LIM Qiu Shi v Adenland (Damansara Jaya) Sdn Bhd (BA-12ANCvC-75-12/2024)

On 15 November 2024, the Sessions Court dismissed the Appellant/Plaintiff’s Notice of Application in Enclosure 34 (filed on 26 April, 2024, for, inter alia, a preliminary determination of a number of Issues/Question pursuant to Order 14A and/or Order 33 rule 2 of the Rules of Court 2012) with costs of RM5,000.00.

The Appellant/Plaintiff has filed the present appeal on 28 November, 2024 against the above decision of the Sessions Court.

The two apposite issues is this appeal are:

Whether the decision of the Sessions Court in dismissing the Appellant/Plaintiff’ Notice of Application is amenable to appeal; and

If the first issue is answered in the affirmative, whether the learned Sessions Court Judge committed any appealable error warranting appellate intervention. The Pertinent Background Facts [4] The Issues/Questions posed in Enclosure 34 were as follows:

Whether the thirty-six (36) month period for vacant possession and completion of common facilities should be calculated:

From the date of payment of the booking fee, i.e., commencing on 15.12.2016; or

(ii) From the date of the SPA, i.e., commencing on 5.6.2017;

Whether the Respondent/Defendant delayed in delivering vacant possession and completing the common facilities, taking into account any extensions granted by the Ministry of

Whether the Respondent/Defendant is liable to pay liquidated ascertained damages (“LAD”) for the delay in delivering vacant possession and completing the common facilities. The Decision of the Sessions Court [5] In her grounds of judgment (which was written after the present appeal was filed), the learned Sessions Court Judge expressed the view that there was only one issue for determination, that is, whether her decision in dismissing Enclosure 34 was one that was appealable. This is evident in paragraph [12] of the grounds of judgment: ISU [12] Isunya adalah satu Sahaja iaitu: Sama ada Keputusan Mahkamah ini boleh dirayu. [6] For completeness and ease of reference, the learned Sessions Court Judge’s reasoning and decision that the matter is not appealable are as follows: KES INI TIDAK BOLEH DIRAYU [21] Perkara yang mustahak kini ialah Mahkamah mendapati kes ini tidak boleh dirayu atas keputusan Mahkamah ini menolak Lampiran 34 selaras dengan “Section 28 of Courts of Judicature Act 1964”. [22] Section 28 of Courts of Judicature Act 1964 menyatakan: “(1) No appeal shall lie to the High Court in any of the following cases:

subject to any other written law, from a decision of a subordinate court in any civil cause or matter where the amount in dispute or the value of the subject matter is ten thousand ringgit or less except on a question of law;

where a subordinate court dismissed any application for a summary judgment;

where a subordinate court dismissed any application to strike out any writ or pleading; and

where a subordinate court allowed any application to set aside a judgment in default. [(1) Subs. Act A1661:3.2]

An appeal shall lie from any decision of a subordinate court in any proceedings relating to maintenance of wives or children, irrespective of the amount involved.” [23] Maka, jelaslah perkataan “shall” bermaksud wajib dan dikehendaki untuk tidak dirayu. [24] Rayuan ini membazir masa Mahkamah walhal undang-undang ialah jelas, nyata dan terang. Pindaan kepada Seksyen 28 telah dibuat sejak 2022 lagi. [25] Maka, hakikatnya pihak-pihak akan diberi peluang membentangkan kes semasa_perbicaraan penuh kelak. Mahkamah Tinggi tidak boleh dibebankan mendengar rayuan bagi kes yang tidak boleh dirayu. KESIMPULAN [26] Justeru, Mahkamah menegaskan bahawa keputusan Mahkamah ini menolak Lampiran 34 tidak boleh dirayu. [7] However, the learned Sessions Court Judge also did allude to and addressed the Notice of Application in Enclosure 34, holding that the said Enclosure 34 was an abuse of the process of the court. That relevant aspect of the learned Sessions Court’s judgment were as follows: DAPATAN DAN ANALISA MAHKAMAH [13] Terlebih dahulu, sebelum mengupas dan menyentuh isu di atas, Mahkamah meneliti dan bersetuju dengan hujahan peguamcara Defendan dan akan membentangkannya di sini. Hujahan Defendan [14] Defendan berhujah bahawa persoalan-persoalan yang dibentangkan oleh Plaintif di Lampiran A, Notis Permohonan (Kandungan 34), tidak melibatkan apa-apa persoalan undang-undang atau pentafsiran apa-apa dokumen yang berbangkit dalam tindakan ini. [15] Sebaliknya, persoalan-persoalan tersebut adalah untuk menjemput Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini membuat penentuan atas dakwaan fakta-fakta yang bercanggahan dan dipertikaikan oleh pihak-pihak dalam tindakan ini tanpa memanggil saksi-saksi yang berkenaan. Oleh itu, persoalan-persoalan tersebut tidak sesuai bagi penentuan tanpa perbicaraan penuh. [16] Lampiran 34 tersebut merupakan suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah dan haruslah ditolak oleh Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini. [17] Defendan berhujah bahawa persoalan-persoalan yang dibentangkan oleh Plaintif di Lampiran A, Notis Permohonan (Lampiran 34), merupakan isu-isu yang telah dibangkitkan dan dihujah dalam permohonan Penghakiman Terus yang dibuat oleh Plaintif terhadap Defendan di Mahkamah Majistret Petaling Jaya (Guaman No. BB-A72NCvC-743-08/2023) (sebelum kes Mahkamah Majistret Petaling Jaya tersebut dipindahkan ke Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini) yang mana Mahkamah Majistret Petaling Jaya telah menolak permohonan Penghakiman Terus tersebut. [18] Oleh itu, implikasi keputusan Mahkamah Majistret Petaling Jaya (Guaman No. BB-A72NCvC-743-08/2023) di atas adalah terdapat isu atau persoalan yang perlu dibicarakan. [19] Namun demikian, Plaintif masih membuat permohonan Lampiran 34 di Mahkamah yang Mulia ini dan membangkitkan isu atau persoalan yang sama dan/atau serupa yang telah dibangkitkan semasa permohonan Penghakiman Terus yang dibuat oleh Plaintif terhadap Defendan di Mahkamah Majistret Petaling Jaya. [20] Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan peguamcara Defendan ini. The Appellant/Plaintiff’s Contention [8] The grounds upon which the Appellant/Plaintiff has premised her appeal were as follows:

Mahkamah Sesyen, semasa memberikan keputusan tersebut secara lisan, telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang dan/atau fakta apabila memutuskan bahawa Perayu tidak berhak menuntut gantirugi tertentu (“LAD”) bagi penyerahan milikan kosong dan penyiapan kemudahan bersama atas alasan pengiraan LAD bermula daripada tarikh perjanjian jual beli, sedangkan pengiraan LAD bermula daripada tarikh pembayaran fi tempahan/deposit.

Mahkamah Sesyen, semasa memberikan keputusan tersebut secara lisan, telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang dan/atau fakta apabila memutuskan bahawa Perayu tidak berhak menuntut LAD bagi penyerahan milikan kosong dan penyiapan kemudahan bersama atas alasan fakta-fakta kes semasa berbeza daripada kes PJD Regency Sdn Bhd v. Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah & Anor and other appeals [2021] 2 MLJ 60 (Mahkamah Persekutuan) (“PJD Regency”), sedangkan fakta-fakta kes semasa sebenarnya sangat serupa dengan kes PJD Regency.

Mahkamah Sesyen, semasa memberikan keputusan tersebut secara lisan, telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang dan/atau prinsip apabila memutuskan bahawa pengiraan LAD bagi penyerahan milikan kosong dan penyiapan kemudahan bersama bermula daripada tarikh perjanjian jual beli dan bukan daripada tarikh pembayaran fi tempatan/deposit, yang bertentangan dengan keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes PJD Regency Sdn Bhd v. Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah & Anor and other appeals [2021] 2 MLJ 60, sedangkan pengiraan LAD bagi penyerahan milikan kosong dan penyiapan kemudahan bersama bermula daripada tarikh pembayaran fi tempahan/deposit dan bukan daripada perjanjian jual beli, yang selaras dengan keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes PJD Regency.

Mahkamah Sesyen telah terkhilaf dari segi prinsip apabila memutuskan dalam Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 20 Januari 2025 (“Alasan Penghakiman”) dengan alasan yang tidak selaras dengan keputusan yang telah diberikan secara lisan tersebut.

Mahkamah Sesyen, dalam perenggan-perenggan 12, 21 hingga 25 Alasan Penghakiman, telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang dan/atau fakta apabila memutuskan bahawa:

satu-satunya isu yang timbul adalah samada Perayu boleh merayu terhadap keputusan tersebut, sedangkan isu ini tidak pernah dibangkitkan semasa pendengaran tersebut; dan

rayuan Perayu tidak boleh diteruskan atas alasan bahawa keputusan tersebut adalah terhadap suatu permohonan penghakiman terus, sedangkan keputusan tersebut sebenarnya dibuat terhadap permohonan di bawah Aturan 14A dan Aturan 33 Kaedah 2 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 seperti yang dinyatakan dalam perenggan 7 Alasan Penghakiman.

Mahkamah Sesyen, dalam perenggan-perenggan 14 hingga 16 Alasan Penghakiman, telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta apabila memutuskan bahawa terdapat fakta-fakta yang bercanggahan dan dipertikaikan oleh pihak-pihak yang tidak sesuai bagi penentuan tanpa perbicaraan penuh, sedangkan isu-isu yang dibangkitkan semasa pendengaran merupakan isu-isu undang-undang seperti berikut:

samada tempoh tiga puluh enam (36) bulan bagi penyerahan milikan kosong dan penyiapan kemudahan bersama adalah:

dikira dari tarikh pembayaran fi tempahan, iaitu bermula dari 15.12.2016; atau

(ii) dikira dari tarikh Perjanjian Jual Beli, iaitu bermula dari 5.6.2017;

samada terdapat kelewatan oleh Defendan dalam menyerahkan milikan kosong dan menyiapkan kemudahan bersama, setelah mengambil kira pengecualian-pengecualian tempoh yang diberikan oleh Kementerian Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan kepada Defendan; dan

samada Defendan perlu membayar LAD bagi kelewatannya dalam menyerahkan milikan kosong dan menyiapkan kemudahan bersama.

Mahkamah Sesyen, dalam perenggan-perenggan 17 hingga 19 Alasan Penghakiman, telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang dan/atau fakta apabila memutuskan bahawa permohonan penghakiman terus telah ditolak, dan oleh itu, permohonan semasa juga mesti ditolak, sedangkan kedua-dua permohonan tersebut adalah isu yang berasingan. The Case for the Respondent/Defendant [9] In challenging the present appeal, the Respondent/Defendant has advanced the following arguments. [10] First, it was asserted by the Respondent/Defendant that the present matter determined under Order 14A and Order 33 rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Court 2012 is not appealable pursuant to section 28 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. [11] Second, the Respondent/Defendant also averred that the issues in question are factual rather than legal, thereby failing to meet the threshold for determination under Order 14A and/or Order 33 rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Court 2012. The Applicable Law and Provisions or the Rules of Court 2012 [12] Section 28 of Courts of Judicature Act 1964 provides as follows: Civil appeals from subordinate courts

(1) No appeal shall lie to the High Court in any of the following cases:

subject to any other written law, from a decision of a subordinate court in any civil cause or matter where the amount in dispute or the value of the subject matter is ten thousand ringgit or less except on a question of law;

where a subordinate court dismissed any application for a summary judgment;

where a subordinate court dismissed any application to strike out any writ or pleading; and

where a subordinate court allowed any application to set aside a judgment in default.

An appeal shall lie from any decision of a subordinate court in any proceedings relating to maintenance of wives or children, irrespective of the amount involved. [13] Order 14A of the Rules of Court 2012 reads as follows: Determination of questions of law or construction (O. 14A, r. 1)

1.

The Court may, upon the application of a party or of its own motion, determine any question of law or construction of any document arising in any cause or matter at any stage of the proceedings where it appears to the Court that— (a) such question is suitable for determination without the full trial of the action; and (b) such determination will finally determine the entire cause or matter or any claim or issue therein.

On such determination the Court may dismiss the cause or matter or make such order or judgment as it thinks just.

The Court shall not determine any question under this Order unless the parties have had an opportunity of being heard on the question.

The jurisdiction of the Court under this Order may be exercised by a Registrar.

Nothing in this Order shall limit the powers of the Court under Order 18, rule 19 or any other provisions of these Rules. Manner in which applications under rule 1 may be made (O. 14A, r. 2)

An application under rule 1 may be made by a notice of application or, notwithstanding Order 32, rule 1, may be made orally in the course of any interlocutory application to the Court. [14] As for Order 33 of the Rules of Court 2012, rules 2 and 5 provide as follows: Time of trial of questions or issues (O. 33, r. 2) The Court may order any question or issue arising in a cause or matter, whether of fact or law or partly of fact and partly of law, and whether raised by the pleadings or otherwise, to be tried before, at or after the trial of the cause or matter, and may give directions as to the manner in which the question or issue shall be stated.” Dismissal of action after decision of preliminary issue (O. 33, r. 5) If it appears to the Court that the decision of any question or issue arising in a cause or matter and tried separately from the cause or matter substantially disposes of the cause or matter or renders the trial of the cause or matter unnecessary, it may dismiss the cause or matter or make such other order or give such judgment therein as may be just. Analysis and Decision of this Court [15] This Court expresses its appreciation to learned counsel on both sides for their comprehensive and well-articulated submissions, both written and oral, which have been of considerable assistance in the determination of this matter. The Issue of Appealability [16] One must bear in mind that Enclosure 34 was made pursuant to Order 14A and/or Order 33 rule 2 of the Rules of Court 2012. [17] This Court shall first deal with Order 33 rule 2 of the Rules of Court 2012. [18] It bears noting that Order 33 concerns the Mode of Trial. [19] In Fauziah Ismail & Ors v Lazim Kanan & Orang-Orang Yang Tidak Diketahui [2013] 7 CLJ 37; [2013] 5 MLJ 423; [2013] 4 MLRA 445, the Court of Appeal articulated the rationale for Order 33 rule 2 as follows: [14] Alternatively, the same application can also be made under O 33 r 2 of the Rules of Court 2012. Under the said rule, the court may order any question or issue arising in any cause or matter, whether of fact or law or partly of fact and partly of law, and whether raised by the pleadings or otherwise, to be tried before, at or after the trial of the cause or matters and the court may give directions as to the manner in which the question or issue shall be stated. As a general rule, the court will exercise its power under this rule if the trial of the question or issue will result in a substantial saving of time and expenditure which otherwise would have to be expended should the action go to trial. As a whole the outcome of the application will depend very much on the facts of each case. Under O 33 r 5, the court may give judgment and allow the plaintiff’s claim; or dismiss the cause. [20] The power conferred under Order 33 rule 2 of the Rules of Court 2012 must be construed in tandem with Order 33 rule 5, which empowers the Court to summarily dispose of a matter where the separate trial of a question or issue renders the determination of the entire cause or matter unnecessary. The two provisions are thus complementary and must be read as part of a unified procedural scheme. [21] Sections 28(1) and 68(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, which govern appeals to the High Court and the Court of Appeal respectively, do not expressly address the appealability of a decision made pursuant to the exercise of discretion under Order 33 rule 2 by a court of first instance. [22] In the absence of an express statutory bar, this Court is of the considered view that a decision made under Order 33 rule 2 is amenable to appellate review, particularly where it involves the exercise of judicial discretion that affects substantive rights or the procedural conduct of the case. [23] The issue concerning the appealability of a decision made pursuant to an application under Order 14A of the Rules of Court 2012 takes on a different complexion. This is because the procedure under Order 14A involves the summary disposal of a claim, albeit on a point of law or the construction of documents. [24] The question that then arises is whether sections 28(1)(b) and 68(1)(d) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 are applicable in the context of an Order 14A application. [25] The Sessions Court answered this question in the affirmative. In agreeing with the Respondent/Defendant, the learned Sessions Court Judge relied on section 28(1)(b) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 for the proposition that “no appeal shall lie to the High Court” where a subordinate court has dismissed an application for summary judgment. [26] The Respondent/Defendant referred this Court to the remarks that this Court has made in two earlier decisions, namely, Ideal Principles Sdn Bhd v Central Spectrum (M) Sdn Bhd [2023] 1 CLJU 2273; [2023] MLJU 2511; [2023] MLRHU 1827 (“Ideal Principles”) and Parabhjot Singh a/l Kalwan Singh & Anor v Hari Krishnan a/l Perumal (“Parabhjot Singh”) [2024] AMEJ 0761; [2024] CLJU 717; [2024] MLJU 779; [2024] 4 MLRH

[27] In Ideal Principles, this Court has observed as follows: Postscript [36] The scope of the summary judgment procedure has widened considerably. In addition to the general summary judgment procedure laid down in Order 14 and the disposal of a case on questions of law or construction under Order 14A of the Rules of Court 2012, summary judgment for specific claims such as accounts and inquiries, actions for specific performance etc and summary proceedings for possession of land are provided for in Order 43, Order 81 and Order 89 respectively. Hence, the proposition that “trial, as a rule, must precede judgment” (Symons & Co v Palmer’s Stores (1903) Ltd [1912] 1 KB 259, 266) is no longer the “rule”. Be that as it may, summary judgment is not granted as a matter of cause when these Orders are invoked. [37] With the amendment of section 68 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, section 68(1)(d) now provides that “where a High Court dismissed any application for a summary judgment”, no appeal shall be brought to the Court of Appeal. When one examines this provision and those in section 68(1)(e) and (f), the rationale becomes obvious. A dismissal of an application for summary judgment does not mean that the applicant has failed in the action. The matter proceeds to trial. Likewise, when an application to strike out any writ or pleading is dismissed or an application to set aside a judgment in default is allowed, the matter proceeds to trial. In each of the above situations, section 68(1)(d), (e) and (f) now state that no appeal shall be brought to the Court of Appeal. [38] This Court has been made to understand that the Plaintiff in the instant case is appealing against this Court’s decision in dismissing the Plaintiff’s application for summary judgment. As explicated in the 12 preceding paragraphs, and in line with the provisions in section 68(1)(d) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, no appeal shall be brought to the Court of Appeal. [39] This Court has also been made to understand that the Plaintiff intends to argue that section 68(1)(d) only applies to dismissal of summary judgment applications made under Order 14. As this application is made pursuant to Order 14A, the Plaintiff will accordingly argue that the provision in section 68(1)(d) does not apply. [40] If the reasoning that section 68(1)(d) is only meant to apply to applications made under Order 14, then dismissal of applications for summary judgment under Order 14A, Order 43, Order 81 and Order 89 are all subject to appeal. [41] This Court is of the view that if indeed the intention of the Rules Committee is to limit the application of section 68(1)(d) to dismissals of any application for a summary judgment under Order 14, this would or should have been made clear in the said sub-section 68(1)(d). In view of the absence of the phrase “under Order 14” in the said sub-section 68(1)(d), summary judgment ought to be understood as to include all summary judgment applications under the various procedural rules of the Rules of Court 2012. [42] It is nevertheless granted that in certain circumstances, a determination of questions of law or construction of provisions in a statute or clauses in a contract or document pursuant to Order 14A of the Rules of Court 2012 may bring a matter to an end. In such a case the losing party ought not be prohibited from bringing an appeal to the Court of 13 Appeal. The adoption of such an approach will correspond with the rationale behind the introduction of sub-section 68(1)(d), (e) and (f) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. [43] As for the present case, the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s Notice of Application for summary judgment under Order 14A does not result in the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s action. The dismissal of the Plaintiff’s Notice of Application for summary judgment under Order 14A does not result in judgment entered in favour of the Defendant. This Court is therefore of the view that the present case falls squarely within objective envisaged or intended by the introduction of the new paragraph

in sub-section 68(1) of the of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. Henceforth, no appeal shall be brought to the Court of Appeal. However, that is the decision to be made by the Court of Appeal. [28] In Parabhjot Singh, this Court again commented as follows: [24] Returning to the present appeal and the preliminary point raised by the Respondent, the pertinent question is whether the dismissal of the Appellants’ application by the learned Magistrate resulted in the dismissal of the Appellant’s action. This Court is of the view that the answer is in the negative. That being the case, this Court is therefore of the considered view that the present appeal is not maintainable by virtue of section 28(1)(b) of the Courts of the Judicature Act 1964. [29] Although the decision in Ideal Principle and Parabhjot Singh dealt with separate provisions, that is, sections 68(1) and 28(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 respectively, since section 28(1)(b) is in pari materia with section 68(1)(d), the observations made apply equally to both sections 28(1)(b) and 68(1)(d) of the said Act. [30] In response to the above, the Appellant/Plaintiff referred this Court to a recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Lee Kam Lan v Lou Mai Chun & Ors [2025] 2 MLJ 496 (“Lee Kam Lan”). [31] The above case concerned an appeal by the defendant against the decision of the High Court judge in which the defendant’s application under O 14A of the Rules of Court 2012 for the disposal of the case on point of law without the full trial of the action was dismissed with costs of RM3,000. [32] The Court of Appeal considered and allowed the appeal, leading the Appellant/Plaintiff to contend that a dismissal of an Order 14A application for summary judgment is nor barred by the provisions in section 28(1)(b) nor section 68(1)(d) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. [33] While this Court is of course bound by the doctrine of stare decisis, it is not evident from the judgment in Lee Kam Lan as to whether the issue of appealability under section 28(1)(b) or section 68(1)(d) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 was expressly raised, argued, or determined. [34] In the absence of express pronouncement on this threshold issue by the Court of Appeal, and pending further authoritative clarification, this Court is prepared to proceed on the footing that the present appeal is properly before it. Applicability of Order 14A and/or Order 33 rule 2 [35] In determining whether the learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law and/or in fact, this Court has carefully examined the relevant background facts, the cause papers, and considered these in light of the questions raised in Enclosure 34. [36] Equally material to this Court’s deliberation are the submissions advanced and authorities cited by both parties, as well as the grounds of judgment of the learned Sessions Court Judge, particularly paragraphs [13] to [20], which set out her reasoning. [37] Upon full consideration, this Court is of the considered view that no appealable error has been demonstrated on the part of the learned Sessions Court Judge that would justify appellate intervention. [38] Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed with costs of RM5,000.00. Dated: 19 June, 2025 sgd (CHOONG YEOW CHOY] Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Shah Alam Counsel: Kimberly Ng Wenn Mei for the Plaintiff (Messrs. Ho Partnership) Eng Yi Wang and Ong Swee Long for the Defendant (Messrs. Armiy Rais)