Liziz Plantation Sdn Bhd v Liew Ah Yong (AA-24NCvC-82-02/2020)

The Plaintiff filed this action on 21-2-2020 against the Defendant for inter alia an Order that private caveats lodged by the latter be removed pursuant to section 327 of the National Land Code 1965 (“NLC”). The Plaintiff claims amongst others that the entry of these private caveats was wrongful 30 and seeks damages pursuant to section 329 of the NLC. 31/07/2023 09:32:35 AA-24NCvC-82-02/2020 Kand. 44 S/N euIqKrnegUG6dWq6qvyTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2

The private caveats were lodged under Presentation Number 42/2020 dated 7-1-2020 (hereinafter referred to as the “private caveats”) over the lands held under issued documents of title PN 10052, PN 10051, HS(D) 702 Mukim Relai and HS (D) 1644, HS (D) 3928, HS (D) 3927 and HS (D) 3926 Mukim 35 Ulu Nenggiri, Jajahan Gua Musang, Negeri Kelantan (hereinafter referred to as “the said Lands”).

On 11-3-2020, the Defendant took out an application vide Enclosure 5

the High Court to another High Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction;

….

….

….. the High Court Judge or the Judge of the Sessions Court or Magistrate, as the case may be, shall take into consideration 90 whether the High Court or the Subordinate Court which shall hear the case is located at or nearest the place where –

(A) the cause of action arose;

(B) the defendant, or one of several defendants, resides or has his place of business; 95 S/N euIqKrnegUG6dWq6qvyTA (C ) the facts on which the proceedings are based exist or are alleged to have occurred;

(D) the land the ownership of which is disputed is situated; or

(E) for other reasons it is desirable in the interests of justice that the proceedings should be transferred. 100 (emphasis was placed by the Defendant on the parts in bold and underlined). [8] Both the Plaintiff and the Defendant are on common ground that no one single factor will prevail over the other. For this principle, the Defendant relies 105 upon the authority of Gasing Potensi Construction Sdn Bhd v Hyper Act Marketing Sdn Bhd [2019] 1 LNS 407 a decision of Mohd Radzi Harun JC (as His Lordship then was). The Plaintiff on the other hand relied upon the case authority of KW Aquatic Supplies Sdn Bhd v MERP Technologies Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 CLJ 403, a decision of Ahmad Shahrir Mohd Salleh JC and 110 that of Megarina Sdn Bhd v Enersafe Sdn Bhd [2002] 5 CLJ 478, a decision of Nik Hashim J (as His Lordship then was) for the proposition that where the law provides for several factors and uses the function word of “or” to indicate an alternative, they must be construed disjunctively and therefore so long as the Plaintiff can satisfy one of the factors the action can remain in 115 the Court in which the action was initiated. S/N euIqKrnegUG6dWq6qvyTA [9] In KW Aquatic Supplies Sdn Bhd v MERP Technologies Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 CLJ 403 at 414 para 34, Ahmad Shahrir Mohd Salleh JC went further to hold that:- 120 “On the face of equally acceptable grounds for the transfer of proceedings ….and for the proceedings to remain…, this court in the interest of justice, has to delve further into the facts and attempt to sieve determinant factors to assist in coming to a decision. In the case of Low Long Yoong & Anor v Lok Kok Choon & Anor [2014] 4 CLJ 577, 125 [2014] 2 MLJ 725 HC, His Lordship Nantha Balan JC (then HCJ, at the time of Ahmad Shahrir Mohd Salleh JC’s judgment and now JCA at the time of writing this judgment) was of the view that the most important task is to ascertain which court had the closest nexus in the dispute. In the circumstances of this case, I would readily subscribe to this view.” 130 [10] In seeking to persuade this Court that the Transfer Application ought to be allowed, the Defendant asserts in the Transfer Application that: i) the said Lands are situated in Kelantan; 135 ii) as the private caveats were entered at the Land and Mines Office in Kelantan, the cause of action arose in Kelantan; S/N euIqKrnegUG6dWq6qvyTA iii) the proceedings in this action will have a bearing on the registered owner of the said Lands namely the Perbadanan Menteri Besar of Kelantan; and 140 iv) while the Defendant’s residential address is listed in Ipoh, he currently resides in Kuala Terengganu where his business is based and where he spends most of his time. Analysis of the Defendant’s submissions 145 [11] In analyzing the grounds relied upon by the Defendant, I am required by O 57 R 1 (4) (supra) to take into consideration the factors set out in sub-paragraphs (A) to (E) of this sub-Rule which I have set out in paragraph [7] above. From here on, references to sub-paragraphs (A) to (E) shall mean 150 references to sub-paragraphs (A), (B), (C), (D) or (E) of O 57 R 1 (4) as the case may be. [12] From the grounds of the Transfer Application relied upon by the Defendant and from the Affidavits filed by the Defendant, two factors 155 contained in sub-paragraphs (A) and (C) were said to be in the Defendant’s favour namely that because the private caveats had been entered in the Land and Mines Office in Kelantan the cause of action arose in Kelantan and S/N euIqKrnegUG6dWq6qvyTA closely related to this is that the act of lodgment of these private caveats in Kelantan would be part of the existence of facts on which the proceedings are 160 based and are alleged to have occurred in Kelantan. Needless to say, the High Court at Kota Bahru is in the state of Kelantan. [13] The Defendant submitted that he currently resides in Kuala Terengganu in the state of Terengganu and by reason thereto the requirement for the 165 factor in sub-paragraph (B) is not met. More will be said on this later. [14] That the Defendant has no dispute over who owns the interest in the said Lands meant that the factor in sub-paragraph (D) was not relevant to the Transfer Application. 170 [15] The Defendant submitted that the proceedings in this action will have a bearing on the registered owner of the said Lands namely the Perbadanan Menteri Besar of Kelantan. However, the action herein is for the removal of 175 private caveats over the said Lands. With the Perbadanan Menteri Besar being not a party to this action, the latter will not be bound by any order made: Dr Lourdes Dava Raj A/L Curuz Durai Raj v Dr Milton Lum Siew Wah & Anor [2020] MLJU 1144. 180 S/N euIqKrnegUG6dWq6qvyTA [16] The Defendant went on to submit that the Transfer Application was not a delaying tactic and although he had filed another suit against the Plaintiff and two others in Ipoh High Court Originating Summons No. AA-24NCC-3- 02/2020, he did so because the Ipoh High Court was the forum conveniens for that matter. That such a submission is made, would suggest that the 185 Defendant was very much aware that in the event the Transfer Application were to be allowed, the proceedings in this action will be delayed with its attendant increase in costs as the matter will take some time to be transferred to the High Court at Kota Bharu and for the matter to be re-scheduled into the High Court’s list at Kota Bharu. This does not augur well for the underlying 190 need for the just, expeditious and economical disposal of the action. [17] In considering the factors in sub-paragraph (A) and (C) on where the cause of action arose and the facts on which proceedings were based exist or were alleged to have occurred, the Defendant helpfully referred to the case of 195 RHB Bank Bhd (previously known as United Malayan Banking Corp Bhd and then as Sime Bank Bhd) v Wong Kok Leong (as executor and trustee of the estate of Wong Kwong Wah, deceased) & Ors [2017] 4 MLJ 281 where the Federal Court cited with approval the case of Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Kamarstone Sdn Bhd [2014] 2 MLJ 749 which had 200 S/N euIqKrnegUG6dWq6qvyTA reviewed a number of authorities and adopted with approval the definition of cause of action as:-

“a factual situation the existence of which entitled one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another….., ”;

“the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim, the phrase comprises every fact which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment…..”; and

“that which makes the action possible.....” 210 [18] It follows that just because the private caveats were entered at the Land and Mines Office in Kelantan it does not necessarily mean that the cause of action arose in Kelantan. As settled by the Federal Court in the case of RHB Bank Bhd (previously known as United Malayan Banking Corp Bhd and then as Sime Bank Bhd) v Wong Kok Leong (as executor and trustee of 215 the estate of Wong Kwong Wah, deceased) & Ors (supra) the entire set of facts has to be taken into account. and the entry of the caveats is but only one of the facts to be taken into account because it cannot be denied that an entry simpliciter does not ipso facto means it is unlawful: Luggage Distributors (M) Sdn Bhd v Tan Hor Teng & Anor [1995] 3 CLJ 520. 220 S/N euIqKrnegUG6dWq6qvyTA [19] The grounds relied upon for the lodgment of the private caveats are also facts which make up the cause of action. [20] A perusal of the forms and accompanying statutory declarations filed 225 for the entry of the private caveats and exhibited in Enclosure 2 show that the grounds were settled in Kuala Lumpur with the Defendant declaring that his address is at No. 2, Laluan Bercham Selatan 3/3, Taman Boulevard Timur, 31400 Ipoh, Perak claiming that he is entering the private caveats as a beneficiary shareholder of the Plaintiff with its registered address at No. 81, 230 Tingkat 1, Jalan Market, Ipoh, 31400 Perak and a business address at No. 27A Jalan Perajurit Ipoh Garden East Ipoh, 31400 Perak. It is, therefore, arguable where the cause of action arose and where the facts on which the proceedings are based exist or alleged to have occurred but as will be seen later in this Judgment, in my opinion, these factors in sub-paragraph (A) and 235

(C) do not have a determinative effect on whether the Transfer Application ought to be allowed. [21] Before I leave the analysis of the Defendant’s submissions, it would be fair to the Defendant to mention that in both his written submissions, the 240 Defendant underscored the points that the cause of action did not arise in Ipoh but in Kelantan and he does not reside or have his place of business in S/N euIqKrnegUG6dWq6qvyTA Ipoh and although he concedes that there was never any dispute that this Honourable Court has jurisdiction over the action, it is not the forum coveniens. Reliance is placed by the Defendant on the authority of Malacca 245 Securities Sdn Bhd v Loke Yu [1999] 6 MLJ 112 a decision of His Lordship Augustine Paul J ( as he then was) for the principle that: “the critical issue for determination is whether this court is the forum conveniens to hear the dispute notwithstanding the fact that 250 it has jurisdiction to do so.” [22] It is appropriate to observe that in the case of Malacca Securities Sdn Bhd, His Lordship Augustine Paul J was then deciding on a transfer application premised not upon the provisions of O 57 R 1 but upon the 255 provisions of section 23 (1) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (hereinafter referred to as “CJA”) which are as follows: Subject to the limitations contained in Article 128 of the Constitution the High Court shall have jurisdiction to try all civil proceedings where – 260

the cause of action arose; or

the defendant or one of several defendants resides or has his place of business; or S/N euIqKrnegUG6dWq6qvyTA

the facts on which the proceedings are based exist or alleged to have occurred; or 265

any land the ownership of which is disputed is situated, within the local jurisdiction of the Court and notwithstanding anything contained in this section in any case where all parties consent in writing within the local jurisdiction of the other High Court. 270 [23] The question then arises whether the added factor in sub-paragraph (E) “for other reasons it is desirable in the interest of justice” is ultra-vires section 23 (1) CJA and need not be considered. In my opinion, it is not because it cannot be gainsaid that the High Court was set up by the Federal Constitution to do justice and underlying its duty to do so, it should always have in the 275 forefront of its mind, the interest of justice. In Malacca Securities Sdn Bhd (supra) itself at pages 119 -120, Augustine Paul J said :- “The result is that a plaintiff is entitled to file an action in any branch of the High Court in Malaya regardless of whether the 280 cause of action arose in another state.....( at page 119 second paragraph) In declining to exercise jurisdiction a court does so not on grounds of convenience but of the suitability or appropriateness of another S/N euIqKrnegUG6dWq6qvyTA tribunal in the interests of all parties and for the ends of 285 justice......(at page 119 last paragraph followed through to page 120 first paragraph) (emphasis added) [24] Thus, what is set out in sub-paragraph (E) of O 57 R 1 (4) is only to express what is undeniably implicit in the Court’s duty to do take into account 290 what is desirable to meet the interest or ends of justice. Factor of “for other reasons it is desirable in the interest of justice” in O 57 R

295 [25] The factor in sub-paragraph (E) requires the Judge to be satisfied that the proceedings in this Court can be conveniently or fairly tried in some other Court and one of the factors that has to be considered is whether it is desirable in the interests of justice to have the proceedings transferred to the other Court. 300 [26] In my opinion, the added factor of “for other reasons it is desirable in the interest of justice” was expressly set out in O 57 R 1 (4) because the ROC 2012 has brought in a new regime in the disposal of cases whereby the progress of the case was no longer left in the hands of the litigants but with 305 the Court in the driver’s seat: see Hong Leong Finance Bhd v Low Thiam S/N euIqKrnegUG6dWq6qvyTA Hoe & Another Appeal [2016] 1 MLJ 301 Federal Court at para [18] as per Zulkifli CJ Malaya (as his Lordship then was). Although, this was decided in the context of an application to amend a defence, the underlying jurisprudence of the new regime for the need to secure the just, expeditious 310 and economical disposal of the action is of general application. In the context of this Transfer Application under O 57 R 1, this underlying jurisprudence should be borne in mind. [27] The Defendant had very helpfully collated in his Bundle of Authorities in 315 Enclosure 27 several authorities on the construction and application of O 57 R 1. On these authorities in my opinion:-

the additional factor in sub-paragraph (E) was not discussed 320 and applied in the cases of Gasing Potensi Construction Sdn Bhd v Hyper Act Marketing Sdn Bhd [2019] 1 LNS 407 and Low Long Yoong & Anor v Low Kok Choon & Anor [2014] 2 MLJ 725;

(ii) the case of Raja Thangiah v Baldev Singh Bhar [2001] 7 CLJ 325 130 HC was decided before the introduction of O 57 R 1; and

(iii) the Federal Court authority of Hap Seng Plantations (River Estates) Sdn Bhd v Excess Interpoint Sdn Bhd & Anor S/N euIqKrnegUG6dWq6qvyTA [2016] 3 MLJ 553 in dealing with the power to transfer any proceeding to any other Court held that paragraph 12 of the 330 Schedule to the CJA has to be read in the light of section 3 of the CJA and O 57 R 1 and the FC went on to hold that the High Court in Malaya does not have the jurisdiction to transfer any proceeding in the High Court in Malaya to the High Court in Sabah & Sarawak because local jurisdiction is defined to mean 335 the territory comprised in the states of Malaya and a transfer of proceedings in the context of O 57 R 1 (4) ROC can only mean the power to transfer within the territorial jurisdiction of either the High Court in Malaya or High Court in Sabah & Sarawak. 340 [28] None of the cases referred to above by the Defendant dealt with the factor in sub-paragraph (E) of “for other reasons it is desirable in the interest of justice” which gives the Court the discretion to take into account other reasons in the interest of justice which the Court strives to serve. Whether it would be in the interest of justice to allow the transfer would be dependent 345 upon the facts of each case. [29] The Defendant cited two other cases where the transfer applications were allowed; Dalam Harta Pusaka Tasir Guntat, Yusoff Che Hat v Salbiah S/N euIqKrnegUG6dWq6qvyTA Khamis & Anor [2014] 1 LNS 1254 and Lim Guan Eng v FZ Sdn Bhd & 350 Anor [2015] 8 MLJ 469. The first case was an administration of estate case and the other a defamation case, both of which have to be tried with witnesses and where in the former, the mobility of one of the witnesses in attending Court weighed heavily in the mind of the learned Judge. As will be seen later, the importance of the mobility of witnesses attending Court is now 355 of much less importance. However, it is to be observed that in Dalam Harta Pusaka Tasir Guntat, Yusoff Che Hat, Wong Teck Meng JC (as His Lordship then was) at paragraph 46 of his judgment in dealing with the transfer application made pursuant to O 57 R 1 (4) grounded his decision on the “in the interest of justice” provision and eloquently said the Court is the 360 “…protector of justice…..” Application of sub-paragraph (E) – “for other reasons it is desirable in the interest of justice” 365 [30] I now turn to consider the facts and in particular the underlying premise of this action. [31] The action is for the removal of the private caveats lodged by the Defendant over the said Lands. 370 S/N euIqKrnegUG6dWq6qvyTA [32] It is not disputed by the parties that the Plaintiff has an interest in the said Lands in the form of a lease of the said Lands for 66 years. [33] Both the learned counsel for the Plaintiff and the Defendant agreed when asked during the hearing of the Transfer Application on 3-9-2020 that 375 the critical issue in the main action is whether the Defendant who lodged the private caveats has any registrable interest in or a right to claim title to the said Lands. [34] Without deciding on the merits of the action, my view is that this critical 380 issue is a question of law which can be tried without the necessity of calling witnesses as the facts of lodgment of the private caveats, why and where they were lodged have been set out in the Affidavits filed in this action and are undisputed. It only remains to be decided whether as a matter of law, the lodgments were lawful. 385 [35] In Luggage Distributors (M) Sdn Bhd v Tan Hor Teng & Anor [1995] 3 CLJ 520, the Court of Appeal said that: “In considering an application for the removal of a caveat, the 390 procedure to be adopted should be a simple and summary S/N euIqKrnegUG6dWq6qvyTA one with the first stage being to examine the grounds expressed in the application for the caveat and once the Court is satisfied that the caveator’s claim amounts in law to a caveatable interest, it must then go on to consider whether the claim discloses a 395 serious question meriting a trial. After these two stages have been crossed, the Court must decide where the balance of convenience lies. “ (emphasis added) [36] Based upon the authority of Luggage Distributors (M) Sdn Bhd, the 400 factors of where the cause of action arose and where the facts on which the proceedings are based exist or are alleged to have occurred would not be determinative of the Transfer Application by reason of the procedure that is to be adopted for the purposes of the hearing of this action. Pursuant to this procedure, the action can just as conveniently and fairly be tried in this Court. 405 [37] More importantly, with the proceedings in this action having reached an advanced stage of being ready for hearing it would not be in the interest of justice to have the action transferred to another Court as a transfer would not secure the just, expeditious and economical disposal of the action. 410 S/N euIqKrnegUG6dWq6qvyTA [38] In the prescribed forms for the lodgment of the private caveats viz., Form 19B and the statutory declarations affirmed by the Defendant accompanying the prescribed forms which were exhibited in the affidavit in support of the main action (Enclosure 2) and also referred to by the Defendant 415 in his Transfer Application, the Defendant had affirmed that his address is at No. 2, Laluan Bercham Selatan 3/3, Taman Boulevard Timur, 31400 Ipoh, Perak. This amply supports the Plaintiff’s submission that the factor in sub-paragraph (B) has been complied with and the action should remain in this branch of the High Court in Malaya. 420 [39] On top of that, a perusal of the affidavits filed by the Defendant in support of the Transfer Application in Enclosures 6 and 20 show that he had affirmed that his place of residence is that of No. 2, Laluan Bercham Selatan 3/3, Taman Boulevard Timur, 31400 Ipoh, Perak. O 41 R 1 (4) ROC 425 mandates that every affidavit shall inter alia state the place of residence of the deponent. Having affirmed statutory declarations and affidavits that he resides in Ipoh, it does not lie in the mouth of the Defendant to say otherwise. [40] It follows that for purposes of this Transfer Application, this Court should 430 give little weight to the Defendant’s averment that he currently resides in Kuala Terengganu. In any event, his residing in Kuala Terengganu does not in S/N euIqKrnegUG6dWq6qvyTA any way aid his Transfer Application to have the action transferred to the High Court in Malaya at Kota Bahru for purposes of compliance with the factor in sub-paragraph (B). It would be absurd if any one defendant can seek a 435 transfer of proceedings just by relocating to another local jurisdiction in the course of proceedings and inviting the Court to play catch-up. [41] The Defendant also submitted during oral submissions on 3-9-2020 that in the event an Order is granted for the private caveats to be removed, 440 witnesses from all over including witnesses from Kota Bharu including the defendant who is now in Gua Musang will have to be called for the assessment of damages. [42] However, with all due respect to the Defendant, this is a bare averment 445 or more commonly known as making a submission from the Bar without any supporting materials to support the same and the Court will not take it into consideration. It is also premature at this stage as it is yet to be determined whether the Plaintiff’s action would be allowed and whether there would be any assessment of damages, if at all, and if so by who, when and where. 450 [43] In any event, with the experience gained in using remote communication technology in dealing with the Movement Control Order, S/N euIqKrnegUG6dWq6qvyTA Conditional Movement Control Order and the Recovery Movement Control Order that is extant and which were necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic, 455 the physical location of any one litigant or witness and the issue of having to physically travel to any Court has become very much less important. [44] The need for counsel, litigants and witnesses to physically travel to the Court for the hearing of their matters is getting less and less. Hearings and 460 meetings can now be done and are, by reason of the COVID-19 pandemic, encouraged to be done electronically via a variety of internet platforms2 such as “Zoom” or “Skype” not to mention that there are other platforms as well such as “Google Duo”, “Google Hangouts”, “MS Teams” and “Adobe Connect.”3 465 [45] In fact, with the aid of video conferencing and given the restrictions in air travel caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, you can, for example, have a Court sitting in the British Virgin Islands (“BVI”) conducting a trial with participation by counsel from the United Kingdom, solicitors from Singapore and Hong 470 1 http://www.kehakiman.gov.my/sites/default/files/2020-04/Press%20Release%2017%20April%202020.pdf 2http://www.kehakiman.gov.my/sites/default/files/Kenyataan%20Media%20PKPMP%2012%20Jun%202020%20- %20Perbicaraan%20Kes%20Secara%20Sidang%20Video%20Bagi%20Mahkamah%20Persekutuan%20dan%20Mahk amah%20Rayuan%20di%20Sabah%20dan%20Sarawak.pdf 3 http://www.kehakiman.gov.my/sites/default/files/2020- 03/KENYATAAN%20MEDIA%20PKPMP%2026.3.2020%20- %20PEMAKLUMAN%20PENDENGARAN%20KES%20SECARA%20DALAM%20TALIAN%20SEMASA%20TEMPOH%20PE RINTAH%20KAWALAN%20PERGERAKAN.pdf S/N euIqKrnegUG6dWq6qvyTA Kong and witnesses from Hong Kong, Australia and Malaysia all from the comfort of their respective offices or homes without having to fly out to the Court in the BVI.4 If this can be done across countries, what more is to be said about the importance and necessity, if any, of litigants and witnesses residing in Malaysia having to be physically present in a particular branch of 475 the High Court in Malaya. [46] The Malaysian Courts have kept up with the march of technology. Case management of cases by way of e-reviews5 is widely used and paperless hearings with the aid of technology in the Federal Court has commenced this 480 year. 6 [47] The first virtual hearing with the parties being not physically present in Court was conducted by the Court of Appeal via tele-conferencing on 23-4- 2020 and live-streamed to the public with the three learned Judges comprising 485 the panel of the Court of Appeal hearing the matter seated separately in each 4 https://maples.com/en/Knowledge-Centre/Analysis-and-Insights/2020/07/Maples-Group-Acts-in-BVI-Commercial-Courts-First-Remote-Trial 5 https://intranet.kehakiman.gov.my/EAA/arahanamalan/73491-2020-EAA.pdf 6 http://www.kehakiman.gov.my/sites/default/files/Kenyataan%20Media%20PKPMP%205.6.2020%20- %20Persidangan%20Kes%20Mahkamah%20Persekutuan%20Malaysia%20Menggunakan%20Sistem%20e-Appellate%20pada%209%20Jun%202020_0.pdf S/N euIqKrnegUG6dWq6qvyTA of their chambers/homes and the learned counsel for the parties seated in their own respective office/home.7 [48] Recently, in SS Precast Sdn Bhd v Serba Dinamik Group Bhd & 9 490 Others [2020] MLJU 400, Wong Kian Kheong J conducted three applications through “Skype“ and decided that even if the Plaintiff had objected to the use of video conferencing (“VC”), in view of the fundamental right of the defendants: 495 “to have access to justice as guaranteed under Article 5 (1) FC, the court would nevertheless exercise its discretion to proceed with the VC in the interest of justice under O 32 rr 10 and 11 (1) read with O 1A and O 2 R 1(2) RC.” 500 Conclusion [49] In my view, in the circumstances of this case and given the increasing acceptance of remote communication technology, it would not be in the 505 interest of justice to allow the Transfer Application. It would not secure the just, expeditious and economical disposal of the action. Accordingly, I had 7 http://www.kehakiman.gov.my/sites/default/files/2020-04/Press%20Release%20- S/N euIqKrnegUG6dWq6qvyTA after hearing counsel for the Plaintiff and Defendant on 3-9-2020, dismissed the Transfer Application in Enclosure 5 with costs of RM20,000 subject to the payment of allocator bearing in mind the application was heard pursuant to a 510 Certificate of Urgency, the seniority of counsel involved and the amount of materials, submissions and authorities that have to be considered. [50] I end by thanking counsel for both the Plaintiff and the Defendant for the submissions they have made which made it easier for me to put up this 515 judgment and I mean no discourtesy to counsel, if I did not make mention of any of the other authorities they have cited as it was not necessary to do so for the reasons I have expressed in coming to the decision I have made. Dated : 7 September 2020 520 ( SU TIANG JOO ) Judicial Commissioner 525 High Court of Malaya Ipoh, Perak 530 S/N euIqKrnegUG6dWq6qvyTA Parties: Counsel for the Plaintiff/Respondent C.T. Tenh together with S.K. Tenh Messrs C K Lim, Tenh & Chong 535 Advocates and Solicitors Ipoh, Perak Counsel for the Defendant/Applicant Manshan Singh a/l Jeswender Singh together with Elizabeth Goh Yeek Li 540 Messrs Skrine Advocates and Solicitors Kuala Lumpur S/N euIqKrnegUG6dWq6qvyTA