Linggi Agriculture Sdn Bhd v Chin Su Hin (JA-29PB-395-06/2023)

Pemiutang Penghakiman (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai JC) telah memperolehi penghakiman bertarikh 9.12.2003 terhadap Penghutang Penghakiman (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai JD) di Mahkamah Sesyen Melaka.

Lanjutan itu, JC telah memulakan tindakan kebankrapan terhadap JD dan Perintah Penerimaan dan Perintah Penghukuman telah direkodkan terhadap JD pada 9.8.2007.

Pada 28.9.2022, Notis Tentang Niat untuk mengeluarkan Perakuan Pelepasan Bankrap daripada kebankrapannya (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai Notis 51B) telah dikeluarkan oleh Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi Malaysia (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai KPI).

JC kemudiannya telah menyerahkan Notis Bantahan Pemiutang 51C (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai Notis 51C) bertarikh 31.10.2022 bagi membantah Notis 51B yang dikeluarkan oleh KPI. Notis 51C tersebut diterima KPI pada 1.11.2022 secara email dan kurier.

Melalui surat bertarikh 23.5.2023, JC telah dimaklumkan bahawa KPI menolak Notis 51C yang difailkan JC. Maka, JC memfailkan permohonan di Mahkamah ini untuk menghalang KPI dari mengeluarkan Perakuan Pelepasan Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi kepada JD menurut seksyen 33B(4) Akta Insolvensi 1967 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai Akta Tersebut). Analisis dan keputusan Mahkamah Isu 1 : Sama ada Notis Bantahan JC (Notis 51C) difailkan di luar masa?

Mahkamah merujuk Seksyen 33B(2) Akta Tersebut yang memperuntukkan bahawa:- “(2) A creditor who has been served with a notice under subsection (1) and who wishes to object to the issuance of a certificate discharging the bankrupt shall, within twenty-one days from the date of service of the notice, furnish a notice of the objection stating the grounds of his objection.”

Penelitian peruntukan tersebut menunjukkan bahawa apabila KPI mengeluarkan notis niat untuk mengeluarkan sijil pelepasan di bawah seksyen 33A Akta Tersebut, pemiutang yang ingin membantah niat KPI tersebut adalah diwajibkan untuk mengemukakan bantahan kepada KPI dalam tempoh 21 hari dari tarikh penyampaian notis tersebut. Menurut surat KPI bertarikh 23.5.23 (MS 51-52 Lampiran 2), KPI menolak bantahan JC kerana dikemukakan di luar tempoh masa yang ditetapkan menurut seksyen 33B(2) Akta Tersebut.

Mahkamah percaya KPI telah menolak bantahan JC berdasarkan pengiraan 21 hari dari tarikh pengeposan notis niat bertarikh 28.9.22 pada 6.10.22 (sebagaimana diperhatikan dari status tracking Pos Malaysia di muka surat 42 lampiran 2). Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah dapati seksyen 33B(2) Akta Tersebut tidak menyatakan secara spesifik bahawa Notis Niat KPI (Notis 51B) perlu dikemukakan secara kediri kepada JC. Maka, selaras seksyen 130 Akta Tersebut, KPI boleh mengemukakan Notis Niat tersebut melalui pos berdaftar sebagaimana dalam kes ini. Seksyen 130 Akta Tersebut memperuntukkan bahawa:- “All notices and other documents for the service of which no special mode is prescribed may be sent by prepaid registered post letter to the last known address of the person to be served therewith.”

Apabila KPI menghantar surat tersebut secara Pos Berdaftar sebagaimana diperuntukkan dalam seksyen 130 Akta Tersebut, maka anggapan yang boleh dipatahkan wujud sebagaimana diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 12 Akta Tafsiran 1948 & 1967 yang memperuntukkan bahawa:- “12. Where a written law authorises or requires a document to be served by post, then, until the contrary is proved, service:

shall be presumed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post a letter containing the document; and

shall be presumed to have been effected at the time when the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of the post.”

Dalam mentaksirkan peruntukan tersebut, Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Goh Teng Whoo & Anor v Ample Objectives Sdn Bhd [2021] 3 MLJ 159; [2021] 4 CLJ 348; [2021] 2 MLRA 682; [2021] 3 AMR 881 memutuskan bahawa:- “[31]Section 12 of the Interpretation Acts must be read in its proper context. What it says is that where a document is served by registered post, service and time of service are "presumed" "until the contrary is proved". There is nothing in the section to say that posting by registered post is conclusive proof of service. What is clear is that it is a rebuttable presumption of law that can be displaced by evidence to the contrary. It is not an irrebuttable presumption that shuts out all forms of defence to the proof of posting. [32]Thus, if there is evidence that the defendant has not been served with the document, the presumption is rebutted and the court will make a finding that there has been no service of the document in an application for setting aside. It is anathema to the concept of justice and fair play that a defendant who has no knowledge of the action is attached with liability without being given the opportunity to explain why the default judgment should not be entered against him.”

Berdasarkan nas tersebut di atas, anggapan penyampaian atau tarikh penyampaian dapat dipatahkan sekiranya JC dapat menunjukkan bahawa penyampaian tidak sempurna atau penyampaian diterima lewat. Dalam Afidavit Sokongan, JC telah mengemukakan status “tracking” Pos Malaysia di muka surat 42 lampiran 2 yang menunjukkan bahawa Notis Niat KPI hanya telah berjaya disempurnakan penyampaian kepada JC pada 21.10.22. Fakta ini tidak pernah dipertikaikan secara spesifik oleh KPI dalam Afidavit Balasan KPI mahupun dalam hujahan bertulis KPI. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes OCBC Bank (Malaysia) Bhd v Tiong Chiong Hieh & Ors [2023] MLJU 1000; [2023] 7 CLJ 465; [2023] 5 MLRH 237; [2023] 5 AMR 887 di mana Mahkamah membuat penemuan fakta berkenaan status penyampaian berdasarkan status tracking Pos Malaysia seperti berikut:- “[61] In the premises, the defendants have successfully rebutted the presumption that they were not indeed served or given the said statutory notices issued by the plaintiff's solicitors by the production of the print-outs of the trace and tracking of the delivery of the said statutory notices from the website of Pos Malaysia which shows that the said statutory notices were all returned to the plaintiff and undelivered to the defendants.”

Maka, atas alasan ini, Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan JC bahawa memandangkan Notis Niat KPI hanya disempurnakan penyampaian kepada JC pada 21.10.22, permohonan JC yang difailkan pada 1.11.22 adalah dalam tempoh 21 hari dari tarikh penerimaan notis sebagaimana diperuntukkan dalam seksyen 33B(2) Akta Tersebut. Maka, alasan KPI dalam menolak bantahan JC kerana dikemukakan di luar tempoh masa tidak dapat dipertahankan dan dengan demikian, merit permohonan JC wajar dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah ini. Isu 2 : Sama ada permohonan JC dihalang oleh pindaan kepada Seksyen 33B(2A) Akta Tersebut?

Mahkamah dapati seksyen 33B(2A) telah dipindahkan melalui Akta A1695, Akta Insolvensi (Pindaan) 2023 untuk memasukkan 2 kategori tambahan yang mana JC tidak boleh membuat bantahan kepada notis niat pelepasan KPI seperti berikut: “*(e) a bankrupt who is incapable of managing himself and his affairs due to any mental disorder, as certified by a psychiatrist from any government hospital; and *(f) a bankrupt aged seventy years and above and in the opinion of the Director General of Insolvency, is incapable of contributing to the administration of his estate.”

Pindaan kepada seksyen 33B tersebut berkuatkuasa pada 6.10.2023 iaitu selepas permohonan JC difailkan di Mahkamah tetapi sebelum Mahkamah membuat keputusan terhadap permohonan tersebut.

JD dalam kes ini adalah berusia 70 tahun pada tahun semasa (lahir pada bulan Disember 1952) (dan bukan berusia 64 tahun sebagaimana dalam hujahan KPI). Maka wujud persoalan sama ada peruntukan tersebut menghalang JC dari membuat sebarang bantahan kepada notis niat KPI.

Mahkamah mengambil maklum bahawa anggapan wujud bahawa sebarang pindaan kepada peruntukan undang-undang berkuatkuasa prospektif sekiranya melibatkan isu substantif dan berkuatkuasa kebelakangan (retrospektif) sekiranya melibatkan isu prosedur, melainkan dinyatakan sebaliknya secara ekspress dalam perundangan tersebut. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Dalip Bhagwan Singh v PP [1998] 1 MLJ 1; [1997] 4 CLJ 645; [1997] 1 MLRA 653; [1997] 4 AMR 4029 memutuskan bahawa:- "In respect of legislation on substantive law, there is a rule of presumption that it is not retrospective in operation in the absence of a contrary intention by express words or by necessary implication. Conversely, in respect of legislation on evidence or procedure, the presumption is that it is retrospective in operation in the absence of a contrary intention, unless, the application of such legislation deprives a person of a vested right and offends art. 7(1) of the

Dalam hal ini, seksyen 17 Akta Insolvensi (Pindaan) 2023 dengan jelas memperuntukkan bahawa:- “Notwithstanding sections 15 and 16, any proceedings, actions or other matters required to be done under the principal Act which are still pending immediately before the coming into operation of this Act shall be continued or concluded under the principal Act as if the principal Act had not been amended by this

Maka, Akta Insolvensi (Pindaan) 2023 secara ekspress menyatakan pindaan yang digubal berkuatkuasa ke hadapan. Dalam kes ini, permohonan JC di bawah seksyen 33B(4) Akta Tersebut telah difailkan pada 21.6.23 manakala Akta Pindaan tersebut mula berkuatkuasa pada 6.10.23. Maka, permohonan JC secara nyata tidak terhalang menurut seksyen 33B(2A)(f) Akta Tersebut dan Mahkamah perlu mendengar permohonan JC seolah-olah Akta Tersebut tidak dipinda. Isu 3 : Sama ada penyediaan laporan KPI adalah mandatori semasa KPI mengeluarkan sijil pelepasan di bawah seksyen 33A Akta Tersebut?

JC berhujah bahawa KPI mempunyai tanggungjawab mandatori untuk menyediakan laporan KPI dan menyerahkan kepada JC namun tiada sebarang laporan sedemikian telah disediakan oleh KPI dalam kes ini. Maka, JC berhujah bahawa KPI telah gagal melaksanakan tanggungjawab sebagaimana dalam Akta Tersebut dan Kaedah-kaedah Insolvensi 2017 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai Kaedah Tersebut).

JC bersandar kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan Lim Hun Swee v Malaysia British Assurance Bhd & Ors and Other Appeals [2011] 2 MLJ 218; [2010] 8 CLJ 680; [2010] 2 MLRA 392; [2011] 1 AMCR 157 dan kes Mahkamah Tinggi Lee Aik Chong v Perdana Merchant Bankers Bhd [2014] 8 CLJ 509; [2013] MLRHU 1085; [2014] 2 AMR 64 sebagai asas kepada hujahan JC berkenaan isu ini.

Umpamanya, dalam kes Lim Hun Swee (supra) Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[30] The court is aware that on the hearing of an application for an order of discharge, the court shall take into consideration a report by the DGI. This is a mandatory requirement. However, it does not mean that the court is bound to accept the statements therein contained. No doubt sub-s. (8) of s. provides that for the purpose of an application for a discharge the DGI's report shall be prima facie evidence of the statements contained therein; but the court is duty bound to scrutinise the truth and reliability of the statements and in appropriate case, when the court is satisfied that the report is incomplete and misleading, the court is not bound to accept the statements contained in the report…”

Mahkamah dapati kedua-dua kes yang dirujuk JC adalah diputuskan dalam konteks permohonan pelepasan oleh JD menurut seksyen 33 Akta Tersebut. Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa JC telah tersalah arah apabila berhujah bahawa KPI perlu menyediakan laporan berkenaan keputusan KPI untuk mengeluarkan sijil pelepasan di bawah seksyen 33A Akta Tersebut. Laporan KPI hanya relevan bagi permohonan pelepasan oleh Si Bankrap di bawah seksyen 33 Akta Tersebut yang perlu diputuskan Mahkamah setelah meneliti laporan KPI menurut seksyen 33(3) Akta yang sama. Memandangkan keputusan KPI untuk mengeluarkan Sijil Pelepasan di bawah seksyen 33A Akta Tersebut adalah keputusan beliau sendiri setelah meneliti kandungan dokumen-dokumen dalam fail si bankrap, maka tiada keperluan untuk penyediaan laporan tersebut.

Dalam menjelaskan isu ini, Mahkamah dalam kes Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Bassanio Teo Yang [2009] MLJU 313; [2009] 9 CLJ 413; [2009] 2 MLRH 668; [2009] AMEJ 0407 memutuskan bahawa:- “To my mind, the court could certainly delay the issuance of the certificate by two years as this is clearly provided in s. 33B. However, the court should not be strictly guided by s. 33 because that is a provision where the court is vested with the power to discharge a bankrupt. Counsel for creditor's main complaint is that the DGI did not prepare an updated report on the respondent. In my opinion the DGI cannot be faulted for not preparing a report that is required under s. 33. This is because the "report" in s. 33 is prepared by the DGI for the attention of the court for the purpose of providing sufficient information to assist the decision making process. That is the reason why the report is deemed to be prima facie evidence under s. 33(8). It goes without saying that if the report contains any adverse information that is within the contemplation of s. 33(6), the court is empowered to refuse a discharge. However, under s. 33A, the decision maker is the DGI himself and therefore it is common sense that he need not "report" to himself about the status of the bankrupt. It must be assumed all the relevant information that is in the file of the bankrupt has been considered by the proper officer of the DGI before the Notice of Intention to discharge is issued. Therefore, I cannot agree with counsel for the creditor that it is fatal for the DGI not to have prepared an updated report.”

Maka, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa hujahan JC dalam isu ini adalah tidak bermerit. Isu 4 : Sama ada JD gagal untuk mematuhi peruntukan di bawah Akta Tersebut?

JC berhujah bahawa JD gagal mematuhi peruntukan Akta Tersebut dan Kaedah Tersebut iaitu:- a) JD gagal mengemukakan penyata hal ehwal dalam tempoh 21 hari sebagaimana diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 16 Akta Tersebut; dan b) JD telah gagal untuk menyimpan buku-buku akaun yang menzahirkan secukupnya transaksi perniagaannya dan kedudukan kewangannya dalam masa 3 tahun sebelum kebankrapan sebagaimana dikehendaki di bawah seksyen 110 Akta Tersebut.

JC seterusnya merujuk kepada kes Lim Hun Swee (supra) di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa:- “[37] Section 33(4) of the Act inter alia provides that where a bankrupt has committed any offence under the Act, the court shall either refuse the discharge or suspend the order until a dividend of not less than 50% has been paid to the creditors but the DGI may for special reasons extend the time by order made under his hand, to be forthwith filed, and recording the reasons for such an extension… [38] Section 16(3) of the Act provides that if the bankrupt fails, without reasonable excuse, proof whereof shall lie on him, to comply with the requirement, he shall be guilty of contempt of court and may be punished accordingly. The court has treated such non-compliance of s. 16(3) of the Act as very serious and had imposed custodial sentence on the bankrupt (see Dato' Abdullah Hishan bin Hj Mohd Hashim v. Sharma Kumari Shukla [2001] 5 CLJ 400; [2000] 7 MLJ 667). Thus, there is no doubt that a contempt of court action under s. 16(3) is an offence under the Act. The bankrupt in this present case has clearly committed an offence under s. 16(2) punishable under s. 16(3) of the Act. Yet, the DGI in his reports had the audacity to state that the bankrupt did not commit any offence under the Act…”

Dengan demikian, JC berhujah bahawa sekiranya JD gagal untuk mematuhi peruntukan yang terkandung dalam Akta Tersebut dan perlanggaran tersebut terjumlah kepada satu kesalahan di bawah Akta Tersebut, maka Mahkamah hendaklah menolak permohonan pelepasan atau menggantung perintah tersebut sehingga dividen tidak kurang 50% telah dibayar kepada JC sebagaimana diperuntukkan dalam seksyen 33(4) Akta Tersebut.

Mahkamah dapati terdapat dua kes Mahkamah Rayuan yang terkemudian yang telah mengkaji semula maksud melakukan kesalahan (“committed any offence”) di bawah seksyen 33(4) Akta Tersebut. Dalam kes Mahkamah Rayuan Dato’ Lim Huah Leong v Engtex Marketing Sdn Bhd [2016] 5 MLRA 457 Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa:- “[27] Further, one can be said to be guilty of committing an offence under the Act only if the bankrupt is charged in court by the DGI for that offence… [28] In the case of In Re: Zanuldin Ahmad; Ex-Parte: Wong Siay Patt & Anor [2007] 5 MLRH 183, it was held that the twin elements of a charge and a conviction must be had before a bankrupt is said to have committed an offence under the Act or under the Penal Code. Similar stance was reiterated in the case of In Re Joshua Tan Pin Pin; Ex P William Jacks & Co (M) Sdn Bhd [2007] 1 MLRH 622; [2007] 4 MLJ 534; [2007] 3 CLJ 153 where it was held that for so long as a bankrupt has not been charged in court for any of the offences referred to in s 33(4) of the Act and that no contempt proceedings have been taken against the bankrupt, to that extent the bankrupt is not required to pay at least 50% of the dividend as required under s 33(4) of the Act. [29] The DGI report submitted had clearly stated in no uncertain terms that the appellant was not guilty of any offence under the Act to be subjected to s 33(4)…As the appellant had not been cited for contempt of court by the DGI, he had not committed any offence, as specified in s 33(4) of the Act. Thus, our inevitable conclusion on this issue is that the appellant's discharge application falls squarely within the ambit of s 33(3) of the Act. [30] Thus, with respect, we found that the learned High Court Judge had misconstrued s 33 by importing into her consideration factors outside ss 33(1) and 33(3) by invoking factors relating to s 33(4) which required the payment of at least 50% of the debt to creditors when in fact, that condition is not required under s 33(1) of the Act…”

Seterusnya, Mahkamah Rayuan baru-baru ini dalam kes Quek Siew Eng v Malayan Banking Berhad [2023] 1 MLJ 99; [2023] 1 CLJ 884; [2023] 2 MLRA 209; [2023] 1 AMR 413 memutuskan bahawa:- “[27] Having perused the Act and the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the considered opinion that the learned judge's presumption that the appellant/judgment debtor had committed an offence is also erroneous as the appellant/judgment debtor was not never charged in court for the offence of not disclosing his co-ownership of the said land and convicted of the same. [28] We are inclined to hold that the phrase "that the bankrupt has committed any offence under this Act or under any written law repealed by this Act or under ss. 421, 422, 423 or 424 of the Penal Code (Act 574) " as contained in s. 33(4) of the Act meant that the bankrupt must have been charged in court of law by the DGI for that offence and was convicted accordingly… [33] Thus, in the light of the above, we are of the considered view that the learned judge's finding that the appellant/judgment debtor had committed an offence under s. 16 of the Act is erroneous. The learned judge cannot summarily and arbitrarily convict the appellant/judgment debtor, without the right to be heard. The appellant/judgment debtor may have an "reasonable excuse" or defence and he should be allowed to advance such a defence. [35] In the present case, the appellant/judgment debtor was never tried or charged for any bankruptcy offence and this was acknowledged by the DGI in para. 39 of the DGI's statutory report which states that the appellant did not commit any offence under ss. 421, 422, 423 and 424 of the Penal Code… [39] Since the appellant/judgment debtor has not committed any bankruptcy offence, the learned judge's decision to consider the appellant/judgment debtor's application under s. 33(4) of the Act for an order of discharge, is also without basis and erroneous. Thus, the appellant/judgment debtor's application for discharge should fall under s. 33(3) of the Act.”

Memandangkan tiada sebarang fakta di hadapan Mahkamah bahawa JD telah dituduh dan disabitkan atas mana-mana kesalahan, wujud keraguan sama ada JD telah sebenarnya melakukan kesalahan (“committed any offence”) bagi maksud seksyen 33(4) Akta Tersebut.

Dalam apa jua keadaan, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa JC telah tersalah arah apabila mengimport syarat seksyen 33(4) Akta Tersebut yang terpakai kepada permohonan pelepasan di bawah seksyen 33 Akta Tersebut ke dalam keputusan KPI dalam mengeluarkan notis niat untuk mengeluarkan sijil pelepasan di bawah seksyen 33A Akta Tersebut. Penelitian Mahkamah kepada seksyen 33A Akta Tersebut menunjukkan tiada sebarang garis panduan tertentu yang perlu diikuti KPI dalam menjalankan kuasa budi bicara beliau dalam memutuskan untuk mengeluarkan Perakuan Pelepasan Ketua Pengarah, melainkan keperluan untuk hanya memastikan pentadbiran kebankrapan telah dilaksanakan selama sekurang-kurangnya 5 tahun. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah dalam kes Bassanio Teo Yang (supra) memutuskan bahawa:- “[11] Very interestingly, unlike s. 33 under which a bankrupt seeks reprieve from the bankruptcy, s. 33A does not provide any guideline for the DGI to consider in granting a discharge. The only precondition is that five years must have elapsed since the commencement of the bankruptcy…”

Dalam menjalankan kuasa budi bicara tersebut, KPI dibimbing oleh Garis Panduan Jabatan. Perkara ini ada dijelaskan dalam kes Re Endon Tamseran; Ex P Parkash Singh Wasawa Singh [2009] 8 CLJ 379; [2009] 2 MLRH 200 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[13] In this case the KP JIM purportedly exercised his discretionary powers under s. 33A(1) of the Act to discharge the bankrupt of her bankruptcy. Here the KP's powers is also unfettered, subject only to the rights of the creditors to object. He is guided by his standard Departmental Guidelines…”

Maka, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa hujahan JC dalam isu ini bahawa JD seharusnya menyelesaikan sekurang-kurangnya 50% dari jumlah hutangnya sebelum KPI mengeluarkan sijil pelepasan menurut seksyen 33A Akta Tersebut adalah tidak bermerit. Isu 5 : Sama ada KPI telah menjalankan kuasa budi bicara dengan sewajarnya?

KPI dalam hujahan bertulis berhujah bahawa walaupun JD masih lagi berhutang kepada JC dan JC tidak menerima apa-apa bayaran dividen daripada KPI, namun jumlah yang masih terhutang adalah bukan satu-satunya faktor yang harus diberikan pemberatan. Dalam hal ini, KPI merujuk kepada kes Re Mohana Sundari M Subramaniam Ex P United Prime Corporation Bhd [2004] 5 MLJ 227; [2004] 1 CLJ 624; [2003] 3 MLRH 719 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “I am also of the view that the amount of the debt still owing to the creditor is not a factor which the court should place too much reliance on when considering an application to be discharged from bankruptcy. In the case of Re Siah Ooi Choe ex p Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (supra) the court held on this point inter alia as follows: With reference to the size of the debt, the Court agreed that it was a very big one, but there was no upper limit set by the Act beyond which discharge was barred. The huge amount of debt here merely reflected the fact that a big business when it failed, tended to fail in a big way and it was in recognition of this fact that no maximum amount was stipulated in the Act. …Based on this reasoning, I take the view that as the Act does not stipulate an upper limit beyond which discharge is barred, the fact that the debt owed by the judgment debtor is a big one should not be given too much weight if any at all.”

Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan KPI bahawa faktor ketiadaan pembayaran dividen kepada JC tidak seharusnya diberi penekanan yang tinggi oleh Mahkamah ini. Namun, ini tidak bermakna bahawa KPI seharusnya mengabaikan faktor ini secara keseluruhan dalam mempertimbangkan permohonan JC. Dalam hal ini, KPI perlu mengimbangi hak kedua-dua pihak dan perlu mengambil kira kesemua fakta di hadapan beliau sebelum membuat keputusan sebagaimana diputuskan dalam kes kes Mayban Finance Bhd v Lee Kee Sen [2014] 10 CLJ 543; [2013] MLRHU 454 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[7] Precisely for the reason that he is still relatively young and with a steady employment that I think that he should continue to honour the obligation to pay his debts even though the bankruptcy may not be totally his fault but contributed to by the state of the economy. Again, like the judgment creditor's counsel, the cases cited by Puan Zalina ie, Re Mohana 's case (supra ) and Public Bank Bhd v. Kok Lee Wah [2005] 5 CLJ 212; [2004] 4 MLJ 433 concern applications for discharge filed by the bankrupts themselves and there were evidence before the court that the bankruptcy were brought about by factors beyond their control. As Zulkefli J said in Mohana 's case (supra ) in considering the application for such a discharge, factors to be considered by the court are the report of the Official Assignee, the cause of the bankrupt's insolvency, his conduct relevant to it and subsequent to his insolvency as well as the interests of the public at large and commercial morality. However, this application being made by the DGI, not the bankrupt, the former bears the burden of justifying that the discharge is warranted and just in the circumstances of the case. What is just must be to achieve a delicate balance between the interests of the bankrupt to free himself from the chains of bankruptcy and the right of the judgment creditor, including his other creditors to receive the judgment sum.”

Rujukan juga dibuat kepada kes Re Benny Ong Swee Siang; Ex P United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd [2016] 8 MLJ 805; [2016] 3 CLJ 1001; [2015] MLRHU 1107 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[19] From my reading of ss. 33A and 33B of the Bankruptcy Act 1967, the DGI does not have the absolute discretion to issue the certificate of discharge. The DGI's exercise of the discretion is plainly subjected to the provisions in s. 33B. It must be made judiciously depending on the circumstances of each case. In the Supreme Court case of Savrimuthu Sinnapan v. PP [1987] 1 CLJ 368; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 322; [1987] 2 MLJ 173, Salleh Abas LP held that public interest, reason and justice demand that any statutory power must be exercised reasonably and with due consideration.”

Dalam membuat imbangan ini, Mahkamah tidak menafikan bahawa usia Penghutang Penghakiman dan tempoh pentadbiran estet si bankrap adalah salah satu faktor yang perlu diambil kira oleh KPI dalam memutuskan isu sama ada sijil pelepasan KPI wajar dikeluarkan. Dalam hal ini, KPI merujuk kepada kes Re Mohana Sundari (supra) dan kes Re Ang Ah Kang [1993] MLJU 656; [1994] 2 CLJ 738; [1993] 4 MLRH 488 untuk menyokong hujahan beliau.

Dalam kes Re Ang Ah Kang (supra) Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “Peguam berhujah lagi bahawa pemohon tidak mengambil apa-apa usaha untuk menebus maruahnya (redeem himself) dengan membuat sesuatu kerja rendah (humble occupation). Bagi menjawab hujah itu, terdapat penilaian Pegawai Pemegang Harta bahawa prospek pemohon untuk mendapat kerja adalah terlalu tipis, memandangkan umurnya yang, menurut wakil Pegawai Pemegang Harta, adalah 60 tahun. Saya telah menerima sebagai tidak munasabah mengharapkan pemohon dapat menceburkan diri dalam sesuatu pekerjaan, biarpun pekerjaan yang rendah…Pada pendapat saya adalah bertentangan dengan kepentingan awam sekiranya seseorang itu terus kekal sebagai seorang bankrap sedangkan keadaan itu tidak memberi guna kepada sesiapa.”

Namun, sebagaimana dihujahkan oleh peguam JC, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa faktor usia dan tempoh pentadbiran estet tersebut tidak wajar dilihat secara isolasi dan wajar dipertimbangkan secara kumulatif dengan faktor-faktor lain yang turut dipertimbangkan dalam kes-kes tersebut. Dalam kes Re Mohana Sundari (supra), di samping mempertimbangkan usia si bankrap telah mencecah 45 tahun pada masa yang material, Mahkamah turut mempertimbangkan bahawa JD telah menjadi penjamin kepada ayah beliau semasa berusia 25 tahun dan sedang menyumbang RM250.00 sebulan pada setiap bulan walaupun hanya memperolehi pendapatan RM500.00 sebulan. Perkara ini dapat dilihat dalam penghakiman Mahkamah seperti berikut:- “…In the present case when the judgment debtor applied for her discharge from bankruptcy, the senior assistant registrar increased her monthly instalments from RM250 to RM300 arbitrarily without first conducting an investigation into the affairs of the judgment debtor to determine if the judgment debtor was in a position to comply with the Order. It is my finding that with the judgment debtor's monthly income of RM500 it is definitely not sufficient to justify such an increase. It is noteworthy that the judgment debtor has made an effort to satisfy her creditors by earning an honest living. It is also to be noted that on the judgment debtor's application to court for a discharge from bankruptcy, after enduring almost 14 years of the same… As to the circumstances that have led her into bankruptcy, it is clear that she was asked to sign guarantees by her father at an age of 25. Being only 25 years of age at the time, the bankrupt must have been influenced by her father into signing the guarantees. These extenuating circumstances have placed the judgment debtor in an unusually adverse position…”

Maka, Mahkamah dalam kes tersebut telah mengambil kira keseluruhan fakta kes tersebut secara kumulatif, bersesama faktor usia si bankrap dan tempoh estet tersebut ditadbir semasa membuat permohonan untuk pelepasan di Mahkamah. Secara jelas, si bankrap tersebut telah menyumbang sekurang-kurangnya RM250 setiap bulan sebelum membuat permohonan tersebut. Dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah, tiada rekod yang menunjukkan bahawa JD pernah menyumbang dalam penyelesaian hutang beliau.

Sebagaimana dihujahkan KPI, baki kredit estet JD setakat 10.9.2023 adalah sebanyak RM1,905.50 sahaja. Dengan ketiadaan sebarang pembayaran dividen kepada JC, adalah selamat untuk Mahkamah membuat anggapan bahawa jumlah tersebut terhasil melalui deposit RM2,000.00 yang telah didepositkan oleh JC semasa memfailkan Petisyen Pemiutang, tanpa apa-apa sumbangan dari JD.

Seterusnya, dalam kes Re Ang Ah Kang (supra) pula, di samping mengambil kira usia si bankrap, Mahkamah turut telah mengambil kira fakta bahawa si bankrap telah menyumbang RM60 setiap bulan kepada estetnya dan telah menyumbang RM67,584.62 setakat lewat

Disamping itu, pemiutang dalam kes tersebut telah menerima RM30,000.00 hasil jualan harta yang dicagarkan. Maka, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa jumlah yang dibayar adalah hampir RM200,000.00 iaitu melebihi amaun pokok dan si bankrap hanya belum membayar faedah yang terakru. Maka, prinsip kes tersebut perlu dilihat dalam konteks latar belakang fakta yang dinyatakan di sini. Maka, usia JD dan tempoh pentadbiran estet JD semata-mata tidak seharusnya dijadikan faktor tunggal atau penentu dalam keputusan KPI dalam mengeluarkan sijil pelepasan di bawah seksyen 33A Akta Tersebut.

Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan JC bahawa tiada keterangan di hadapan Mahkamah bahawa KPI telah melaksanakan sebarang tindakan administratif menurut Akta Tersebut, antara lain memanggil mesyuarat pemiutang menurut seksyen 15 Akta Tersebut, menghubungi JD untuk menyelesaikan penyata hal ehwal menurut seksyen 16 Akta Tersebut, memohon pemeriksaan awam JD menurut seksyen 17 Akta Tersebut mahupun mengisytiharkan sebarang dividen kepada pemiutang. Perkara-perkara ini menunjukkan bahawa pernyataan KPI bahawa kes ini telah ditadbir selama 15 tahun tidak disokong dengan sebarang keterangan di hadapan Mahkamah.

Malah, estet si bankrap adalah estet yang tidak ditadbir dengan sewajarnya (unadministered estate) sebagaimana diputuskan dalam kes Re Benny Ong (supra) di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[22] In the circumstances, this is the situation of an unadministered estate in bankruptcy by reason that the procedures such as meeting of creditors, public examination of debtor and other administrative tasks as laid down in ss. to 17 and 40 to 69 of the Bankruptcy Act 1967 have not yet been undertaken to date. This can easily be contrasted with the s. 33A case of Re Endon Tamseran; Ex p Parkash Singh Wasawa Singh (supra ) relied by the DGI where all the assets of the bankrupt who was then 65 years old had been realised and there was no longer any more contribution pursuant to the administration of the estate.”

Dalam hal ini, Afidavit KPI adalah senyap berkenaan usaha-usaha yang diambil untuk mengesan JD bagi tujuan pemfailan Penyata Hal Ehwal yang merupakan langkah pertama sebelum tindakan administratif lain dilaksanakan seperti mengadakan Mesyuarat Pemiutang atau menjalankan Pemeriksaan Awam. Mahkamah sekali lagi merujuk kepada kes Re Benny Ong (supra) di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “.... I am thus not satisfied that the DGI has utilised all reasonable endeavours to locate him including making internet searches in this modern day of information technology. From the evidence adduced, the DGI has merely written two letters to the JD, to wit: once in 1999 and again in 2012. No other attempts were made to procure his attendance at the Insolvency

Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan JC bahawa prosedur Pemeriksaan Awam JD juga memainkan peranan penting dalam pentadbiran estet JD sebagaimana diputuskan Mahkamah dalam kes Lee Aik Chong (supra) seperti berikut:- “[20] During such examination, any creditor who has tendered a proof of debt or his representative authorised in writing may question the bankrupt concerning his affairs and conduct. The DGI shall also take part in the examination. The court may also put such question to the bankrupt as it thinks expedient. The bankrupt shall be examined upon oath, and it shall be his duty to answer all such questions as the court puts or allow to be put to him. [21] An examination of the bankrupt may be followed by the process of discovery of the bankrupt's property under s. 31 of the said Act where the bankrupt's wife (or husband) or any person known or suspected to have in his possession any of the estate or effects belonging to the bankrupt or supposed to be indebted to the bankrupt or any person whom the court deems capable of giving information respecting the bankrupt, his dealings or property may be summoned before the court.”

Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada seksyen 15(2) Akta Tersebut yang perlu dibaca bersama Jadual A kepada Akta Tersebut yang memperuntukkan prosedur perjalanan Mesyuarat Pemiutang. Menurut perenggan 2(b) kepada Jadual A, KPI perlu menyaman kesemua pemiutang yang dinyatakan dalam Penyata Hal Ehwal JD, Pemiutang yang telah memfailkan Bukti Hutang mereka dan si bankrap untuk Mesyuarat Pemiutang yang Pertama. Mahkamah sedia maklum bahawa pindaan telah dibuat kepada Jadual A melalui Akta Insolvensi (Pindaan) 2023 yang berkuatkuasa pada 6.10.2023, di mana perenggan 1 kepada Jadual yang menghendaki KPI mengadakan Mesyuarat Pemiutang Pertama dalam tempoh 3 bulan dari tarikh Perintah Kebankrapan melalui Petisyen Pemiutang telah dipadam (deleted).

Namun, pindaan tersebut tidak membawa maksud bahawa KPI boleh melengah-lengahkan Mesyuarat Pemiutang Pertama yang perlu diadakan menurut seksyen 15(2) Akta Tersebut. Seksyen 54(2) Akta Tafisiran 1948 dan 1967 dengan jelas memperuntukkan bahawa sekiranya sesuatu statut tidak menetapkan tempoh masa tertentu membuat sesuatu tindakan, maka tindakan tersebut perlu dilaksanakan pada kesegeraan yang praktik. Dalam menjelaskan prinsip ini, Mahkamah dalam kes Yap Chung Chong v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2022] MLJU 2966; [2022] 1 LNS 2715 memutuskan bahawa:- “[7] When no time period is prescribed in legislation, reference is made to subsection 54(2) of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 which states: "54. (2) Where no time is prescribed within which anything shall be done, that thing shall be done with all convenient speed and as often as the prescribed occasion arises." [Emphasis added] [8] Subsection 54(2) of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 provides that when there is no time prescribed in a peace of legislation, anything shall be done with all convenient speed. What then does all convenient speed entail? To answer this question, this court alluded to authorities. Reference was made to the case of Chua Kian Voon v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors [2020] 1 CLJ 747. [9] From the cases cited, the question of whether there has been a delay or otherwise; whether it was done with all convenient speed is a matter of facts…”

Dalam kes ini, adalah tidak munasabah bagi KPI untuk masih tidak mengadakan Mesyuarat Pemiutang yang Pertama sebagaimana dikehendaki menurut Akta Tersebut tanpa sebarang alasan yang munasabah, walaupun KPI mendakwa telah mentadbir estet JD selama 15 tahun.

Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah tidak seharusnya mengabaikan fakta bahawa JD yang bertanggungjawab menyelesaikan hutang JC tidak pernah mengambil sebarang inisiatif untuk menyelesaikan hutang tersebut dan sekiranya permohonan JC tidak dibenarkan Mahkamah, maka JC akan dihalang oleh had masa untuk mengambil sebarang tindakan pelaksanaan yang lain. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah dalam kes Re Benny Ong (supra) memutuskan bahawa:- “[23] That notwithstanding, I also took into consideration the plight of the JC in that there has been no recovery of the judgment debt to date from the JD which ought to have been the dividends paid out from the realisation of the assets of the JD. If the certificate of discharge is issued, the JD gets off scot-free. It is also too late in the day for the JC to seek other modes of enforcement of judgment pursuant to O. 45 to 52 of the Rules of Court 2012 by virtue of the Limitation Act 1953. [24] In the premises, I find it is just and expedient that the appeal should be allowed. Accordingly the DGI should forthwith procure the attendance of the bankrupt JD and commence the administration of the estate in bankruptcy.”

Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa sekiranya keputusan KPI dikekalkan walaupun JD tidak membuat sebarang pembayaran terhadap hutang pemiutang, dan tiada merit yang mewajarkan pelepasan JD menurut seksyen 33A Akta Tersebut, maka keputusan tersebut akan bertentangan dengan moraliti komersil sebagaimana diputuskan dalam kes Lim Hun Swee (supra) di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- "The public as well as commercial players should not be imbued with the perception that a person can easily borrow money (even in big amount) from financial institutions or create debts with other business creditors, then stash the money away, whether in his own name or any other persons and need not be repaid; then personally apply for a bankruptcy order against him (as in the present case) and after a short period apply for an order for a discharge with a minimum or too little dividend to be paid to the creditors, and after the discharge he can enjoy a luxury life. If this practice and perception is not checked, then commercial morality would decline. In this type of fiasco, the court and the DGI should be blamed for not carrying out their duties effectively under the bankruptcy law.".

Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan JC bahawa KPI masih belum mentadbir estet si bankrap dengan sewajarnya. Maka, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa KPI tidak melaksanakan budi bicara di bawah seksyen 33A Akta Tersebut dengan sewajarnya apabila mengeluarkan notis niat untuk mengeluarkan sijil pelepasan menurut seksyen 33A.

Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah dengan ini membenarkan permohonan JC untuk menghalang KPI dari mengeluarkan sijil pelepasan Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi selama 2 tahun menurut seksyen 33B(6)(b) Akta Tersebut dari 22.11.2023 sehingga 21.11.2025. Mahkamah menggunakan budi bicara untuk tidak membuat sebarang perintah terhadap kos. Bertarikh: 22 November 2023 Disediakan oleh, ………………………………….

Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi Jabatan Insolvensi Malaysia Cawangan Johor Bahru Tingkat 12, Menara Tabung Haji, Jalan Ayer Molek, 80720 Johor Bahru, Johor … Puan Jumsah Binti Suratman dan

Tetuan Chee Siah Le Kee & Partners Peguamcara Pemohon/ Pemiutang Penghakiman 2B, Jalan KLJ 4, Taman Kota Laksamana Jaya 75200 Melaka … Ms. Nur Fatehah Binti Roslan Kes-kes yang dirujuk:

Goh Teng Whoo & Anor v Ample Objectives Sdn Bhd [2021] 3 MLJ 159; [2021] 4

CLJ 348; [2021] 2 MLRA 682; [2021] 3 AMR 881 OCBC Bank (Malaysia) Bhd v Tiong Chiong Hieh & Ors [2023] MLJU 1000; [2023] 7 CLJ 465; [2023] 5 MLRH 237; [2023] 5 AMR 887

Dalip Bhagwan Singh v PP [1998] 1 MLJ 1; [1997] 4 CLJ 645; [1997] 1 MLRA 653; [1997] 4 AMR 4029

Lim Hun Swee v Malaysia British Assurance Bhd & Ors and Other Appeals [2011] 2 MLJ 218; [2010] 8 CLJ 680; [2010] 2 MLRA 392; [2011] 1 AMCR 157

Lee Aik Chong v Perdana Merchant Bankers Bhd [2014] 8 CLJ 509; [2013]

MLRHU 1085; [2014] 2 AMR 64 Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Bassanio Teo Yang [2009] MLJU 313; [2009] 9 CLJ 413; [2009] 2 MLRH 668; [2009] AMEJ 0407

Dato’ Lim Huah Leong v Engtex Marketing Sdn Bhd [2016] 5 MLRA 457

Quek Siew Eng v Malayan Banking Berhad [2023] 1 MLJ 99; [2023] 1 CLJ 884; [2023] 2 MLRA 209; [2023] 1 AMR 413

Re Endon Tamseran; Ex P Parkash Singh Wasawa Singh [2009] 8 CLJ 379; [2009] 2 MLRH 200

Re Benny Ong Swee Siang; Ex P United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd [2016] 8

MLJ 805; [2016] 3 CLJ 1001; [2015] MLRHU 1107 Re Mohana Sundari M Subramaniam Ex P United Prime Corporation Bhd [2004] 5 MLJ 227; [2004] 1 CLJ 624; [2003] 3 MLRH 719

Mayban Finance Bhd v Lee Kee Sen [2014] 10 CLJ 543; [2013] MLRHU 454

Re Ang Ah Kang [1993] MLJU 656; [1994] 2 CLJ 738; [1993] 4 MLRH 488

Yap Chung Chong v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2022] MLJU 2966; [2022] 1 LNS 2715