicitor is biased as he is P’s lawyer and represented P in the Settlement Agreement. The truth behind the Settlement Agreement would require mature consideration at trial.

Fourthly, D2 challenged the legality of the Settlement Agreement. Alleging that it is a cloak for an illegal money lending transaction by P. However, P denies any illegality. P avers that no interest was charged on the Loan. The purported 10% interest per annum alleged by D2 is only in respect of the default or late payment interest of the Loan. As per clause 6.3 of the Settlement Agreement. 12

P submits that merely lending money or charging late payment interest is not tantamount to carrying on money lending business within the ambit of the Moneylenders Act 1951. P says there is no evidence of any degree of system and continuity that she had exercised which could lead to a presumption that she was carrying out a money lending business. P relied on the Privy Council case of Chow Yoong Hong v Choong Fah Rubber Manufactory [1962] MLJ 74.

At this stage of the proceedings, I will not attempt to resolve conflicts based on the pleadings and affidavit evidence. That is best left for the trial. I only need to identify the issues raised, as I have done above. And satisfy myself that these are serious enough to merit a trial, which I am. Where the justice of the case lies

It is my finding that the balance of convenience lies in favour of D2. Granting the injunction would produce a greater harm to D2. As compared to the harm that might result to P from its refusal. D2 would suffer the greater injustice by the grant of an injunction. I considered the following factors.

Firstly, P’s claim is in essence a monetary claim. At the end of the day, P wants back the RM500,000 which she had paid. I am aware that P also sought declarations to enforce the Settlement Agreement and to transfer the Property. However, I see those as going towards recouping the Said Sum. This is fortified by the alternative prayers in the SOC. Where P prayed for RM500,000 to be paid by the Defendants jointly and severally. There are other prayers for damages and for the Defendants to 13 bear the losses and claims in connection with Zenith. Again, those boil down to ringgit and sen.

Secondly, the Settlement Agreement and the SPA were never signed. This is not a case where the Settlement Agreement and the SPA were in agreed terms, but D2 reneged on signing the same. D2 claims that he never intended for any agreement to be formed or drafted pertaining to the Property. These agreements only came to light in the Interpleader OS when they were exhibited in the affidavit filed by the Solicitor. D2 avers that he had no knowledge of the existence of any such agreements until then. Neither the drafts or the final copies were ever provided to him for comments or approval.

In this light, the Court of Appeal case of Kho Ah Soon v Ooi Kar Seng (Properties) Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 293 is distinguishable. The brief facts of that case are these. Under a sale and purchase agreement (“agreement”), the respondent agreed to sell and the appellant agreed to buy the property in question. All the salient terms of the agreement had been reached by the parties in a meeting, and they were subsequently confirmed by the respondent by way of their solicitor’s letter. However, there was a disagreement between the parties regarding the date the agreement should carry. Due to the disagreement, the respondent informed the appellant that they did not wish to proceed with the sale. The appellant argued that the agreement had already been concluded despite the fact that it had not been formally signed, and sued for specific performance.

Although the respondent maintained that there was no concluded agreement, the Court of Appeal found that the respondent had acted 14 contrary to that contention. This was evidenced by its letter of confirmation which referred to a draft agreement to be prepared by the appellant’s solicitors at the request of the respondent. Further, the contemporaneous documents show that the reason why the respondent backed out of the agreement was not that the terms had not been agreed upon, but that there was no consensus as to the date that the agreement should carry. On that basis, the Court of Appeal restored an injunction to stop the respondent disposing of the property. So as to protect the subject matter of the dispute and to maintain the status quo.

As explained earlier, the facts of the present case are quite different. Here, P is seeking an interim injunction or preservation order against the Property. On the premise that the Settlement Agreement and the SPA were in agreed terms, and that there was a concluded agreement between her and D2. However, that has not been established. It is far from certain that there was already a concluded agreement in place between P and D2, which was only awaiting formal signature.

Furthermore, the subject matter of the dispute here is essentially the Said Sum of RM500,000. Not the Property. I do not think the Property forms an integral part of the instant suit. Or at least not to the extent that would justify the Property being subject to an interim injunction or preservation order.

Thirdly, there is discrepancy between the terms of the Settlement Agreement and P’s pleaded case. The Settlement Agreement stated the following.

First, that P and D2 are business partners of Zenith. 15

Second, that P has paid a sum of RM250,000 to Zenith as her share of the capital contribution in the partnership. D2 was unable to pay his equal portion. Therefore P had lent D2 a sum of RM250,000 towards his portion. D2 owes this sum to P and agreed to repay the same. 16

Third, that P will retire from the partnership and transfer her 50% interest in Zenith to D2 at a price of RM250,000. 17

Fourth, as consideration of P’s retirement from Zenith, D2 agrees to pay a sum of RM250,000 through the transfer of the Property. The transfer price of the Property is RM280,000. The excess sum of RM30,000 will be applied towards reducing the RM250,000 which D2 owes to P. D2 will repay the balance loan sum of RM220,000. 18

It is evident that the terms of the Settlement Agreement conflicts with P’s pleaded case. P pleaded that she had given a Loan of RM500,000 to D1 through D2. But the Settlement Agreement stated that P has paid a 19 sum of RM250,000 to Zenith as her share of the capital contribution in the partnership. Further, that P had lent D2 a sum of RM250,000 towards his equal portion of the capital contribution.

Fourthly, it is unclear who the Property is to be transferred to. Paragraph 52.1(c) of the SOC prayed for an order that D2 transfers the Property within one month from the date of the order, but is silent on who the transferee would be.

On the one hand, P seeks specific performance of the Settlement Agreement. Based on that, pursuant to the SPA which is to be executed simultaneously, the Property would be transferred to Daughter. On the other hand, paragraph 52.1(d) of the SOC prayed for an order that the Registrar of the High Court executes the transfer of the Property to P. This would be inconsistent with the SPA.

Fifthly, if it be the case that the Property is to be transferred to Daughter, I am wary of granting an interim injunction or preservation order that will benefit a stranger to this suit. Daughter is not a party to the instant suit and has not applied for any injunctive relief.

In this regard, the case of Dato' Jaffar bin Mohd Ali v Jastera Berhad [1999] MLJU 575 is instructive. In that case, the plaintiff sought an interim injunction to restrain the defendants from excluding plaintiff and one Tan Seng Chai from acting as directors. The High Court said: “Tan is not a party to this suit and he has not applied to this Court for any injunctive relief. That being the case, it is neither necessary nor proper for this Court to consider any injunctive relief in his favour. Our Courts do not function as busy bodies and it has never been the business of our Courts to 20 give an order in favour of or against any person or persons who are non-parties or strangers to the cases before our Courts.”

In the light of the above factors, I do not think the justice of the case lies in favour of granting the interim injunction or preservation order. The Property is owned by D2. To restrain him from dealing with the Property pending full and final disposal of this suit would cause him great injustice. On balance, refusing the interim injunction or preservation order sought by P would produce lesser harm. Especially when her claim started off with and remains essentially a monetary claim of RM500,000. That leads to the next point that damages is an adequate remedy. Damages is adequate remedy

In my view, damages would be an adequate remedy for P if he wins at the trial. P’s loss or damage can be easily quantified. Namely the Said Sum of RM500,000. Which is the amount that P is seeking to recoup. Whether it be categorised as a Loan, as P avers. Or as an investment and capital contribution, as averred by the Defendants.

P argued that he would suffer irreparable harm as the Property “being a valuable and special commodity, once lost, may not adequately be compensated by damages”. (See Kho Ah Soon (supra) at page 300).

P relied on section 11(2) of the Specific Relief Act 1950 which reads: “Unless and until the contrary is proved, the court shall presume that the breach of a contract to transfer immovable property cannot be adequately relieved by compensation in money, and that the breach of a contract to transfer movable property can be thus relieved.” 21

However, I am not satisfied that there exists a contract to transfer the Property in the instant case. Much less that there is a breach of such a contract. The Settlement Agreement and the SPA, which would form a contract to transfer the Property, were never signed. It has not been established that there was any concluded agreement to transfer the Property.

Oddly enough, Enc 55 contained alternative prayers for the sum of RM280,000 (being the agreed value of the Property), to be deposited or otherwise secured with the court or an independent third party law firm. Actually, this negates P’s argument that she would suffer irreparable harm if the Property is lost. Such alternative prayers suggest that if the Property is unavailable, the sum of RM280,000 (being the agreed price of the Property) would suffice as security. This reinforces my view that:- (a) P’s claim is essentially a monetary claim and (b) damages is an adequate remedy. Delay

The Defendants contend that there was delay on the part of P in applying for the interim injunction or preservation order. Enc 55 was filed on 9.4.2021, about 9 months after the filing of the SOC on 27.7.2020. However, P cited the Supreme Court case of Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 241 at

And argued that in considering the lapse of time, delay commences to run from the discovery of the circumstances giving title to the relief.

P submitted that the risk of disposal of the Property only arose upon the determination of the Interpleader OS on 6.4.2021. Enc 55 was filed on 22

9.4.2021, 3 days after the risk of disposal became apparent to P. As such, there is no delay.

I am satisfied that there is no inordinate or inexcusable delay in the filing of Enc 55. The delay in filing Enc 55, if any, has been explained by P. Namely that the circumstances giving rise to it arose after my decision in the Interpleader OS. Interpleader OS

However, that raises another consideration. In the Interpleader OS, I had ordered the Solicitor to return the Property Documents to D2. But now vide Enc 55, P seeks an order for D2 to deposit the Property Documents with the court or an independent third party law firm until final judgment or full disposal of this suit.

The Defendants contend that res judicata is applicable on the facts of the present case. They argued that P is estopped from filing Enc 55 as she had elected to participate and ventilate her rights and reliefs in the Interpleader OS. I disagree. In deciding the Interpleader OS, I made no determination on the merits of P’s claim. I simply held that the Solicitor had no right to withhold the Property Documents from D2.

Nevertheless Enc 55, if allowed, would indirectly achieve what the Interpleader OS failed to do. It seems to me that Enc 55 would effectively circumvent my decision in the Interpleader OS. If I were to grant the preservation order sought by P, it would mean that D2 will have to surrender the Property Documents which he had successfully recovered at the conclusion of the Interpleader OS. 23

Ordering the Property Documents to be deposited with an independent third party law firm, as prayed for by P, would bring parties one full circle to where they were previously. Where the Property Documents were withheld by the Solicitor, purportedly as stakeholder, from D2. That was precisely the situation which led to the filing of the Interpleader OS.

The Solicitor initially proposed a stay of the Interpleader OS pending the disposal of the instant suit. The Interpleader OS was filed on 2.7.2020. Before the Writ in the instant suit, which was filed on 27.7.2020. The request for a stay was however withdrawn. If a stay had been granted, it would have resulted in the Property Documents being kept in the possession of the Solicitor until the disposal of this suit.

The Solicitor then proposed that the Property Documents be deposited with the court for safekeeping. Which I rejected. Again, that is what Enc 55 now seeks to do. Preliminary issue on 1st Defendant’s standing in Enc 55

P raised a preliminary issue regarding D1’s standing in Enc 55. P argued that Enc 55 does not concern D1 because:- (a) she is not the owner of the Property, (b) she is not an aggrieved person under the reliefs sought for in Enc 55 and (c) she is not affected if Enc 55 is allowed.

No doubt D1 is not the owner of the Property against which the interim injunction or preservation order is sought. Nevertheless, I permitted D1 to participate in Enc 55. I took into account the fact that there were various 24 allegations of fraud, false misrepresentation and conspiracy against D1 in the SOC. Further, that D1 is a de facto partner in Zenith and the mastermind. In the circumstances, I felt it would be useful to hear from D1 regarding her dealings with P and her involvement in Zenith.

I also took into account the fact that Enc 55 prayed for a deposit or security of the sum of RM280,000. That goes towards repayment of the Loan which P purportedly gave to D1 through D2. Enc 55 itself states that the grounds for P’s application for an interim injunction or preservation order is because P “has serious questions to be tried against the Defendants.” It is evident that the question of whether there is a bona fide serious issue to be tried needs to be considered with both Defendants in mind. Conclusion

For the reasons above, I dismissed Enc 55. I ordered P to pay costs of RM5,000 to each of the Defendants. Dated 27 June 2021 Quay Chew Soon Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur Civil Division NCvC 10 Counsels Wong Mun Hoe, Long Chay Jo and Thomas Lee Ming Zhang (Messrs Munhoe) for the Plaintiff. R.K. Sharma and Phang Zheng Jack (Messrs Vicknaraj, R.D. Ratnam, Rajesh Kumar & Associates) for the 1st Defendant. 25 Amrit Pal Singh and Aawaisha Pillai (Messrs Amrit & Company) for the 2nd Defendant. Cases cited Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v Mohd Noor bin Abdullah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 193 Chow Yoong Hong v Choong Fah Rubber Manufactory [1962] MLJ 74 Kho Ah Soon v Ooi Kar Seng (Properties) Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 293 Dato' Jaffar bin Mohd Ali v Jastera Berhad [1999] MLJU 575 Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 241 Legislation cited Order 29 rule 1 and rule 2 and Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 Section 25(2) and paragraph 6 of the Schedule of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 Sections 11(2), 50 and 51 of the Specific Relief Act 1950