LIM Siong Kim (JA-45B-1-02/2020)

The accused, Lim Siong Kim, was charged with the murder of Teo Kang Ling (“the deceased”) under Section 302 of the Penal Code. The offence was alleged to have been committed on 3 June 2019 at approximately 8.00am at No. No. 17-01, Jalan Setia 3/5, Taman Setia Indah, 81100 Johor Bahru, Johor. The accused operated a dental prosthetics workshop at that address, which is situated within the residential and commercial estate of Taman Setia Indah, Johor Bahru.

The prosecution called twelve witnesses (SP1 through SP12). The prosecution's case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence. There is no eyewitness to the act of killing. S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2

The prosecution case was heard and presided over by the predecessor judge, YA Dato' Abu Bakar Katar, between 30 April 2024 and 29 July 2025 when the prosecution case closed. Written submissions were received from both parties. On 14 August 2025, the predecessor judge delivered his ruling calling upon the accused to enter his defence. I took over at the defence stage and then presided over the examination of defence witnesses between 3 November 2025 and 19 January 2026. The defence case closed on 19 January 2026. The court received the parties' written submissions, and on 1 April 2026 conducted an oral clarification hearing at which both prosecution and defence addressed this court on all material issues.

The accused elected to give evidence under oath as the first defence witness (SD1). He filed written witness statements PSSD1A and PSSD1B, which were supplemented by cross-examination. The accused's father, Lim Teck Beng, gave evidence as the second defence witness (SD2) through witness statements PSSD2A and PSSD2B, likewise subjected to cross-examination.

At the conclusion of the trial, this court found the accused guilty as charged and recorded a conviction under Section 302 of the Penal Code. The accused was sentenced to 35 years' imprisonment commencing from 10 June 2019, the date of his arrest, together with 12 strokes of the whip. These are the grounds of that judgment. S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3

The charge preferred against the accused, produced and marked as P2, reads as follows: “Bahawa kamu pada 3 Jun 2019 jam lebih kurang 8.00 pagi bertempat di No.17-01, Jalan Setia Indah, di dalam daerah Johor Bahru di dalam Negeri Johor Darul Takzim, telah membunuh TEO KANG LING (No. K/P: 861112-23-5774), dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan.” Hukuman: Hendaklah diseksa dengan dihukum gantung sampai mati atau jika tidak dihukum dengan hukuman gantung hendaklah dihukum dengan hukuman penjara tidak kurang dari 30 tahun dan tidak lebih dari 40 tahun dan juga dikenakan hukuman sebat tidak kurang 12 sebatan.

The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

The accused and the deceased had been in a romantic relationship since approximately 2012, spanning approximately seven years. They are the natural parents of a daughter, who will only be refered to as “CL” to protect her identity, who was approximately six years old at the material time. The accused operated his dental prosthetics business at No. 17-01, Jalan Setia 3/5, Taman Setia Indah, Johor Bahru (but referred to in the charge as No. 17-01, Jalan Setia Indah, which the defence did not appear to take objection to). The deceased resided at her family home at No. 16, Jalan Gangsa 5, Taman Sri Putri, Skudai, together with her mother Gan Hwi Eng (SP7) and other family S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 members. SP7 confirmed the duration of the relationship in her testimony.

SP7 testified that on the night of 28 May 2019, between approximately midnight and the early hours of 29 May 2019, the accused arrived uninvited at the family home in Skudai. He insisted on removing the deceased and their daughter, CL. SP7 recounted her own response: “Kemudian saya melutut dan meminta Lim Siong Kim supaya tidak membawa anak perempuan saya keluar. Dia cakap dia ada... Kerana Lim Siong Kim memberitahu yang dia menghidap kanser, Yang Arif, dan perlu pergi ke Kuala Lumpur dan berjanji akan menghantar mereka balik semula.”

The accused's insistence was accompanied by a threat to cause a scene if he was denied. The deceased's brother also protested. The accused persisted, and the deceased and their daughter CL ultimately departed with the accused in his white Honda CRZ bearing the registration number JPX 9777 (P36).

On 29 May 2019, SP7 received messages in the morning containing two photographs of the deceased and CL at a shopping mall engaged in a colouring activity. That afternoon, the deceased telephoned SP7 to request a money transfer, mentioning that the accused was sleeping. Later that evening, at approximately 7.00 to 8.00pm, SP7 called the deceased. The deceased told her mother: S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 “..jangan risau. Lim Siong Kim akan hantar mereka balik semula.”

That was the last time SP7 heard from or spoke to her daughter. SP7 confirmed during her examination-in-chief that she did not see the deceased again after the midnight removal. She further testified that on approximately 5 June 2019, while SP7 was in Muar, the accused's wife (Tay Shu Fen) arrived at the Skudai family home and returned CL.

On 7 June 2019, the deceased's brother lodged a missing person report at Skudai Police Station, recorded as Skudai Report No. 4768/19, after the family had been without any communication from the deceased since the evening of 29 May 2019.

Acting on the missing person report, Inspector Sathyaseelan A/L Chandramohan (SP3), attached to D9 IPK Johor, led a team to No. 12, Jalan Setia 10/3B, Taman Setia Indah on the evening of 10 June 2019 at approximately 6.30pm. SP3 encountered the accused there and invited him to accompany the team to IPK Johor. On 10 June 2019, during questioning at the police station, the accused communicated in Mandarin to SP3 and the assisting officers, L/Kpl 191341 Yong Chee Choy and Konst 191189 Lau Chee Wei, indicating that he had disposed of “baobei's” body in Taman Daya and was willing to show them the location. SP3 lodged police report Setia Indah No. 7454/19 (P7). L/Kpl 191341 Yong Chee Choy recorded the relevant information on a piece of paper which the accused S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 then signed. The police team, with the accused present, thereafter proceeded to Jalan Setia 4/9, Taman Setia Indah, where a wooden plywood box was found at a rubbish-disposal area. SP3 identified the box in court based on its shape and construction, and pointed to photographs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 in Exhibit P8. The rough sketch plan P37 records the location of discovery.

The box was transported to Hospital Sultanah Aminah, Johor Bahru. Dr Mohamad Aznool Haidy bin Hj Ahsorori (SP5), the Ketua Jabatan dan Pakar Perubatan Forensik, conducted a post-mortem examination on 11 June 2019 at approximately 12.15pm. The post-mortem report is Exhibit P19 (reference HSA 194/2019). The deceased was subsequently identified by DNA comparison between specimens from the body and from her father and daughter, confirmed under Chemistry Department reference 19-FR-J- 03651, as recorded in P19.

The post-mortem findings documented in P19 are as follows. The crime scene box was described in P19's documentation as: a wooden plywood box measuring approximately 55 x 78 x 52 cm; it was wrapped in a white body bag and black plastic bag sealed with PDRM tape, covered with clear plastic and partly covered with whitish cement-like material and partly exposed blue canvas; a black tray measuring approximately 58 x 88 x 8 cm served as the base of the box. The body inside was found in a left lateral position with both lower limbs flexed at the thighs. S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 This was consistent with having been placed inside the box in a curled or foetal position. The body was in an advanced state of decomposition. Maroon pants and dark colour pieces of clothing (shirt) were present, both with burn marks. There were significant maggot infestations of various sizes throughout.

The Pathologist found the following injuries. Contusions were present on the right lip and the right cheek region. Multiple scalp contusions were noted. Rib fractures were found at the T8 to T10 right back aspect ribcages and at the T6 to T11 left back ribcages. There were also areas of burning on the clothing and the body itself. SP5 stated in P19 that the burning was post-mortem, concluded from the absence of soot within the airway and the absence of cherry-red discolouration of the muscle and soft tissues. Those are indicators that would be present if the person had been alive when the fire occurred. The burning, he testified, was most probably an attempt at post-mortem disposal of the body.

On the cause of death, SP5's examination-in-chief and cross-examination are significant. He explained smothering as follows: “Smothering adalah satu keadaan di mana seseorang atau pun si mangsa telah pun meninggal dunia akibat halangan atau pun tekupan pada bahagian pernafasan atas iaitu pada mulut dan juga pada bahagian hidung. Dan keadaan ini yang akan menyebabkan kelemasan dan menjurus kepada kematiannya.” S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8

He described the contusions on the right lip and right cheek as injuries consistent with significant external pressure applied to the front face. The pressure was applied to the nose and mouth region, leading to obstruction of the upper airway. On cross-examination, he was pressed about the absence of petechiae, which are pinpoint haemorrhages associated with asphyxia. He answered: “Benar Yang Arif. Apabila seseorang yang mengalami smothering atau pun akibat deprivation of oxygen, biasanya kita akan nampak muka akan congestion dan kadang-kadang bintik-bintik pada permukaan muka dan juga bintik-bintik pada bahagian mata, Yang Arif. Tetapi malangnya dalam kes ini proses itu telah tidak dapat dicerap atau pun diperiksa kerana ia telah mengalami proses pereputan, Yang Arif. Secara patologi dan secara anatomy apabila terdapat lebam pada bahagian muka khususnya kawasan yang berhampiran dengan bahagian hidung dan juga mulut dengan corak kecederaan-kecederaan lain dan jenazah atau pun mayat bagaimana ia dijumpai saya berpandangan bahawa ia mencukupi bahawa sebab kematian sebagai probable smothering, Yang Arif.”

His conclusion in paragraph 8 of P19 was: “The findings of postmortem examination were consistent with that of a death brought upon by Probable Smothering. In my opinion, the patterns were in keeping with homicide. In my opinion, the cause of death was: PROBABLE SMOTHERING.”

SP5 further confirmed that the deceased had died at least 48 hours or more prior to the post-mortem examination conducted on 11 June 2019. S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9

The rib fractures found at T8 to T10 right back and T6 to T11 left back deserve specific attention. SP5 testified that these fractures are highly likely the result of significant compression postmortemly. He stated that they were highly likely caused by an attempt to dispose of the body in the limited space of the box. SP5 confirmed that no obvious haemorrhage was visible at the rib fracture sites. This was consistent with the fractures having occurred after death, postmortemly.

The post-mortem burning, as documented in P19 and as SP5 confirmed in his testimony, is a medically distinct finding with its own significance. SP5's explanation was that the burning was post-mortem because no soot was found within the airway and no cherry-red discolouration of the muscle and soft tissues was present. This establishes that the accused, or whoever handled the body after death, attempted to destroy evidence of the killing by burning the body. Burns that occur post-mortem leave no cherry-red discolouration. That someone deliberately applied fire to the body of the deceased after her death is itself a significant circumstance pointing to the consciousness of guilt of the person who handled the body.

DSP Shanker A/L Shanmugam (SP12) was the Investigating Officer assigned following the discovery of the body. SP12 gave evidence through PSSP12. At paragraph 10 of PSSP12, SP12 recorded that on 14 June 2019 at approximately 5.00pm, the accused spontaneously S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 disclosed to him, without being specifically prompted, that the deceased had come to his workshop at No. 17-01, Jalan Setia 3/5, Taman Setia Indah at approximately 5.00am on 2 June 2019. She had complained that she was being harassed by a Chinese man named “Johnny” who was sending her threatening messages and had sought the accused's help. The accused told SP12 that he had refused to help, had chased her away because she was disturbing his sleep, and had had no further contact with the deceased after that until his arrest.

Wan Nur Zawani binti Wan Samsudin (SP9), Chemistry Officer at the Department of Chemistry Malaysia, prepared the chemistry report dated 7 August 2019 (P29). SP9 received 27 exhibits from SP12 on 13 June 2019 and a further 14 exhibits on 19 June 2019.

The material findings in P29 are as follows.

From the dental workshop, swab “12”, taken from on top of a box in Room 4, bore stains indicative of blood. Swab “12”, and clothes “H7” and “H8”, being soiled cloth bearing blood stains, all yielded a common female DNA profile that matched the DNA profile derived from bone specimen “H2”, labelled “Unknown” at the time and subsequently identified as the deceased by reference 19-FR-J-03651. These items were visible in photographs 21, 22, 23, 30 and 31 of P15. S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11

From the Honda CRZ (JPX 9777), neck pillow “5A” yielded a common female DNA profile matching the deceased. Swab “2A”, taken from the gear knob, yielded a mixed DNA profile from at least two contributors. One matched the accused's profile and the other the deceased's.

Neck pillow “4A” yielded a mixed DNA profile from at least three contributors. They were the accused, the deceased, and a third consistent with SP8 Lim Kok Kwang.

The accused's DNA profile alone was confirmed on the steering, swab “1A”, and water bottle, “6A”, recovered from the Honda CRZ. It was also confirmed on the toothbrush, short pants, and T-shirt recovered from the workshop.

The forensic scene examinations were conducted by Mohd Nur Azri bin Mohd Sabri (SP10) and Inspector Fathuddin bin Zakaria (SP11). SP10 prepared the scene examination report for the dental workshop. SP11 conducted the forensic examination of the Honda CRZ at IPD JBS on 15 June 2019 (P35), confirming the vehicle's connection to the relevant events. Both officers confirmed no fingerprint evidence was recovered.

SP8, Lim Kok Kwang, was a personal friend of the accused who, along with his own brother, had previously helped the accused in renovation works at the workshop SP8 testified that on approximately 6 June 2019, around one week after the deceased was last confirmed alive, the accused called S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 him at night and asked him to come to the workshop to help dispose of a box. When SP8 arrived, he found a box near the foot of the workshop stairs. The accused told him it contained a broken table leg. SP8 testified: “Dia beritahu itu adalah kaki meja, Yang Arif. Dia minta saya bersama-sama dengan dia pergi buang kaki meja itu. Kerana pada masa itu, saya ingatkan itu adalah sampah. Kerana pada itu...kerana sebelum itu, kedai dia under renovation, Yang Arif. Sebelum ini, saya dengan abang saya ada menolong dia buat renovation, Yang Arif dan memang sering kali saya menolong dia untuk membuang sampah. Sebab itu, saya ingatkan itu adalah lebihan sampah dan saya menolong dia membuang sampah tersebut.”

SP8 and the accused loaded the box into the boot of the accused's Honda CRZ. They drove for approximately ten minutes before depositing the box at a rubbish area. When shown photographs in Exhibit P8 at trial, SP8 testified: “Saya tidak berani pasti sama ada kotak yang seperti dalam gambar-gambar ini adalah kotak itu kerana setiap satu gambar kotak tersebut, bahagian bawah ada benda hitam tersebut. Bentuk kotak lebih kurang sama.”

He also stated that he placed the disposal box inside a large rubbish bin, which he could not identify from the photographs.

The prosecution also relied on the accused's post-offence conduct during the twelve days from the evening of 29 May 2019 to the discovery of the body on 10 June 2019. During this entire period, the accused made no inquiry regarding the deceased. He made no telephone contact with her S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 family. He lodged no missing person report. He contacted no one who might be expected to know her whereabouts. The only relevant act was the silent return of CL to the Skudai family home on 5 June 2019 by the accused's wife Tay Shu Fen, unaccompanied by the accused and unaccompanied by any explanation.

Section 180(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that at the close of the prosecution's case, the court shall consider whether the prosecution has made out a prima facie case against the accused.

The meaning of a prima facie case is settled by the Federal Court in Balachandran v PP [2004] 2 MLRA 547. The force of the evidence adduced must be such that, if unrebutted, it is sufficient to induce the court to believe in the existence of the facts stated in the charge, or to consider their existence so probable that a prudent man ought to act upon the supposition that those facts exist or did happen.

This is not achieved by accepting the prosecution's evidence uncritically. The Federal Court in PP v Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2005] 2 MLRA 590 held that a maximum evaluation requires the trial court to subject the evidence led by the prosecution in its totality to a maximum evaluation, carefully scrutinise the credibility of each of the S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 prosecution's witnesses, take into account all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, and, if the evidence admits of two or more inferences, draw the inference that is most favourable to the accused.

This formulation, first in Looi Kow Chai & Anor v PP [2003] 2 MLJ 65, requires the court to ask itself this question. If the accused is called upon to enter his defence and elects to remain silent, is the court preared to convict him on the totality of the evidence before it?

If the answer is yes, a prima facie case has been made out and the defence must be called.

At the conclusion of the prosecution case on 29 July 2025, written submissions were subsequently filed by both parties in August 2025. The predecessor judge, YA Dato' Abu Bakar Katar, delivered his ruling on 14 August 2025. Having conducted a maximum evaluation and considered the parties' submissions, he expressed his findings in the following terms: “(a) Teo Kang Ling (kad pengenalan: 861112-23- 5774)(simati) telah meninggal dunia;

Pendakwaan bergantung kepada keterangan ikut keadaan bagi membuktikan kematian simati disebabkan kecederaan-kecederaan yang dilakukan oleh tertuduh. Mahkamah ini telah menimbangkan keterangan yang ada mencukupi untuk mengaitkan tertuduh dengan pembunuhan.

Tertuduh orang terakhir bersama simati. S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA

(ii) Maklumat yang diberikan dibawah s.27 Akta Keterangan

Tindakan tertuduh yang membawa pihak polis kepada kotak berisi mayat simati ditempat pembuangan sampah S.8 Akta 1950 terpakai.

(iii) DNA simati ditemui dikedai membuat gigi palsu.

(iv) Kawan tertuduh (SP8) yang mengesahkan tertuduh meminta bantuan untuk membuang kotak berisi mayat simati ditempat pembuangan sampah.

Mahkamah ini berpendapat tindakan menekup mulut dan hidung simati pada lazimnya boleh membawa kematian. Pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan cabang (c), S.300 Kanun Keseksaan.

Diakhir kes pendakwaan, Mahkamah ini memutuskan ada kes prima facie tertuduh diperintah untuk membela dirinya atas pertuduhan [P2].” [42] The accused was accordingly ordered to enter his defence in respect of P2 pursuant to Section 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code. SUCCESSOR JUDGE: DUTY AND APPROACH [43] I did not preside over the prosecution case and had no opportunity to observe the prosecution witnesses as they gave their evidence. This circumstance gives rise to the question of what approach this court should adopt at the conclusion of the trial. [44] The governing authority is Norol Rojik Jun v PP [2018] 8 CLJ 186, a decision of the Court of Appeal. In that case, the defence was called on the order of the Court of Appeal after the original trial judge had acquitted the accused and the decision reversed. A different judge presided over the S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA defence stage. On appeal against conviction, the accused argued among other things that the succeeding judge had erred. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and stated at paragraphs 11 and 12: “[11] …..It was therefore not open to the succeeding judge to reopen the issue of whether a prima facie case had been established by the prosecution. Nor was it open to us, being a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, to do so. [12] The trial judge's duty after the order was made by this court was only to consider whether the appellant's explanation, if any, had cast a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case. But of course in doing so, the learned judge was bound by s. 182A(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (“the CPC”) to consider all the evidence adduced before the court, which necessarily includes evidence adduced by the prosecution at its stage of the case.” [45] The Court of Appeal further stated at paragraph 44 of Norol Rojik: “At the conclusion of the trial, what s. 182A(1) of the CPC requires is for the court to consider all the evidence in determining whether the case had been proved beyond reasonable doubt. This does not mean however that the court must decide all over again whether a prima facie case had been established by the prosecution. That is a requirement of s. 180(1) of the CPC at the close of the prosecution case and not a requirement of s. 182A(1) at the close of the defence case.” [46] This court adopts and applies this guidance. [47] In the present case, the calling of the accused's defence was the order of the predecessor judge. This court treats that order as having been made by this court itself. It is not open to this court to revisit whether the prosecution's S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Any proposed ground of acquittal must accordingly be rooted in what the defence evidence has raised, not in a retrospective challenge to the prosecution's case as it stood at the close of the prosecution's case. [48] As was observed at paragraph 43 of Norol Rojik, however, if the succeeding judge had at all erred, she had erred in favour of the accused by re-evaluating the prosecution's case. The learned Judge went beyond what was strictly required. This court will not make the same error. The focus of this judgment is exclusively on whether, on the totality of all the evidence, prosecution and defence, the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and whether the accused's explanation has cast a reasonable doubt on the prosecution's case. DUTY OF THE COURT AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL [49] Section 182A(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code provides: “At the conclusion of the trial, the Court shall consider all the evidence adduced before it and shall decide whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.” [50] The mandate of “all the evidence” under Section 182A(1) is holistic. The court weighs prosecution and defence evidence together and assesses their cumulative effect. As the Federal Court directed in PP v Datuk Tan Cheng Swee & Anor [1980] 2 MLJ 276, the duty of the trial court is to S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA come to a correct decision on the totality of all the evidence placed before it. Prosecution and defence evidence are not to be compartmentalised or assessed in sequence as if each belonged to a separate inquiry. [51] Reasonable doubt is a doubt grounded in the evidence or in the absence of evidence. It is a real, substantial doubt arising from reason, not from a fanciful possibility or mere conjecture. The prosecution succeeds if this court is satisfied beyond such doubt of the accused's guilt. The accused succeeds if his explanation, even if not accepted, raises in this court's mind a genuine reasonable doubt as to his guilt. [52] In Mat v PP [1963] 1 MLRH 400, Suffian J described the character of reasonable doubt as follows. The accused need not establish his innocence. It suffices for his explanation to raise a real state of doubt in the mind of the court. The prosecution's case need not eliminate every theoretical possibility. It must exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. In the present case, the prosecution has established a solid, mutually corroborating case built on four strands of independently sourced evidence. This court does not identify any reasonable hypothesis consistent with the accused's innocence that has not been considered and excluded in the course of this judgment. S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA THE LAW ON MURDER AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE Sections 299, 300 and 302 of the Penal Code [53] Section 299 of the Penal Code defines culpable homicide as the causing of death by an act done with an intention to cause death, or to cause bodily injury likely to cause death, or with knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. Section 300 of the Penal Code elevates culpable homicide to murder in four alternative situations. The prosecution in this case relies exclusively on Limb (c): “…if the act by which death is caused is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.” [54] Section 302 of the Penal Code, as amended by Section 34 of the Abolition of the Mandatory Death Penalty Act 2023 (“Act 846”), which came into force on 4 July 2023, now provides: “Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death or imprisonment for a term of not less than 30 years but not exceeding 40 years and if not sentenced to death, shall also be punished with whipping of not less than 12 strokes.” [55] This amended provision governs sentencing in this case. Four Ingredients of Murder S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA [56] The four ingredients the prosecution must prove for a murder charge are: (a) the deceased is dead; (b) the death of the deceased was caused by the injuries suffered by the deceased; (c) the accused caused the injuries that caused the death of the deceased; and (d) the act causing the death of the deceased was done with the intention under Section 300 (a), (b), (c) or (d) of the Penal Code. All four must be established beyond reasonable doubt. The Virsa Singh Elements for Limb (c) [57] The authoritative formulation of the elements of Limb (c) is found in Virsa Singh v State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465, consistently applied in Malaysia. See: Tham Kai Yau & Ors v PP [1976] 1 MLRA 279 (Federal Court); Aziz Mat Shah v PP [2010] 1 MLRA 145 (Court of Appeal) and Zulkiple Mohamad v PP [2022] 2 MLRA 70 (Federal Court). The prosecution must prove: first, that a bodily injury is present; second, that the nature of that injury has been proved; third, that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury (not accidental or unintentional); and fourth, that the injury of the type established is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. As Vivian Bose J stated in Virsa Singh: “ This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender... It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.” S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA [58] The objective nature of the fourth element was elaborated in Rajwant Singh v State of Kerala AIR 1966 SC 1874: “The third clause discards the test of subjective knowledge. It deals with acts done with the intention of causing bodily injury to a person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In this clause the result of the intentionally caused injury must be viewed objectively. If the injury that the offender intends causing and does cause is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary way of nature the offence is murder whether the offender intended causing death or not and whether the offender had a subjective knowledge of the consequences or not.” [59] Both Virsa Singh and Rajwant Singh, applied in Malaysia in Mohamed Yasin Bin Hussin v PP [1976] 1 MLRA 603 (Privy Council); Tham Kai Yau & Ors v PP [supra]; Aziz Mat Shah v PP [supra]; Zulkiple Mohamad v PP [supra], are relied upon by the prosecution in their submissions. [60] On the question of intention under Limb (c), the Court of Appeal in Mohd Yasser bin Shaik Mahmad v PP [2017] 4 MLJ 250 confirmed: “From a bare reading of s 300(c) of the Penal Code, it is clear that murder may also be committed if the accused intentionally causes an injury to a person which injury, in the ordinary course of nature, is sufficient to cause death. Under that limb

to s 300 of the Penal Code, an intention to kill on the part of an accused person is not a pre-requisite which the prosecution would otherwise have to prove in order to secure a conviction for a murder charge.” Circumstantial Evidence S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA [61] Since the prosecution's case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, the applicable framework from PP v Azilah Hadri & Anor [2015] 1 MLRA 431 (Federal Court) applies. Conviction can be secured based on circumstantial evidence provided that: a) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn has been established; b) the facts so established is consistent with the hypothesis of the guilt; and c) circumstances should be of a conclusive nature in that the chain of evidence is complete so as to exclude any conclusion consistent with the accused person's innocence. [62] Thomson CJ's statement in Chan Chwen Kong v PP [1962] 1 MLRA 32 (Court of Appeal) remains the authoritative Malaysian statement on how individual strands of circumstantial evidence are to be assessed together: “…where the evidence is wholly circumstantial what has to be considered is not only the strength of each individual strand of evidence but also the combined strength of these strands when twisted together to make a rope. The real question is: is that rope strong enough to hang the prisoner?” [63] Each strand of circumstantial evidence will be assessed individually before being measured in combination. S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA EVALUATION OF THE PROSECUTION'S CASE [64] As a successor court, this court does not reopen the prima facie finding made by the predecessor judge on 14 August

What this court does is to examine the evidentiary foundation of that finding. It does so to satisfy itself that the evidence adduced at the prosecution stage supports the predecessor judge's conclusions on each of the four strands he identified. Where challenges to the prosecution witnesses were raised in cross-examination at the prosecution stage, those challenges and the evidence bearing on them are also considered here. First Ingredient: The Death of the Deceased [65] The death of Teo Kang Ling is established beyond question. The body was found on 10 June 2019. Identification was confirmed by DNA comparison via reference 19-FR-J-03651 as recorded in P19. Death was certified by SP5 following the post-mortem examination at Hospital Sultanah Aminah on 11 June 2019. This ingredient is not in dispute and the evidence supports it without qualification. Second and Third Ingredients: Cause of Death and Limb (c) [66] SP5, the Ketua Jabatan dan Pakar Perubatan Forensik at Hospital Sultanah Aminah, Johor Bahru, holds the qualifications of MD and DrPath (Forensic) UKM, MPM S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA Registration No. 35187. His post-mortem report P19 (HSA 194/2019) records his opinion at paragraph 8 as follows. “The findings of postmortem examination were consistent with that of a death brought upon by Probable Smothering. In my opinion, the patterns were in keeping with homicide.” [67] His examination disclosed contusions on the right lip and right cheek region. They were situated at precisely the location where cupping of the mouth and nose would be applied. They were consistent with significant external pressure on the facial airway. The body was found in a left lateral position with both lower limbs flexed at the thighs. This was consistent with placement in the box after death. The body and clothing bore signs of burning that SP5 identified as post-mortem. This was evidenced by the absence of soot in the respiratory tract and the absence of cherry-red discolouration in the muscles and soft tissue. Rib fractures were found at T8 to T10 right back and T6 to T11 left back. Multiple scalp contusions were also noted. [68] SP5's opinion was subjected to sustained cross-examination. Four specific challenges were raised to his findings. [69] First, the absence of petechiae. SP5 acknowledged their diagnostic value but explained that the advanced state of decomposition precluded their observation. This explanation is consistent with the documented condition of the body and does not undermine the smothering finding. S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA [70] Second, the concession that the scalp contusions were not the cause of death. SP5 consistently maintained that the cause of death was smothering, not blunt head trauma, and that the scalp contusions were accompanying injuries. [71] Third, the absence of internal respiratory tract damage. SP5 explained that this is not invariably present in smothering cases, particularly after decomposition. [72] Fourth, the broader challenge that the small amount of blood at the workshop was inconsistent with the injuries in P19. The medical evidence from SP5 establishes that smothering is an asphyxial mechanism producing minimal external blood loss. The scalp contusions and rib fractures are not haemorrhagic causes. The evidence supports SP5's opinion on each of these points, and that opinion is internally consistent throughout. [73] The predecessor judge found that smothering the mouth and nose of the deceased is in the ordinary course of nature sufficient to cause death, thereby establishing Limb (c) of Section 300. The evidence supports this finding. Applying the Virsa Singh elements, the bodily injury, namely obstruction of the nose and mouth by application of external force, is established by the contusions on the right lip and right cheek. The nature of that injury has been established through SP5's expert testimony. The evidence of the injury mechanism is inconsistent with any accidental or self-S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA inflicted cause. This supports the inference that the injury was intentionally inflicted. SP5 also confirmed that sustained smothering, by cupping of the mouth and nose, is in the ordinary course of nature sufficient to cause death by asphyxia. The fourth element, being purely objective, does not depend on the accused's subjective state of mind. The evidence supports the predecessor judge's conclusion that Limb (c) is established. Fourth Ingredient: Attribution — The Four Circumstantial Strands Strand 1: The Last Seen Evidence [74] The predecessor judge found that the accused was the last person seen with the deceased. The evidence supports this finding. SP7, the deceased's mother, testified that the accused arrived at the family home in Skudai in the early hours of 29 May 2019 and insisted on removing the deceased and their daughter despite SP7's entreaties. She knelt before the accused to beg him not to take the deceased; the accused persisted and the deceased departed with him in his Honda CRZ JPX 9777. That evening, at approximately 7.00 to 8.00pm, SP7 telephoned the deceased. The deceased's words as testified to by SP7 were: “Jangan risau. Lim Siong Kim akan hantar mereka balik semula.” S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA [75] These words were spoken some four to five hours after the accused's account has him parting from the deceased at Tesco Tebrau at approximately 3.00pm. They indicate that the deceased, at the time of the call, expected the accused to be responsible for returning them home. No independent person saw or heard from the deceased after that call. [76] SP7's evidence on this strand is straightforward and unshaken. The deceased did not tell SP7 where she was during the evening call. SP7 confirmed that she heard the voice of a child in the background. The deceased's words, that the accused would send them home, were the last SP7 heard from her daughter. No challenge was raised to the accuracy or reliability of SP7's recollection of those words. The evidence supports the predecessor judge's finding on this strand. Strand 2: The Section 8 Conduct Evidence [77] The predecessor judge found that information given by the accused under Section 27 of the Evidence Act 1950, and the accused's conduct in leading the police to the location of the body, were relevant under Section 8 of the same Act. The evidence supports this finding. SP3, Inspector Sathyaseelan A/L Chandramohan, testified that on 10 June 2019 the accused communicated, in Mandarin through two assisting officers, information about the location of the deceased's body. The police team thereafter proceeded with the accused to Jalan Setia 4/9, Taman Setia Indah, S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA where the body was found in a wooden plywood box at a rubbish-disposal area. SP3 documented this communication in police report P7 and the discovery in P9. He also identified the box from the photographs in P8. The rough sketch plan P37 records the precise location of discovery. [78] Two challenges to this strand were raised at the close of the prosecution case. First, the admissibility of the accused's communication under Section 27. SP3 does not speak Mandarin, and the two officers through whom the communication was received, L/Kpl 191341 Yong Chee Choy and Konst 191189 Lau Chee Wai, were not called as witnesses. The defence submitted that SP3's account was hearsay and that P25, produced by SP6, was inadmissible for want of a certified translation. The defence further submitted that Section 8 could not be used to achieve indirectly what Section 27 had failed to achieve. It argued that without an admissible statement, the act of accompanying the police team was meaningless in isolation. [79] The prosecution's reliance is on Section 8, not Section 27. The governing authority is Amathevelli a/p P Ramasamy v Public Prosecutor [2009] 2 MLJ 367 (Federal Court). At paragraph [31], the Federal Court held: “The inadmissibility of the information supplied by the appellant does not affect the admissibility of the evidence of her subsequent conduct under s 8 of the Evidence Act 1950 irrespective of s 27.” S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA [80] The Court endorsed Prakash Chand v State AIR 1979 SC 400, where Chinnappa Reddy J stated that an accused person leading a police officer to a place where relevant items were found is admissible as conduct under Section 8 irrespective of whether any antecedent statement falls within Section 27. Section 8 operates on physical acts independently; it is not a conduit for Section 27. The defence's submission to the contrary is inconsistent with Amathevelli. The evidence supports the predecessor judge's finding on this strand. [81] Second, the discrepancy between “Taman Daya”, as referenced in P7, and “Taman Setia Indah”, where the body was actually found, was noted in cross-examination. The two areas are approximately three kilometres apart. The evidence supports the finding notwithstanding this discrepancy. Taman Setia Indah is the accused's own estate, within which his dental workshop at No. 17-01, Jalan Setia 3/5 is located. That the police team proceeded to the accused's own neighbourhood, and found the body there, is consistent with the accused having provided information pointing to that general vicinity, even if the specific locality name given was imprecise. The evidence supports the predecessor judge's finding on this strand. Strand 3: DNA Evidence at the Workshop and in the Vehicle [82] The predecessor judge found that the deceased's DNA was found at the accused's dental workshop. The evidence S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA supports this finding. SP9, Wan Nur Zawani binti Wan Samsudin, a Chemistry Officer at the Department of Chemistry Malaysia, prepared the chemistry report P29 dated 7 August 2019. P29 confirmed a common female DNA profile, subsequently matched to the deceased, on swab 12, taken from a box inside the workshop, neck pillow 5A, taken from the passenger seat of the accused's vehicle, and clothes H7 and H8, recovered from the deceased's body at the post-mortem, the last two bearing stains indicative of blood. Swab 12 is depicted in photographs 30 and 31 of P15. SP9's qualifications and methodology were not challenged in cross-examination. No challenge was raised to the chain of custody of the exhibits or to the validity of the DNA profiles in P29. The DNA analysis stands as an unchallenged objective finding. [83] The mixed DNA findings from the accused's vehicle are also relevant. Swab 2A from the gear knob of Honda CRZ JPX 9777 yielded a mixed DNA profile consistent with the accused and the deceased. Neck pillow 4A yielded a mixed profile consistent with the accused, the deceased, and SP8. This is consistent with SP8's own evidence at the prosecution stage that he sat in the accused's car during the nocturnal disposal. These vehicle findings support the prosecution's account of the disposal events. Strand 4: SP8's Evidence of Nocturnal Disposal S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA [84] The predecessor judge found that SP8 confirmed that the accused had sought his assistance to dispose of a box from the workshop premises. The evidence supports this finding. SP8, Lim Kok Kwang, a personal friend of the accused who had previously assisted him with renovation work at the workshop, testified to four facts that were not disputed in cross-examination. First, the accused telephoned him at night approximately one week after the deceased was last seen. Second, the accused asked him to come to the workshop to help remove and dispose of a box. Third, the accused described the contents as “kaki meja”, a broken table leg, implying renovation waste. Fourth, both men loaded the box into the accused's Honda CRZ and drove for approximately ten minutes before depositing it in a large rubbish bin. [85] SP8 was cross-examined on the identity of the box. He testified that he could not be certain whether the box in the P8 photographs was the same box he had helped to dispose of. His reason for this uncertainty was that each photograph of the crime scene box showed a black item at the base, which he did not recall being present on the box he had carried. He added, “Bentuk kotak lebih kurang sama.” The general shape was approximately the same. This testimony is one of uncertainty, not a positive identification of a different box. SP8 did not say the boxes were different. He said he could not be sure they were the same. S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA [86] The evidence supports the predecessor judge's finding on this strand. The significance of SP8's conduct evidence lies in the four uncontested facts set out above. They establish that the accused covertly disposed of a large wooden box from premises where the deceased's DNA was found, at night, under a false description of its contents, during the period of the deceased's disappearance. The Charge Date Discrepancy [87] The charge specifies 3 June 2019 as the date of the offence. SP5 estimated the time of death as at least 48 hours before the post-mortem examination on 11 June

SP5's estimate is expressed as a minimum bound; the actual time of death may have been earlier, including on or around 3 June 2019. The evidence supports the predecessor judge's implicit treatment of the date discrepancy as non-material. Cumulative Effect of the Four Strands [88] The four strands, taken in their totality, support the predecessor judge's prima facie finding. Applying the three-limb test from PP v Azilah Hadri & Anor, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn are all established in the evidence. Each of the four strands rests on the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and, in the case of the DNA strand, objective forensic analysis. The facts so established are consistent with the hypothesis that S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA the accused killed the deceased and thereafter disposed of her body. The circumstances are of a conclusive nature in that, taken together, they complete the chain of evidence in a manner that is consistent with guilt and not readily explicable on any innocent hypothesis. Applying the rope metaphor from Chan Chwen Kong v PP, each strand adds strength to the others, and the combined rope is sufficient to support the prima facie finding. The evidentiary foundation of the predecessor judge's ruling is sound. THE DEFENCE CASE [89] The accused gave evidence under oath (SD1). His evidence is assessed on the same standard as that of any other sworn witness. [90] The accused's decision to give sworn evidence, as opposed to making an unsworn statement from the dock, is his right and carries no adverse inference. It does, however, mean that his evidence is subject to cross-examination. Its weight is to be assessed in the same way as that of any other witness, by reference to its internal consistency, its consistency with the external evidence, and this court's assessment of his demeanour and the plausibility of his account. [91] Having observed the accused throughout his evidence, this court notes that he gave his evidence calmly and methodically. He did not contradict himself in significant S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA detail during examination-in-chief. However, his evidence on the central factual question, whether he was with the deceased after 3.00pm on 29 May 2019, is directly contradicted by the deceased's own words to SP7 on the evening of 29 May 2019. Furthermore, his overall defence narrative is contradicted by objective prosecution evidence. The calmness with which the accused maintained a narrative irreconcilable with this objective evidence is a circumstance this court has weighed in assessing his credibility. [92] The accused's defence, as presented through PSSD1A, PSSD1B, and as tested in cross-examination, may be summarised as five propositions. [93] First, the Tesco departure narrative. The accused brought the deceased and their daughter to Tesco Tebrau on 29 May 2019 for a colouring event. He left at approximately 3.00pm to return to his workshop for pending denture orders. He assumed the deceased returned to Skudai. According to the accused, he had no further contact with her from that point onwards. [94] Second, the “Johnny” third-party suspect. The accused claimed the deceased had shown him harassing phone messages from a man named “Johnny” on 28 May 2019. He relied on paragraph 10 of PSSP12, the Investigating Officer's record of the accused's own spontaneous S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA disclosure, to suggest that “Johnny” was a plausible alternative killer. [95] Third, the occupational hazard theory. The deceased regularly assisted with dental prosthetics manufacture at the workshop using carving tools (D39A–H). She sustained finger cuts. This, according to the accused, explains the deceased's blood at the workshop. The deceased also regularly rode in and drove the Honda CRZ. According to the accused, this explains her DNA in the vehicle. [96] Fourth, the passive passenger claim. The accused denied providing any information to SP3. He said the police drove him directly to Taman Setia Indah. He said it was the police who located and identified the box. According to the accused, he was merely a passenger. [97] Fifth, the different-box argument. The accused contended that the box he and SP8 disposed of lacked a black tray at its base. The crime scene box had a black tray. They were therefore different boxes. According to the accused, the prosecution has failed to connect him to the crime scene box. [98] SD2, the accused's father Lim Teck Beng, gave evidence on two matters: he stated that his wife had told him the deceased delivered CL to his home on the evening of 29 May 2019 (supporting the Tesco narrative and the argument that the deceased was independently mobile); and he S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA provided context for the presence of carving tools at the workshop. [99] SD2 also confirmed in cross-examination by TPR that he was at work when the deceased allegedly delivered CL. He did not personally witness the delivery. He received his information from his wife. His wife was not called as a witness. He himself had no direct personal knowledge of the events at the workshop around the time of the deceased's disappearance. EVALUATION OF THE DEFENCE CASE [100] In Mat v PP, Suffian J stated the framework for evaluating the defence at the conclusion of the trial: a) If you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the accused's guilt - Convict. b) If you accept or believe the accused's explanation - Acquit. c) If you do not accept or believe the accused's explanation - Do not convict but consider the next steps below. d) If you do not accept or believe the accused's explanation and that explanation does not raise in S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA your mind a reasonable doubt as to his guilt - Convict. e) If you do not accept or believe the accused's explanation but nevertheless it raises in your mind a reasonable doubt as to his guilt - Acquit. [101] This court has arrived at its conclusion on the defence case with reference to this framework. The evaluation of each of the five defence propositions, and of SD2's evidence, is set out below. The Tesco Departure Narrative [102] This court rejects the Tesco departure narrative. The rejection flows directly from the deceased's own words. SP7 testified that at approximately 7.00 to 8.00pm on the evening of 29 May 2019, four to five hours after the accused claims to have left the deceased at the mall, she telephoned the deceased. The deceased said: “Jangan risau. Lim Siong Kim akan hantar mereka balik semula.” These are not the words of a woman who has been abandoned at a shopping mall since 3.00pm. They are the words of a woman who, that same evening, was still in circumstances where she expected the accused to be responsible for sending her home. [103] There is no innocent explanation for the deceased's words that is consistent with the accused's account. The accused S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA gave no evidence that could explain why the deceased would have said those words if she had been freely left at the mall at 3.00pm. Counsel for the defence did not put any alternative explanation to SP7. [104] The Tesco narrative is rejected for the reasons set out above. The primary reason is the deceased's own words to SP7 on the evening of 29 May 2019. One point must be noted concerning SP12's paragraph 10 record. The defence has correctly observed that the accused at trial never adopted the 2 June 2019 account as his own evidence. He consistently maintained that he last saw the deceased at Tesco Tebrau at 3.00pm on 29 May 2019. The defence relied on SP12's paragraph 10 record only for the limited purpose of showing that “Johnny” had been mentioned to police during the investigation. It did not rely on it to place the deceased at the workshop on 2 June as the accused's own case. Accordingly, this court does not rely on SP12's paragraph 10 record as an admission by the accused or as a prior inconsistent statement that directly contradicts his trial evidence for the purpose of rejecting the Tesco narrative. The rejection of the Tesco narrative rests on the deceased's own words on the evening of 29 May 2019, on the DNA evidence at the workshop, and on the cumulative weight of the prosecution's case. This court cannot accept the Tesco departure narrative. The “Johnny” Narrative S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA [105] This court finds no evidential foundation for the “Johnny” third-party suspect narrative. No witness named “Johnny” was called. No phone message, telephone record, or any digital evidence of harassment was produced. No independent witness testified to the existence of “Johnny” as a person known to the deceased or to the accused. The entirety of the “Johnny” narrative rests on the accused's own testimony and on paragraph 10 of PSSP12, which is itself nothing more than a record of what the accused told SP12 during the investigation. [106] The prosecution characterised the accused's statement to SP12 as a rehearsed deflection. It submitted that the statement was a pre-emptive attempt to introduce the “Johnny” narrative into the investigation before it could focus squarely on the accused. This court does not need to make a positive finding on that characterisation. Given that the accused at trial did not adopt the statement as his own evidence, the court is cautious about drawing adverse inferences from its content. [107] What can be noted is that the defence's use of SP12's paragraph 10 record was expressly conditional. The defence relied on it only to show that “Johnny” was mentioned to police during the investigation, and for no broader purpose. The defence's written submissions acknowledged the date inconsistency. They framed the relevant point as, “Though the dates are not consistent, the S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA relevant and material fact that the deceased was afraid of Johnny was revealed to (SP12).” [108] On this limited issue, this court accepts that the defence has succeeded in showing that the name “Johnny” was not a trial-stage invention. It was mentioned to the police during the investigation. That concession, however, does not carry the defence further. [109] More fundamentally, the “Johnny” narrative collapses under its own logic. For “Johnny” to be the killer, he would have had to kill the deceased and enclose her body in a large plywood box. He would have had to transport and deposit that box at a rubbish area in Taman Setia Indah. He would have had to do so within the same general period during which the accused and SP8 were disposing of a large box from the accused's workshop in the same estate. He would also have had to somehow leave the deceased's blood at the accused's workshop. The convergence of method, location, and timing is not a reasonable doubt. It is an incredible coincidence. [110] The courts in this jurisdiction have consistently recognised that a third-party hypothesis, to constitute a reasonable doubt, must have some evidentiary basis. It cannot be conjured purely from speculation. In the present case, “Johnny” has no identity, no known address, no digital footprint before the court, no connection to Taman Setia Indah, and no demonstrated access to a plywood box or a S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA rubbish area in the vicinity of the accused's workshop. The “Johnny” narrative is not a reasonable doubt arising from evidence. It is a hope that the court will entertain a possibility for which there is no evidence whatsoever. This court declines to do so. [111] The defence's limited reliance on paragraph 10 of PSSP12 achieves only one thing: it shows that the name “Johnny” was mentioned to the police during the investigation, and that the allegation was therefore not a last-minute trial fabrication. This court accepts that concession, consistent with the defence's own submissions. However, the defence goes no further with paragraph 10 of PSSP12. The paragraph does not corroborate the existence of “Johnny” as a real person from an independent source. SP12 is merely recording what he heard from the accused during the investigation. His testimony does not supply the kind of independent, objective evidence of “Johnny's” existence, identity, motive, or access to the deceased that would be required to give the third-party suspect theory any real purchase. Its value for establishing the existence of “Johnny” as a real person with motive and opportunity to kill the deceased is nil. The Occupational Hazard Theory [112] This court rejects the occupational hazard theory for the following reasons. S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA [113] First, and most fundamentally, the carving tools D39(A) to D39(H) that the accused relies upon were never submitted for forensic examination. They were removed from the workshop by SD2 after the police had completed their scene examination and cleared the premises. There is accordingly no scientific evidence establishing the presence of the deceased's DNA on those tools. The theory depends entirely on the accused's assertion that the deceased suffered tool cuts during denture work. It is forensically uncorroborated. This is not a gap in the prosecution's investigation. It is a gap created by the defence's own conduct in failing to hand the tools over to the police for testing during the investigation. The defence attempted instead to manufacture a forensic hypothesis at the trial stage on the basis of untested tools. [114] Second, swab 12, which returned the deceased's blood DNA profile, was taken from a box inside the workshop, not from the tools. Even if the occupational hazard theory were accepted, it would explain potential traces of blood on the tools. It cannot explain blood on the box. The presence of the deceased's blood on swab 12 remains unexplained by the occupational hazard theory. [115] Third, the defence argued that the absence of large blood splatter at the workshop is inconsistent with the Pathologist's findings of blunt injuries to the head and fractures to the ribs. This argument is misconceived. The cause of death is smothering. It is an asphyxial death that S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA produces minimal or no external bleeding. SP5 confirmed this clearly. The scalp contusions, which are internal bruises, and the rib fractures, which were inflicted post-mortem, were not the cause of death and would not produce external bleeding. The minimal blood traces at the workshop are entirely consistent with a death by smothering, not inconsistent with it. The Passive Passenger Claim [116] This court rejects the passive passenger claim. SP3's evidence in examination-in-chief, corroborated by the contents of police report P7, establishes that the accused communicated in Mandarin at the police station that he had disposed of “baobei's” body in Taman Daya and was willing to show the police the location. Whether or not that communication is admissible under Section 27, a question this court has left open, SP3's evidence of it was before the court at the prima facie stage and was accepted by the predecessor judge. The defence's challenge to its admissibility at the defence stage is exactly the sort of retrospective re-evaluation of the prosecution case that is foreclosed under Norol Rojik. [117] This court further observes that the passive passenger claim was never put to SP3 during cross-examination. Counsel confined the challenge to establishing that the accused remained inside the police vehicle throughout the journey from IPD to the scene, a proposition SP3 confirmed. S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA Counsel did not put to SP3 that the accused did not lead or direct the police to the location, that the police already knew the location before leaving the police station, or that the accused was merely taken to a location already known to them. SP3 was accordingly never given the opportunity to respond to or explain the version later advanced through the accused's own testimony. A defence account that departs materially from the case put to the relevant prosecution witness, and that surfaces for the first time only when the accused himself gives evidence, is entitled to correspondingly less weight. [118] In any event, the Section 8 conduct evidence stands independently. The accused led the police team to the location where the body was found in his own neighbourhood. It was found in the same estate as his workshop. The argument that the police independently selected Taman Setia Indah rather than the referenced “Taman Daya”, and coincidentally found the body in the accused's own estate, is no more plausible than the “Johnny” theory. The most natural explanation for the body being found in Taman Setia Indah, rather than in Taman Daya three kilometres away, is that the accused's information pointed broadly but accurately to his own neighbourhood. The police proceeded accordingly. [119] The passive passenger claim is also inconsistent with the overall constellation of facts. Whether or not SP3's account of what the accused said during the investigation is treated S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA as the accused's own admission, which, for the reasons given above, this court does not do, the passive passenger claim fails on its own terms. The body was found in the accused's own estate, within the same neighbourhood as his workshop. The police team proceeded to Taman Setia Indah rather than to Taman Daya, the location referenced in P7. The accused and SP8 disposed of a large box from the workshop approximately one week before the body was found at a rubbish area within the same neighbourhood. A man truly passive and uninformed as to the body's location would not have led the police to his own neighbourhood where the body was found. The Different-Box Argument [120] On the different-box argument, SP8's testimony was one of uncertainty, not a positive identification of a different box. SP8's precise words were that the general shape was “lebih kurang sama”, approximately the same. He was uncertain because each photograph of the crime scene box showed a black item at the base which he did not recall from the box he had carried. He did not say the boxes were different. He said he could not be sure they were the same. That is a statement of uncertainty, not an exculpatory finding. The threshold for raising a reasonable doubt is not met by a witness testifying to uncertainty as to the identity of two items. S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA [121] More fundamentally, what is uncontested is that the accused telephoned SP8 at night, approximately one week after the deceased was last seen, and sought covert assistance in removing a large wooden box from his workshop premises. That conduct, soliciting a friend's help under a false pretext to dispose of a large box at night from the very premises where the deceased's DNA was found during the twelve days of her disappearance, is wholly inconsistent with innocence. Whether or not the box SP8 helped to dispose of was the identical box found at the crime scene, the conduct of the accused in making that nocturnal, deceptive request stands as an independent and powerful incriminating circumstance. [122] The prosecution does not need to prove that the box SP8 helped dispose of was the exact crime scene box. The prosecution relies on the disposal conduct as evidence of guilty knowledge. It is an independent and incriminating circumstance regardless of box identity. The accused knew what was in the box. SP8 did not. [123] This court further observes that if, as the defence suggests, the murder were committed by a third party such as “Johnny”, that third party would have had to, by pure coincidence, choose to conceal the body inside a wooden box and deposit it at the same general location to which the accused and SP8 had, days earlier, themselves disposed of a wooden box. This court finds no credible basis on which that convergence, the same type of receptacle, the same S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA method of disposal, the same locality, within the same narrow window of time, can be attributed to coincidence rather than to the knowledge and agency of the accused. The convergence is not merely improbable. On a realistic assessment of the evidence, it is impossible to explain on any basis other than that the accused was responsible for the body's presence at that location. The different-box argument is rejected. SD2's Evidence [124] SD2's evidence that the deceased delivered CL to his home on the evening of 29 May 2019, which, if true, would place the deceased as independently active and not under the accused's control, is inadmissible hearsay in every material particular. SD2 was at work when this allegedly occurred. He received his information from his wife. SD2 himself confirmed this in cross-examination: “TPR: Dan Encik Lim tidak melihat dengan mata sendiri apa yang berlaku dengan Teo Kang Ling?” SD2: Tiada, Yang Arif.” [125] SD2's wife was not called as a witness. No explanation was given for her absence. SD2's account of what his wife told him cannot establish the truth of the proposition that the deceased independently visited the family home on the evening of 29 May 2019. S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA [126] The accused's wife Tay Shu Fen, who returned CL to the Skudai family home on 5 June 2019, and who by virtue of living with the accused would have been privy to his whereabouts and the circumstances regarding CL in late May and early June 2019, was also not called. No explanation was offered for her absence. These are witnesses with direct personal knowledge of matters material to the case. Their non-appearance is a circumstance this court observes. Applying Mat v PP [127] This court's assessment of the accused's credibility as a witness may be stated briefly. The accused gave his evidence under oath and is subject to the full evidential discipline applicable to a sworn witness. Having observed him during examination-in-chief, cross-examination by the prosecution's TPR, and re-examination, this court makes the following observations. The accused's trial testimony, that he last saw the deceased at Tesco Tebrau at 3.00pm on 29 May 2019 and had no further contact with her thereafter, is not accepted. That testimony is irreconcilable with the deceased's own last communication to her mother on the evening of 29 May 2019, in which she indicated that the accused would be sending them home. The accused gave no evidence that could explain those words if his Tesco account were true. The accused's evidence is not accepted on the Tesco departure narrative on those grounds. The rejection is based on the objective evidence S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA from SP7 and the overall weight of the prosecution's case. It is not based on any inconsistency with SP12's investigation record, which the accused at trial never adopted as his own account. [128] This court does not accept or believe the accused's explanation. Each of the five planks of his defence has been assessed and rejected. The Tesco departure narrative is irreconcilable with the deceased's own words to SP7 on the evening of 29 May 2019 and with the objective evidence of the prosecution's four strands. The “Johnny” narrative is devoid of independent evidential support and is logically incoherent as a third-party suspect theory, even though this court accepts that the name “Johnny” was mentioned to police during the investigation. The occupational hazard theory is forensically unverifiable due to the defence's failure to hand the tools over to the police for testing. The passive passenger claim is contradicted by SP3's evidence and by the inherent implausibility of the body being found in the accused's own neighbourhood by accident. The different-box argument rests on SP8's uncertainty, which falls short of positive exculpatory identification. [129] This court further finds that the accused's explanation does not raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Not one of the five propositions is supported by independent, objective, corroborative evidence. Every element of the defence rests either on the accused's own interested testimony or on the inadmissible hearsay of his father. The prosecution's case, S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA by contrast, is built on physical DNA evidence, the deceased's own last words, independent witness testimony from SP3, SP7, SP8, and SP12, documentary evidence in P7, P19, P29, P33, and the accused's own conduct across twelve days. [130] The present case falls squarely within limb (d) of Mat v PP: this court does not accept or believe the accused's explanation, and that explanation does not raise in this court's mind a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

[131] This court pauses to record its overall assessment of the state of the evidence before arriving at the formal verdict. The prosecution's case is constructed of four independent strands of circumstantial evidence. Each points to the accused. No one strand could by itself sustain a conviction. Together, however, they form the kind of interlocking edifice that the rope metaphor in Chan Chwen Kong was designed to capture. The last seen strand is corroborated by the DNA strand. The deceased was last with the accused, and her blood was in his workspace. The DNA strand is corroborated by the Section 8 conduct strand. The deceased's blood was at the workshop, and her body was found in the accused's own neighbourhood when he led the police. S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA [132] The conduct strand is corroborated by SP8's disposal strand. The accused and SP8 were covertly disposing of a large box from that same workshop during the period of disappearance. SP8's disposal strand is corroborated by the post-offence conduct strand. A man who was innocently disposing of renovation waste has no reason to maintain twelve days of silence about his partner's disappearance. The strands do not merely add to each other. They corroborate each other. That multi-directional corroboration is the hallmark of a case in which the circumstantial evidence has truly reached the standard required for a conviction. [133] Having considered all the evidence adduced before this court in accordance with Section 182A(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, and having applied the direction of the Federal Court in PP v Datuk Tan Cheng Swee & Anor to arrive at a correct decision on the totality of the evidence, this court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecution has proved its case against the accused, Lim Siong Kim, on the charge as preferred. [134] The accused's explanation has wholly failed to raise a reasonable doubt on the prosecution's case. The four strands of circumstantial evidence, assessed individually and cumulatively in accordance with Azilah Hadri and Chan Chwen Kong, point collectively and irresistibly to the accused as the person who killed Teo Kang Ling. The accused is accordingly found guilty as charged of the S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA offence of murder under Section 302 of the Penal Code. A conviction is recorded. SENTENCE [135] Having recorded a conviction under the amended Section 302 of the Penal Code, this court proceeds to sentence. Section 34 of Act 846 converted the mandatory death penalty into a discretion: the court may impose death, or imprisonment of between 30 and 40 years with not less than 12 strokes. In Alowonle Oluwajuwon Gilbert v PP [2024] 2 MLRA 266, the Court of Appeal confirmed that Act 846 makes imprisonment the rule and confines the death penalty to the most exceptionally serious, foul, and shocking murders. They are murders athat are callous to an almost unbelievable degree. In Mohammad Firdaus Ismail lwn Pendakwa Raya [2025] MLRAU 294, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed this and substituted a death sentence with 40 years' imprisonment and 12 strokes for the killing of the accused's own mother. On this line of authority, the governing test is whether the case falls within the “rarest of the rare”. Parties' Submissions on Sentence [136] The defence submitted for 30 years' imprisonment. Encik Ravichanthiran urged that there was no evidence of intent to kill and no premeditation. The defence cited PP v Gopu Lakshmanan & Anor [2026] CLJU 776 (Court of Appeal). In S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA that case, the Court of Appeal reversed a Section 304(a) Penal Code conviction to Section 302 and sentenced each of the two respondents to 30 years' imprisonment and 12 strokes. The killing arose from a group assault at a secluded location. She also cited several other Court of Appeal decisions imposing 30 years. She prayed under Section 282(d) of the Criminal Procedure Code for the sentence to run from the date of arrest. [137] The prosecution submitted for the death penalty. It urged the impact on two generations of the deceased's family, the betrayal of intimate trust, the deliberate and sustained nature of smothering, which cannot be accidental, the inhuman post-death concealment and dumping of the body, and the total absence of remorse. The prosecution relied on PP v Mohamad Amier Amzar Mohamad Aspar [2025] MLRHU 1872 (High Court) and PP lwn Muhammad Fakrul Aiman Sajali [2025] MLRHU 2572 (High Court). In the latter case, the accused was sentenced to death for the planned killing of a person known to him. The prosecution also relied on several other High Court decisions in which death was imposed. Death Penalty Declined [138] This court declines to impose the death penalty. Applying the “rarest of the rare” framework from Alowonle, the death penalty is reserved for the most exceptionally serious, foul, and shocking murders. They are murders that are callous to S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA an almost unbelievable degree. The present case does not reach that threshold. The killing was not premeditated and was not characterised by extreme sadism. The accused, having only a drug consumption charge, is effectively a first offender. Fakrul, where the accused prepared accelerants and set fire to the victim, and Amier, where the assault was brutal and sustained, represent the kind of exceptional depravity the “rarest of the rare” framework targets. Both are distinguishable from the present case. On the Alowonle test, the death penalty is not warranted. [139] This court has also considered Robin Radjaini Saih @ Amjan Patta v PP [2024] MLRAU 185 (Court of Appeal), in which the Court of Appeal declined to adopt the “rarest of the rare” doctrine in Malaysia. At the relevant paragraph of that judgment, the court held that applying the doctrine would amount to an unlawful curtailment of the wide and unfettered judicial discretion Parliament conferred under Section 302 of the Penal Code read with Sections 34 and 39 of Act 846. Robin held instead that the wide judicial discretion is to be exercised with public interest as the primary consideration. The court is to take into account all aggravating and mitigating factors and the four objects of sentencing. They are deterrence, rehabilitation and reformation, retribution, and restitution. Even applying the Robin framework, this court reaches the same conclusion. The aggravating features demand a substantial custodial term. However, the absence of premeditation, the accused's prior record being limited to a drug consumption charge, his S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA age, and the possibility of rehabilitation all weigh against the ultimate penalty. Deterrence and retribution are adequately served by 35 years' imprisonment. On either approach, Lim Siong Kim will not be sentenced to death. [140] A specific finding on premeditation is required. The prosecution argued that the materials at the workshop, cement, a saw, canvas, and the wooden box, showed advanced preparation. This court does not accept that argument. Those materials were present due to renovation works at the premises. This court does not find evidence of preplanning and does not regard this as a premeditated murder. The accused's blanket denial also means this court was not privy to the precise circumstances of the killing. The Appropriate Sentence [141] While death is not warranted and the killing was not premeditated, the lowest threshold of 30 years cannot be imposed. The reason is the callous manner in which the accused disposed of the body. It was enclosed in a wooden plywood box, wrapped in blue canvas, sealed with plastic and cement-like material, subjected to post-mortem burning, then transported at night by a deceived friend and deposited at a public rubbish area. The body was found twelve days later in an advanced state of decomposition. The accused took calculated, repeated steps to conceal what he had done. Those steps included the sealing, the S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA burning, the nocturnal disposal under false pretences, and twelve days of complete silence. [142] Further aggravating factors are the betrayal of an eight-year intimate relationship and the sustained anguish of the deceased's family. Her mother attended nearly every hearing. The mitigating factors are a prior record limited to a drug consumption charge, age 42 at conviction, and being the only son of aged parents. [143] PP v Aung Zaw Win [2024] MLRHU 444 (High Court) (spontaneous stabbing, genuine remorse, no body disposal) and PP v Gopu Lakshmanan & Anor (joint group assault, no post-death concealment) represent the lower end at 30 years. This case is aggravated beyond those precisely by the sustained, calculated disposal of the body. At the upper end, premeditated killings and exceptionally heinous cases attract 38 to 40 years: Mohammad Firdaus Ismail lwan Pendakwa Raya [2025] MLRAU 294 (Court of Appeal). Since no premeditation has been found, this case does not reach that register. The Alowonle comparator of 35 years for an intimate partner killing (though notably without disposal of the body) is the most apposite reference point. [144] Defence counsel's prayer under Section 282(d) of the Criminal Procedure Code is granted. The sentence runs from 10 June 2019, the date of the accused's arrest. S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA [145] The accused, Lim Siong Kim (IC: 840502-01-6355), is sentenced as follows: a) Imprisonment: 35 years, commencing from 10 June 2019. b) Whipping: 12 strokes. 2 July 2026 ATAN MUSTAFFA YUSSOF AHMAD Judge High Court of Malaya Johor Bahru S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA COUNSEL: For the Prosecution: TPR Tuan Muhammad Syafiq Bin Mohd Ghazali TPR Puan Lydia binti Salleh TPR Umar Faiz bin Abdul Kohar Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Johor, Aras 2, Bangunan Dato’ Ja’afar Muhammad, Kota Iskandar, 79100 Nusajaya, Johor. For the Accused : Encik Ravichanthiran a/l Ganesan Puan Aida Binti Haji Hassan Messrs Aida & G. Ravi No. 19, Jalan Setulang, Taman Stulang, 80300 Johor Bahru, Johor Datin Freda Josephine Gonzales, bersamanya Encik Sarawanakumar a/l Kanan, Miss Yvonne Kee Yee Huan Messrs Freda Sabapathy & Co. Unit UG-02, Ground Floor, Menara TJB, No.9, Jalan Syed Mohd Mufti, 80000 Johor Bahru S/N fo/PiSExt0WylkLr5yonGA