LIM Hun Swee v Chew Hon Choy (WA-12BNCvC-84-07/2024)

The Plaintiff is Lim Hun Swee (P), the Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director of Tomypak Holdings Berhad (Tomypak), a public listed company. The Defendant is Chew Hon Choy, a Tomypak shareholder.

P’s claim arises from Tomypak's 25th Annual General Meeting (25th AGM). P alleges that D uttered the following words at that AGM—words which P pleaded as the "Alleged Defamatory Statement"— "Noted that the Managing Director, Mr. Lim Hun Swee has been acquiring the Company's shares and remarked that shareholders have been receiving calls offering to purchase their shares and questioned if there is any plan for a hostile takeover."

D denied making that statement. He asserts that those words did not originate with him; they were composed by the company secretary who took the 25th AGM minutes, and the minutes were approved by Tomypak’s own Board of Directors. D further raised the defences of justification, qualified privilege, and fair comment.

The Sessions Court dismissed P's libel claim. She found that P had failed to plead the Alleged Defamatory Statement verbatim (in Page 3 of 25 exactly the same words); that the published words belonged to SP1 and the Board, not to D; and that the statement in any event conveyed no defamatory meaning. The Sessions Court also found that D had proved justification and fair comment.

P appeals to the High Court against the Sessions Court’s judgment. Should his appeal be allowed?

It appears to me that the Sessions Court has conflated, or at least did not make a distinction between the cause of action for slander and the cause of action for libel. Slander is spoken defamation (the words that D uttered at the 25th AGM). And libel is written defamation (the words published in the 25th AGM minutes).

This could have been because of the way in which the parties have pleaded their claim and defence. But from the issues that arise in this appeal, it is not necessary for me to analyse whether it was erroneous for the Sessions Court not to have made that distinction.

I set out the following pertinent pleaded and proven facts.

P was the CEO and MD of Tomypak. D was a shareholder of Tomypak. D attended Tomypak’s 25th AGM on 19.8.2020 as a shareholder.

The minutes of the 25th AGM were taken by SP1, Chen Yew Ting—a manager at Tomypak’s external company secretarial firm. SP1 was the only person who recorded notes of the 25th AGM proceedings. SP2: Santhi a/p Saminathan, reviewed the draft minutes but took no notes of her own.

The Alleged Defamatory Statement as pleaded by P appears in the 25th AGM minutes under section "Q4". The full Q4 entry in those minutes—as distinct from the partial excerpt pleaded by P—reads as follows: "Q4. Shareholders are not satisfied that the Company has been making losses for the past 2 years with no return and weak market share price. Noted that the Managing Director, Mr. Lim Hun Swee has been acquiring the Company's shares and remarked that shareholders have been receiving calls offering to purchase their shares and questioned if there is any plan for a hostile takeover."

P pleaded only the second sentence of Q4, omitting the first opening sentence.

In cross-examination, SP1—P's own witness—made a series of admissions that are critical. First, the words in Q4 were not a verbatim record of what D said at the AGM. Second, the word "Noted", which begins the second sentence in Q4, was her own improvisation and not what D had said, because, as she admitted: "no one talks like that" (referring to what was said at the AGM). Third, the word "remarked" was likewise her own summary language. Fourth, the bracketed notation in the minutes—"(Summarized enquiries and comments raised by shareholder: Mr Chew Hon Choy [D])"—was her own description of what she had done while she took notes of the AGM proceedings.

She was the person who summarised D's enquiries and comments. She was the person who summarised D’s words. The words in Q4 were hers.

After SP1 drafted the minutes, she circulated them to the Board of Directors for review and amendment. P—as MD—was a Board member. No evidence was led as to what amendments, if any, the Board may have made.

SP2 confirmed that she did not retain any copy of the Board's comments on the draft minutes. The earlier draft, as circulated to the Board, was never tendered as evidence.

D's witness, SD2: Chong Wee Yoon, gave direct evidence that he had personally telephoned Tomypak shareholders to ask whether they wished to sell their shares, and that the shares sold by those shareholders were purchased by P. P did not contradict this evidence.

Articles published by the The Edge magazine before the 25th AGM—independently reported on P's acquisition of Tomypak shares, and on concerns within the marketplace about the direction of Tomypak’s management. P did not contradict those articles either.

An appellate court will not interfere with the decision of a trial court unless the trial court was "plainly wrong".

The Federal Court in Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng (administratrix for the estate of Tan Ewe Kwang, deceased) & Ors [2020] 12 MLJ 67 (FC); [2020] 8 AMR 227; [2020] 10 CLJ 1; [2020] 6 MLRA 193 (Ng Hoo Kui), comprehensively restated the "plainly wrong" principle and the elaborative principles which stem from it. These elaborative principles are that a decision is "plainly wrong" if— Page 7 of 25

it was arrived at through "no or insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence"—which encompasses: (a) a critical factual finding with no basis in the evidence, (b) a demonstrable misunderstanding of the relevant evidence, or (c) a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence;

it involved a "material error of law";

it “could not reasonably be explained or justified”, which makes it a decision "which no reasonable judge could have reached": Tengku Dato' Ibrahim Petra bin Tengku Indra Petra v Petra Perdana Bhd & Anor Appeal [2018] 2 MLJ 177 (FC); [2018] 1 AMR 517; [2018] 2 CLJ 641; [2018] 1 MLRA 263. [21] But, the "plainly wrong" test is not a mechanism for substituting the appellate court's view for that of the trial court. Ng Hoo Kui is explicit about this. The Federal Court held that it is irrelevant if the appellate court would have reached a different decision than the trial court—so long as the trial court's decision can reasonably be explained or justified. What matters is whether the decision was a decision that was reasonably made, or whether the decision was a decision that no reasonable judge could have reached. [22] The Court of Appeal in MMC Oil & Gas Engineering Sdn Bhd v Tan Boon Kwee & Sons Sdn Bhd [2016] 2 MLJ 428 (CA); [2016] 4 CLJ 665; [2016] 3 MLRA 144; [2016] AMEJ 0743 (MMC Oil) puts it Page 8 of 25 this way: the adverb "plainly" in the plainly wrong principle does not speak to the appellate court's degree of confidence in its own view about the correctness of the trial court’s decision; it speaks to whether the trial court's decision was one which no reasonable judge could have reached. So long as the trial court's findings are plausible on the evidence, there is no room for appellate interference. [23] I apply these principles. My task is to examine whether the Sessions Court committed a fundamental error of the kind identified in Ng Hoo Kui. My task is not to decide whether I would have reached the same conclusions as the Sessions Court. The Law on Defamation—Elements of the Cause of Action [24] To succeed in defamation, the plaintiff must prove three elements—

the impugned words are defamatory;

those words refer to the plaintiff; and

those words were published to third parties: Fitters Diversified Bhd & Ors v Mohd Roslan Mahayudin (sued as Director, Enforcement Division) & Ors [2024] 3 MLJ 937 (CA); [2024] 4 CLJ 657; [2024] 5 MLRA 291, at paragraphs [32], [33]. [25] A further requirement is this: in libel and slander, the very words complained of are the material facts upon which the action is Page 9 of 25 grounded. It is insufficient to describe their substance, purpose, or effect. The actual words must be pleaded in full—so that the defendant knows precisely the charge against him, and so that the court can determine, as a matter of law, whether those words give rise to the defamatory imputations alleged: Credit Guarantee Corp Malaysia Bhd v SSN Medical Products Sdn Bhd [2017] 2 MLJ 629 (CA); [2017] 6 CLJ 129; [2017] 1 MLRA 541 (Credit Guarantee Corp). [26] The test, for whether the impugned words are defamatory, is whether the words were “calculated to expose the plaintiff to hatred, ridicule, or contempt in the mind of a reasonable man” or would tend to lower him “in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally”: Bre Sdn Bhd & Ors v Tun Datuk Patinggi Hj Abdul Rahman Ya’kub [2005] 3 MLJ 485 (CA), [2005] 3 AMR 1; [2005] 2 CLJ 645; [2005] 1 MLRA 289, at paragraph [10]. The Law on Justification and Fair Comment [27] The defence of justification is that the meaning of the impugned words in the Alleged Defamatory Statement is not defamatory of P because the words or statements are true, and therefore, justified. In other words, since the impugned words are in fact true, they cannot be defamatory of the Plaintiffs. Page 10 of 25 [28] The defence of fair comment requires that the impugned words are a comment, and the comment is on a matter of public interest. But the defendant must also establish that the comment is based on facts that are true: Dato’ Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh bin Ismail & Anor v Mohd Rafizi bin Ramli [2022] 3 MLJ 758 (FC); [2022] 4 AMR 695; [2022] 5 CLJ 487; [2022] 4 MLRA 718. [29] In other words, a comment can only be fair if it is built on true facts, i.e. facts that are not assumed or made up. ANALYSES AND FINDINGS Issue 1—Whether P's failure to plead the verbatim words is fatal [30] P submits that the Sessions Court placed undue weight on P’s failure to plead the impugned words verbatim. P argues that in defamation, a defendant is liable for the republication of the substance of the impugned words, and it is therefore sufficient to plead the published version, provided it conveys the sting of what was said. [31] D, however, submits that the failure to plead the actual impugned words is, by itself, fatal—citing the case law authority of Credit Guarantee Corp Malaysia Bhd v SSN Medical Products Sdn Bhd [2017] 2 MLJ 629 (CA); [2017] 6 CLJ 129; [2017] 1 MLRA 541 (Credit Guarantee). D also submits that the defect is compounded Page 11 of 25 by P's election to plead only a portion of Q4, omitting the opening sentence. [32] I find in D's favour on this issue. [33] Credit Guarantee states the law plainly—in libel and slander, the very words complained of are the material facts grounding the action. It is critical to set out the actual impugned words—not merely to describe their substance, purpose, or effect. [34] The Court of Appeal in Credit Guarantee (at paragraph [47]) also held that the failure to reproduce the offending words, and the failure to identify the specific parts of a publication said to be defamatory, is "for this reason alone" fatal to the claim. The Sessions Court applied Credit Guarantee directly, and did so correctly. [35] This finding is further fortified by the evidence of P's own witness. SP1 confirmed in cross-examination that: (i) the words in Q4 of the 25th AGM minutes were not a verbatim record of what D said at the AGM; (ii) the words "noted" and "remarked" were her own improvised language; and (iii) she was the person described in the bracketed notation as having summarised D's enquiries. The impugned words, as pleaded, are SP1's words, not D’s. There was no evidence of what D actually said. Page 12 of 25 [36] P's reliance on the republication principle—citing the case law authorities of Chua Jui Meng v Hoo Kok Wing & Anor [2000] 3 MLJ 1 (HC); [2000] 6 CLJ 390; [2000] 2 MLRH 333; [2000] AMEJ 0070 and Tan Sri Dato' Lim Guan Teik v Tan Kai Hee [2014] 9 MLJ 363 (HC); [2013] 5 AMR 594; [2013] 10 CLJ 771; [2013] 6 MLRH 630—does not assist him. The republication principle addresses who may be held liable for published words. It does not dispense with the fundamental pleading requirement that P must set out the actual impugned words. [37] P cannot rely on republication (in the AGM minutes) to excuse his failure to plead D's actual words, because D's actual words are not disclosed in the evidence. [38] There is a further defect. P pleaded only the second sentence of Q4. P omitted to plead the opening sentence regarding shareholders' dissatisfaction with Tomypak's financial performance. P’s pleading was therefore a partial and selective extract of even the published minutes, and not a reproduction of D's words at all. [39] I am satisfied that the Sessions Court was correct, and was not plainly wrong, in finding P's failure to plead the verbatim words fatal to P’s claim. Page 13 of 25 Issue 2—Whether the Alleged Defamatory Statement was made or published by D [40] P submits that D—having attended and raised the points captured in Q4 of the AGM minutes—was the originator of the remarks which found their way into the minutes. P argues that it does not matter that the precise words were unrecorded, since what was recorded conveys the sting of what D said. [41] D submits that the words in Q4 were composed and published by SP1 and the Board—not by him. D argues that P has accordingly failed to prove the third element of the cause of action for libel: that D published the impugned words to third parties. [42] I find against P on this issue as well. [43] This issue cannot be separated from Issue 1. P pleaded that the words in Q4 of the minutes were uttered by D. The Sessions Court found that those impugned words were prepared by SP1 and the Board. The Sessions Court is correct. [44] The evidence establishes this in four steps—first, SP1 alone took notes at the 25th AGM; second, she alone drafted the minutes; third, the draft was circulated to the Board for review and amendment (P was a member of the Board); fourth, the minutes were published by Tomypak—a company under P's stewardship as CEO and MD. Page 14 of 25 What D actually said at the 25th AGM remains unestablished on the evidence. [45] I am also unpersuaded by P's argument that D bore the burden of proving that his actual words differed from what was recorded. The burden of proof in defamation lies on P at all times: Ayob Saud v T.S. Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 MLJ 315 (HC); [1989] 1 CLJ Rep 321; [1988] 1 MLRH 653. P did not discharge that burden. SP1's evidence—given for P—dismantled P's own case. [46] I find that the Sessions Court was not plainly wrong in finding that P failed to prove that the Alleged Defamatory Statement was made or published by D. Issue 3—Whether the Alleged Defamatory Statement is defamatory of P [47] P submits that raising the idea of a threat of a "hostile takeover" connected to the CEO and MD of a public listed company is plainly defamatory. P argues that any statement which tend to lower P in “the estimation of right-thinking members of society” is defamatory. [48] D submits that—read in context and as a whole—the Alleged Defamatory Statement is incapable of defamatory meaning. It was a question asked by a shareholder at an AGM, directed at the Page 15 of 25 Chairman, based on publicly reported facts. And the statement imputes no wrongdoing on P. [49] Even if—contrary to my findings above—P had succeeded in proving that the Alleged Defamatory Statement was made by D and was properly pleaded, I find that the statement is incapable of bearing a defamatory meaning. [50] The test for whether the impugned words bear a defamatory meaning is an objective one—whether the words “were calculated to expose P to hatred, ridicule, or contempt in the mind of a reasonable man”, or “would tend to lower him in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally”: Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul-Rahman Ya'kub v Bre Sdn Bhd & Ors [1996] 1 MLJ 393 (HC); [1995] 4 MLRH 877; [1995] 1 LNS 304. [51] Read in the context of Q4 of the minutes—including the opening sentence, which records shareholder dissatisfaction with Tomypak's financial performance—the statement is a question. It is a shareholder asking the Chairman and the Board, at an AGM, whether a third party was planning a corporate takeover. [52] D confirmed in his witness statement that the question was directed at the Chairman, Yong Kwet On, to elicit information about a third-party investor reportedly interested in acquiring the Yong family's controlling stake. That context is borne out by the The Edge Page 16 of 25 articles, which reported on those market rumours before the 25th AGM. [53] P argues that because he was the only person acquiring Tomypak shares at the time, right-thinking members of society would read the impugned words as imputing wrongdoing to him personally. But I reiterate that the test of whether the impugned words are defamatory is objective—not subjective to P's sensitivities or circumstances. Share acquisition by a CEO and MD, cannot, of itself, constitute a defamatory imputation merely because it is mentioned in a question posed at the AGM. P’s buying of Tomypak’s shares was a fact. [54] P's reliance on Chok Foo Choo @ Chok Kee Lian v The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 371 (CA); [1999] 1 AMR 753; [1999] 1 CLJ 461; [1998] 2 MLRA 287 is misplaced. In that case, the offending article literally described the plaintiff there as "a cheat and a liar"— language imputing dishonesty and moral failing. No such language appears in the Alleged Defamatory Statement. The statement is couched as an enquiry seeking information; it asserts nothing about P's character or conduct. The two cases are not analogous. [55] I find that the Sessions Court was not plainly wrong in finding that the Alleged Defamatory Statement did not bear a defamatory meaning. And that finding is itself a further basis for dismissing P's claim. Page 17 of 25 Issue 4—Whether the defences of justification and fair comment were established [56] P submits that the justification and fair comment defences were not established. On justification, P argues that D failed to prove that shareholders had, in fact, been receiving calls offering to purchase their shares. On fair comment, P argues that D failed to prove the truth of the underlying facts. [57] D submits that SD2 gave direct, unchallenged evidence of the calls he made to shareholders and of the identity of the purchaser— P himself—which is corroborated by the The Edge articles. D argues that both these defences were proved. [58] These defences arise only if P has first satisfied all three elements of the cause of action. He has not—for the reasons already given. Nevertheless, the Sessions Court addressed them, and so shall I. [59] On justification: the underlying facts—that shareholders received calls about selling their shares, and that the purchaser was P—were substantially true. SD2 gave unchallenged evidence of this. He testified that he personally telephoned shareholders to enquire whether they wished to sell their shares, and that P purchased the shares that were sold. Page 18 of 25 [60] The Bursa Malaysia announcements of 23.9.2019 and 26.9.2019—verified by SD2—established that P had acquired two batches of Tomypak shares. [61] The Sessions Court's finding (at paragraphs [21]–[23] of the Grounds of Judgment (GOJ)), that justification was established, is well-supported by the evidence. [62] On fair comment, the UK Court of Appeal case law authority of Digby v The Financial News, Limited [1907] 1 KB 502 (UKCA), establishes that comment, which contains no “misstatement of fact”, qualifies as fair. [63] The underlying facts here were demonstrated as true by SD2's evidence and the The Edge articles. These facts were not rebutted by P. Section 9 of the Defamation Act 1957, as applied by the Sessions Court (at paragraph [25] of the GOJ), provides that the defence of fair comment does not fail merely because not every alleged fact is proved, so long as the comment is fair on the facts that are proved. [64] P's argument that SD2 lacked neutrality—as the person who made the calls—does not dilute the essential point: his evidence was uncontradicted. [65] I find that the Sessions Court was not plainly wrong in finding both defences established. Page 19 of 25 Issue 5—Whether qualified privilege was properly pleaded and established [66] P submits that the qualified privilege defence fails for two reasons: first, D did not clearly plead whether he relied on absolute or qualified privilege, nor did he plead the necessary particulars of either; second, even if qualified privilege were available, D was actuated by malice—because he raised the question of a hostile takeover. [67] D submits that an AGM is an inherently privileged occasion; that the defence was adequately pleaded; and that there is no evidence of malice. [68] I must note, at this juncture, that there is no specific paragraph in the Sessions Court’s GOJ that contains a direct finding by the Sessions Court that the defence of qualified privilege is established. But since this issue is raised as a ground of appeal, I will analyse the issue and make a finding on the Sessions Court’s judgment. [69] An AGM of a public listed company—convened as a matter of legal requirement—is a recognised occasion of qualified privilege. Shareholders have a legitimate interest in raising concerns about the company's affairs; the Board has a corresponding duty to receive those concerns and to respond. D raised his question as a shareholder at an AGM, in a context where the The Edge had reported on the very matters he enquired about. Page 20 of 25 [70] On pleadings: the substance of the defence—that the occasion was privileged and the remarks were made honestly and without improper motive (malice)—was raised in D's Amended Defence. P has failed to identify any prejudice caused by any imprecision in how the qualified privilege defence was pleaded. [71] On malice: the burden lies on P to prove it. P has not discharged the burden. D's evidence—that he asked a genuine question about a third-party investor and did not direct his question at P—is credible and reasonable. There is no basis from which malice—such as reckless disregard of truth, or an improper purpose—can properly be inferred. [72] I find that the Sessions Court was not plainly wrong in omitting to make a direct finding that the defence of qualified privilege was available to D, and that it was not defeated by malice. Not making a finding that D has established the defence of qualified privilege is inconsequential in the context of this appeal. The Sessions Court had—correctly, in my view—made a finding that D succeeded in the defences of justification and fair comment. Whether D has established an additional defence to the claim does not bear upon the Sessions Court’s ultimate decision to dismiss P’s claim against D. Page 21 of 25 Issue 6—The adverse inference argument: failure to call Yong Kwet On [73] In the Additional Memorandum of Appeal, P raises another ground—that the Sessions Court erred in not drawing an adverse inference under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against D for failing to call Yong Kwet On, the Chairman of the 25th AGM, who confirmed and signed the minutes. [74] I find that section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 does not help P. Section 114(g) empowers the court to infer that evidence withheld would, if produced, be unfavourable to the party withholding it. But that power arises only where the withheld evidence is material to an issue that the withholding party has the burden of proving. [75] D's case—that the minutes were a summary composed by SP1, and not a verbatim record of the words D uttered—was already established by P's own witness. Yong Kwet On's evidence, as the Chairman who countersigned the minutes, would not have added anything material to the evidence. [76] More importantly, P bore the burden of proof throughout. Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 cannot be deployed by P, to fill the gaps in his own case—by casting on D a duty to call witnesses that P should have called. Page 22 of 25 [77] I find that the Sessions Court was not plainly wrong to decline to draw an adverse inference. CONCLUSION AND ORDER [78] One—P's claim was irreparably defective in pleading. P never pleaded D's actual verbatim words. This defect is fatal. [79] Two—P failed to prove that the Alleged Defamatory Statement was made or published by D. SP1—P's own witness—verified that the words in Q4 of the 25th AGM minutes were her words—adopted and approved by the Board (of which P himself was a member), before publication. [80] Three—the Alleged Defamatory Statement is incapable of bearing a defamatory meaning in its natural and ordinary meaning. Read in context—as a question asked by a shareholder at an AGM, directed at the Chairman, about publicly reported market rumours—it would not tend to lower P in the estimation of right-thinking members of society. [81] In addition, D established the defences of justification and fair comment on SD2's unchallenged evidence and the The Edge articles. And P’s adverse inference argument under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 fails. Page 23 of 25 [82] Applying the law on appellate intervention as laid down in Ng Hoo Kui—I find no appealable error. The Sessions Court's decision was reasonably made, grounded in the evidence, and correct in law. The Sessions Court was not plainly wrong. [83] I dismiss P's appeal, with costs of RM10K to be paid by P to D. Costs are subject to the allocatur. Dated: 26 May 2026 KENNETH ST JAMES HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR Solicitors for the Appellant : Ang Boon Heng Messrs. Ang & Co. Solicitors for the Respondent : Sivabalan & Goh Wan Ping Messrs. Mastura Partnership Page 24 of 25 Legislations:

Section 9 of the Defamation Act 1957.

Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950.

Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng (administratrix for the estate of Tan Ewe Kwang, deceased) & Ors [2020] 12 MLJ 67 (FC); [2020] 8 AMR 227; [2020] 10 CLJ 1; [2020] 6 MLRA

193.

Tengku Dato' Ibrahim Petra bin Tengku Indra Petra v Petra Perdana Bhd & Anor Appeal [2018] 2 MLJ 177 (FC); [2018] 1 AMR 517; [2018] 2 CLJ 641; [2018] 1 MLRA 263.

MMC Oil & Gas Engineering Sdn Bhd v Tan Boon Kwee & Sons Sdn Bhd [2016] 2 MLJ 428 (CA); [2016] 4 CLJ 665; [2016] 3 MLRA 144; [2016] AMEJ 0743.

Fitters Diversified Bhd & Ors v Mohd Roslan Mahayudin (sued as Director, Enforcement Division) & Ors [2024] 3 MLJ 937 (CA); [2024] 4 CLJ 657; [2024] 5 MLRA 291.

Credit Guarantee Corp Malaysia Bhd v SSN Medical Products Sdn Bhd [2017] 2 MLJ 629 (CA); [2017] 6 CLJ 129; [2017] 1

Bre Sdn Bhd & Ors v Tun Datuk Patinggi Hj Abdul Rahman Ya’kub [2005] 3 MLJ 485 (CA), [2005] 3 AMR 1; [2005] 2 CLJ 645; [2005] 1 MLRA 289.

Dato’ Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh bin Ismail & Anor v Mohd Rafizi bin Ramli [2022] 3 MLJ 758 (FC); [2022] 4 AMR 695; [2022] 5 CLJ 487; [2022] 4 MLRA 718.

Chua Jui Meng v Hoo Kok Wing & Anor [2000] 3 MLJ 1 (HC); [2000] 6 CLJ 390; [2000] 2 MLRH 333; [2000] AMEJ 0070.

Tan Sri Dato' Lim Guan Teik v Tan Kai Hee [2014] 9 MLJ 363 (HC); [2013] 5 AMR 594; [2013] 10 CLJ 771; [2013] 6 MLRH

630.

Ayob Saud v T.S. Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 MLJ 315 (HC); [1989] 1 CLJ Rep 321; [1988] 1 MLRH 653.

Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul-Rahman Ya'kub v Bre Sdn Bhd & Ors [1996] 1 MLJ 393 (HC); [1995] 4 MLRH 877; [1995] 1

Chok Foo Choo @ Chok Kee Lian v The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 371 (CA); [1999] 1 AMR 753; [1999] 1 CLJ 461; [1998] 2 MLRA 287.

Digby v The Financial News, Limited [1907] 1 KB 502 (UKCA).