LIM WEI JIE v Pendakwa Raya (W-05(SH)-627-12/2023)

The appellant, Lim Wei Jie, was charged for trafficking methamphetamine which is a substance listed as a dangerous drug in the First Schedule of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (hereafter “DDA”). The act of trafficking any dangerous drug is a criminal offence under section 39B(1)(a) of the DDA. A charge was framed against the appellant, and it reads as follows: “Bahawa kamu pada 29 November 2021, jam lebih kurang 3.30 petang, di tepi Jalan Bangunan M Avenue, Jalan Segambut, di dalam Daerah Sentul, di dalma Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, telah mengedar dadah berbahaya iaitu 3832.2 gram methamphetamine dan dengan itu, kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama.”

The appellant was called upon to enter his defence after the trial judge was satisfied that a prima facie case had been made out against the appellant on the offence charged after the respondent had concluded its case. The trial judge, after having evaluated the appellant’s defence and having considered all the evidence in totality, was satisfied that the respondent had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant. Hence, the trial judge found the appellant guilty and convicted him for the offence charged. The trial judge, after having considered the S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 3 of 28 appellant’s mitigation, sentenced him to life imprisonment effective from the date of arrest (on 29.11.2021), with 12 strokes of whipping.

The appellant was not satisfied with the entire decision of the trial judge and filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal. On 27.5.2025, this Court, after having considered both the submissions, orally and in writing, of the appellant’s counsel and the deputy public prosecutor, was satisfied that the trial judge did not err in law or fact in coming to his decision. This Court, therefore, dismissed the appellant’s appeal and affirmed the High Court’s decision. The reasons for the decision of this Court are now set out as below.

On 29.11.2021, based on information received (or a tip-off), a team of police personnel led by Inspector Andrew Lim (SP4) intercepted a vehicle bearing registration number WA9516A which was driven by the appellant along Jalan Segambut. SP4 identified himself as a police officer to the appellant. A body search was carried out on the appellant, but no incriminating items was found on the body of the appellant. SP4 then conducted a search on the vehicle in the presence of the appellant. SP4 found a box labelled with the words “Livinox Range Hood” (P30) in the vehicle. SP4 then administered a caution to the appellant pursuant to section 37B(1)(b) of the DDA before he proceeded further to question the appellant regarding the content in the box. Below is the conversation recorded in his witness statement (WSSP4): “S: Kotak ini hendak dihantar ke mana? Ke parcel hub di Jalan Ipoh, Kuala Lumpur. S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 4 of 28 Untuk hantar ke mana? Miri, Sarawak. Ada apa-apa barang salah di kotak ini? Ya. Ada. Boleh kamu tunjukkan di mana dadah itu? Boleh, dadah disorok dalam kitchen hood.”

SP4 then inspected P30 in the presence of the appellant. SP4 found a unit of kitchen hood (P32) packed in styrofoam. After removing the styrofoam, SP4 used a screwdriver and a knife to remove the cover of the kitchen hood. SP4 found inside the kitchen hood five packages wrapped in aluminum foils (P20-P24). The substances inside P20-P24 were packed in transparent plastic bags. The substances were suspected to be a dangerous drug - methamphetamine. SP4 seized all the items found and the vehicle as well. The appellant was brought back to the police station in Sentul.

SP4, on the following day, after having completed his police reports and identifying, marking and weighing all the suspected seized dangerous drug, handed all the seized items and the appellant to the Investigation Officer ASP Muhammad Ridhuwan (SP7) for further investigation.

On 14.12.2021, in the course of further investigation, SP7 handed the suspected dangerous drug to Chemist Nur Ikadewi binti Sarimin (SP3) for analysis. SP3 testified in her witness statement (WSSP3) that the substances found in the seized items (P20-P24) were methamphetamine having a net weigh of 3832.2 grammes. SP3 produced her Chemist Report in court marked as “P18”. S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Based on the above salient facts, the prosecution mounted the criminal charge of trafficking dangerous drug against the appellant.

The core of the appellant’s defence was that he was an innocent carrier, and he was merely carrying out transportation services. The appellant denied having knowledge that P32 contained dangerous drug (P20-P24). The appellant gave evidence under oath. The appellant also called two other witnesses, namely, the appellant’s mother Madam Koo Kim Kiat (SD2) and one Indra Kumar a/l Balakrishnan (SD3). SD3 is appellant’s friend who is also known as “Abu”.

The appellant’s main testimony was that prior to his arrest, he was working for or providing transportation services to Lalamove through a phone application (or apps). Prior to providing transportation services to Lalamove, the appellant was a Grab driver and also transporting parcels for J&T Express.

The crux of the appellant’s narrative was that on 29.11.2021, around 12.20 p.m., he accepted a private delivery job from someone by the name of “Fill”, who offered him RM100.00 to deliver six boxes of machine oil. The appellant said Fill would make the arrangement for the boxes to be delivered to him, and that he would coordinate the courier service for the delivery. The appellant went to a parcel hub in Jalan Ipoh to wait for the boxes to be sent to him as arranged by Fill for appellant to pick-up. The appellant had also arranged with SD3 to meet him there. SD3 came with his friends to meet the appellant at the parcel hub in Jalan Ipoh. S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

A lorry arrived at the parcel hub in Jalan Ipoh with six boxes. SD3 and his friends together with the appellant removed the boxes from the lorry and brought them into the parcel hub. The appellant then contacted Fill for instruction where to deliver the boxes, and he was instructed that the boxes were to be sent to Sarawak. The appellant then arranged a courier service to send the boxes to Sarawak at the parcel hub. The cost for the courier service was RM4,000.00, and the appellant wanted to return RM1,000.00 to Fill since Fill had earlier transferred RM5,000.00 into the appellant’s bank account. Fill replied that it was not necessary because he had two more boxes that needed to be delivered to Sarawak, but had to use two different courier service companies. The appellant agreed and accepted the second job. The appellant then waited for Fill to give him further instruction where to go to receive the two boxes.

Around 2.00 p.m., after having received Fill’s instruction, the appellant went to a different parcel hub to wait for the two boxes to be delivered to him. This time the parcel hub was located at Jalan Kuching. The appellant was accompanied by SD3 and his friends, but the appellant and SD3 and his friends were travelling in different vehicles.

A Nissan vehicle (4x4) arrived at the parcel hub with two boxes. SD3 helped to carry the first box into the parcel hub, and the second one was carried into the appellant’s vehicle. The appellant arranged for the first box to be sent to Sarawak at the parcel hub, and he paid the necessary charges. With regard to the second box that was carried into the appellant’s vehicle, the appellant wanted to use a different courier service to send this second box. As such, the appellant went to J&T Express in Jalan Segambut, but he found out that it was closed when he arrived. The appellant said that while he was walking back to his vehicle S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 7 of 28 after finding J&T Express closed, he was approached by two policemen. The two policemen then arrested him. The appellant said he saw SD3 and his friends were also arrested at the scene, and they were brought to where the appellant’s vehicle was parked.

The appellant in his testimony said that SP4 approached the appellant’s vehicle and instructed two policemen to remove the box (P30) in the vehicle and placed the box at the side of the road. The appellant said SP4 opened the box and found a kitchen hood (P32). He then used a screwdriver to remove the cover of the kitchen hood, and found five packages (P20-P24) inside the kitchen hood. The appellant and SD3 and his friends were asked about the contents of the five packages. The appellant and SD3 and his friends said they did not know what were inside the 5 packages. The appellant said it was SP4 who told them the five packages contained dangerous drugs. They were shocked to hear from SP4 that the contents were dangerous drugs. The appellant thought that the box (P30) contained machine oil.

The appellant said that he was brought to the parcel hub in Jalan Ipoh by the police. At the parcel hub, the police seized the six boxes which were sent earlier by the appellant as instructed by Fill. The police also brought the appellant to the parcel hub in Jalan Kuching, and the police also seized the first box from the parcel hub. The appellant was told by the police that all the boxes contained packages with dangerous drugs.

The appellant denied having any knowledge that the boxes, particularly P30, contained packages with dangerous drugs in them. He also denied that he was cautioned by the police at the time he was arrested. S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

The above is the gist of the appellant’s narrative.

The learned trial judge in his Grounds of Judgment stated as follows: “[31] From the totality of the evidence this Court was satisfied that since the drug was found following the information given by the Accused to the complainant, hence he must have knowledge about the drug (as will be explained below). Infact [sic] it is recognised that knowledge of the Accused can be equated to information given by him. Hence the Accused is in (mens rea) possession of the drugs. …

From the totality of the evidence adduced, this Court is satisfied that the information was given by the Accused himself under Section 27 of Evidence Act to SP4. Section 27 is independent from the preceeding [sic] sections and a bonus to the Prosecution whereby no caution needs to be administered or given. In another words, voluntariness is not in issue. This Court ruled that the finding of the drugs lends credence to the information given by the Accused to SP4 earlier. This shows that the Accused knew that he was carrying the proscribed drugs in the box as per the charge, in the car driven by him. Further at the time of the arrest, he was alone in the car. For the aforesaid reason, this Court ruled that he has (means rea) possession of S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 9 of 28 the proscribed drugs. Infact [sic], the manner the drugs were packed i.e in the hood that was concealed in the box like any other postal parcel which infers his intention to avoid detection, in itself strengthened the Prosecution’s case that the Accused has knowledge of the drugs.

From the surrounding evidence, it was very appearant [sic] that the founding of the drugs were [sic] upon information received following the Accused’s arrest. Lest we forget, it was in evidence that the Accused, after giving information regarding the drugs inside the box, showed the position of the drugs inside the hood.”

With regards to the appellant’s claim to be an innocent carrier, the learned trial judge stated as follows: “[35] Looking at the evidence in totality, this Court opined that the wrapped box by appearance has created some suspicion as the box was wrapped in a concealed manner and there was no sticker or information that contained the name of the sender much less, the receiver. There was no evidence to show he knew Fill very well to counter that Fill is not a stranger. Be that as it may, the Accused had taken no steps to inquire regarding the contents of the said box, when there are many reasons to be suspicious of but he willingly shut his eyes. Such failure has negated the Counsel’s submission that the Accused was an “innocent carrier” and hence the doctrine of willful blindness will be invoked against him.” S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

The learned trial judge had considered the credibility of SP4’s testimony and found he was a credible witness and that he had nothing to gain from the arrest of the appellant. From the totality of the evidence, the learned trial judge found actual possession of the dangerous drugs, and invoked section 37(da)(xvi) of the DDA in that any person who is found in possession of 50 grammes or more in weight of methamphetamine shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, to be trafficking the said drug.

The learned trial judge went on to consider the appellant’s case and stated as follows: “[40] This Court had considered the Defence of the Accused including the Submission by his Counsel. In his defence, the Accused had put up a long story of him being a courier and have been sending to “Parcel Hub” which this Court though has taken cognisance but carries little weight as it was not of great significance. However, he denied the incident of the information he gave to SP4 about the box and its contents i.e the proscribed drugs, against the strong evidence of SP4. This Court has also considered his cautioned statement (D44) which is consistant [sic] with his evidence of denial in Court. SD3 who testified was an interested witness to exculpate the Accused. His evidence that he did not hear SP4 cautioned the Accused and that the Accused gave information about the drugs in the box cannot hold water because he was no where nearby and was arrested elsewhere.

For the aforesaid reasons, at the conclusion of the trial after considering the Accused’s defence and considering the S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 11 of 28 evidence in totality, including the Prosecution’s evidence pursuant to Section 182A(1) CPC, the Accused failed to rebut the presumption of trafficking and hence failed to raise a reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s case. The prosecution hence has successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.”

The trial judge, after having considered the parties’ submissions on mitigation, exercised his discretion to sentence the appellant to life imprisonment and with 12 strokes of whipping, instead of imposing the punishment of death sentence.

In the Petition of Appeal, the appellant raised 12 grounds of appeal. However, in the appellant’s counsel’s submission, the 12 grounds were condensed into four main grounds. They are paraphrased as below:

the challenge of admission of the dangerous drug as evidence through the information received from the appellant pursuant to section 27 of the Evidence Act 1950 (hereafter “the EA 1950”);

(ii) the challenge of finding of fact (and law) that the appellant was in possession of the illicit drug;

(iii) a complaint that the trial judge erred in fact (and law) for non-appreciation of the appellant’s case or defence in that the appellant was an innocent carrier;

(iv) a complaint that the trial judge had wrongly admitted the hearsay evidence of “the information received” or the tip-off, which was highly prejudicial to the appellant. S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg Page 12 of 28 [25] This Court will address the four main grounds of appeal in seriatim. However, this Court finds the discussion of the first and second grounds are intertwined, therefore, they will be addressed together as below. Grounds (i) and (ii): Section 27 EA 1950 and the Establishment of Possession [26] The appellant’s counsel submitted that the trial judge was wrong in law to admit the evidence of the information statement made by the appellant leading to the discovery of the dangerous drug found inside the kitchen hood through section 27 of the EA 1950 because the admission of the evidence failed to satisfy the fundamental requirements for the application of the said section. The wrongly admitted evidence, i.e., the information statement, also goes to wrongly establishing the state of mind of the appellant that he knew he was in possession of the illicit drug. [27] Section 27 of the EA 1950 states as follows: “When any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a police officer, so much of that information, whether the information amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved.” [28] Essentially, section 27 of the EA 1950 deals with information received leading to a discovery of certain fact which is relevant. In the present case, the information received was contained in a statement made by the appellant to SP4. The statement is as follows: S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg Page 13 of 28 Boleh kamu tunjukkan di mana dadah itu? Boleh, dadah disorok dalam kitchen hood. [29] The critical information is the statement “dadah disorok dalam kitchen hood.” With that information received, it led SP4 to discover the illicit drug (P20-P24) which was concealed inside the kitchen hood (P32). Based on the application of section 27 of the EA 1950, P20-P24 was found inside the kitchen hood in consequence of the information received from the appellant. [30] The information statement and the discovery of evidence of fact, i.e. P20-P24, are both admissible, and the information statement may be proved under section 27 of the EA 1950. Section 27 is an exception to the law of confession contained in sections 24, 25 and 26 of the EA 1950. [31] However, the application of section 27 of the EA 1950 requires stringent scrutiny before it could be applied to admit the statement to be proved. It is stated that the section requires proof of the following facts before it can be invoked:

the information must have been received from a person accused of an offence;

such person must have been in the custody of a police officer at the time of giving the information;

a fact must be deposed to as having been discovered in consequence of such information. S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg Page 14 of 28 [32] It is further stated that upon proof of the above elements then:

so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. (see: Augustine Paul, Evidence Practice and Procedure, 4th ed. LexisNexis: 2010, 311) [33] The appellant’s counsel submitted that the information must come from the accused, not from any other sources. The appellant’s counsel submitted the fact that SP4 went to the operation with his screwdriver and knife, these facts could infer that SP4 already knew that incriminating substance or illicit drug was concealed in the kitchen hood. The appellant’s counsel also submitted that in the event the police had prior knowledge where the incriminating drug could be found before a statement was made, then section 27 of the EA 1950 could not be applied to admit the information statement leading to the discovery of fact (see Md Desa Bin Hashim v PP [1995] 4 CLJ 677). This part of the appellant’s counsel’s submission goes to challenge the first requirement of fact to be proven as stated above. [34] This Court is of the considered view that the mere fact a screwdriver and/or a knife was brought along by the police in an operation could not be construed or inferred that the police already had prior knowledge of where the illicit drug could be found. In the present case, the illicit drug could be hidden in any place, such as in a hidden compartment of the vehicle, if there was one, and not necessarily inside the kitchen hood. Having screwdrivers and/or knife in hand in a police operation could S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg Page 15 of 28 become handy when in need. Therefore, this Court is not persuaded to make an inference of fact based on the mere fact the police had with them a screwdriver and knife to mean that the police already knew where the illicit drug could be found. [35] If not for the statement (or information) provided by the appellant, SP4 could not have immediately discovered the hidden illicit drug. This Court observes from the notes of proceedings that there was no direct challenge to SP4’s prior knowledge of where the illicit drug could be found before SP4 asked the appellant. This Court is not ready to suggest an inference to be made based on unchallenged fact. [36] This Court observes that although there was a challenge made to SP4 pertaining to “the information received” (or the tip-off), there was no clear question or statement from the appellant’s counsel put to SP4 that the “information received” had specifically informed SP4 where the illicit drug was hidden. The information received (or the tip-off), by itself could not be taken as evidence of fact that it had revealed where the illicit drug was hidden without proper support of clear evidence in the trial. Hence, the appellant’s counsel’s submission that the discovery of P20-P24 was not through the information obtained from the appellant is unsustainable. [37] The evidence before the trial judge was clear that the appellant was already in custody of the police officers at the time of giving the information, and the fact that the illicit drug deposed to was discovered in consequence of such information given by the appellant. All the preliminary elements to apply section 27 of the EA 1950 could be said have been proven and satisfied. It follows that such information was distinctly or directly related to the fact (the illicit drug) thereby discovered, S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg Page 16 of 28 and therefore, the information statement would be admissible as evidence to be proved pursuant to section 27 of the EA 1950. [38] Still on the application of section 27 of the EA 1950, the appellant’s counsel submitted that the trial judge ought to have excluded the application of section 27 on the ground that it had prejudiced the appellant. To exclude the application of section 27 of the EA 1950 on the ground of prejudice, one must demonstrate there was “circumstances of involuntariness” and it “must be indeed be extraordinary in order to exclude a statement on a ground which, in the first place, does not affect its admissibility in law” (see Francis Anthonysamy v PP [2005] 2 CLJ 481, p. 501, FC). Further, the party seeking to have the information in section 27 of the EA 1950 be excluded bears the burden to show the exercise of discretion should lean in his favour, otherwise, the admission of the statement is an exercise of discretion by the trial judge (see Krishna Rao a/l Gurumurthi v PP [2009] 2 CLJ 603, FC). [39] In the present case, this Court is of the considered view that the trial judge had rightly exercised his discretion applying section 27 of the EA 1950 to admit the information statement made by the appellant. There was no evidence in the records that could suggest there was presence of extraordinary involuntariness on the part of the appellant when providing the information to SP4. The appellant’s counsel could not satisfy this Court as to why the application of section 27 of the EA 1950 should be excluded and that the exercise of such discretion should tilt to the appellant’s favour. [40] On the establishment of possession, the appellant could not be said to be in possession of an illicit drug if he had no knowledge that what he S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg Page 17 of 28 was having in his custody or control contained illicit drug, unless the invocation of statutory presumption of knowledge through section 37(d) of the DDA. [41] In the present case, the illicit drug (methamphetamine [P20-P24]) was concealed inside the kitchen hood (P32) which was placed inside the box labelled with “Livinox Range Hood” (P30). [42] The appellant’s narrative was that he had custody of P30 because he was about to deliver it to a courier company to be sent to Sarawak. Hence, it is safe to say that the appellant was so situated with respect to P30 (which the illicit drug was hidden inside the kitchen hood placed inside the box) that he had the power to deal with it as owner to the exclusion of all other persons, when the circumstances were such that he may be presumed to intend to do so in case of need (see Chan Pean Leon v PP

22 MLJ 237, p. 239). On this score, it is suffice to say that the prosecutor had proven that the appellant was in custody or control of P20- P24 which was concealed in P32 which was kept inside P30. [43] The proving of physical possession of P30 or P32 where P20-P24 was concealed inside P32 is insufficient, the prosecutor has to also prove that the appellant had the knowledge that what he was in possession was illicit drug. It is trite law that knowledge could hardly be proven by direct evidence. However, knowledge could be proven by inference from surrounding circumstances. Any spontaneous action of a person is an important lead in the person’s knowledge of the nature of thing he/she was in possession. S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg Page 18 of 28 [44] the appellant’s counsel submitted that the judge erred in accepting the evidence of fact that it was the appellant who pointed out to SP4 where the illicit drug was hidden, because it was not possible as the appellant was being handcuffed at that material time. In respond to this submission, the respondent’s counsel submitted that the appellant’s counsel had taken SP4’s testimony, i.e., “menunjuk ke arah kitchen hood”, out of context and in isolation. What “mununjuk” here refers to the act of revealing the information, the respondent’s counsel submitted. Further, it was submitted that during re-examination, SP4 explained that the appellant could still move his hands from the side, despite he was being handcuffed. We find the appellant’s counsel’s complaint here is immaterial, because first, the appellant was not entirely immobile, he could still move his hands even though he was handcuffed at that material time. The mere gesture of pointing, i.e., despite being handcuffed, was a subsequent conduct which was relevant in respond to a question asked. Secondly, the conduct was accompanied with an information statement. Explanation 1 in section 8 of the EA 1950 states: “The word ‘conduct’ in this section does not include statements unless those statements accompany and explain acts other than statements; but this explanation is not to affect the relevancy of statements under any other section in the Act.” Hence, the hand gesture of pointing is a relevant fact within the contemplation of section 8 of the EA 1950, and the statement accompanying the conduct was relevant and admissible through section 27 of the EA 1950 which has been discussed and explained above. Therefore, we find the appellant’s counsel’s complaint on this ground is unsustainable. [45] The conduct of the appellant could infer that he was aware and had full knowledge of what the contents of P20-P24. That would go to establish the appellant knew what he had in possession, i.e., the illicit S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg Page 19 of 28 drug. On the application of the doctrine of willful blindness, which is relevant to establish the knowledge of the appellant, it will be discussed in the later part of the judgment. [46] The information statement admitted under section 27 of the EA 1950 also comes handy in proving the appellant had the knowledge of what he was in possession. It is undeniable that section 27 of the EA 1950 has two distinctly related elements. First, the element of physical object thereby discovered which is relevant to an investigation of a crime. Second, the element of mental knowledge vis-à-vis the condition of knowing something. The knowledge could come from experience or through some form of association. The latter element could establish the mental knowledge of the appellant in that he knew what he was in possession, i.e., the illicit drug. [47] Based on the above analysis, this Court is satisfied that the elements of possession of the illicit drug have been made out, namely, the appellant was in custody or control of the illicit drug, and that the appellant had full knowledge of the packages containing the illicit drug. Ground (iii): Non-appreciation of the Appellant’s case – An Innocent Carrier [48] For this ground, the appellant’s counsel raised three complaints as to why the trial judge failed to appreciate the appellant’s case. First, SP7 failed to investigate the person named “Fill”, thereby prejudicing the appellant’s defence. Secondly, the trial judge failed to accept SD3’s evidence as credible, especially the part that SD3 said the appellant did not show the police the location the illicit drug was hidden. If the trial judge S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg Page 20 of 28 had considered carefully and accepted SD3’s testimony as credible, he would find that SD3’s testimony supports the appellant’s defence that the appellant was an innocent carrier. Lastly, the trial judge had erred in making a finding that the appellant’s case was merely a bare denial. [49] With regard to the first complaint, evidence in the trial reveals that the appellant only provided the name “Fill” to the police. The appellant did not inform the police Fill’s phone number. He claimed that Fill’s number was stored in his phone which was seized by the police. However, in the course of investigation, the police did not find any useful information from the appellant’s phone. Further, there was no application installed in the phone pertaining to any logistic transport company, like “Lalamove” or “Telegram”. During the trial, SP4 and SP7 were not cross-examined about whether the appellant had shown to the police the information in his phone. It was submitted by the respondent’s counsel that the absence of such crucial challenge weakens the credibility of the appellant’s narrative that he was an innocent carrier. This Court, after having scrutinized the notes of proceeding and after having examined the evidence, could not find any reason to support the appellant’s complaint in that the failure to investigate the existence of this person named “Fill” would prejudice the appellant’s narrative. There is no evidence that was substantive enough that could give a lead to the police to investigate further pertaining to the existence of Fill. [50] With regard to the second complaint, the trial judge in his Grounds of Judgment at para [40] stated that SD3 was an interested witness to exculpate the appellant’s wrong doing. The trial judge did not believe SD3 was able to narrate what had transpired between the appellant and the police officers at the scene, because SD3 was nowhere nearby the scene. S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg Page 21 of 28 SD3 was arrested elsewhere. According to SP7’s testimony, the appellant was arrested at 3.30 p.m.. Whereas, SD3 and his friends were arrested at 4.15 p.m., nearby the area, approximately a distance of ten vehicles away from where the appellant was arrested. Therefore, the trial judge was right to conclude that SD3 was nowhere nearby when the appellant was arrested. These are all findings of facts, and the trial judge had the benefit of hearing the evidence and seeing the demeanor of the witnesses before him, therefore, the trial judge would have a better judgment of the credibility of the witnesses. Hence, this Court is not moved that the trial judge was wrong to find that SD3’s testimony was not credible. [51] With regard to the third complaint, the trial judge found that the appellant’s case was mainly, in the trial judge’s own words, “put up a long story of him being a courier and have been sending to “Parcel Hub” which this Court though has taken cognizance but carries little weight as it was not of great significance.” The trial judge had considered the contradictory evidence which is the appellant claimed he did not give any information statement to SP4, whereas, the SP4 stated otherwise. The trial judge accepted the “strong evidence” from SP4, and disbelieved the narrative of the appellant. The trial judge ruled that SP4 was a credible witness, and that his evidence was corroborated with documentary evidence. [52] This Court, after having scrutinized the appellant’s narrative as well as the testimonies of the appellant’s witnesses, finds that there is nothing that is capable of shaking the prosecution’s case, and that the evidence adduced before the trial court in fact supports the prosecution’s case. [53] In fact, there are many telltale signs from the appellant’s case. First, the appellant claimed that he received in total RM7,000.00 from Fill to S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg Page 22 of 28 deliver the eight parcels he was instructed to send, and each delivery (the first 6 parcels and the second 2 parcels) earned him a commission of RM100.00. There was no clear explanation from the appellant that he actually spent RM6,800.00 for all the courier charges which would leave RM200.00 as his commission. As submitted correctly by the respondent’s counsel that “the disproportionate payments and Fill’s apparent lack of concern over the excess funds raise doubts about whether these transactions were genuinely intended for legitimate courier services.” [54] Secondly, it is illogical why the appellant needed to select several parcel hubs to send the parcels to the instructed destination in Sarawak. This could clearly raise a red flag as to what he was doing. There was no evidence to suggest the appellant made any enquiry to Fill why the parcels needed to use different courier services to be sent to the destination in Sarawak. The appellant did not offer any explanation in his defence. [55] Thirdly, the appellant averred that the delivery arrangement with Fill was a private arrangement, not through Lalamove, but using the platform called “Telegram”. The police could not trace any application named “Telegram” in the appellant’s phone, neither any application by the name of “Lalamove”. There was no evidence offered by the appellant that he had been providing services through private arrangements with customers using “Telegram” as a mean of communication. There was no past history to show that the appellant had entered into private arrangements for sending parcels for customers or for Fill. [56] Fourthly, the appellant said that the parcels contained machine oil as told by Fill. Ironically, the parcel P30 was labelled with the words “Livinox Range Hood”. The appellant did not make any attempt to enquire S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg Page 23 of 28 with Fill why the parcel P30 was labelled with a brand of a kitchen hood. When the appellant was asked about the label on P30 as to why it shows it contained a kitchen hood, and why he said he was delivering machine oil, the appellant conveniently told the trial court that he thought machine oil and kitchen hood were the same thing. The appellant’s reply raises serious doubt of the credibility of his narrative and defence that he was an innocent carrier. [57] Fifthly, no explanation was offered as to why the parcels did not come with the names of the sender and the recipient as well as the addresses of the recipients. The information of the recipient(s) has to come discreetly from Fill through the phone to the appellant at the parcel hubs. [58] Lastly, SD3’s role in the whole saga also raises one’s eyebrows. No explanation was offered as to why SD3 and his friends followed the appellant to the second parcel hub at Jalan Kuching and then to J&T Express at Jalan Segambut. The appellant did not offer any evidence to suggest he alone could not carry the parcel P30 by himself, therefore, he needed SD3 and his friends to accompany him, or offer any other reason why SD3 and his friends were following him. The presence of SD3 and his friends raises more questions than it can fortify the innocence of the appellant. [59] The overall narrative of the appellant’s case exposes many loose ends. All these loose ends converge to one conclusion which is a case of an innocent carrier could not be supported and that the defence was, but a mere bare denial. The label on P30 showing the content was a kitchen hood as opposed to machine oil, Fill’s instruction to send the parcels using S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg Page 24 of 28 different courier services, and the “missing” information of the sender and recipient(s), all these were sufficient to raise a suspicion mind of the appellant to make inquiries as to the contents of the parcels. [60] When the surrounding circumstances were so obviously suspicious, and no enquiry was made, the appellant’s turning a blind eye, could be taken to be willful blindness on the part of the appellant. The appellant could not shut his eyes when the surrounding circumstances were so obviously suspicious. When the doctrine of willful blindness is applied, this would tantamount to actual knowledge of the appellant. When the trial judge made a finding that the appellant had turned a blind eye, this finding would immediately crush the appellant’s narrative of being an innocent carrier. [61] Based on the above analysis and the evaluation of the appellant’s defence and narrative, this Court is of the considered view that the third ground of the appellant’s complaint in this appeal is without merits and unsustainable. In fact, the finding and evaluation by this Court fortifies that the finding of actual possession of the illicit drug had been correctly made out at the court below. Consequently, the defence of innocent carrier has no leg to stand and is obviously untenable. Ground (iv): Wrongly admit of hearsay evidence - “the information received” [62] With regard to the final ground of appeal, this Court is of the considered view that the information received by SP4 adduced before the trial court was merely intended to be an introductory statement of the prosecution case. The prosecution did not intend to prove the truth of the S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg Page 25 of 28 contents of the information received. The admission of the information received as part of the evidence was merely to establish it was a fact that information was received, not the truth of the contents of the information. SP4 in his witness statement (WSSP4) did not state the details of the information received, he merely stated “bertindak di atas maklumat….” Likewise, in his police report (P26), SP4 also stated “bertindak di atas maklumat pengedaraan dadah….” [63] During examination-in-chief, further questions were posed to SP4 by the deputy public prosecutor, and SP4 did give several details of the information he received (see Encl. 14, pdf p. 59/2020). However, the trial judge’s judgment did not use that detailed information to link it to the appellant. The trial judge also did not make any finding of the truth of the contents of the information received. If the trial judge did not make a finding of the truth of the contents of the information received, but merely accepted that there was a statement of information received, then the receipt of an information was indeed evidence of fact that could be admissible. In these circumstances, the hearsay rule is inapplicable. [64] Further, this Court could not agree with the appellant’s counsel’s submission that the trial judge had relied on the detailed information received to arrive at his finding of the identity of the appellant. This Court could not find in any part of the trial judge’s Grounds of Judgement that he had relied on the detailed information received to find the appellant guilty for the offence charge. [65] In fact, the trial judge had only allowed the record of the evidence to the extent as to what was recorded in the police report. Hence, all the S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg Page 26 of 28 cases cited by the appellant’s counsel in support of inadmissible hearsay rule were irrelevant. [66] Based on the above analysis, this Court is of the considered view that the appellant’s fourth ground of appeal is unsustainable and misconceived. Summary of this Court’s finding [67] Based on the above analysis, and taking into consideration of all the evidence in totality, this Court is of the considered view that there is overwhelming evidence, as mentioned in this judgment, to point to the fact that the appellant was in possession of the illicit drug. [68] Likewise, there is overwhelming evidence justifying and proving that the appellant had the knowledge that what he possessed was an illicit drug. Hence, possession, which is the pivotal ingredient for the offence charged, has been proven. [69] With regard to the presumption of trafficking of the illicit drug, this Court is of the considered view that, after having scrutinized the entire defence case, the appellant had failed to rebut the presumption of trafficking. [70] On all counts, this Court is satisfied that the prosecution had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt, and the trial judge’s finding of guilt and conviction of the offence charged against the appellant is therefore safe. There is no reason to disturb any part of the finding of the trial judge. S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg Page 27 of 28 [71] For completeness, although the appellant’s counsel did not present any submission on the sentence meted out by the trial judge, this Court finds no reason to disturb the sentence imposed by the trial judge as well. Finally, this Court wishes to state that the evidence that is not mentioned in the judgment, but was adduced at the trial court, has also been considered. This evidence is too trivial and could not raise any doubt in the prosecution case, and the evidence also could not affect the overall finding of this Court. Conclusion [72] For the above reasons, this Court has affirmed the High Court’s decision and ordered that the appellant’s appeal be dismissed. -sgd-CHOO KAH SING Court of Appeal Judge S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg Page 28 of 28 Appellant’s counsel: Haziq Aziz (Nicholas Cheoh with him) Tetuan Haziq Aziz Attorney General’s Chambers: Ng Siew Wee Deputy Public Prosecutor (The Appellate and Trial Division) S/N Oh8od4Aa1kiH1N213vPlg