(c) the contents of the Newspaper Articles were not pleaded in their entirety as required by law. [41] We found sound basis for the above contention, amongst others, by reason of the principle adopted by the Federal Court in Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd (in creditors’ voluntary liquidation) v Hue Shieh Lee [2019] 3 MLJ 720, where Ramli Ali, FCJ held at pages 743- 744 that because the words complained of in the article were not the actual words uttered or published by the respondent therein, it resulted in its claim relating to the article not being supported by a valid cause of action in defamation and on that ground alone the claim under the article for defamation must fall : “[63] Evidence wise, we agree with both the High Court and the Court of Appeal that the words complained of in the second article are not the actual words uttered or published by the respondent. Instead, the words in question were in fact a report or statements by FMT and/or the reporter, Aneesa Alphonsus. The appellant had failed to call the said reporter as a witness, during trial, to prove that she had interviewed the respondent and the respondent had actually uttered those words. Only the reporter can throw light on whether the respondent did actually utter the words what she alleged to have said. Ultimately, it is the burden of the appellant to 16 prove that it was the respondent who had published or caused to be published the alleged words. The appellant has failed to prove that there was publication by the respondent of the same. [64] Pleading wise, the actual words of the respondent during the press conference must specifically be pleaded to support the apppelant’s claim. The appellant failed to do so. As clearly stated in Harris v Warre (1879) 4 CPD 125 ‘In libel or slander, the very words complained of are the facts on which the action is grounded. The law on this issue is clear – that it is necessary for the plaintiff to plead or allege verbatim the exact words which he complains of. Other authorities on this issue are : Lim Kit Siang v Datuk Dr Ling Liong Sik & Ors [1997] 5 MLJ 523; Collins v Jones [1955] 2 All ER 145 and more recently, Bode v Mundell [2016] EWHC 2533 (QB). [65] The law requires the very words in the libel to be set out. In the statement of claim in order that the court may judge whether they constitute a ground of action. It would be hard for the court to judge and to determine whether the words as found in the statement of claim, constitute a ground of action for libel – since those words in the report (in this case the second article) are reported in the third person and are the product of a reporter’s or journalist’s creative skills and reporting. This is in line with the decision of the Court of Appeal in Mak Khuinweng v Melawangi Sdn Bhd [2016] 5 MLJ 314 where it was stated “ What is important to note in defamation is that all the required elements to prove the elements of the tort which must be pleaded, 17 must be established at the stage of plaintiff’s case itself to have a viable cause of action in defamation. Only upon the elements having been established and/or proven that the defendant’s obligation to demonstrate the viable defence to defamation action will arise. [66] It is essential for the appellant in the present case to first plead a cause of action against the respondent in relation to the second article. On the above reasons, the appellant has failed to do so, which resulted in its claim relating to the second article not supported by a valid cause of action defamation. On this ground alone, we can safely conclude that the appellant’s claim under the second article must fall. (Emphasis ours) [42] Premised on the above principle, in our considered view, there was ample substance in Mr. Lim’s contention that the Plaintiffs’ claims for defamation against him which are based solely on Newspaper Articles and not evidence of actual words uttered by the alleged defamer ought to have been dismissed outright for want of a valid cause of action in defamation. [43] Secondly, on the next significant point raised by the Appellant as to the failure of the Respondent to produce a valid and complete translation of the contents of the impugned Newspaper Articles from the said Chinese daily, it was beyond dispute that Newspaper Articles had not been fully translated as confirmed by the interpreter called by the Plaintiff to testify in Court (PW.1). To support his contention, the Appellant relied on the case of Lim Kit Siang v Datuk Dr Ling Liong Sik [1997] 5 MLJ 523 which held at page 526 that: 18 “The authorities are manifest in their approach that it is fundamental that the exact words as uttered (by the first defendant in this case) must be reproduced in the original language with a certified translation in the language of the court, in the absence of which the claim will fail.” [44] It is thus, firstly crucial in a defamation suit which is based on newspaper articles, that the full contents of the impugned articles must be put before the Court for consideration premised on the guiding principle that the offending statements or words must not be viewed in isolation but in the context of the entire statement allegedly made by the defamer/defendant. The principle was articulated succinctly in Dato’ Sri Dr Mohamed Salleh bin Ismail v Nurul Izzah bt Anwar [2018] 3 MLJ 726 where Abang Iskandar, JCA (now CJSS) held that: “[35] As alluded to earlier by us, the impugned statements were contained in a bigger body of statement, to wit, the entire press release that was given by D1. As such, the guiding principle involved must necessarily be the one as stated in the work by Gatley on Libel & Slander namely that the impugned statements must be viewed not in isolation, but rather in the context of the totality of the whole statement of which the impugned statement was but a part thereof. … [36] We agreed with the learned trial judge in her approach when she undertook the exercise of viewing the impugned statement from a holistic approach. We found the statement to that effect in para 37 of her grounds of judgment where she said, It is equally 19 well established that the whole statement must be looked at as a whole and not just selected extracts of the statement … … [41] She concluded at para [82] of her grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to prove, on the balance of probabilities that the impugned statements were defamatory of the plaintiffs. With respect, we agreed with her conclusion. In as much as there may be venom in the impugned statements taken in isolation assuming the statements were directed at the plaintiffs, which they were not, but applying the holistic approach as expounded in Gatley on Libel & Slander the antidote was also contained in whole press statement which had the effect of ameliorating the alleged ‘sting’ that was complained of by the plaintiffs.” (Emphasis ours) [45] We are in agreement with the position taken by the Appellant supported by the above judgment of the Federal Court that in view of the Plaintiffs Mr. Thean and Mr. Goh having omitted or neglected to produce the entire Newspaper Articles with a certified and complete translation, the Plaintiffs should have been found to have failed to prove their defamation claims on a balance of probabilities. [46] We have, secondly, also borne in mind the settled law principle that in order to establish a cause of action in defamation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that a statement bearing a defamatory imputation, which refers to or reflects upon his reputation, has been published to a third person by the defendant. (See Raub Australian Gold Mining (supra). [47] In respect of the claims by Mr. Thean and Mr. Goh which were founded purely on publication of the Newspaper Articles in the respective 20 local newspapers and comments therein, it is beyond doubt that the publications were made by the newspapers concerned and not by the Appellant Mr. Lim. In any event, the impugned words as pleaded by Mr. Thean and Mr. Goh and published in the said newspapers do not, in our view, when read in their proper context and as a whole bear defamatory imputations which reflect upon the plaintiffs’ reputation. The words concerned criticism during the protest as reported against the Selangor Education Department (‘JPS’) for inaction on various complaints lodged by parents against the 3 particular schools for improper financial affairs and management and not any personal attacks against Mr. Thean and Mr. Goh which would warrant a libel claim being sustained. [48] For the aforesaid reasons, in Appeal Numbers 1710 & 1724, our conclusion is that in respect of the actions by Mr. Thean and Mr. Goh, the LJC had plainly erred and arrived at an incorrect finding that the claims for defamation had been proved on a balance of probabilities. We are, therefore, constrained to allow both these Appeals and set aside the decision of the LJC. [49] Moving on to the FB Posts, the crucial fact to be noted is that the whole FB Posts and the exact words said to be offensive were not pleaded. On this point, we have duly noted the observations and findings of the LHCJ in Appeal No. 210 with which we associate ourselves. The LHCJ had, in our view, correctly paid careful attention to the words actually uttered and those that were pleaded. In essence, the LHCJ rightly took into account the fact that the words pleaded were only part of the statements published in the Mandarin Language on 2.09.2015 and 1.12.2015 which the Plaintiffs chose not to plead in toto. Hence, the Court, 21 in confining itself to the words pleaded, was not in a position to determine the context in which they were uttered. [50] Likewise, the LHCJ was not satisfied with accuracy of the translation which was not pleaded in its entirety and also expressed doubts as to whether the translation in fact gave an accurate picture of what was published in Mandarin in the FB Posts. [51] His Lordship was entirely correct in expressing the position under the law of defamation to be that in order to properly determine whether the words are defamatory or otherwise and whether they refer to the Plaintiff, the exact words and the whole article must be pleaded. [52] In the instant case, the whole translation of the impugned FB Article was not pleaded as admitted by PW.1, the interpreter tasked with translating the article from Mandarin to B.Malaysia. PW.1 said that she merely ‘picked and chose’ parts of the article as instructed by the lawyer for the Plaintiff whereas some important parts in favour of the Appellant were not translated. Hence, the translation was in doubt and could not on the evidence before him sustain the Plaintiff Mr. Chew’s claim. [53] In support of the principle that in a defamation suit the actual words used and the context of the words are of paramount importance, the Respondent Mr. Lim cited the Court of Appeal case of Keluarga Communication v Normala Samsudin [2006] 2 MLJ 700 which held that: “[15] At the outset, we would state that the test to be applied when considering whether a statement is defamatory of a plaintiff is well 22 settled in that it is an objective one in which it must be given a meaning a reasonable man would understand it and for that purpose, that is, in considering whether the words complained of contained any defamatory imputation, it is necessary to consider the whole article. Gatley on Libel & Slander (10th Ed) on this point at pp 108 and 110, inter alia, states as follows: It is necessary to take into consideration, not only the actual words used, but the context of the words. It follows from the fact that the context and circumstances of the publication must be taken into account, that the plaintiff cannot pick and choose part of the publication which, standing alone, would be defamatory. This or that sentence may be considered defamatory, but there may be other passages which take away the sting. (Emphasis added.)” [54] Upon having heard all the evidence at a full trial and reading the purported translation of the FB Posts, the LHCJ, in our view, made a correct finding of fact that the FB Posts referred to the school administration and not to Mr. Chew personally whereas Mr. Chew brought the action in his personal capacity. Hence, the LHCJ was justified in holding that Mr. Chew was not the right party who had the locus or capacity to institute this action. It would follow that, as the impugned words or post were found not to refer personally to Mr. Chew, the words or post could not be considered to have any defamatory imputation or meaning against him as alleged in his pleadings. Upon reading the impugned words objectively in context in their natural and ordinary 23 meaning, the contents of the post cannot be said to be defamatory of Mr. Chew. [55] In this regard, the LHCJ was not shown to have misconstrued or failed to judicially appreciate the evidence as a whole in drawing his conclusion on the claim. [56] The posts merely sought from the school a public explanation to the Appellant’s queries on the manner in which the school administration managed several accounts for funds that it had received. [57] As regards the defences advanced by Mr. Lim [Defendant/ Respondent in Appeal No. 210], the LHCJ, considered the Defences of Justification and Public Interest and decided that these Defences were open to him. [58] We concur with the LHCJ’s decision on this vital issue. It falls squarely within the principle expounded by the Federal Court in the case of Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor Sdn Bhd v Tony Pua Kiam Wee [2015] 6 MLJ 187, where Azhar Mohamad, FCJ (as he then was), as paraphrased in the Respondent’s Submission, held that although the test referred to “Journalism”, it is merely a convenient description because it is in no way limited to journalistic publications. It is available to “anyone who publishes or discloses material of public interest in any medium to assist the public better comprehend and make an informed decision on matter of public interest that affect their lives”. [59] We are satisfied that the LHCJ’s view is correct that the Respondent’s impugned FB Posts concerned a matter of public interest 24 wherein it involves the school’s accountability and financial management for the donations made by the public to the school. [60] Regard was duly given to the right of the concerned public in this matter to know whether the school funds were administered properly and in accordance with the governing rules. [61] His Lordship duly noted that, “The School refused or ignored the queries even though the Defendant requested for it to be in writing. No reasons were given. The School refused to comment on how many school accounts it has in the School’s name, “SJK(C) Yuk Chai”. [62] Based on the circumstances alluded to, we have no doubt that the conclusion that the defence of public interest was available to the Respondent was justified and correct. [63] As we have found that the decision of the LJC in respect of Appeals No. 1710 & 1724 that the claim for defamation by the Plaintiffs Mr. Thean and Mr. Goh had been proved was erroneous and plainly wrong, we would only briefly express our views on the quantum of damages awarded by the LJC. In gist, our considered view is that the awards of General Damages [‘GD’] are manifestly excessive and contrary to the current trend of awards in defamation cases. [64] Damages were awarded for the respective Plaintiffs by the LJC in Appeals No. 1710 & 1724 as follows: