be resident or be employed or be in ownership of land within the area of operations of the primary co-operative society, or, in the case of a school co-operative society, be a registered student of the school.” [23] Given that the Second Respondent/Defendant is neither a “co-operative society” nor a “member” under section 82(1) of the Co-operative Societies Act 1993, the Court is of the view that the Malaysia Co-operative Societies Commission has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the Appellant/Plaintiff’s claim. S/N trOQrwWCka333sdXwTGgw [24] If the dispute were to be referred to and adjudicated by the Malaysia Co-operative Societies Commission, the Commission would have exceeded its jurisdiction under section 82(1) as the Second Respondent/Defendant is not an entity that is subjected to the purview of the Co-operative Societies Act 1993. [25] Such a construction is consistent with the decision of the High Court in Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Bhd v Koperasi Belia Islam Malaysia Bhd [2017] CLJU 1682; [2017] MLJU 1607; [2017] MLRHU 1170, where it was held at paragraphs [10] to [12] that: [10] It is clear that section 82 of the Act deals a dispute which involves a Cooperative Society, its members, its Board or any officer in the Cooperative Society. [11] Based on the facts of this case, the facility was granted by the Plaintiff to the Defendant and not the Defendant members. In this case, the relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant is a relationship between a bank and a borrower and therefore section 82 is not applicable in this present case. [12] Based on the above reasons, the disputes is outside the scope of section 82 of the Act and should not be referred to the Commission. Therefore the Court has jurisdiction to hear the matter as the claim is for breach of contract. Therefore the preliminary objection is overruled. [26] In the present case, the capacity of the Second Respondent/Defendant is not of a “co-operative society” nor a “member” under the Co-operative Societies Act 1993, but an independent trust S/N trOQrwWCka333sdXwTGgw company. Hence, this Court is of the view that the Malaysia Co-operative Societies Commission has no jurisdiction over the dispute. [27] The second reason relates to the nature of the Appellant/Plaintiff’s claims. [28] The Appellant/Plaintiff’s claims against the First Respondent/Defendant are premised upon breach of fiduciary duties and breach of contract (that is, breach of the Scholarship Fund Agreement dated 1 May 2010). [29] Meanwhile, the Appellant/Plaintiff’s claim against the Second Respondent/Defendant is based on breach of fiduciary duties and breach of trust (under the Deed of Trust between the First and Second Respondents/Defendants). The reliefs sought by the Appellant in this regard are for a declaration of breach of trust and damages. [30] The Respondents/Defendants thereby contended that the Appellant/Plaintiff’s “true cause of action” is for recovery of debt of RM34,084.00 under the Scholarship Fund Agreement. They argued that pursuant to section 82 of the Co-operative Societies Act 1993 and Rules 80(1) and 84 of the First Respondent/Defendant's by-laws, this constitutes a “dispute touching the management or business” of the First Respondent/Defendant. As such, the Malaysia Co-operative Societies Commission, argued the Respondents/Defendants, has jurisdiction over the dispute. [31] The ambit of the phrase "dispute touching on the management or business of a co-operative society" in section 82(1) of the Co-operative S/N trOQrwWCka333sdXwTGgw Societies Act 1993 was examined by the Court of Appeal in Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd (KOSMA) v Jamil Ninggal [2019] 9 CLJ 600; [2018] 5 MLJ 766; [2018] 5 MLRA 184. In that case it was held that a complaint of wrongful termination or unfair dismissal by an employee of a co-operative society does not fall within the purview of the above phrase and consequently, the Malaysia Co-operative Societies Commission did not have any jurisdiction or power to deal with such a dispute or to refer it to the Tribunal established under section 83(1) of the Act. [32] The decision of the High Court in Koperasi Telekom Malaysia Berhad v Ismail bin Nordin & Ors [2020] 3 CLJ 277; [2020] MLJU 20; [2020] 3 MLRH 1 (“Koperasi Telekom Malaysia”) is instructive and the relevant paragraphs in that judgment are as follows: [18] In my considered view, in cases such as the present, it is imperative to first identify the true nature of the dispute and to then ascertain whether it is such a dispute that was envisaged to be referred to the commission within Section 82 and if so, whether it ousts the jurisdiction of the civil courts to determine them (unless and until the Commission requires the parties to refer the dispute to Court). [19] As set out earlier in this decision, the claims and relief sought by the Plaintiff are manifold and they essentially allege breach of fiduciary and statutory duties and seek declaratory and injunctive relief. Can such claims and relief sought be considered a ‘dispute touching the business of a Co-operative society” thus invoking Section 82? The Plaintiff relies on the recent decisions of the Court of Appeal in Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd (KOSMA) v Jamil Ninggal & Ors [2019] 9 CLJ 600 CA and the High Court in Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia v Koperasi Amanah S/N trOQrwWCka333sdXwTGgw Pelaburan Bhd [2019] MLJU 754 HC case and urges this Court to answer the question in the negative. [20] To reiterate, the Plaintiff contends that in light of the nature of the dispute and the relief claimed, theirs is not a dispute falling within Section 82 and the Defendants’ application to strike out their claim be dismissed with the necessary result that this court proceed to hear this dispute on the merits. [21] In order to consider the merits of the Plaintiffs contention and bearing in mind that both the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Koperasi Serbausaha and the High Court in Bank Kerjasama Rakyat relied upon had occasion to deal, and if I may observe, deal quite extensively with Section 82 of the said Act, it behoves me to now examine the facts of those two case in detail and to distill the principles of law enunciated … … [35] Having had the benefit of reading the said judgment and the discussion, I am of the same view that the Civil Court surely cannot only have jurisdiction to hear a matter concerning a cooperative society only once the Commission requires the parties concerned to refer the dispute to Court. [36] Back to the facts of the case at hand. Based on the facts of this case and in particular, the nature of the plaintiffs claim and their various causes of action, and applying the principles as set out in the Kooperasi Serbausaha and Bank Kerjasama Rakyat cases, I have no hesitation in dismissing the Defendants application to strike out the Plaintiffs claim. S/N trOQrwWCka333sdXwTGgw [37] I am of the considered view that the facts of the present case are distinguishable from Arulandan as the reliefs sought herein do not relate to a disciplinary action against an employee. Further, bearing in mind that the causes of action relate to breach of fiduciary/statutory duty, such claims cannot be considered a dispute touching on the management or business of the Plaintiff. [33] As with the case in Koperasi Telekom Malaysia, the “true nature of the dispute” and the Appellant/Plaintiff’s claims are based on breach of fiduciary duties and statutory duties (alleging, amongst others, that the Respondents/Defendants failed to appoint a fund manager as required under the Deed of Trust). And again, similar to Koperasi Telekom Malaysia, the Appellant/Plaintiff in this case is seeking a declaratory relief in the form of a declaration of breach of trust – a remedy that the Malaysia Co-operative Societies Commission lacks the authority to grant, thus placing the claims outside the Commission’s jurisdiction. Additionally, the legal question of whether there was privity of contract between the Appellant/Plaintiff and the Second Respondent/Defendant, as per the Clause 6 of the Scholarship Fund Agreement and Clause 11.4 of the Deed of Trust also falls outside the scope of “dispute touching the management or business” of the First Respondent/Defendant. [34] The third reason is premised on the ground that the claims against the First and Second Respondents/Defendants are closely intertwined with one another. [35] This Court finds that the Appellant/Plaintiff’s claims against both the Respondents/Defendants are so closely intertwined with one another, S/N trOQrwWCka333sdXwTGgw making it difficult if not impossible, to view the claims against each of them in insolation. [36] The Respondents/Defendants argued that it is Parliament’s intention that disputes involving co-operative societies are to be referred to the Malaysia Co-operative Societies Commission at first instance because section 83(6A) and (6C) of the Co-operative Societies Act 1993 empower courts to enforce any award made by the Co-operative Tribunal. They assert that in allowing members, such as the Appellant/Plaintiff in this case, to bypass the Commission and bring claims directly to the courts, without first referring to the Commission, would render section 83(6A) and (6C) redundant and without effect. [37] The Court takes the view that this argument is untenable. This is because in ascertaining the spirit of the Co-operative Societies Act 1993 and Parliament’s intention, it is imperative to review the Act in its entirety. The Preamble and section 4 of the Act allude that the Act is designed to ensure the economic interests of members of the co-operative societies. [38] Specifically, the Preamble reads: