Lim Bee Chian v Hendrick Chia Miah Yang (BA-23NCvC-20-05/2018)

POSITION Mr Lau Beng Long Managing Director, Sunway Group

Healthcare Service

Director of Clinical Services

Director of Nursing

Senior Manager, Medical Affairs

Medical Director

Head of Division Medicine Dr Jude Gerard Murugasu Chairman of Medical and Dental Advisory Board of SMC (MDAB) The Plaintiff’s Case [5] The plaintiff pleads in para. 4 of the Statement of Claim that the following words (“the Impugned Words”) in the said Letter are defamatory of the plaintiff.

Patient GHC (MRN345103). This was an old patient of Dr Samuel Ong, who was attended to by Dr LBC when he was on-call on 10/9/2017 (Sun), when Dr Samuel Ong was away. As documented in the notes (on 26/10/2017), the patient requested for Dr Sam Ong the following day (on 11/9/2017), but was not referred back to him. Dr LBC went on to perform a coronary angiogram on the patient on 11/9/2017, even though Dr SO was back on that day’.

Patient Mr MS (MRN 144298) - I received a phone call complaint from Dr Tamil Selvam (Senior Consultant Cardiologist at Damansara Specialist Hospital) who is a relative of this patient. According to the patient, he was asymptomatic when he came for Health Screening check-up on 20/6/2017, was told to have an abnormal stress test, and saw Dr LBC on the same day. He was apparently told by Dr LBC that he needed an urgent coronary angiogram on that day itself, or he would Lim Bee Chian v Hendrick Chia Miah Yang 3 have a heart attack. The patient complained that he was “pressured” by Dr LBC to have the procedure, even though he was asymptomatic’.

This issue of cases being done as emergencies after hours appears to be a common practice for Dr LBC, and of the 27 cases done (non on-call after hours cases) from Jan to October 2017, the majority has been Dr LBC’s cases’.

In the Cardiac Department meeting on 29/9/2017, where we routinely reviewed the preceding months’ angioplasty cases, of the 5 cases of Dr LBC, we are of the opinion that 4 out of 5 cases of Dr LBC’s angioplasty cases were not appropriate, and did not meet the American College of Cardiology guidelines of 70% stenosis or more. In fact, in 2 out of the 4 cases highlighted, Dr LBC himself reported the lesions as less than 70%’.

In all my years (as well as my colleagues) working here in Sunway Hospital, I had not performed any emergency procedures on any of my colleagues’ patients, without speaking to the primary Consultant personally. The case of GHC, Dr SO's patient was not the first time that Dr LBC performed a procedure on other Consultant Cardiologists’ patients without reference to the appropriate Consultants’.

Pressuring patients to have procedures urgently (unless clinically appropriate) will have long term detrimental effect not only to the reputation of Cardiologist but also to the reputation of the Hospital as a whole (which I pointed out to Dr LBC). Not only will Cardiologists outside Sunway Hospital find out but also patients as well. I recently had a patient who also complained to me personally that when he saw Dr LBC, he was asked to immediately undergo a coronary angiogram procedure, which I felt was not clinically indicated”.

Inappropriate coronary angioplasties will affect Sunway Hospital eventually. As highlighted to you & the Management previously, in the United States & other European countries, successful medico-legal cases have been brought against Cardiologists & hospitals who do not practice according to ACC guidelines (70% or more lesions). Medical insurers have also successfully sued hospitals who condone such practices. I sincerely believe that it will be a matter of time before such medico-legal cases will happen in Malaysia’. Lim Bee Chian v Hendrick Chia Miah Yang 4 [6] The plaintiff pleads in para. 7 of the Statement of Claim that the Impugned Words in their natural and ordinary meaning and/or by way of inference mean or could be understood to mean that:

The plaintiff is an unprofessional doctor;

The plaintiff is an unethical doctor; and

The plaintiff in his medical practice did not adhere to medical guidelines fixed and/or recommended by international medical bodies. [7] The plaintiff pleads in para. 8 of the Statement of Claim that the Impugned Words are false and defamatory of the plaintiff. He pleads that following the publication of the Impugned Words, he suffered a loss of reputation, odium and lack of trust of his colleagues at SMC. Para. 8 of the Statement of Claim is reproduced below:

Pernyataan-Pernyataan Fitnah tersebut yang telah diterbitkan oleh Defendant adalah palsu dan merupakan fitnah serius terhadap Plaintif. Lanjutan daripada penerbitan Penyataan-Pernyataan Fitnah tersebut, Plaintif telah mengalami kerosakan reputais, kebencian dan kehilangan kepercayaan rakan-rakan sekerja di Sunway Medical Centre. [8] In para. 9 of the Statement of Claim, the plaintiff pleads that the defendant had published the Impugned Words recklessly and that in the premises, the defendant had failed, refused and/or omitted to confirm and/or ensure the veracity of the contents of the said Letter. [9] In his Reply to the defendant’s Defence, the plaintiff pleads that the defendant is not entitled to qualified privilege because the Impugned Words in the said Letter were made with malice. Further and/or in the Lim Bee Chian v Hendrick Chia Miah Yang 5 alternative, the plaintiff states that the defendant had written the said Letter as revenge (balas dendam). [10] The plaintiff claims from the defendant the following reliefs:

General damages for defamation;

Aggravated damages to be assessed by this Court;

An injunction to restrain the defendant by himself, through his representative and/or agent or in any other manner whatsoever from publishing the Impugned Words and/or defamatory words relating to the plaintiff and/or words that have the same effect and/or the same meaning as the

Interest at the rate 5% per annum from the date of the publication of the Impugned Words until full settlement. The Defendant’s Defence [11] The defendant does not deny that the Impugned Words referred to the plaintiff. Additionally, he admits that the said Letter was sent to Dr Khoo and copied to the persons in the cc. list in the Letter. [12] However, the defendant denies that the Impugned Words were made with malice and are defamatory of the plaintiff. The defendant pleads, further and in the alternative, that the letter was published on an occasion protected by qualified privilege. Lim Bee Chian v Hendrick Chia Miah Yang 6 [13] The defendant pleads in para. 5.1 of his Defence that the persons to whom the said Letter was copied have a legitimate interest in the matters raised in the said Letter. [14] The defendant contends that he tried to discuss his concerns about the plaintiff’s practice with the plaintiff but the plaintiff refused to participate in any discussion with the defendant. The defendant pleads that the information stated in the said Letter was gathered from trusted sources including other consultant cardiologists at SMC. B. LAW ON TORT OF DEFAMATION [15] To establish a case in defamation against the defendant, the plaintiff must prove, on a balance of probabilities, all of the three elements below (see Ayob Saud v TS Sambanthamurthy [1989] 1 MLJ 315; [1989] 1 CLJ 152, HC; Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd (in creditors’ voluntary liquidation) v Hue Shieh Lee [2019] 3 MLJ 720; [2019] 3 CLJ 729; [2019] 2 AMR 525, FC):

The statement identifies the plaintiff;

The statement was published to a third person by the defendant; and

The statement bears defamatory imputations. [16] In this case, the defendant had admitted the first and second elements i.e., that the Impugned Words in the Letter referred to the plaintiff, and that the said Letter was published to third persons, namely Dr Khoo and the persons listed in the cc. list. Lim Bee Chian v Hendrick Chia Miah Yang 7 [17] Therefore, what is left for this Court to determine is the existence of the third element, i.e. whether the Impugned Words bear defamatory imputations of the plaintiff. [18] If this Court finds that the Impugned Words bear defamatory imputations against the plaintiff, the plaintiff would have successfully proven that, on a balance of probabilities, the Impugned Words are defamatory of him. [19] Once the plaintiff establishes a cause of action in defamation against the defendant, the law assumes that the defamatory statements are false: see S Pakianathan v Jenni Ibrahim [1988] 2 MLJ 173; [1988] 1 CLJ 771; [1988] 1 MLRA 110, SC; Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim v Wan Muhammad Azri bin Wan Deris [2014] 9 MLJ 605; [2015] 2 CLJ 557; [2014] AMEJ 0329, HC. The burden of proof then shifts to the defendant to establish a valid defence: see Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul Rahman Ya’kub v Bre Sdn Bhd & Ors [1996] 1 MLJ 393; [1995] 1 LNS 304, HC; Mak Khui Weng v Melawangi Sdn Bhd [2016] 5 MLJ 314; [2016] 8 CLJ 831; [2016] 5 AMR 115, CA. [20] In this case, the defendant raises the defence of qualified privilege. It is important to note that the qualified privilege attaches to the occasion of the publication of the defamatory statement and not the statement itself: see Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor Sdn Bhd v Tony Pua Kiam Wee [2015] 6 MLJ 187; [2015] 8 CLJ 477; [2015] 6 AMR 66, FC. [21] Like the defence of fair comment, the defence of qualified privilege can be defeated by the plaintiff by proving that the defendant had made the defamatory statement with express malice. Accordingly, once the defendant proves that the defamatory statement was made on an Lim Bee Chian v Hendrick Chia Miah Yang 8 occasion of privilege, the burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff to prove express malice: see Financial Information Services Sdn Bhd v Hj Salleh Hj Janan [2018] supp MLJ 176; [2012] 8 CLJ 885; [2013] 2 AMR 93, FC. C. ISSUES TO BE TRIED [22] After considering the plaintiff’s case and the defendant’s defence, as well as the defendant’s admission to the fact that the Impugned Words referred to the plaintiff and the said words were published to third persons, this Court frames the following issues for deliberation for determination of this suit:

Are Impugned Words defamatory of the plaintiff?

Were the Impugned Words published on an occasion protected by qualified privilege? and

If the answer in (b) is in the affirmative, whether the Impugned Words were made by the defendant with express malice? D. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS OF THIS COURT Issue (a): Are the Impugned Words defamatory of the plaintiff? [23] It is established law that in an action for defamation, it is for the Court to determine whether the impugned words are defamatory of the plaintiff: see Seema Elizabeth Isoy v Tan Sri David Chiu Tat Cheong [2024] 4 MLJ 260; [2024] 6 CLJ 635; [2024] 5 AMR 341, FC; Chok Foo Choo @ Chok Kee Lian v. The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 371; [1999] 1 CLJ 461; [1999] 1 AMR 753, CA. Lim Bee Chian v Hendrick Chia Miah Yang 9 [24] The test to be undertaken by a trial court is a two-stage objective test. The two-stage test was laid down by the Court of Appeal in Chok Foo Choo @ Chok Kee Lian v. The China Press Bhd (supra), namely:

Whether the words complained of are capable of bearing defamatory meaning?

(ii) If the answer to question (i) is in the affirmative, whether the words are in fact defamatory? [25] What is “defamatory imputation”? The Federal Court in its majority judgment Lim Guan Eng v Ruslan bin Kassim and another appeal [2021] 2 MLJ 514; [2021] 4 CLJ 155; [2021] AMEJ 0200, FC held that an imputation is defamatory if it tends to expose the plaintiff in the eyes of the community (a) to hatred, ridicule or contempt; or (b) to lower him in their estimation; or (c) cause him to be shunned and avoided. Harmindar Singh FCJ delivering the majority decision of the Federal Court held: [86] The law in respect of what amounts to defamatory matter is well-settled. An imputation would be defamatory if its effect is to expose the plaintiff, in the eyes of the community, to hatred, ridicule or contempt or to lower him or her in their estimation or to cause him or her to be shunned and avoided by them (see Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v The New Straits Times Press (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [2010] 2 MLJ 492; [2010] 3 AMR 514 (‘Anwar Ibrahim v NST’); Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Berhad & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56; JB Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1985] 1 MLJ 334; Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul-Rahman Ya’ Kub v Bre Sdn Bhd & Ors [1996] 1 MLJ 393; Chok Foo Choo @ Chok Kee Lian v The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 371). [87] The defamatory nature of the imputation is to be judged by the ordinary and reasonable members of the community or an appreciable and reputable section of the community (see Jones v Skelton [1963] 3 All ER 952; Peak v Tribune Co [1909] 214 US 185; Hepburn v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [1983] 2 NSWLR 682). The ordinary reasonable person has Lim Bee Chian v Hendrick Chia Miah Yang 10 been held to be one of fair average intelligence (see Slatyer v Daily Telegraph Newspaper Co Ltd (1908) 6 CLR 1, who is not avid for scandal (see Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234) but who may engage in some degree of loose thinking (see Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd and another [1971] 2 All ER 1156) and reading between the lines (see Farquhar v Bottom [1980] 2 NSWLR 380), but who, at the same time, should not be unduly suspicious (see Keogh v Incorporated Dental Hospital of Ireland [1910] 2 IR 577). [Emphasis added] [26] The test was repeated by the Federal Court in its later decision in Dato’ Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh bin Ismail & Anor v Nurul Izzah bt Anwar & Anor [2021] 2 MLJ 577; [2021] 4 CLJ 327; [2021] 2 AMR 741, FC. Accordingly, it can be discerned from the decisions of the Federal Court in Lim Guan Eng v Ruslan bin Kassim (supra) and Dato’ Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh bin Ismail & Anor v Nurul Izzah bt Anwar & Anor (supra) that a statement is capable of bearing defamatory imputations if it tends to:

lower the plaintiff in the esteem of right-thing members of society generally;

cause the plaintiff to be shunned or avoided; or

expose the plaintiff to hatred, contempt or ridicule. [27] On how to ascertain the meaning of the statement or publication, Courts may rely on the natural and ordinary meaning or the innuendo meaning. The Federal Court in Seema Elizabeth Isoy v Tan Sri David Chiu Tat Cheong (supra) held: [54] The first task in determining an action for defamation is whether the impugned statement is capable of being defamatory. This involves the Lim Bee Chian v Hendrick Chia Miah Yang 11 assessment of the words and construction of the impugned statement in its entirety and as to its ordinary and natural meaning either directly, indirectly, by implication, or inference.

Are the Impugned Words capable of bearing defamatory meaning? [28] It is settled law that the offending words must be considered in the context of the whole article and not isolated passages. In Dato’ Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh bin Ismail & Anor v Nurul Izzah bt Anwar & Anor (supra), the Federal Court quoted with approval the following passage in para.5.2.5 to 5.28 of Duncan & Neill on Defamation 4th Ed: In order to determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the statements of which the claimant complains it is necessary to take into account the context in which it appeared and the mode of publication ... It follows from the principles set out above that a claimant cannot select an isolated passage in an article and complain of that alone if other parts of the article throw a different light on that passage. [29] Reading the Impugned Words objectively as a whole, this Court finds that the words in their natural and ordinary meaning are capable of meaning the following:

The plaintiff is an unethical and unprofessional doctor as he failed to refer the patient back to Dr Samuel Ong after being requested by the patient, and that the plaintiff’s failure to refer Dr Ong’s patient was not the first time the plaintiff performed a procedure on other cardiologists’ patients without reference to the appropriate cardiologist.

The plaintiff’s action in performing emergency procedures without speaking to the primary consultant cardiologist was Lim Bee Chian v Hendrick Chia Miah Yang 12 unusual and not in accordance with the practice of the defendant and the other cardiologists in SMC.

The plaintiff had acted unprofessionally and inappropriately in having pressured the patient, Mr. MS, to undergo an urgent coronary angiogram even though he was asymptomatic, and in having asked the patient (who had complained to the defendant personally) to undergo a coronary angiogram procedure, which was not clinically indicated.

The plaintiff’s action in pressuring patients to undergo procedures would have a long detrimental effect on the cardiologists and SMC.

The plaintiff consistently acted inappropriately because in the opinion of SMC’s Cardiac Department 4 out of 5 of the plaintiff’s angioplasty cases were inappropriate.

The plaintiff actions in conducting his angioplasty procedures on SMC patients are contrary to standard medical procedures and the American College of Cardiology guidelines; thus exposes SMC to risks of medico-legal suits. [30] For this reason, this Court finds that Impugned Words are capable of and tends to expose the plaintiff in the eyes of the community (a) to hatred, ridicule or contempt; (b) to lower him in their estimation; and/or (c) cause him to be shunned and avoided. [31] Therefore, this Court finds that the Impugned Words are capable or bearing defamatory meaning. Lim Bee Chian v Hendrick Chia Miah Yang 13

(ii) Are the Impugned Words in fact defamatory? [32] Having found that the Impugned Words are capable of bearing defamatory meaning, the next step is for this Court to ascertain whether the words complained of were in fact defamatory of the Plaintiff. As held in Chok Foo Choo @ Chok Kee Lian v. The China Press (supra), this is a question of fact dependent on the facts and circumstance of the case. [33] The plaintiff is a consultant cardiologist at SMC. This Court finds that the Impugned Words are in fact defamatory of the plaintiff because any ordinary reasonable person reading the Impugned Words would have understood the words to mean that the plaintiff on more than one occasion had performed procedures on patients without reference to the patient’s primary consultant cardiologist; that he had pressured patients to undergo coronary angiogram procedures even when they were asymptomatic and not clinically indicated; that 4 out of 5 of the coronary angiogram procedures performed by the plaintiff were inappropriate, and were contrary to standard medical procedures and international guidelines. Finding on Issue (a) [34] For the above reasons, this Court finds that the Impugned Words are defamatory of the plaintiff. Issue (b): Were the Impugned Words published on an occasion protected by qualified privilege? [35] The defendant’s pleaded defence is that the Impugned Words were published on an occasion protected by qualified privilege. Lim Bee Chian v Hendrick Chia Miah Yang 14 [36] It is settled law that a defendant in raising the defence of qualified privilege, the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove that the occasion on which the defamatory words were published was an occasion of privilege. [37] Furthermore, it is for the Court to rule whether or not in fact there is an occasion of privilege: see Toogood v. Spyring (1834) 1 CM & R 181;

149 ER 1044; Adam v. Ward [1917] A.C. 309. [38] This English common law principle has been cited with approval by our Courts in several cases including the Federal Court in Financial Information Services Sdn. Bhd. v. Hj. Salleh Hj Janan (supra), Dato’ Dr Low Bin Tick v. Datuk Chong Tho Chin & Other Appeal [2017] 5 MLJ 413; [2017] 8 CLJ 369; [2017] 5 AMR 629, FC; Datuk Harris Mohd Salleh v. Datuk Yong Teck Lee & Anor [2017] 6 MLJ 133; [2018] 1 CLJ 145; [2017] 7 AMR 317, FC. [39] The test of whether or not an occasion of qualified privilege exists, is a question law and fact, which must be decided by the Courts objectively. It is for the judge alone to decide whether the occasion is privileged and whether the defendant was under a duty to make or interest to make the communication and the recipients of the communication have a legitimate interest in the matters raised in the said communication. Whether an occasion is a privileged occasion depends on the circumstances of each case, the nature of the information and the relation of speaker and recipient. The Federal Court in Dato’ Dr Low Bin Tick v. Datuk Chong Tho Chin & Other Appeal (supra) said: [46] Qualified privilege depends on the occasion upon which the communication is made, and not the communication itself. A qualified Lim Bee Chian v Hendrick Chia Miah Yang 15 privilege occasion is an occasion where the person who makes a communication has an interest or a duty, legal, social or moral to make it to the person to whom it is made, and the person to whom it is so made has a corresponding interest or duty to receive it. If the communication were made in pursuance of a duty or on a matter in which there was a common interest in the party making and the party receiving it, the occasion is said to be one of qualified privilege. Whether an occasion is a privileged occasion depends on the circumstances of each case, the nature of the information and the relation of speaker and recipient. It is for the judge alone to determine as a matter of law whether the occasion is privileged (Adam v Ward [1916–17] All ER Rep 157; [1917] AC 309). [40] It matters not that the person who made the defamatory statement honestly believed that he had a legitimate duty or interest to make the statement or his audience to receive the statement. Duncan and Neil on Defamation, 4th Edition states: “….. the duties and interest which found an occasion of qualified privilege must exist in fact. This is an objective question, and it is not sufficient that the person who make the defamatory communication honestly believes that he had legitimate duty or interest to make it or his audience to receive it. Thus in Adam v. Ward, Lord Atkinson said: ‘While on the question of malice the bona fide belief of the defendant that he was under a moral or social duty to make the communication is relevant and important, the existences, in fact, of this duty or interest, nor merely the defendant’s belief in its existence, is the thing which is relevant to the question whether the occasion was or was not privileged.’ In assessing whether the objective test had been satisfied in any particular case the court may have regard to the relationship between the publisher and the recipient or recipients of the publication.” [Emphasis added] [41] In this case, the defendant wrote the said Letter and made the Impugned Words in reply to Dr Khoo’s letter of 12.10.2017. Lim Bee Chian v Hendrick Chia Miah Yang 16 [42] Dr Khoo in his letter of 12.10.2017 referred to the defendant’s letter of 09.10.2017 to the Cath Lab staff to release cardiac angiograms and angioplasty reports to the defendant in his capacity as Sub-Division Head of Cardiology. [43] In the letter Dr Khoo asked for (i) further information on the particular reports that the defendant asked to be released; and (ii) clarification on whether these reports are related to any reported incidents or patient complaints that had occurred in the Cath Lab Department. Dr Khoo copied his letter to Mr Lau Beng Long, Dr Ang Kong Hui, Ms. Chan Lai Hong and Dr Cheah Xian-Nian. [44] Looking at Dr Khoo’s queries objectively, I am of the opinion that it would been sufficient for the defendant in his reply to the queries to have provided the information of the reports that he would like the Cath Lab staff to release to him; and clarified that the reports were related to reported incidents and/or complaints by patients. [45] I find that in the circumstances the defendant did not have a duty or interest to make the Impugned Words as regards the plaintiff in his reply to Dr Khoo’s query for clarification as to which reports the defendant wanted released and whether these reports related to any reported incidents or patients complaints. [46] Further, I find that Dr Khoo and the seven other recipients of the defendant’s Letter did not have a legitimate interest in the matters raised in the Impugned Words. Lim Bee Chian v Hendrick Chia Miah Yang 17 Findings on issue (b) [47] Accordingly, based on the facts and circumstance on which the said Letter was written, this Court finds that the defendant failed to discharge his burden of proof that the said Impugned Words were published on an occasion of qualified privilege. Issue (c): If the Issue (b) was answered in the affirmative, were the Impugned Words made with express malice? [48] As the defendant failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the Impugned Words were made on an occasion of qualified privilege, the defendant’s defence of qualified privilege fails. [49] Accordingly, there is no defence of qualified privilege for the plaintiff to defeat by showing express malice on the part of the defendant. [50] It follows therefore, that this Court does not have to make a finding on whether the Impugned Words were made by the defendant with express malice. E. DAMAGES [51] Having found that the Impugned Words were defamatory of the plaintiff and that the defendant failed to establish that the defamatory words were made on an occasion of qualified privilege, this Court has to determine the appropriate quantum of damages payable by the defendant to the plaintiff. [52] In determining the quantum of damages for libel, this Court is entitled to consider the seriousness of the libel, the recklessness of the Lim Bee Chian v Hendrick Chia Miah Yang 18 publication, as well as the trend of award of damages made by the Courts: see Datuk Harris Mohd Salleh v Datuk Yong Teck Lee & Anor (supra). [53] In this case, this Court has taken cognizance of the fact the publication of the said Letter was limited to eight individuals, who were all working in the hospital. Also, that SMC did not take any disciplinary action against the plaintiff after the publication of the Letter and the plaintiff remains as consultant cardiologist at SMC to date. [54] After having considered these factors and the trend of award of damages made the Courts in libel cases, this Court award damages in the sum of RM100,000.00 against the defendant. F. DECISION [55] For the reasons above, this Court grants judgment for the plaintiff and make the following orders:

The defendant to pay general damages in the sum of RM100,000.00 to the plaintiff.

An injunction is granted to the plaintiff restraining further publications of the Impugned Words or anything similar of the defamatory matters.

Interest on the judgment sum at the rate of 5% per annum from the date of this judgment until full settlement.

Costs in the sum of RM50,000.00, subject to allocatur. [56] No order is made for aggravated damages. Lim Bee Chian v Hendrick Chia Miah Yang 19 Dated: April 16, 2025 -sgd- (FAIZAH JAMALUDIN) JUDGE HIGH OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM COUNSELS: For the Plaintiff: Francis Goh Yun Hong (Eg Kaa Chee, Genevie Goh Yui Bing and Nur Dhia Almos Muhamad Nizam with him) Messrs Rajah Lau & Associates B-13-13, Block B, 13th Floor Unit 13, Megan Avenue ll No. 12, Jalan Yap Kwan Seng 50450 Kuala Lumpur For the Defendant: Raja Eileen Soraya (Amanda Sena and Kho Yan Yee with her) Messrs Raja, Darryl & Loh Level 26, Menara Hong Leong No. 6, Jalan Damanlela