LIM YOKE PIN v Pendakwa Raya (CB-42JSKS-3-06/2023)

Ini adalah rayuan Perayu terhadap keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen di mana Perayu telah disabitkan dengan pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 14 (a) Akta Kesalahan-Kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-Kanak 2017. Perayu telah dihukum penjara 12 tahun dari 09.06.2023 dan 3 sebatan.

Perayu telah dituduh dengan pertuduhan seperti yang berikut: “Bahawa kamu pada awal 14/03/2021, jam lebih kurang 3.00 petang, di Jalan Desa Damai, di dalam Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur, sebagai guru memandu di Syarikat Ray Pandu Sdn Bhd, mempunyai hubungan amanah dengan mangsa bernama Chia Xin Rong, No. KPT: 030508-14-0918, yang berumur 17 tahun 10 bulan telah melakukan amang seksual fizikal dengan memegang bahu, payudara dan kemaluan mangsa. Oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 14(a) Akta Kesalahan-Kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-Kanak 2017 dan dibaca bersama Seksyen 16(1) di bawah Akta yang sama.”

Mahkamah telah meneliti alasan penghakiman Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen dan adalah menjadi prinsip yang mantap bahawa mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan tidak akan campur tangan dan mengganggu dapatan yang dibuat oleh hakim bicara kerana hakim bicara mempunyai keistimewaan untuk melihat saksi-saksi semasa memberikan keterangan.

Selain daripada itu, Mahkamah juga perlu berhati-hati dalam mengganggu dapatan hakim bicara berkenaan dengan kredibiliti dan juga kebolehterimaan keterangan saksi-saksi. Ini bagi mengelakkan mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan akan campur tangan dalam perkara-perkara yang sepatutnya berada di bawah bidang kuasa hakim bicara dalam memberikan dapatan berkenaan dengan kredibiliti saksi-saksi. Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan hanya akan mengganggu dapatan hakim bicara sekiranya terdapat kesalahan yang ketara ataupun kegagalan meneliti keterangan-keterangan dengan sewajarnya.

Dalam kes ini Mahkamah mendapati bahawa sabitan yang diputuskan oleh hakim bicara adalah berdasarkan kepada keterangan SP 6 yang merupakan saksi utama dalam kes ini. Di samping itu terdapat keterangan sokongan lain iaitu SP 4, SP 5, SP 7 dan saksi-saksi lain yang memberikan keterangan.

Perayu menyatakan bahawa Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah terkhilaf apabila bersandarkan kepada keterangan SP 6 kerana tiada langsung keterangan-keterangan lain yang dapat digunakan bagi menyokong keterangan SP 6.

Timbalan Pendakwa Raya berhujah bahawa keterangan SP 6 telah disokong dengan keterangan-keterangan lain yang telah mengesahkan kejadian tersebut. Ini misalnya terdapat dalam keterangan SP 7 yang mengesahkan bahawa selepas kejadian tersebut SP 6 telahpun datang ke pejabatnya dalam keadaan menangis.

Timbalan Pendakwa Raya menyatakan bahawa penggunaan seksyen 18 Akta Kesalahan-kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-kanak 2017 oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen adalah wajar digunakan kerana itu adalah kelakuan SP 6 selepas daripada kejadian tersebut dan dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen itu adalah teratur. Sebaliknya, peguam menyatakan bahawa keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh SP 4 dan SP 5 itu tidak merupakan keterangan sokongan.

Mahkamah ini perlu meneliti sama ada terdapat keterangan sokongan dalam kes ini atau adakah ianya merupakan pengulangan keterangan oleh saksi-saksi berdasarkan kepada maklumat melalui keterangan SP 6 berkenaan dengan kejadian tersebut.

Sementara itu Perayu di dalam pembelaannya telah menafikan keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh saksi-saksi pendakwaan. Ini bermakna bahawa terdapat keterangan SP 6 dan keterangan Perayu yang memperihalkan kejadian tersebut. Ini adalah disebabkan hanya SP 6 dan Perayu yang berada di tempat kejadian iaitu dalam kenderaan tersebut.

Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen dalam alasan penghakimannya telah menyatakan berkenaan dengan keterangan SP 6 seperti yang berikut: “19. Berdasarkan kesemua keterangan dan autoriti yang dirujuk di atas, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa keterangan SP6 sebagai kanak-kanak dalam kes ini adalah “unusually convincing” dan boleh diterima pakai sekalipun keterangan ini adalah keterangan tanpa sokongan.

Namun begitu, Mahkamah turut mendapati bahawa keterangan SP6 adalah konsisten dengan keterangan saksi-saksi lain iaitu SP4, SP5 dan SP7. keterangan saksi-saksi ini turut menyokong antara satu sama lain beserta dengan keterangan berbentuk dokumentari.” Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen besandarkan kepada kes PP v Mohamad Malek Ridhzuan Che Hassan [2013] 8 CLJ 359.

Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen juga telah menyatakan bahawa SP 6 adalah saksi yang kompeten untuk memberikan keterangan seperti yang dinyatakan di bawah seksyen 17 Akta Kesalahan-Kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-kanak 2017.

Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen juga menyatakan bahawa sejurus selepas disentuh oleh Perayu, SP 6 telah segera kembali ke sekolah memandu dan berjumpa dengan SP 7 untuk mendapatkan bantuan dan mengadu mengenai perbuatan Perayu tersebut. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berpuas hati kesemua saksi-saksi pendakwaan tidak ada sebab untuk mereka-reka cerita bagi memburuk-burukkan Perayu.

Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen ketika menimbangkan pembelaan Perayu telah menyenaraikan keterangan Perayu seperti di perenggan 24 (a) hingga (i) dan memutuskan bahawa ia tidak dapat menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah bahawa keterangan SP 6 hanyalah rekaan dan berniat untuk menjatuhkan Perayu semata-mata.

Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen juga menolak pembelaan Perayu yang menyatakan bahawa tidak mungkin dia memegang bahu SP 6 kerana perlu sentiasa bersedia untuk memegang stereng. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berpendapat ia telah disanggah semasa pemeriksaan balas apabila Perayu menyatakan dia tidak perlu memegang bahu SP 6 semasa mengajar memandu. Ini adalah disebabkan SP 6 telah 70 % mahir untuk memandu.

Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah bergantung kepada keterangan saksi pendakwaan semasa menimbangkan pembelaan Perayu dengan menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “Bagaimanapun, berdasarkan keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan, OKT telah merangkul tubuh badan SP 6 dengan cara meletakkan tangan kanannya di bahu kanan SP 6 sebelum memegang payudara dan menggosok kemaluan SP 6. Kesemua bahagian tubuh ini tidak mungkin sama ada sekali berkaitan dengan pengajaran pemanduan kereta.”

Adalah menjadi prinsip undang-undang yang termaklum bahawa hakim bicara sekiranya membuat dapatan berdasarkan kepada keterangan saksi-saksi dan tidak melakukan sebarang kesilapan yang ketara di samping telah menganalisa keterangan-keterangan tersebut dengan sewajarnya Mahkamah Rayuan tidak sepatutnya campur tangan dalam dapatan hakim bicara tersebut.

Ini berdasarkan kepada harapan bahawa hakim bicara akan mengendalikan perbicaraan berdasarkan kepada tatacara yang telah ditetapkan di bawah Kanun Prosedur Jenayah. Di samping itu hakim bicara dapat memutuskan penerimaan masuk keterangan, kebolehterimaan keterangan, kredibiliti saksi-saksi dan keputusan terhadap bantahan-bantahan yang dikemukakan oleh pendakwa raya dan peguam semasa perbicaraan dijalankan.

Harapan ini berdasarkan kepada latihan ikhtisas dan keyakinan yang tinggi kepada hakim bicara mempunyai kefahaman yang tinggi dan betul berkenaan dengan prinsip undang-undang. Hakim bicara boleh merujuk kepada keputusan-keputusan Mahkamah Atasan untuk memperkemaskan serta memperdalamkan kefahaman terhadap peruntukan undang-undang yang perlu digunakan untuk menganalisa keterangan saksi-saksi. Pada masa yang sama ulang kaji yang berterusan kepada prinsip undang-undang dan mengambil kira perkembangan terkini kepada prinsip undang-undang adalah amat penting bagi memastikan hakim bicara membuat keputusan berdasarkan undang-undang terkini dalam memastikan pihak-pihak yang berguam di hadapan hakim tersebut memperolehi keadilan yang berkualiti dan terkini.

Namun begitu, sekiranya terdapat kegagalan hakim bicara melakukan penilaian keterangan seperti yang sepatutnya di bawah undang-undang atau terdapat kesilapan yang ketara yang dilakukan oleh hakim bicara, maka Mahkamah Rayuan adalah bertanggungjawab dan berkewajipan untuk campur tangan dalam dapatan hakim bicara tersebut. Hal ini telah dinyatakan Watt or Thomas v Thomas [1947] AC 484 yang diperturunkan secara terperinci walaupun ianya sudah menjadi prinsip yang termaklum namun bagi menggilap semula kefahaman kepada prinsip tersebut maka ia diulangi lagi di sini seperti yang berikut: “I do not find it necessary to review the many decisions of this House, for it seems to me that the principle embodied therein is a simple one, and may be stated thus: I. Where a question of fact has been tried by a judge without a jury, and there is no question of misdirection of himself by the judge, an appellate court which is disposed to come to a different conclusion on the printed evidence, should not do so unless it is satisfied that any advantage enjoyed by the trial judge by reason of having seen and heard the witnesses, could not be sufficient to explain or justify the trial judge's conclusion; II. The appellate court may take the view that, without having seen or heard the witnesses, it is not in a position to come to any satisfactory conclusion on the printed evidence; III. The appellate court, either because the reasons given by the trial judge are not satisfactory, or because it unmistakably so appears from the evidence, may be satisfied that he has not taken proper advantage of his having seen and heard the witnesses, and the matter will then become at large for the appellate court.”

Begitu juga Lord Simonds dalam kes yang sama telah menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “There I should be content to leave this case but for certain criticisms made by counsel for the respondent in his able and candid address. Relying on the testimony of certain witnesses called on behalf of the respondent (whom I need not name) he said that the learned Lord Ordinary had come to a conclusion which was diametrically opposed to that testimony, yet he had not explicitly stated that he did not accept them as witnesses of truth nor indeed, made any adverse comment upon them. Your Lordships were therefore invited to find that the learned judge had forgotten or ignored this evidence and to hold that his judgment was thereby vitiated. I believe this to be fundamentally unsound criticism. The trial judge has come to certain conclusions of fact; your Lordships are entitled and bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that he has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. If his conclusion is inconsistent with the evidence of certain of the witnesses but he does not, in terms, stigmatize them as false witnesses, it is not the proper or necessary inference that he has forgotten or ignored them; of this the present case is a cogent example, for I can well understand why the Lord Ordinary, while not accepting his evidence, did not think fit to comment unkindly on one at least of the witnesses in question.”

Malahan Lord Du Parcq menyatakan seperti yang berikut dalam kes tersebut: “All the authoritative decisions which relate to the proper attitude of an appellate court towards the findings of fact of the trial judge naturally tend to lay emphasis on one aspect of the question, either on the fact that the appellate court's duty to see justice done may constrain it to reject the judge's findings, or on the undesirability of deciding a case on a written record against the view of the judge who heard the witnesses. But, though one aspect may be emphasized, the other must always be present to the mind of the court. Thus, in Yuill v. Yuill (2), where the decision of the judge was reversed, Lord Greene M.R. said: "It can, of course, only be on the rarest occasions, and in circumstances where the appellate court is convinced by the plainest considerations, that it would be justified in finding that the trial judge had formed a wrong opinion." My Lords, I am satisfied that this is not one of those very rare occasions. There are, no doubt, cases in which it is proper to say, after reading the printed record, that, after making allowance for possible exaggeration and giving full weight to the judge's estimate of the witnesses, no conclusion is possible except that his decision was wrong.”

Prinsip yang dinyatakan berkenaan dengan campur tangan Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap keputusan mahkamah bicara seperti yang dinyatakan dalam kes Watt or Thomas v Thomas (supra) di atas telah dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Agong di United Kingdom dalam kes Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd and another [2014] 1 WLR 2600. Lord Reed menyatakan seperti berikut: “63 In Thomas itself, Lord Thankerton, with whose reasoning Lord Macmillan, Lord Simonds and Lord du Parcq agreed, said [1947] AC 484, 487–488 that in the absence of a misdirection of himself by the trial judge, an appellate court which was disposed to come to a different conclusion on the evidence should not do so “unless it is satisfied that any advantage enjoyed by the trial judge by reason of having seen and heard the witnesses, could not be sufficient to explain or justify the trial judge’s conclusion”. 64 Lord du Parcq’s speech is to similar effect. Distinguishing the instant case from “those very rare occasions” on which an appellate court would be justified in finding that the trial judge had formed a wrong opinion, he said, at p 493: “There are, no doubt, cases in which it is proper to say, after reading the printed record, that, after making allowance for possible exaggeration and giving full weight to the judge’s estimate of the witnesses, no conclusion is possible except that his decision was wrong.” 65 Viscount Simon, at p 486, while disagreeing as to the result of the appeal, also emphasised the need for the appellate court to consider whether the trial judge’s decision could reasonably be regarded as justified: “If there is no evidence to support a particular conclusion (and this is really a question of law), the appellate court will not hesitate so to decide. But if the evidence as a whole can reasonably be regarded as justifying the conclusion arrived at at the trial, and especially if that conclusion has been arrived at on conflicting testimony by a tribunal which saw and heard the witnesses, the appellate court will bear in mind that it has not enjoyed this opportunity and that the view of the trial judge as to where credibility lies is entitled to great weight.” 66 These dicta are couched in different language, but they are to the same general effect, and assist in understanding what Lord Macmillan is likely to have intended when he said that the trial judge might be shown “otherwise to have gone plainly wrong”. Consistently with the approach adopted by Lord Thankerton in particular, the phrase can be understood as signifying that the decision of the trial judge cannot reasonably be explained or justified. 67 It follows that, in the absence of some other identifiable error, such as (without attempting an exhaustive account) a material error of law, or the making of a critical finding of fact which has no basis in the evidence, or a demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence, or a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence, an appellate court will interfere with the findings of fact made by a trial judge only if it is satisfied that his decision cannot reasonably be explained or justified. 68 This approach is consistent, as I have explained, with the Scottish authorities, and also with more recent authority in this court and in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council: see, for example, In re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2013] 1 WLR 1911, paras 52–53, per Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC. A similar approach has also been adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada (see HL v Canada (Attorney General) [2005] 1 SCR 401, paras 55–56) and by the United States Supreme Court: see Anderson v Bessemer (1985) 470 US 564, 573–574.”

Pendekatan campur tangan mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan terhadap dapatan dan keputusan hakim bicara ini dikenali sebagai prinsip jelas kesilapannya (plainly wrong). Mahkamah Persekutuan telahpun menjelaskan pemakaian prinsip tersebut semasa mendengar rayuan daripada mahkamah bawahan dalam kes Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator Of The Estates Of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Ors Federal Court, Putrajaya [2020] 10 CLJ 1 seperti yang berikut: [71] From the aforesaid authorities, there appears to be a difference in approach taken and applied by the UK Supreme Court and the approach taken by the Malaysian courts. Whilst Lord Reed in Henderson (supra) separated the four non exhaustive identifiable errors of a trial judge from the plainly wrong test:

a material error of law;

(ii) a critical finding of fact which has no basis in the evidence;

(iii) demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence; and

(iv) a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence; (all of which justifies appellate intervention of a trial judge's decision), this court in Gan Yook Chin (supra) effectively included them under what amount to the trial judge as being "plainly wrong". [72] The phrase "lack of judicial appreciation of evidence" used in Gan Yook Chin (supra) could very well encompass three out of four errors of a trial judge (other than the "material error of law") said to be identifiable by Lord Reed in Henderson (supra), namely:

critical factual finding which has no basis in evidence;

(ii) demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence; and

(iii) demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence. [73] Given that the issue at present is about identifying situations where the findings of fact by a trial court justify appellate intervention, the other identifiable error of "material error of law" listed by Lord Reed in Henderson (supra) can occur when a trial judge erroneously apply legal principles (eg rules of evidence) in the course of making a finding of fact, thus resulting in a lack of judicial appreciation of evidence. For example, when a trial judge erroneously placed a burden of proof on a party, that will lead the judge to misdirect himself when he attempts to interpret the factual matrix before him. The commission of material error of law by the trial judge in arriving at his conclusions (eg, the requirement of proof of intention in constructive trust as opposed to express trust), also justifies an appellate court reversing such conclusions. [74] Thus, whilst there is a slight difference in approach of appellate intervention, both the UK Supreme Court and our Federal Court effectively shares a common thread where it has been held that appellate intervention is justified where there is lack of judicial appreciation of evidence. [75] The Court of Appeal in Singapore applies the plainly wrong test which is similar to our Federal Court, as illustrated in Damu Jadhao v. Paras Nath Singh [1965] CLJU 30; [1965] 1 LNS 30; [1976] 1 MLJ 151, when it held: The principles under which an appellate court acts when an appellant seeks to displace the conclusion arrived at by a trial judge on questions of fact have been very recently restated by the Privy Council in the case of Tay Kheng Hong v. Heap Moh Steamship Co Ltd [1964] CLJU 202; [1964] 1 LNS 202; [1964] MLJ 92 and [1965] 2 MLJ 151 at 153 need only refer to a passage of the judgment of Lord Guest when dealing with the matter, where he states: Before the Court of Appeal in Singapore was entitled to reject the trial judge's estimate of the credibility of the appellant and Goh Leh they would have to be satisfied that the trial judge's view was plainly wrong and that any advantage which he enjoyed by having seen and heard the witnesses was not sufficient to explain his conclusion. This case seems to me to be completely dependent on the trial judge's estimate of the credibility of the appellant and his witnesses and nothing that counsel for the appellant has put forward in his arguments before me has persuaded me that the trial judge's view of the credibility of the witnesses before him was in any way plainly wrong. [76] What is pertinent is that, the "plainly wrong" test is not intended to be used by an appellate court as a mean to substitute its own decision for that of the trial court on the facts. [77] It is to be observed that this court in Tengku Dato' Ibrahim Petra Tengku Indra Petra (supra) had referred to McGraddie (supra) and Henderson (supra) and has adopted the Henderson (supra) approach of the "plainly wrong" test in determining whether the trial court's findings of fact is reversible upon appeal: Recently in Henderson v. Foxworth Investments Ltd and Another [2014] 1 WLR 2600, the United Kingdom Supreme Court held that in the absence of some other identifiable error, such as a material error of law or the making of a critical factual finding which had not interfered with the factual finding which had no basis in the evidence, an appellate court should not interfere with the factual findings of a trial judge unless it was satisfied that the decision of the trial judge was "plainly wrong" in the sense that it could not reasonably be explained or justified and so was one which no reasonable judge could have reached, and that if the appellate court was not satisfied that the decision came within that category it was irrelevant that, with whatever degree of certainty, it considered that it would have reached a different conclusion from the trial judge. (emphasis added) [78] Hence following this court's ruling in Tengku Dato' Ibrahim Petra Tengku Indra Petra (supra) an appellate court should not interfere with the factual findings of a trial judge unless it was satisfied that the decision of the trial judge was "plainly wrong" where in arriving at the decision it could not reasonably be explained or justified and so was one which no reasonable judge could have reached. If the decision did not fall within any of the aforesaid category, it is irrelevant, even if the appellate court thinks that with whatever degree of certainty, it considered that it would have reached a different conclusion from the trial judge.”

Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah juga perlu memberikan perhatian semasa meneliti rayuan Perayu bagi menentukan sama ada terdapatnya keperluan untuk mengganggu dapatan hakim bicara. Ia sejajar dengan apa yang dikenali sebagai kegagalan hakim bicara yang tidak membuat penilaian keterangan secara mencukupi (insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence). Ia perlu dilihat hubung kait di antara prinsip jelas kesilapannya (plainly wrong). Hubung kait di antara penilaian keterangan secara mencukupi (insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence) dan prinsip jelas kesilapannya (plainly wrong) telah dijelaskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Gan Yook Chin & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309 seperti yang berikut: “In our view, the Court of Appeal in citing these cases had clearly borne in mind the central feature of appellate intervention ie, to determine whether or not the trial court had arrived at its decision or finding correctly on the basis of the relevant law and/or the established evidence. In so doing, the Court of Appeal was perfectly entitled to examine the process of evaluation of the evidence by the trial court. Clearly, the phrase "insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence" merely related to such a process. This is reflected in the Court of Appeal's restatement that a judge who was required to adjudicate upon a dispute must arrive at his decision on an issue of fact by assessing, weighing and, for good reasons, either accepting or rejecting the whole or any part of the evidence placed before him. The Court of Appeal further reiterated the principle central to appellate intervention ie, that a decision arrived at by a trial court without judicial appreciation of the evidence might be set aside on appeal. This is consistent with the established plainly wrong test.” Adakah Mahkamah ini wajar atau perlu campur tangan dalam dapatan hakim bicara?

Penelitian kepada alasan penghakiman menunjukkan bahawa hakim bicara telah bergantung kepada keterangan SP 6 yang telah digolongkan sebagai luar biasa meyakinkan (unusually convincing). Apa yang menarik dalam kes ini ialah setelah Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berpendapat bahawa SP 6 adalah saksi yang luar biasa meyakinkan, hakim bicara berpendapat bahawa sebenarnya keterangan SP 6 ini boleh diterima masuk di bawah seksyen 18 Akta Kesalahan-kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-kanak 2017 yang memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut: “18. Keterangan saksi kanak-kanak Walau apa pun apa-apa yang berlawanan dalam mana-mana undang-undang bertulis yang lain, dalam mana-mana prosiding terhadap mana-mana orang yang berhubungan dengan mana-mana kesalahan di bawah Akta ini, atau mana-mana kesalahan yang dinyatakan dalam Jadual sekiranya mangsa ialah kanak-kanak, mahkamah boleh mensabitkan orang itu bagi kesalahan itu berasaskan keterangan tanpa sokongan seseorang kanak-kanak, yang diberikan dengan sumpah atau selainnya.”

Kini, seksyen 18 tersebut telah dipotong melalui Akta A1734 berkuat kuasa pada 03 Mac 2025 seperti PU(B) 84/2025. Namun demikian semasa keputusan kes ini dibuat oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen, seksyen 18 itu masih berkuat kuasa. Penelitian kepada alasan penghakiman menunjukkan bahawa Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berpendapat bahawa keterangan SP 6 boleh diterima walaupun tiada keterangan sokongan seperti yang diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 18 Akta Kesalahan-kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-kanak 2017.

Mahkamah ini berpendapat Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah terkhilaf apabila mencampur-adukkan di antara SP 6 sebagai saksi yang memberikan keterangan luar biasa menyakinkan dengan seksyen 18 Akta Kesalahan-kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-kanak 2017. Ini adalah disebabkan sekiranya SP 6 telah dikatakan memberi keterangan yang luar biasa menyakinkan, tidak timbul lagi keperluan untuk mendapatkan keterangan sokongan dan sabitan boleh dibuat berdasarkan kepada keterangan SP 6 itu sahaja. Pada hemat Mahkamah ini tidak dilakukan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. Malahan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen juga telah menyatakan bahawa terdapat keterangan-keterangan sokongan lain daripada SP4, SP 5 dan SP 7 yang memperihalkan berkenaan dengan kejadian yang menimpa SP 6 tersebut.

Pada hemat Mahkamah, Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah gagal untuk memberikan penilaian yang sewajarnya kepada keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan. Malahan telah melakukan kesilapan yang ketara apabila menerima keterangan SP 6 sebagai keterangan luar biasa menyakinkan. Pada masa yang sama masih memerlukan keterangan sokongan yang lain serta berdasarkan kepada seksyen 18 Akta Kesalahan-kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-kanak 2017.

Mahkamah ini berpendapat seksyen 18 Akta Kesalahan-Kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-kanak 2017 yang berkuatkuasa pada masa itu perlu dibezakan dengan keterangan luar biasa meyakinkan. Ini adalah disebabkan matlamat seksyen 18 Akta Kesalahan-Kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-kanak 2017 ialah untuk membolehkan keterangan-keterangan kanak-kanak bagi kesalahan-kesalahan seksual diterima masuk sebagai keterangan walaupun tiada keterangan sokongan. Ini ialah bagi membolehkan kanak-kanak yang menjadi mangsa kepada kesalahan seksual dapat memberikan keterangan tanpa berharapkan kepada keterangan-keterangan sokongan yang mungkin sukar diperolehi oleh kanak-kanak tersebut.

Sebaliknya sekiranya seseorang saksi kanak-kanak itu dikatakan sebagai memberi keterangan yang luar biasa menyakinkan keterangan saksi itu boleh digunakan tanpa keperluan untuk mendapatkan keterangan sokongan bagi membuktikan pertuduhan terhadap Tertuduh. Apa yang jelas ialah sekiranya seorang kanak-kanak itu memberikan keterangan dan pemakaian seksyen 18 Akta Kesalahan-Kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-kanak 2017 digunakan, keterangan kanak-kanak itu boleh dijadikan asas untuk mensabitkan Tertuduh tanpa memerlukan keterangan sokongan. Ini bermakna sekiranya hakim bicara menggunakan seksyen 18 Akta Kesalahan-kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-kanak 2017 ia tidak wajar menyatakan bahawa keterangan SP 6 adalah luar biasa menyakinkan. Ini adalah disebabkan seksyen 18 Akta tersebut adalah mencukupi.

Namun demikian dalam kes ini Mahkamah mendapati Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen dalam penelitiannya kepada keterangan SP 6 telah tidak dapat memastikan sama ada keterangan SP 6 diputuskan sebagai luar biasa meyakinkan atau keterangan itu diterima di bawah seksyen 18 Akta Kesalahan-kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-kanak 2017. Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa hakim bicara tidak diharapkan mencerakinkan secara terperinci asas kepada dapatan dan penganalisaan kepada keterangan saksi-saksi. Namun adalah wajar untuk hakim bicara menjelaskan dalam alasan penghakimannya asas kepada penemuan atau dapatan hakim bicara. Penelitian kepada alasan penghakiman dalam kes ini ini menunjukkan bahawa hakim bicara telah tidak menyatakan dengan jelas berkenaan dengan dengan kedudukan keterangan SP 6 itu sama ada ada dia adalah saksi yang luar biasa meyakinkan keterangannya atau yang digolongkan di bawah seksyen 18 Akta Kesalahan-kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-kanak 2017.

Apa yang didapati oleh Mahkamah ini ialah ketidakpastian hakim bicara berkenaan dengan pemakaian seksyen 18 Akta Kesalahan-kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-kanak 2017 atau SP 6 telah memberikan keterangan yang luar biasa menyakinkan. Ini pada hemat Mahkamah ini adalah satu kesilapan yang ketara dan kegagalan membuat penilaian kehakiman terhadap keterangan SP 6 tersebut.

Penelitian kepada nota prosiding juga menunjukkan keterangan saksi-saksi lain iaitu SP 5 dan SP 7 adalah mengulangi apa-apa yang telah dinyatakan oleh SP 6 kepada mereka. Persoalannya adalah ia tergolong di dalam keterangan sokongan seperti yang dinyatakan dalam kes R v Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan Jenayah di United Kingdom melalui penghakiman Lord Reading CJ menyatakan seperti yang berikut, berkenaan dengan keterangan sokongan: “We hold that evidence in corroboration must be independent testimony which affects the accused by connecting or tending to connect him with the crime. In other words, it must be evidence which implicates him, that is, which confirms in some material particular not only the evidence that the crime has been committed, but also that the prisoner committed it. The test applicable to determine the nature and extent of the corroboration is thus the same whether the case falls within the rule of practice at common law or within that class of offences for which corroboration is required by statute. The language of the statute, "implicates the accused," compendiously incorporates the test applicable at common law in the rule of practice. The nature of the corroboration will necessarily vary according to the particular circumstances of the offence charged. It would be in high degree dangerous to attempt to formulate the kind of evidence which would be regarded as corroboration, except to say that corroborative evidence is evidence which shows or tends to show that the story of the accomplice that the accused committed the crime is true, not merely that the crime has been committed, but that it was committed by the accused.”

Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa keterangan saksi-saksi yang dikatakan menyokong keterangan SP 6 itu adalah berpunca daripada maklumat yang diberikan oleh SP 6 kepada saksi-saksi tersebut. Ia bukannya keterangan bebas yang diperolehi daripada saksi-saksi yang tidak mempunyai kaitan dengan maklumat yang diberikan oleh SP 6 tersebut. Apa yang jelas adalah keterangan yang diberikan oleh SP 7 dan SP 5 itu adalah pengulangan daripada maklumat yang dinyatakan oleh SP 6. Pada hemat Mahkamah ia tidak memenuhi kehendak suatu keterangan sokongan dalam kes ini.

Semasa pemeriksaan balas terhadap SP 6 berkenaan dengan mengapakah SP 6 tidak memberhentikan kenderaan tersebut dan keluar dari kereta, SP 6 menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “Soalan : Kalau boleh tahan brek, kamu boleh try ke hadapan sedikit dan berhentikan kereta ke tepi jalan? Jawapan : Boleh. Soalan : Tetapi kamu tidak akan buat? J :

Apa yang lebih menarik ialah keterangan yang diberikan oleh saksi SP 6 menyatakan bahawa selepas daripada kejadian tersebut SP 6 terus memandu kenderaan itu sehingga sampai kembali ke sekolah memandu yang berkenaan. SP 6 dan ibunya menunggu di bilik mesyuarat tersebut selama lebih kurang 1 jam. SP 6 dan ibunya itu menunggu bersama-sama namun OKT tidak masuk ke dalam bilik tersebut. SP 6 dalam keterangannya berkenaan dengan perkara yang berlaku selepas kejadian adalah seperti yang berikut: “Saya tunggu lebih kurang 15 – 20 minit dan ibu saya sampai. Apabila ibu sampai, pengurus terus beritahu kami untuk sabar dan dia akan selesaikan kes ini dan minta kami tunggu di bilik mesyuarat. Pada masa itu, saya, ibu dan pengurus ada di bilik mesyuarat itu. Selepas itu, ibu saya terus soal pengurus bagaimana pengajar pandu kereta boleh lakukan perbuatan yang ada niat seksual ke atas pelajar memandu kereta dan minta pengurus berikan jawapan yang sewajarnya dan tanya bagaimana untuk selesaikan. Pengurus kata dia akan cuba selesaikan kes ini, dia pun tidak sangka berlaku insiden begitu dan pesan kami, jangan laporkan kepada polis. Selepas itu, kamu telah tunggu lebih kurang 1 jam dan ibu kata tidak mahu tunggu selanjutnya dan terus pergi laporkan kepada polis.”

Seterusnya SP 6 dalam keterangannya menyatakan selepas menunggu pengurus sekolah memandu itu tidak datang ke bilik mesyuarat itu SP 6 dan ibunya telah pergi membuat laporan di balai polis. SP 6 juga menyatakan bahawa sebelum ini Perayu telah mengajarnya dengan betul untuk memandu. Walau bagaimanapun SP 6 dalam keterangannya menyatakan bahawa dia tidak bersetuju bahawa sentuhan yang dilakukan oleh Perayu adalah tidak sengaja kerana SP 6 100 % pasti bahawa nampak tangan Perayu menyentuh bahu sampai ke kemaluannya.

Ini bermakna selepas kejadian tersebut terdapat sela masa yang menyebabkan SP 6 serta ibunya mengadakan perbincangan dengan pihak sekolah memandu sebelum memutuskan untuk membuat laporan polis. Adalah didapati bahawa tempoh masa yang tersebut tidak dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah bicara. Sebaliknya menyatakan bahawa keterangan SP 6 telah menunjukkan terdapatnya perbuatan amang seksual fizikal oleh Perayu. Ia telah dikatakan dilakukan oleh Perayu terhadap SP 6 bagi maksud seksual. Pada masa yang sama penelitian kepada keterangan SP 7 iaitu kakitangan sekolah memandu tersebut mengesahkan bahawa dia telah diberitahu oleh SP 6 ingin menukar cikgu belajar kerana cikgu itu ada memegang-megang dan meraba-raba dia. Selepas itu SP 6 menangis. Walau bagaimanapun SP 7 mengesahkan bahawa dia tidak tahu sama ada Perayu benar-benar menyentuh atau tidak SP 6.

Mahkamah ini juga mendapati Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tidak menyatakan dalam alasan penghakimannya telah menimbangkan keterangan SP 6 berkaitan dengan tindakannya tidak membrek keretanya sejurus Perayu melakukan perbuatan amang seksual terhadapnya. Ini bermakna keterangan yang ada ialah keterangan SP 6 yang mendakwa kejadian tersebut telah dilakukan oleh Perayu. Sementara Perayu di dalam keterangan pembelaannya telah menafikan perbuatan tersebut.

Oleh itu tiada keterangan bebas yang dapat mengesahkan sama ada kejadian itu berlaku atau sebaliknya. Adalah tidak tepat untuk Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen mengambil kira keterangan sokongan SP 7 dan SP 5 berkenaan dengan kejadian tersebut kerana mereka tidak melihat kejadian tersebut. Malahan hanya berdasarkan kepada keterangan SP 6. Sebaliknya Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen menyatakan bahawa kesemua saksi-saksi pendakwaan tidak mempunyai alasan untuk mereka-reka keterangan terhadap perbuatan Perayu.

Mahkamah perlu memberikan perhatian dan berhati-hati dalam menentukan sama ada keterangan SP 6 mencukupi untuk memperihalkan tindakan yang telah dilakukan oleh Perayu kepada SP 6. Ini adalah disebabkan sebarang dakwaan yang dikemukakan oleh SP 6 sekiranya diterima sebagai keterangan yang boleh mensabitkan Perayu ia perlu memerlukan penelitian yang mendalam terhadap keterangan tersebut. Oleh itu butiran yang terperinci berkenaan dengan kejadian itu harus dianalisa atau diteliti oleh hakim bicara. Keterangan yang diberikan oleh SP 6 juga perlu untuk dipastikan tiada sebarang kecacatan. Ini adalah disebabkan Mahkamah akan hanya berdasarkan kepada SP 6 bagi mensabitkan Perayu sekiranya Mahkamah berpendapat keterangan SP 6 adalah luar biasa meyakinkan atau menggunakan peruntukan di bawah seksyen 18 Akta Kesalahan-Kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-Kanak 2017. Ini pada hemat Mahkamah menunjukkan bahawa keterangan SP 6 tidak boleh terdedah kepada apa-apa kesilapan atau kekurangan disebabkan ia akan menjadi asas kepada sabitan. Oleh hakim bicara hendaklah teliti dan berhati-hati dalam meneliti keterangan SP 6 tersebut.

Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen dalam alasan penghakiman telah menyatakan bahawa keterangan SP 6 adalah keterangan luar biasa meyakinkan. Ini dapat dilihat di perenggan 19 seperti yang berikut: “19. Berdasarkan kesemua keterangan dan autoriti yang dirujuk di atas, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa keterangan SP 6 sebagai kanak-kanak dalam kes ini adalah “unusually convincing” dan boleh diterima pakai sekalipun keterangan ini adalah keterangan tanpa sokongan.”

Mahkamah mendapati dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen bahawa SP 6 adalah satu keterangan yang luar biasa meyakinkan tidak dapat dipertahankan setelah Mahkamah ini meneliti keterangan SP 6 tersebut. Ini adalah disebabkan terdapat beberapa bahagian keterangan SP 6 tersebut yang pada hemat Mahkamah ini tidak dapat menggolongkannya sebagai keterangan luar biasa meyakinkan. Di antaranya ialah apabila SP 6 tidak dapat menjelaskan dengan sewajarnya mengapa dia tidak memberhentikan kenderaan tersebut sedangkan dia boleh berbuat demikian. Pada masa yang sama mengapakah SP 6 mengambil masa lebih kurang 1 jam berunding dengan pengurus sekolah memandu tersebut sebelum memutuskan untuk membuat laporan polis. Ini adalah disebabkan sekiranya kejadian tersebut adalah sesuatu yang serius dan menjejaskan SP 6 sewajarnya SP 6 membuat laporan polis dengan kadar segera dan tidak ditangguhkan. Apa yang jelas daripada keterangan yang ada ialah pengurus sekolah memandu itu ada mencadangkan supaya penyelesaian dibuat dan meminta SP 6 dan ibunya tidak membuat laporan polis. Ini pada hemat Mahkamah tidak dipertimbangkan dengan sewajarnya oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen dan sekiranya ia dipertimbangkan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tidak sewajarnya memutuskan bahawa SP 6 adalah seorang saksi yang luar biasa meyakinkan keterangannya.

Mahkamah ini berpendapat berdasarkan penelitian di perenggan 44 di atas, ia adalah suatu kesilapan yang ketara dan kegagalan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen meneliti keterangan-keterangan saksi dengan berdasarkan kepada undang-undang. Ia memerlukan campur tangan Mahkamah ini.

Jika diteliti kepada penggunaan istilah luar biasa meyakinkan yang dinyatakan dalam kes PP v Mohamad Malek Ridhzuan Che Hassan v PP [2013] 8 CLJ 359 adalah berdasarkan kepada kedudukan undang-undang ketika itu di Singapura dan India. Ini dapat dilihat di perenggan 22 hingga 23 seperti yang berikut: “[22] Walau apa pun jua, pada pandangan kami, sekiranya keterangan pengadu adalah "unusually convincing", sabitan dalam kes-kes seksual boleh dibuat tanpa keterangan sokongan. Kami bersetuju dengan proposisi undang-undang yang dinyatakan di dalam kes Kwan Peng Hong v. PP [2000] 4 SLR 96 (Mahkamah Tinggi), apabila Yong Pung How CJ berkata di ms. 104: But I also took great care to make clear that it is dangerous to convict on the words of the complainant alone unless her evidence is unusually compelling or convincing (Tang Kin Seng v. PP [197] 1 SLR 46 at 58, Teo Keng Pong v. PP [1996] 3 SLR 32 (at 340 and Soh Yang Tick v. PP [1998] 2 SLR 42 at 50). In short, the court is to be extremely cautious is relying on the sole evidence of the complainant for a conviction. The phrase 'unusually compelling or convincing' simply means that the complainant's evidence was so convincing that the prosecution's case was proven beyond reasonable doubt, solely on the basis of that evidence. [23] Nampaknya mahkamah-mahkamah di India juga telah mengambil pendekatan yang sama, iaitu sekiranya keterangan pengadu dalam kes-kes seksual adalah kredible, dan meyakinkan, ia adalah mencukupi untuk mensabitkan tertuduh tanpa keterangan sokongan. Dalam kes tersohor Vijay @ Chinee v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2010] 8 SCC 191, Mahkamah Agung India, setelah menyemak semula kes-kes yang berkaitan dengan keterangan mangsa rogol, membuat pemerhatian yang berikut:

In State of Maharashtra vs. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain AIR 1990 SC 658, this Court held that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court observed as under: A prosecutrix of a sex-offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the Court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence.

In State of UP vs. Pappu @ Yunus & Anr. AIR 2005 SC 1248, this Court held that even in a case where it is shown that the girl is a girl of easy virtue or a girl habituated to sexual intercourse, it may not be a ground to absolve the accused from the charge of rape. It has to be established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the court to absolve the accused. This Court further held that there can be conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the court is not satisfied with the version of the prosecutrix, it can seek other evidence, direct or circumstantial, by which it may get assurance of her testimony. The Court held as under: It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice, would do.

In State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh & Ors AIR 1996 SC 1393, this Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation etc. the court is duty bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and it does not require any corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience. The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under: The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the company of three desperate young men who were threatening her and preventing her from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did not conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix... The courts must, while evaluating evidence remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case... Seeking corroboration of her statement before replying upon the same as a rule, in such cases, amounts to adding insult to injury... Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. xxx The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations.

In State of Orissa vs. Thakara Besra & Anr. AIR 2002 SC 1963, this Court held that rape is not mere a physical assault, rather it often distracts the whole personality of the victim. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and in such cases, non-examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses had not seen the commission of the offence.

In State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Raghubir Singh (1993) 2 SCC 622, this Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity.

A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Wahid Khan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 2 SCC 9, placing reliance on earlier judgment in Rameshwar vs. State of Rajasthan AIR 1952 SC 54.

Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that statement of prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. (penekanan ditambah).”

Jika ditelusuri istilah luar biasa meyakinkan dalam keputusan-keputusan Mahkamah seperti di atas ia telah dirumuskan dengan menarik dalam kes Teo Keng Pong v Public Prosecutor [1996] 3 SLR 329 di mana istilah luar biasa meyakinkan telah dinyatakan oleh YAA Yong Pung How CJ seperti yang berikut: “I would add that there is nothing magical about the words ‘unusually convincing.’ They are but another way of saying that the witness’s testimony was so convincing that the prosecution’s case was proven beyond reasonable doubt, solely on the basis of that evidence.”

Jika diteliti kes Khoo Kwoon Hain v Public Prosecutor [1995] 2 SLR 767 setelah Mahkamah meneliti keterangan yang diberikan oleh pengadu dalam kes tersebut dan dapat dilihat bagaimana ianya dilakukan dan akhirnya diputuskan bahawa keterangan sedemikian tidak luar biasa menyakinkan. Keterangan saksi dapat dilihat seperti yang berikut: “The main plank of the prosecution’s case was the evidence of the complainant. She testified that on 14 September, she started work at 12 noon. The appellant was her supervisor. Another supervisor was one Lena. At about 4.45pm, while the complainant was working at the dining area of Sardi’s, the appellant allegedly called her over to the bar counter. The complainant alleged that the appellant then asked her if she had a friend who worked as a call-girl. The complainant said ‘no’. Whereupon the appellant hugged the complainant from behind. While doing so, he allegedly touched the complainant’s body, breasts and buttocks. The complainant said that she told him to let go. She asked him why he did that. When she wanted to leave, he touched her breast again. The complainant said that she felt the appellant’s private part on her buttocks. Thereafter, the complainant went to her locker to change as it was nearly time for her break. When she came out of the toilet, she saw the appellant entering the corridor to go to the men’s toilet. The appellant allegedly hugged the complainant tightly again. She was surprised and covered her face with the apron she was holding. The appellant pressed his private part against hers. He also kissed her on the right ear and neck. The complainant testified that she told the appellant to release her and that if he did not, she would scream. This alleged second incident could not be seen from the dining area as there was a common door which was closed. The complainant told the court that when she asked the appellant to let her go, the appellant said, ‘Why should I there is nobody around.’ She pushed him and asked him a second time to release her. She finally managed to push him away. She went straight to the kitchen and put her things in her locker. She then went off for her break. About an hour later, the complainant returned from her break. She did not see the appellant again that evening. She continued her work. The complainant said that during the first incident, she did not know where Lena was. After that, she saw that Lena was at the cashier’s counter. Before finishing her work, she told one ‘aunty’ who was working in the kitchen that the appellant touched her. She did not tell anybody else until she went home. The next day, the complainant told her sister, Zaiton, as she could not sleep that night. This was at about 2pm. The complainant told Zaiton that she had something to tell her regarding the complainant’s work. She did not tell Zaiton what happened over the telephone but did that when she went over to Zaiton’s shop. Zaiton then took the complainant to the police post at Bukit Batok to make a police report. After that, the complainant did not go back to work at Sardi’s. Cross-examined, the complainant said that it did not occur to her during the first incident to scream. This was because there was nobody around. She maintained that though there were people working in the kitchen, there was nobody in the dining area. When she saw Lena, she did not complain to her as she did not know Lena well. She was also confused and was afraid that Lena would not believe her as she did not see what had happened. When pressed further, she said that she would not know whether Lena saw the incident. She merely assumed that it was the case as there was nobody around. The complainant said that she was the only waitress left, as at about 4.30pm the rest had gone out for their break. She could not remember who was working that day. During the second incident, she did not scream as she was in a confined area. According to her, it was useless for her to scream. She did not go back into the toilet because she was afraid that he would follow her in. So she tried to walk past him. Even though she knew that there was nobody there, she threatened to scream as she wanted to scare the appellant so that he would let go. On both occasions she raised her voice so that she was speaking louder than normal. In her opinion, her voice would not carry from the bar counter to the cashier’s counter as there was piped in music. The distance was about eight metres. After the second incident, she ran out of the toilet area. The appellant allegedly called her back but she went into the kitchen. There were two persons in the kitchen but she did not tell them about the incidents. This was because there was nothing they could do. She told ‘aunty’ later because she knew her better. However, the complainant did not know her name and could only guess her age as around 40. During the break, she walked around. She was still fearful of the appellant. At the time, she was confused and did not think of calling anyone. She went back to work as she felt that she needed to return to work. At that time, she did not know if the appellant was still there. She worked for about two more hours. She did not tell anyone else at the restaurant. She did not know why she told ‘aunty’ about the incident. When the complainant went home, she did not tell her parents as they might worry. They were sleeping at the time. The next day, she worked up at about noon. Nobody was in the house then.” Seterusnya YAA Hakim Yong Pung How CJ menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “Finally, I should say that I have examined the notes of evidence in this case very carefully. With respect to the district judge, I am not satisfied that the complainant’s evidence in this case is unusually convincing. There were inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence, some more material than others. Some of these include the complainant’s explanation for not screaming, which showed that this was a result of a conscious decision after assessing the circumstances. This showed she was not confused, as evidenced by her alleged ability to issue a bluff by threatening to scream even though, according to her, there was nobody there. Her behaviour in returning to work after the alleged incident also required some explanation. Her reasons for telling ‘aunty’ and not the others were also suspect. It is also not improbable that she decided not to return to work much earlier than she said she did, because the next day she woke up at noon. In any event, she appeared to have slept very soundly. There was also no reason for the complainant to assume that Lena did not see the alleged incident and would not believe her, unless it never happened at all.”

Pada hemat Mahkamah, kes-kes di atas adalah contoh teladan untuk melihat bagaimana keterangan-keterangan luar biasa meyakinkan perlu dianaliasa sebelum memutuskan keterangan seseorang saksi itu adalah luar biasa menyakinkan. Ia memerlukan proses penelitian keterangan dengan terperinci dan teliti sebelum memutuskan bahawa seseorang saksi itu keterangannya luar biasa meyakinkan.

Seterusnya dalam kes Kwan Peng Hong v Public Prosecutor [2000] 4 SLR 96 dinyatakan seperti yang berikut berkenaan dengan keterangan luar biasa meyakinkan: “[33] Secondly, I made clear in Tang Kin Seng that in Singapore there is no legal requirement for a judge to warn himself expressly of the danger of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of a complainant in a case involving a sexual offence. But I also took great care to make clear that it is dangerous to convict on the words of the complainant alone unless her evidence is unusually compelling or convincing (Tang Kin Seng v PP [1997] 1 SLR 46 at 58, Teo Keng Pong v PP [1996] 3 SLR 329 at 340 and Soh Yang Tick v PP [1998] 2 SLR 42 at 50). In short, the court is to be extremely cautious in relying on the sole evidence of the complainant for a conviction. The phrase ‘unusually compelling or convincing’ simply means that the complainant’s evidence was so convincing that the prosecution’s case was proven beyond reasonable doubt, solely on the basis of that evidence. [34] Thirdly, what is important is for the trial judge to analyse the evidence for the prosecution and for the defence with a view to deciding whether a conviction based solely on the complainant’s evidence is not unsafe. If it is not unsafe to so convict, the trial judge need not go further, except to explain clearly the reasoning behind the findings of fact. [35] Fourthly, if it is unsafe to convict, the trial judge should identify which aspect of the evidence is not so convincing. The trial judge should then look for supporting evidence and ask whether in taking the weak evidence, together with the supporting evidence, the trial judge is convinced that the prosecution case is proven beyond reasonable doubt. [36] Finally, in analysing the evidence, the trial judge must weigh it carefully, always bearing in mind the relevant aspects of human nature and behaviour. But it would be wrong to be bogged down by technicalities, especially when they have no logical bearing to the case in hand. Our approach is clear. We have left behind a technical and inflexible approach to corroboration and its definition (Tang Kin Seng v PP [1997] 1 SLR 46 at 60-63 and Soh Yang Tick v PP [1998] 2 SLR 42 at 52). [37] Instead, our approach is liberal, ensuring that the trial judge has the necessary flexibility in treating relevant evidence as corroborative. This is in line with the approach of other jurisdictions. What is important is the substance and the relevance of the evidence, and whether it is supportive or confirmative of the other weak evidence. Essential qualities of corroborative evidence are its independence, admissibility and whether it implicates the accused in a material particular. [38] Even if the evidence is capable of corroboration, whether it does supply corroboration still depends on all the circumstances of the case. The trial judge must pay particular consideration to the extent to which the evidence that is capable of corroboration does provide the corroborative evidence to satisfactorilyPage 106 dispel any doubt on the guilt of the accused. This flexible approach to corroboration ensures that proper weight is given to the right evidence and no undue weight is assigned to some evidence merely because it is called ‘corroboration’. [39] As I said in Khoo Kwoon Hain v PP [1995] 2 SLR 767 at 776, Soh Yang Tick v PP [1998] 2 SLR 42 at 53 and Tan Pin Seng v PP [1998] 1 SLR 418, although s 159 EA ensures that the complainant’s former statement was capable of being corroborated, it was not independent evidence and thus had little additional evidential value. I also said in Tang Kin Seng [1997] 1 SLR 46 at 65 that the evidential value of a prompt complaint did not render her complaint more credible. The fear that her reaction or distress might have been simulated or feigned has to be borne in mind. Here, the trial judge was aware that the complaint was not an independent piece of evidence and was essentially self-serving.”

Penjelasan yang lebih jelas berkenaan dengan frasa luar biasa meyakinkan dalam konteks di Singapura dinyatakan dalam kes Public Prosecutor v Mohammed Liton Mohammed Syeed Mallik [2008] 5 SLR 601. Mahkamah Rayuan di Singapura menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “[37] The rule as to corroboration in so far as sexual offences are concerned was laid down in the local context in the Singapore High Court decision of Khoo Kwoon Hain v PP [1995] 2 SLR 767 (“Khoo Kwoon Hain”), where Yong Pung How CJ held that while there was no rule of law in this country that in sexual offences, the evidence of the complainant must be corroborated, it was nonetheless unsafe to convict in cases of this kind unless the evidence of the complainant was “unusually convincing” (Khoo Kwoon Hain at 777, [50]; see also Tang Kin Seng v PP [1997] 1 SLR 46 (“Tang Kin Seng ”) at [43] (where the phrase “unusually compelling” was used); Soh Yang Tick v PP [1998] 2 SLR 42 (“Soh Yang Tick”) at [33]; Kwan Peng Hong v PP [2000] 4 SLR 96 (“Kwan Peng Hong”) at [33] (where the phrase “unusually compelling or convincing” was used); and Chng Yew Chin v PP [2006] 4 SLR 124 (“Chng Yew Chin”) at [33]). Further, in Tang Kin Seng, Yong CJ clarified (at [43]) that this did not amount to a legal requirement for a judge to warn himself expressly of the danger of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of a complainant in a case involving a sexual offence (see also Kwan Peng Hong at [33]). [38] As to what “unusually convincing” means, Yong CJ, in Teo Keng Pong v PP [1996] 3 SLR 329, clarified ( at 340 [73]) that this simply meant that the witness’s testimony must be “so convincing that the prosecution’s case was proven beyond reasonable doubt, solely on the basis of the evidence” (see also Lee Kwang Peng v PP [1997] 3 SLR 278 (“Lee Kwang Peng”) at [69]–[70] and Kwan Peng Hong ([37]; supra) at [33]). Rajah J in Chng Yew Chin ([ 37] supra) also adopted this meaning, holding thus (at [ 33]): In this context, dicta in case law abound cautioning judges to scrutinise the evidence before them with a fine-tooth comb, given both the ease with which allegations of sexual assault may be fabricated and the concomitant difficulty of rebutting such allegations: Ng Kwee Piow v Regina [1960] MLJ 278. Therefore, it is necessary that the testimony of such complainants be “unusually convincing”, which is to say, it must be sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt: Teo Keng Pong v PP [1996] 3 SLR 329 at 340, [73]. [emphasis added] [39] Given that the standard of proof required in a criminal case is already that of “beyond a reasonable doubt” (see [34]–[35] above), the expression “unusually compelling” must mean something more than a mere restatement of the requisite standard of proof. Indeed, Prof Michael Hor notes, in “Corroboration: Rules and Discretion in the Search for Truth” [2000] SJLS 509 at 531, that the expression must clearly mean something apart from the standard of proof. If, in fact, one scrutinises closely the observations of Rajah J in Chng Yew Chin ([37]; supra) quoted in the preceding paragraph, it will be seen that the true emphasis is not on the standard of proof in the abstract, but, rather, on the sufficiency of the complainant’s testimony. By its very nature, the inquiry is a factual one. It is also a question of judgment on the part of the trial judge that is inextricably linked to the high standard of proof, ie, “beyond a reasonable doubt”. In our view, therefore, the “extra something” implied by the word “unusually” must refer to the need for the trial judge to be aware of the dangers of convicting solely on the complainant’s testimony as well as of the importance of convicting only on testimony that, when weighed against the overall backdrop of the available facts and circumstances, contains that ring of truth which leaves the court satisfied that no reasonable doubt exists in favour of the accused. Since a mandatory warning from the judge to himself is not required, the implication is that the appellate courts will scrutinise the trial judge’s grounds of decision to see whether the trial judge was indeed aware of the danger of convicting on the bare word of the complainant as well as whether the quality of the testimony itself was consistent with the high standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [40] In the present case, a definitive ruling on the meaning of the expression “unusually compelling” is not strictly necessary since the trial judge implicitly found that corroboration was required. In Mohammed Liton (No 1) ([4]; supra), the trial judge held (at [36]) that: However, from the testimonies, and given the small measure of corroboration in the cautioned statements of the accused, I am satisfied that, in so far as the sexual offences were concerned, the Prosecution has proved that the accused had raped the complainant and also sodomised her. [emphasis added] In our view, this was an implicit finding by the trial judge that corroboration was necessary, presumably because the complainant’s evidence was not “unusually compelling”. In this respect, the Singapore High Court has held that an appellate court will not readily overturn a trial court’s finding that corroboration was not required: see Chen Jian Wei v PP [2002] 2 SLR 255 at [34], where Yong CJ observed that a trial judge who had had the benefit of observing the demeanour and conduct of a child witness would be in a far better position than an appellate court to decide if corroboration was required in the circumstances of the case (although he decided, based on the actual facts of that particular case, that the trial judge erred in not requiring corroboration of the child witness’s testimony). The same considerations must apply when the trial judge has found that corroboration was required. Accordingly, we were of the view that, in this case, corroboration was required in respect of the complainant’s evidence before conviction of the respondent in respect of the acquitted charges could be secured. Indeed, both the appellant and the respondent proceeded in their submissions on the basis that corroboration was required.”

Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah juga perlu memberikan perhatian mengapakah terdapat seksyen 18 Akta Kesalahan-kesalahan Seksual terhadap Kanak-Kanak 2017 dan Akta Keterangan Kanak-kanak 2007 yang telah mengakaskan peruntukan di bawah seksyen 133A Akta Keterangan 1950 kerana bagi membolehkan keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh kanak-kanak yang menjadi mangsa bagi satu kesalahan seksual kanak-kanak itu akan dapat dinilai oleh Mahkamah tanpa terikat dengan prosedur-prosedur yang ketat dalam penelitian keterangan-keterangan bagi kes-kes seksual yang memerlukan keterangan sokongan.

Selain daripada itu sekiranya Mahkamah bicara menolak keterangan SP 6 dan menyatakan bahawa keterangan SP 6 tidak boleh diterima, adakah ini akan menunjukkan keadaan bahawa tidak mungkin satu keterangan kanak-kanak seperti SP 6 ini akan diterima oleh Mahkamah kerana ada penafian daripada pihak Tertuduh yang menyatakan bahawa keterangan SP 6 itu adalah suatu yang bukannya luar biasa menyakinkan. Jika ini berlaku ia akan menyebabkan pihak Tertuduh yang terlibat dengan kanak-kanak terutama dalam kes seksual akan menyanggah keterangan seorang kanak-kanak tersebut, maka natijahnya ialah keterangan kanak-kanak itu akan ditolak semata-mata kerana ia tidak luar biasa meyakinkan. Ia akan mendedahkan kanak-kanak kepada kegiatan jenayah yang dilakukan oleh seorang dewasa tersebut tanpa pelindungan undang-undang yang sewajarnya terutamanya berkenaan dengan keterangan yang diberikan oleh kanak-kanak tersebut. Oleh itu seksyen 18 Akta Kesalahan-kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-kanak 2017 boleh digunakan tanpa perlu memutuskan sama ada saksi kanak-kanak tersebut adalah luar biasa keterangannya.

Namun dalam kes ini Mahkamah mendapati bahawa Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tidak dapat membezakan di antara pemakaian seksyen 18 Akta Kesalahan-kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-kanak 2017 dan keterangan SP 6 sebagai keterangan luar biasa meyakinkan. Sebaliknya, hakim bicara telah mencampur-adukkan pemakaian seksyen 18 Akta Kesalahan-kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-kanak 2017 dengan keterangan SP 6 yang luar biasa meyakinkan. Ini pada hemat Mahkamah adalah suatu kesilapan yang perlu diteliti oleh Mahkamah ini. Keterangan berkenaan dengan peluang Perayu melakukan jenayah

Mahkamah juga meneliti perenggan 26 alasan penghakiman ketika Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen meneliti pembelaan pihak Perayu yang hanya menyatakan bahawa Mahkamah mendapati keberadaan Perayu bersama dengan mangsa di dalam kereta itu menunjukkan peluang dan ruang kepada Perayu untuk melakukan amang seksual fizikal terhadap SP 6 walaupun Perayu menafikan perkara tersebut. Hakim bicara menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “26. Mahkamah mendapati keberadaan OKT bersama mangsa di dalam kereta itu menunjukkan OKT mempunyai ruang dan peluang untuk melakukan amang seksual terhadap SP6. Walaupun OKT menafikan bahawa dia ada melakukan perkara tersebut, terdapat keterangan saksi-saksi lain yang konsisten menyokong keterangan SP6 bahawa OKT telah berbuat demikian.”

Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa peluang melakukan suatu tindakan adalah satu keterangan yang relevan untuk dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah. Ia telah dinyatakan di bawah seksyen 7 Akta Keterangan 1950 yang memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut: “7 Facts which are the occasion, cause or effect of facts in issue Facts which are the occasion, cause or effect, immediate or otherwise, of relevant facts or facts in issue, or which constitute the state of things under which they happened or which afforded an opportunity of their occurrence or transaction, are relevant.

The question is whether A robbed B. The facts that shortly before the robbery B went to a fair with money in his possession and that he showed or mentioned the fact that he had it to third persons are relevant.

The question is whether A murdered B. Marks on the ground produced by a struggle at or near the place where the murder was committed are relevant facts.

The question is whether A poisoned B. The state of B's health before the symptoms ascribed to poison and habits of B known to A, which afforded an opportunity for the administration of poison, are relevant facts.”

Penggunaan seksyen 7 Akta Keterangan 1950 ini oleh Mahkamah adalah bergantung kepada fakta dan keadaan dalam sesuatu kes. Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada Sarkar Law of Evidence 20th Edition, Volume 1, LexisNexis Reprint 2022 yang menjelaskan berkenaan dengan pemakaian keterangan berkaitan dengan peluang seperti yang berikut: “Opportunity must always be relevant: for no circumstance can be more infirmative of a charge than that the accused had no opportunity of committing the crime. On the strength of this rests the force of a defence founded on an alibi. But the judge must be on his guard against jumping hastily from opportunity for, to commission of, a crime. There can be no crime without the opportunity, but there is a wide gulf between opportunity and commission.”

Penelitian kepada seksyen 7 Akta Keterangan 1950 didapati ia terletak di Bab 2 Akta Keterangan 1950 berkaitan dengan kerelevanan fakta-fakta (relevancy of facts). Ini bermakna peluang untuk melakukan satu tindakan adalah satu fakta yang relevan untuk dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah. Ia bukan bermaksud pada hemat Mahkamah peluang tersebut adalah keterangan yang boleh menentukan sama ada pihak pendakwaan telah membuktikan pertuduhan terhadap Tertuduh. Sebaliknya Mahkamah boleh menimbangkan keterangan peluang tersebut sebagai fakta yang relevan semasa memutuskan pihak pendakwaan membuktikan kes terhadap Tertuduh. Ini perlu difahami bagi mengelakkan kesilapan apabila Mahkamah bicara berpendapat bahawa disebabkan terdapatnya peluang untuk seseorang melakukan kesalahan maka ia boleh dijadikan asas untuk menyatakan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah membuktikan kesnya terhadap Tertuduh. Jika ini dilakukan ia tidak menepati kehendak seksyen 7 Akta Keterangan 1950 yang merupakan fakta-fakta relevan yang perlu dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah dan tidak menyebabkan pihak pendakwaan boleh semata-mata bergantung kepada peluang melakukan kesalahan untuk membuktikan kes tanpa keterangan-keterangan yang lain.

Misalnya, sesorang lelaki yang didapati berada bersama-sama dengan seorang perempuan tanpa kehadiran pihak ketiga. Adalah jelas di dalam contoh tersebut lelaki itu mempunyai peluang untuk melakukan kesalahan rogol atau amang seksual terhadap perempuan tersebut sekiranya perempuan tersebut adalah seorang kanak-kanak. Keterangan peluang melakukan kesalahan itu adalah satu fakta yang relevan tetapi pihak pendakwaan masih perlu mengemukakan keterangan bagi memenuhi elemen-elemen bagi kesalahan rogol atau amang seksual. Ini bermakna peluang seseorang untuk melakukan jenayah tidak secara automatik menyebabkan satu pertuduhan jenayah telah dibuktikan terhadapnya.

Seterusnya dalam senario apabila seorang lelaki telah mengarahkan semua orang mengosongkan rumah tersebut yang menyebabkan hanya Tertuduh dan mangsa sahaja berada dalam rumah tersebut keterangan berkenaan dengan peluang untuk melakukan kesalahan itu adalah fakta relevan yang perlu dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah kerana ia berkaitan dengan fakta yang menjadi isu dalam kesalahan rogol dan amang seksual.

Pemakaian seksyen 7 Akta Keterangan 1950 ini iaitu keterangan mengenai peluang ini dapat dilihat melalui kes Aziz Bin Muhamad Din v Public Prosecutor [1996] 5 MLJ 473. Keterangan yang ada dalam kes tersebut berkenaan dengan kejadian rogol dalam kes tersebut adalah seperti yang berikut: “SP6 said in his evidence that on 31 January 1995 the accused came to his house at 8pm to spend the night there. He then added: Dia duduk dengan kawan dia. Saya tidak tahu nama – SP2 dicamkan. Under cross-examination he said: Kedua mereka ada minum di rumah saya pada waktu pagi. In this regard SP2 said in her evidence: Saya ada masuk ke rumah. Suhaimi keluar selepas lebih kurang 30 minit kami masuk. Dia balik pada 1 Februari 1995 pagi. Masa Suhaimi balik kami sudah bangun. Bila Suhaimi balik, kami pun balik.”

Hakim dalam kes tersebut telah meneliti keterangan di atas dan memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “From the evidence adduced it is clear that SP6 allowed the accused to spend the night in his house on 31 January 1995. He saw SP2 there on that night and the following morning. The question for deliberation is whether this evidence is sufficient to corroborate the testimony of SP2 that the accused raped her in SP6's house. Although it constitutes evidence of opportunity it is settled law that evidence of mere opportunity, without more, cannot amount to corroboration.”

Mahkamah ini juga dapat melihat bagaimana fakta yang dikemukakan dalam satu perbicaraan boleh digunakan sebagai keterangan yang menunjukkan peluang melakukan kesalahan. Ini dapat dilihat dalam kes Thomas v Jones [1921] 1 K.B 22 seperti yang berikut: “I will deal with the facts seriatim, and ask myself whether any one of these facts has a different complexion put upon it, if I may use that expression, by any one of the other facts. The first fact is that the appellant sent for the doctor. I say, with great respect to any one who takes a different view, that it seems to me grotesque to suggest that the fact that the appellant, a bachelor with a single woman only in the house on the farm, sent for the doctor when the woman was apparently in great pain and seriously ill, is in any way inconsistent with his story that he was never intimate with her, and is more consistent with her story that he was the father of her child.”

Begitu Mahkamah mendapati dalam kes Cracknell v Smith [1960] 1 WLR 1239. Salah satu keterangan dalam kes tersebut ialah apabila keterangan ibu kepada mangsa yang menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “The complainant's mother testified that the defendant had on three occasions visited her house where the complainant also lived about January and February, 1958, and that he had seen the complainant there; that at that time the complainant and the defendant went out together from time to time, and that sometimes the complainant would go to meet the defendant at the corner of the street.” Lord Parker menyatakan bahawa: “For my part, I am perfectly satisfied that the evidence of the mother was not sufficient corroboration or, perhaps more accurately, any corroboration, because the weight to be attached to the evidence is a matter for the justices. Quite apart from the fact that she was only speaking in regard to January and February, 1958, and not in regard to March, it is quite clear that her evidence was as to mere opportunity. Mere evidence of opportunity and nothing more can be no corroboration. There are, of course, cases, of which Moore v. Hewitt2 is an example, and also Harvey v. Anning,3 in both of which there was something more than mere opportunity. In both cases, unlike the present case, there was evidence that the complainant was not being intimate with or associating with anybody else. Secondly, in Harvey v. Anning3 there was, as an additional factor, the great difference in the social position of the parties, and in both cases there was real evidence of courtship and association together, and not the very vague association spoken to by the mother in the present case.”

Pemakaian seksyen 7 Akta Keterangan 1950 juga telah dirujuk oleh pihak pendakwaan dalam kes Syed Saddiq bin Syed Abdul Rahman v Public Prosecutor and other appeals [2025] 4 MLJ 676; 2025 7 CLJ 265 seperti yang berikut: “[69] The prosecution then gathered all the evidence obtained by PW25 and relied on the conduct and omission of the appellant before the withdrawal until 28 May 2020 when the appellant was no longer holding any position in Bersatu or Armada to prove the appellant’s dishonest intention in giving the instruction to withdraw the RM1m from the Armada’s account. The prosecution argued that the series of the appellant’s conduct or omission are relevant pursuant to ss 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Evidence Act 1950 as his conduct and omissions are said to be connected with the facts in issue.”

Keterangan dalam kes Syed Saddiq bin Syed Abdul Rahman (supra) itu berkaitan dengan pemakaian seksyen 7 Akta Keterangan 1950 dapat dilihat melalui keterangan SP25 seperti yang tercatat di perenggan 67 kes tersebut seperti yang berikut: [67] Evidently, the context in which the conversation relating to the ‘clearkan’ was held at the time when the appellant’s house was broken into and money was stolen from the safe therein. It must be reiterated that the RM1m was withdrawn on 6 March 2020 and the focused of the investigation apparently was on the possibility that the monies were taken from insiders. As such, in the light of the circumstances that happened and the conversation was held, it is logical there arose the need to keep the monies held by PW13 safe. The cross-examination of PW25, the investigating officer supports this. In cross-examination of PW25 on 27 September 2022, he answered as follows: GDW: Dalam ini, ada orang pecah masuk rumah Syed Saddiq PW25: Betul GDW: Dalam insiden itu, ada wang yang telahpun diambil dari peti besi beliau PW25: Tidak pasti. GDW: Dalam siasatan itu, Syed Saddiq juga disiasat kerana dikatakan mungkin ada hal yang dilakukan oleh orang dalaman PW25: Betul GDW: Ini bermaksud ada orang dalaman yang mungkin ambil duit Syed Saddiq tersebut? PW25: Tidak pasti … GDW: Ada siasat Rafiq? PW25: Ada GDW: Dia katakan ada arahan untuk clearkan duit? PW25: Betul GDW: Itu fahaman beliau? PW25: Betul GDW: Dalam kes ini ianya dikatakan berlaku selepas 31 Mac. Beliau kata beliau faham untuk clearkan selepas 31 Mac itu untuk selamatkan wang tersebut? PW25: Wang mana? GDW: Wang balance yang ada dipegang dari 1,000,000 itu PW25: Betul.

Mahkamah Rayuan setelah meneliti hujahan yang berkenaan dengan pemakaian seksyen 7 Akta Keterangan 1950 tersebut berpendapat seperti yang berikut: “[71] We are of the considered view that what prompted the appellant to give the instruction or command to withdraw the RM1m to PW13 is not an issue. We find that the withdrawal was consequential to the decision to have the respective programs. As stated earlier, the issue is whether in giving such command or instruction, the appellant abetted the offence of criminal breach of trust ie whether the withdrawal is an actus reus of criminal breach of trust or if committed is an actus reus of criminal breach of trust. The answer to the questions are in the negative because giving instruction or command to withdraw falls short of the five actus reus of criminal breach of trust. … [80] In the circumstances alluded to in the above, we find that the prosecution failed to prove the abetment charge even at the prima facie stage.”

Berdasarkan kepada autoriti-autoriti di atas adalah jelas dan nyata bahawa Mahkamah bicara tidak boleh dengan sewenang-wenangnya mengambil kira peluang untuk melakukan kesalahan sebagai asas kepada sabitan bagi sesuatu kes jenayah. Ia hanyalah merupakan fakta relevan yang boleh dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah tertakluk kepada tanggungjawab pihak pendakwaan untuk membuktikan elemen-elemen kesalahan bagi sesuatu pertuduhan.

Penelitian kepada alasan penghakiman dalam kes ini menunjukkan bahawa hakim bicara telah menyatakan bahawa disebabkan Perayu mempunyai peluang untuk melakukan kesalahan amang seksual tersebut maka ia adalah satu asas yang menyatakan bahawa penafian Perayu di dalam pembelaannya tidak dapat dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah bicara. Pada hemat Mahkamah ia adalah satu kesilapan yang ketara yang perlu diperbetulkan oleh Mahkamah ini disebabkan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tidak menimbangkan pembelaan Perayu dengan sewajarnya.

Sesungguhnya perlindungan kepada kanak-kanak daripada diperlakukan secara seksual oleh orang dewasa telah dititikberatkan oleh badan perundangan dengan penggubalan Akta Kesalahan-kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-kanak 2017 dan Akta Keterangan Kanak-Kanak 2007. Ia digubal bagi memberikan perlindungan yang sewajarnya kepada kanak-kanak. Namun demikian keberkesanan undang-undang tersebut dan hasrat untuk melindungi kanak-kanak daripada perlakuan seksual akan hampa sekiranya pihak-pihak yang berwajib tidak melaksanakan tanggungjawab seperti yang dikehendaki di bawah undang-undang. Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah akan memutuskan kes-kes berkaitan dengan kesalahan seksual terhadap kanak-kanak berdasarkan kepada peruntukan undang-undang dan tidak boleh terbawa-bawa dengan sentimen berkaitan dengan kesalahan seksual terhadap kanak-kanak.

Apa yang jelas ialah Mahkamah akan memutuskan kes berdasarkan kepada keterangan yang dikemukakan di Mahkamah bersama-sama dengan undang-undang yang berkaitan dengan nya. Sekiranya Mahkamah mengambil pendekatan yang lain dengan tidak menitikberatkan kepada keterangan dan undang-undang ia akan menyebabkan ketidakadilan akan muncul. Pada masa yang sama pihak pendakwaan dan peguam adalah sewajarnya membantu Mahkamah untuk sama-sama mencapai matlamat penggubalan Akta Kesalahan-Kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-kanak 2017 dan undang-undang lain yang melindungi kanak-kanak.

Akhirnya, berdasarkan kepada alasan penghakiman, nota prosiding, hujahan pihak-pihak Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa dapatan dan hukuman Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen adalah tidak selamat untuk dikekalkan. Oleh yang demikian Mahkamah membenarkan rayuan Perayu, sabitan dan hukuman oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen diketepikan. Bertarikh: 14 hb. Ogos 2025 (ROSLAN BIN MAT NOR) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR Peguam Bagi Pihak Perayu - Emily Chong Pei Yen dan Bryan Tan Tetuan Othman Hashim & Co Kuala Lumpur Peguam Bagi Pihak Responden - TPR Intan Nor Hilwani binti Mat Rifin Unit Pendakwaan, Pejabat Penasihat Undang-undang Negeri Pahang Temerloh, Pahang Darul Makmur