Loh Gwo Fynne v Gwo-Burne Loh (WA-22NCvC-815-12/2021)

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA CIVIL SUIT NO. WA-22NCvC-815-12/2021 Between Loh Gwo Fynne (NRIC No: 780821-71-5055) … Plaintiff And

1. Loh Gwo-Burne (NRIC No: 740226-71-5097)

2. Loh Gwo-Tynde (NRIC No: 760123-71-5199) … Defendants GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction

1. In the quiet aftermath of a patriarch’s passing, what should have been a period of mourning and orderly transition instead became a theatre of attrition and familial fracture. The law of succession is designed to provide a clear pathway for the transmission of a deceased’s estate, governed by the testator’s final wishes and the executor’s fiduciary duty. When an 06/07/2026 17:09:55 WA-22NCvC-815-12/2021 Kand. 107 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 executor is appointed, they step into a role of profound responsibility, holding the estate not for their own benefit but in trust for those who are to come after.

2. Instead, this estate descended into discord. What ought to have been a process of measured administration became, regrettably, a source of suspicion, recrimination, and sustained familial fracture. The plaintiff, Loh Gwo Fynne, the youngest son of the late Loh Mui Fah (“the deceased”), now finds himself in entrenched litigation against his elder brother, the first defendant, Loh Gwo-Burne, who was appointed the sole executor and trustee of the deceased’s estate. The plaintiff contends that the first defendant has fundamentally failed in the discharge of that office through a prolonged pattern of opacity, inertia, and disregard for the obligations imposed upon an executor.

3. The dispute ultimately converges upon a single but significant question of whether the conduct of the first defendant in administering the estate has so compromised the welfare of the beneficiaries and the due administration of the estate that this Court ought to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction to remove him from office.

4. The plaintiff paints the picture of an executor who has been inert in administration, secretive in conduct, and derelict in fiduciary responsibility. The defendants, by contrast, portray the first defendant as a conscientious steward working through legal **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 complexities, practical obstacles, and external disruptions in an earnest effort to preserve the estate for the benefit of all concerned.

5. The Court is not concerned with the emotional currents that often accompany disputes of this nature, though they are plainly present here. Probate litigation between siblings rarely unfolds in an atmosphere of detachment. Yet the jurisdiction to remove an executor is neither punitive nor sentimental. It is exercised to safeguard the proper administration of the estate and the interests of those beneficially entitled to it. Having considered the voluminous documentary record, and the careful submissions advanced on both sides, the Court’s task is to move beyond accusation and counter-accusation and to apply, with principled detachment, the settled principles governing trusts and probate administration. The question is not whether the relationship between the parties has broken down, plainly it has, but whether the administration of the estate itself can properly and safely continue under the stewardship of the first defendant. Background Facts

6. The genesis of this dispute begins with the demise of the deceased on 3 August 2017, at the University of Malaya Medical Centre, following a period of illness. He was survived by his three sons, the first defendant, Loh Gwo-Burne, the eldest; the second defendant, the middle son; and the plaintiff, **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 Loh Gwo Fynne, the youngest. Prior to his death, the deceased had executed a will on 15 November 2011 (“the 2011 Will"). The terms of this instrument were straightforward and unambiguous. It appointed the first defendant as the sole executor and trustee, with the plaintiff designated as the substitute executor should the first defendant failed to act. The deceased bequeathed his entire residuary estate to his three sons in equal shares. Crucially, clause 3 of the 2011 Will contained a specific directive that the executor was to continue or commence legal proceedings to recover assets allegedly misappropriated from the estate of the deceased’s own father, Loh Kim Foh. At the material time, those claims were already the subject of pending proceedings in Civil Suit No. WA-22NCvC-833-12/2016 (“Suit 833”). In addition, clause 5 of the 2011 Will conferred upon the executor a wide discretion to sell, call in and convert the estate’s assets, with the power to postpone such sale for so long as he shall in his absolute discretion think fit without being liable for loss nor to account to anyone. The deceased therefore contemplated not a simple estate of immediate distribution, but one potentially involving prolonged and contentious litigation.

7. However, in the shadows of the 2011 Will, a competing instrument emerged. On the very day the deceased passed away, 3 August 2017, an alleged will of even date (“the 2017 Will") surfaced. This document purported to appoint the first defendant, the second defendant, and the deceased’s goddaughter and personal assistant, Liang Poh Yen, as joint executors. The first defendant, the second defendant, and Liang **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 Poh Yen proceeded to extract a grant of probate based on the 2017 Will on 9 October 2017 (“the 2017 Probate").

8. The plaintiff challenged the validity of the 2017 Will in Civil Suit No. WA-22NCvC-755-11/2018 (“Suit 755”). That litigation was ultimately resolved by way of a consent judgment on 3 May 2019 (“the Consent Judgment”). Under the terms of the Consent Judgment, the 2017 Will was declared null and void, the 2011 Will was affirmed as the deceased’s final valid testamentary instrument, and the 2017 Probate was ordered to be returned to the Court. Following the Consent Judgment, the first defendant applied for and obtained a fresh grant of probate based on the 2011 Will on 28 June 2019 (“the 2019 Probate"). It is the 2019 Probate, and the administration carried out pursuant to it, that forms the sole subject matter of the present action. The plaintiff’s pleaded relief is confined to the removal of the first defendant from the executorship constituted under the 2011 Will. The controversies surrounding the validity of the 2017 Will and the propriety of the 2017 Probate were conclusively resolved by the Consent Judgment and are therefore res judicata.

9. One might have expected that, with the legal position clarified, the administration of the estate would proceed with transparency and expedition. That expectation was not borne out. The relationship between the brothers quickly frayed. By letters dated 21 May 2019 and 7 August 2019, the plaintiff’s solicitors requested accounts and information concerning the **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 estate administration. No reply was forthcoming from the first defendant. His explanation, both in correspondence and at trial, was that he was still in the process of ascertaining the true extent of the estate’s assets and liabilities before any meaningful account could be rendered. The plaintiff, perceiving himself to have been excluded from information relating to the estate, responded by filing a citation on 18 December 2019. Matters then took an awkward turn. During the hearing of the citation on 6 March 2020, counsel for the first defendant disclosed, apparently for the first time to the plaintiff, that the first defendant had in fact already obtained the 2019 Probate some eight months earlier, on 28 June 2019. Following that disclosure, the citation was withdrawn.

10. The chronology thereafter unfolded against the extraordinary backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic. Throughout 2020 and much of 2021, the country operated under varying phases of the Movement Control Order (“MCO”), Conditional MCO, and Recovery MCO. Interstate travel was restricted, commercial activity disrupted, and physical meetings heavily regulated. Against that setting, the first defendant issued letters to the plaintiff dated 10 June 2020, 8 January 2021, and 10 March 2021, providing updates on the estate administration and inviting the plaintiff to attend a beneficiaries’ meeting in Ipoh scheduled for 24 February 2021. The plaintiff declined to attend that meeting. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7

11. The present suit was commenced on 15 December 2021, by which the plaintiff sought, principally, the removal of the first defendant as executor and trustee of the estate. By the time the matter eventually came on for trial in October 2025, the landscape of the administration had altered in one significant respect. The first defendant had, on 29 October 2021, surrendered the 2019 Probate to the Court. As a consequence, his authority to continue administering the estate under the grant was effectively brought to an end from that point onward. That development, however, did not extinguish the controversy between the parties. Rather, it sharpened the central question now before the Court of whether the first defendant’s conduct during the subsistence of the 2019 Probate was such as to justify judicial condemnation and removal under section 34 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959. Plaintiff’s Contention

12. The plaintiff’s case is that the first defendant is not only unfit to continue as executor, but that he has actively mismanaged the estate to the detriment of the beneficiaries. The plaintiff’s primary grievance is the complete absence of a formal account. He submits that an executor’s duty to account is not a mere formality but a fundamental of trust law. In that regard, reliance is placed upon the decision of the Court of Appeal in Damayanti Kantilal Doshi & Ors v Jigarlal Kantilal Doshi & Ors [1998] 4 CLJ 81; [1998] 4 MLJ 268; [1998] 2 MLRA 177; [1998] 4 AMR 3904, where it was recognised that personal **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 representatives are under a continuing obligation to maintain clear and accurate records of the estate and to furnish proper accounts when called upon to do so. The plaintiff argues that without transparent accounting, beneficiaries are left unable to ascertain whether estate assets have been preserved, dissipated, or improperly dealt with.

13. Against that standard, the plaintiff contends that the documents furnished by the first defendant fall manifestly short. Particular complaint is directed at the letters dated 10 June 2020, 8 January 2021, and 10 March 2021. These, it is argued, are no more than narrative descriptions of alleged activity rather than true estate accounts. The plaintiff emphasises that the letter dated 10 March 2021 referred to three purported accounts, namely the “estate of Loh Mui Fah account”, the “CIMB estate account”, and the “estate account”, yet no corresponding bank statements were ever exhibited or produced. In the plaintiff’s submission, an account unsupported by bank records, ledgers of receipts and expenditure, or documentary vouchers is no account at all. The plaintiff further argues that the first defendant’s invitation to inspect documents in Ipoh during the period of MCO did not amount to a genuine or reasonable discharge of the duty to account. He points out that the invitation did not disclose that the proposed meeting was intended to involve a creditor, Loh Siew Ngoh, nor was any attendance list or independent evidence of the meeting ultimately produced. The plaintiff therefore describes the invitation as little more than a superficial attempt at compliance. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9

14. The plaintiff also relies upon certain features of the evidence elicited during trial which, he submits, reveal troubling irregularities in the handling of estate monies. He points in particular to the evidence of the second defendant, who admitted during cross-examination that dividends derived from shares belonging to the deceased had been paid into the second defendant’s personal bank account, without any formal account being prepared in respect of those receipts. Further, DW3, Liang Poh Yen, admitted that she had collected RM5,000 from one Lee Lap Shun, a debtor to the estate, and deposited the monies into her own personal account. The plaintiff contends that these matters disclose either outright misappropriation or, at the very least, a grave failure to safeguard estate assets in accordance with basic fiduciary standards. He argues that such irregularities could only have occurred because the first defendant failed to establish and maintain a transparent and properly supervised estate account. In the plaintiff’s submission, the continued refusal or failure to produce bank statements is not inadvertence but deliberate concealment designed to obscure the true financial state of the estate.

15. A further complaint of the plaintiff concerns the first defendant’s failure to realize estate assets. The plaintiff submits that the first defendant allowed substantial assets, in particular shares and seven motor vehicles, including vehicles bearing valuable registration numbers, to remain unsold for an unreasonable period. The plaintiff contends that the assets ought to have been **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 liquidated during favorable market conditions, particularly before the onset of the MCO in March 2020. He points out that the list of assets filed in support of the 2019 Probate clearly identified those assets, yet from the date probate was obtained on 28 June 2019 until the surrender of the probate on 29 October 2021, no asset of significance was sold. In the plaintiff’s submission, the prolonged retention of depreciating assets, was not an exercise of discretion but an abdication of duty.

16. The plaintiff further alleges a sustained pattern of concealment on the part of the first defendant. He first points to the events surrounding the 2017 Will and the extraction of the 2017 Probate, matters which ultimately culminated in Suit 755 and the Consent Judgment declaring the 2017 Will invalid. The plaintiff submits that he was compelled to discover those matters through independent court searches rather than through candid disclosure by the first defendant. The plaintiff argues that a similar pattern repeated itself in relation to the 2019 Probate. Although the first defendant obtained the grant on 28 June 2019, the plaintiff contends that this fact was concealed from him for some eight months. His solicitors’ letters dated 21 May 2019 and 7 August 2019 went unanswered. It was only after the plaintiff commenced citation proceedings on 18 December 2019 that counsel for the first defendant disclosed, during the hearing on 6 March 2020, that probate had already been extracted months earlier. The plaintiff submits that such conduct constitutes a serious breach of the executor’s duty of good faith toward beneficiaries. He argues that beneficiaries are **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 entitled, at the very least, to know that probate has been obtained and that administration has formally commenced. The failure to provide even that elementary information, he says, forced him unnecessarily into litigation and expense merely to ascertain the status of the estate.

17. The plaintiff further contends that the prolonged delay in the administration of the estate, now extending over some eight years, is attributable principally to the negligence and incompetence of the first defendant. In particular, he rejects the first defendant’s reliance upon Suit 833 as justification for the lack of progress. The plaintiff argues that clause 3 of the 2011 Will merely directed the executor to continue or commence proceedings relating to the alleged misappropriation of assets, it did not authorize the suspension of all other aspects of estate administration pending the final determination of that litigation. In the plaintiff’s submission, the pursuit of Suit 833 and the administration of the estate were obligations capable of proceeding concurrently. He further points to the fact that Suit 833 was struck out on 8 December 2021 after the first defendant failed to inform solicitors acting in that matter that the probate had been surrendered. That omission resulted in costs of RM15,000 being awarded against the estate. The plaintiff submits that such an oversight reveals a level of disorganization incompatible with the proper discharge of fiduciary responsibility. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12

18. The plaintiff likewise dismisses the first defendant’s excuses of negotiating debts with creditors as a red herring. Particular reference is made to the debt allegedly owed to Loh Siew Ngoh, said to exceed RM2.5 million. The plaintiff notes that the first defendant admitted being aware of this liability shortly after the deceased’s death in 2017. Yet, despite the passage of several years, no final resolution had been achieved. In the plaintiff’s submission, prolonged negotiations unsupported by meaningful attempts to realize assets or settle liabilities cannot be considered as prudent administration.

19. Finally, the plaintiff rejects the suggestion that he himself has contributed materially to the deterioration of relations or the delay in administration. He submits that his refusal to attend the proposed meeting in Ipoh on 24 February 2021 is said to have been justified by the prevailing MCO restrictions and by the practical difficulty of requiring all parties, who resided in Kuala Lumpur, to travel interstate during the pandemic. The plaintiff further contends that the invitation itself was misleading, as it did not disclose that a creditor would be present. Similarly, his refusal to permit access to the Hartamas property without the presence of solicitors is said to have arisen from concerns generated by the earlier removal of items from the property during the period when the defendants were acting under the subsequently invalidated 2017 Probate. The plaintiff therefore maintains that his actions were those of a beneficiary seeking accountability rather than hostility for its own sake. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Defendants’ Contention

20. The defendants reject vehemently the allegation that the first defendant has acted improperly in the administration of the estate. Their case is that the first defendant has, throughout, acted conscientiously and in accordance with the deceased’s wishes, but has been hamstrung both by external circumstances and by what they describe as the plaintiff’s persistent obstruction. Far from being a delinquent executor, the defendants portray the first defendant as a fiduciary attempting to navigate an unusually complex estate amidst sustained familial hostility and overlapping litigation.

21. In response to the plaintiff’s complaint concerning the absence of proper accounts, the defendants submit that the first defendant has sufficiently kept the beneficiaries informed of the estate’s progress. They argue that the obligation to furnish a complete and formal account ordinarily arises at a later stage of administration, particularly when the estate is approaching final distribution. Reliance is placed upon Lee Hiong Kiat & Ors v Lee Tin Hui & Anor [2024] MLJU 2627, where it was observed that requests for accounts must be reasonable in context and that the accounting process forms part of the administration leading toward eventual distribution. The defendants therefore contend that the plaintiff’s demand for comprehensive financial statements at this intermediate stage of administration is both premature and unreasonable. They submit that the letters dated 10 June 2020, 8 January 2021, and 10 March 2021 provided **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 substantial updates regarding the state of the estate, the assets identified, and the ongoing administrative efforts undertaken by the first defendant. In particular, the letter dated 10 March 2021 is said to have set out the assets of the estate and the progress achieved in relation to them.

22. The defendants further argue that the plaintiff cannot now complain of informational deprivation when he himself declined opportunities to inspect documents. Considerable emphasis is placed upon the meeting arranged in Ipoh on 24 February 2021. The defendants contend that the meeting took place during the Recovery MCO rather than the stricter MCO phase, such that interstate travel was legally permissible. They note that the second defendant, who was likewise a beneficiary, attended the meeting and received explanations concerning the estate administration. In their submission, the plaintiff’s refusal to attend, coupled with his failure to propose an alternative venue or virtual arrangement, undermines his present complaint that information was withheld from him.

23. As for the plaintiff’s insistence upon bank statements, vouchers, and detailed ledgers, the defendants submit that such documents remain available and can be produced if necessary. However, they argue that the plaintiff never clearly specified, in his earlier correspondence, the precise form of account he demanded. The defendants contend that what the plaintiff effectively seeks is an audited estate account, a request they characterise as excessive and premature. In that regard, **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 reliance is placed upon Lek Eng Hock & Anor v Leck Ah Bah [2020] MLJU 1899; [2020] CLJU 1651; [2020] MLRAU 296, where the court held that demands for audited accounts during an ongoing administration may, depending on the circumstances, be unreasonable.

24. The defendants also seek to minimise the significance of the monies received into personal accounts by the second defendant and DW3, Liang Poh Yen. They submit that the relevant sums were not dissipated or misappropriated, but merely held temporarily on trust pending proper reconciliation within the estate administration. In their submission, there is no evidence that any estate asset has been lost, concealed, or irretrievably diverted.

25. A central feature of the defendants’ case rests upon clause 5 of the 2011 Will, which they describe as conferring exceptionally broad discretionary powers upon the executor. They argue that the deceased expressly entrusted the first defendant with the authority to decide whether and when estate assets ought to be realised. Heavy reliance is placed upon Hong Lee Peng & Ors v Hong Shaw Lin (wasi tunggal yang dinamakan di bawah wasiat dan dilantik untuk mentadbir harta pusaka Khee Eng @ Hong Kim Phoh) & Ors [2022] MLJU 2229; [2022] 9 CLJ 919; [2022] 1 LNS 2165, which the defendants cite for the proposition that where a will grants an executor wide discretionary powers in relation to estate administration, the court will ordinarily be slow to interfere with the bona fide **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 exercise of such discretion. The defendants therefore submit that the plaintiff possesses no legal entitlement to compel the sale of shares, vehicles, or other estate assets merely because he considers such a course commercially desirable. They further contend that the plaintiff’s criticisms regarding alleged depreciation are speculative and unsupported by expert valuation evidence. In relation to the vehicles specifically, the defendants argue that the principal value lies not in the vehicles themselves, but in their accompanying registration numbers, which do not necessarily depreciate in the same manner as ordinary motor vehicles. The defendants maintain that the first defendant had legitimate reasons for postponing any sale of assets. Crucially among those reasons, they say, was the need first to ascertain and resolve the estate’s substantial liabilities. Premature liquidation without a coherent debt-settlement strategy, they argue, would itself have exposed the executor to criticism and potential prejudice to the beneficiaries. In their submission, the first defendant’s decision to defer sale was a bona fide exercise of the discretion expressly conferred upon him by the deceased, and not an abandonment of duty.

26. The defendants also contend that the delays now complained of were materially contributed to, if not principally caused by, the plaintiff himself. They submit that the plaintiff has, from an early stage, engaged in relentless litigation against the first defendant, thereby consuming both time and estate resources that would otherwise have been devoted to administration. Particular reliance is placed upon the citation proceedings filed **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 on 18 December 2019, the further citation proceedings commenced in December 2020, and the present suit itself. In the defendants’ submission, these proceedings significantly disrupted the administration process and impaired the first defendant’s ability to act effectively as executor. They argue that the first defendant was compelled to divert considerable effort and expense toward defending what are characterised as unnecessary proceedings, rather than focusing on the administration of the estate. The defendants further submit that the plaintiff’s own conduct has obstructed the administration in practical terms. They point in particular to the Hartamas property. It is argued that, notwithstanding the Consent Judgment permitting access to the premises, the plaintiff changed the locks and denied the defendants entry for the purpose of locating estate documents and records believed to be stored there. According to the defendants, the plaintiff thereby effectively excluded the executor from property relevant to the administration. The defendants also rely upon the plaintiff’s refusal to attend the Ipoh meeting as evidence that his true concern lies not with assisting the administration of the estate, but with accelerating distribution for his own benefit. In their submission, the plaintiff has consistently adopted an adversarial posture that has made cooperative administration practically impossible.

27. The defendants further maintain that the first defendant has faithfully carried out what the deceased himself regarded as a matter of considerable importance, namely, the continuation of **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 Suit 833. They emphasize that clause 3 of the 2011 Will expressly directed the executor to pursue claims concerning the alleged misappropriation of assets from the estate of Loh Kim Foh. The defendants describe Suit 833 as exceptionally complex, involving approximately 30 related suits and a litigation history extending over two decades. They submit that the first defendant was therefore required to devote substantial personal attention and time toward those proceedings. In their submission, the deceased intended for the executor to give this matter priority, and the first defendant merely acted in accordance with that testamentary direction. The defendants reject the suggestion that the striking out of Suit 833 on 8 December 2021 arose from incompetence on the part of the first defendant. Instead, they argue that the plaintiff’s own actions in filing citation proceedings ultimately caused the first defendant to lose his standing to continue those proceedings. They further submit that the estate could not prudently be distributed pending the outcome of Suit 833, as any recovery achieved therein would materially affect the composition and value of the residuary estate. They submit that the first defendant’s judgment to postpone distribution pending this case is a proper exercise of his discretion and in the best interests of all beneficiaries. They argue that the plaintiff’s singular focus on getting his share shows he does not understand the deceased’s wishes. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19

28. The defendants also contend that the plaintiff is not a fit person to replace the first defendant. They submit that the plaintiff has a strained relationship with the deceased and the family, as he admitted his relationship was one of formality and he was not close to his father. They argue that this emotional distance makes him less likely to understand and carry out the deceased’s wishes, especially regarding Suit 833 which involved family history. They point to the second defendant’s evidence that the plaintiff has demonstrated extreme hostility and rage toward many others, most notably their late father and grandmother. They submit that his conduct in this suit, changing locks, refusing access, and filing numerous applications, shows he is unreliable and irresponsible. The defendants therefore argue that replacing the first defendant with the plaintiff would not improve the administration of the estate, but would instead deepen the dysfunction already surrounding it. They also invite the Court to take into account the wishes of the second defendant, himself an equal beneficiary under the will, who supports the continuation of the first defendant as executor.

29. Finally, the defendants submit that the plaintiff’s alternative proposal to appoint an independent third party, such as Amanah Raya, is legally misconceived. Reliance is placed upon Ong Soo Kan v Ong Soo Kwee [2023] 10 MLJ 843; [2023] 5 CLJ 475, where the court held that it possesses no jurisdiction to appoint as executor a person not nominated under the will itself. The defendants argue that the only substitute executor identified by the deceased under the 2011 Will is the plaintiff. If **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 the Court were to find both brothers unsuitable, then the appropriate course would be the appointment of an administrator pursuant to letters of administration rather than the judicial creation of a new executorship. In any event, the defendants submit that no such relief was specifically pleaded by the plaintiff and that the suggestion of appointing a third-party administrator emerged only as a submission from the Bar. They further contend that the estate, already burdened by substantial liabilities, would struggle to bear the costs associated with a professional administrator. Court’s Analysis and Findings

30. The jurisdiction to revoke a grant of probate, or to remove an executor duly appointed by a testator, is among the more delicate powers entrusted to the Court. Its exercise necessarily intrudes upon the deceased’s final expression of confidence and intention. A testator’s choice of executor is not lightly displaced. The Court therefore approaches such applications with considerable caution, mindful that disagreement between beneficiaries and executors, even intense disagreement, is not of itself sufficient to justify judicial intervention.

31. The statutory foundation for the present application is section 34 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959 (“PAA 1959”), which empowers the Court to revoke a grant for sufficient cause. What constitutes sufficient cause has long been shaped by equitable principle rather than rigid formula. The seminal **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 authority remains the decision of the Privy Council in Letterstedt v Broers and Another (1884) 9 App Cas 371; [1881 - 85] All ER Rep 882, a decision repeatedly endorsed in this jurisdiction, including by the Federal Court in Tan Kah Fatt & Anor v Tan Ying [2023] 2 MLJ 583; [2023] 2 CLJ 169. The threshold, however, is intentionally exacting. The Court is not concerned with minor imperfections in administration, isolated errors of judgment, or personality conflicts among family members. Equity intervenes only where the administration of the trust estate is genuinely imperilled. In Letterstedt (supra), Jessel MR articulated the governing principle in terms that have lost none of their force with time: “It is not disputed that there is a jurisdiction ‘in cases requiring such a remedy,’ as is said in STORY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, s 1287, but there is very little to be found to guide us in saying what are the cases requiring such a remedy so little that their Lordships are compelled to have recourse to general principles. STORY says, s 1289: ‘But in cases of positive misconduct, courts of equity have no difficulty in interposing to remove trustees who have abused their trust; it is not indeed every mistake or neglect of duty; or inaccuracy of conduct of trustees, which will induce courts of equity to adopt such a course. But the acts or omissions must be such as to endanger the trust property or to show a want of honesty, or a want of proper capacity to execute the duties, or a want of reasonable fidelity.’" [Emphasis is mine] **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22

32. The importance of that formulation cannot be overstated. The Court does not sit as a supervisory board reviewing every administrative decision taken by an executor. Provided the executor acts bona fide, within the scope of the powers conferred by the will and the law, and with reasonable fidelity to the trust reposed in him, the Court will ordinarily be slow to interfere. Dissatisfaction with delay, disagreement over strategy, or strained personal relations do not, without more, justify removal. The burden therefore rests squarely upon the plaintiff to demonstrate that the conduct of the first defendant has crossed the line separating mere imperfection from fiduciary unfitness. Against that legal backdrop, I turn to examine the principal complaints advanced by the plaintiff. The Duty to Render Account

33. The plaintiff’s foremost complaint concerns the alleged failure of the first defendant to render proper accounts. The duty to account lies at the very heart of the fiduciary relationship. Transparency is not optional in estate administration, it is one of the mechanisms by which the law ensures accountability to beneficiaries. In Damayanti Kantilal Doshi & Ors v Jigarlal Kantilal Doshi & Ors [1998] 4 CLJ 81; [1998] 4 MLJ 268; [1998] 2 MLRA 177; [1998] 4 AMR 3904, the Court of Appeal, per Shaik Daud JCA, observed: **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 “The duty to render accounts is one of the basic duties of all executors or trustees. It is the duty of the personal representatives to keep clear and accurate accounts, and to be ready at all times to render such accounts when called upon to do so, see Halsbury’s 4th Edn Vol 17 at para 1551 under “Liability to Account”. By the terms of the deceased’s will the issue of accounts is all important since the residue for distribution is derived at only after deductions of debts and expenses have been made. Without the accounts being rendered periodically or at all (as in this case), the beneficiaries would not have any means of knowing whether the estate is being administered properly.”. [Emphasis is mine]

34. I have no hesitation to adopt those observations. An executor who administers an estate behind a veil of opacity risks undermining the very confidence that the office requires. Beneficiaries are entitled to sufficient information to understand whether estate assets are being preserved and administered properly. However, the principle must be applied with careful regard to context. Estate administration is not a static event but a process, often evolving through distinct phases, namely, identification of assets, ascertainment of liabilities, collection of estate property, settlement of debts, and ultimately distribution. The scope and immediacy of the accounting obligation must therefore be assessed against the practical realities of the administration at the material time. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24

35. In Lee Hiong Kiat & Ors v Lee Tin Hui & Anor [2024] MLJU 2627; [2024] CLJU 2295, the High Court recognised this practical dimension, observing that the accounting process ordinarily develops alongside the administration itself and that requests for accounts must be assessed for reasonableness in light of the stage the administration has reached. The court there accepted that demands for highly detailed financial statements or audited accounts at an interim stage may, depending on the circumstances, be premature.

36. The evidence before me establishes that the first defendant did not furnish the plaintiff with a formal or audited account of the estate. That much is undisputed. However, that omission cannot be evaluated in isolation or divorced from the broader circumstances surrounding the administration. From the time the first defendant obtained the 2019 Probate on 28 June 2019, the estate was already burdened with substantial complications. The first defendant was required to ascertain the estate’s liabilities, engage in negotiations with creditors, identify and recover assets, and at the same time pursue the deceased’s express direction in relation to Suit 833. These matters unfolded against the additional disruption occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic and the various MCO then in force. During this period, the first defendant did provide the plaintiff with updates through letters dated 10 June 2020, 8 January 2021, and 10 March 2021. Those communications identified estate assets and described the administrative steps being undertaken. The plaintiff is correct that these documents were not, in the strict **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 sense, formal estate accounts. They were narrative in nature rather than forensic in detail. But the question before the Court is not whether the administration was ideal. The question is whether the shortcomings identified reveal such dishonesty, incapacity, or want of fidelity as to justify the drastic remedy of removal. The plaintiff places considerable emphasis on the absence of supporting bank statements, vouchers, and detailed ledgers. Certainly, those documents will ultimately be required if the administration is to progress toward final distribution with proper transparency. Yet I am not persuaded that the failure to produce them at that intermediate stage of administration, amidst ongoing disputes and unsettled liabilities, crosses the Letterstedt threshold.

37. In that regard, the decision of the Court of Appeal in Lek Eng Hock & Anor v Leck Ah Bah [2020] MLJU 1899; [2020] CLJU 1651; [2020] MLRAU 296 is instructive. The Court there rejected a beneficiary’s demand for highly granular financial disclosure during an ongoing administration, observing: [39] According to the respondent, the so-called statement of accounts given to him are mere draft accounts for the year 2015 and not a set of accounts at all. This is because there was no, among others, itemization of every single detail i.e. source, description of source and date, description of use etc. [40] To our minds, the stance of the respondent on this is unreasonable and premature. In effect, he is demanding that the appellants (as the administrators) provide a financial statement or **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 audited accounts instead of a statement of account. The learned High Court Judge, in our view, has failed to appreciate that the appellants (as administrators and in accordance with their duties) would in due course prepare and render final accounts before the estate is wound up. The appellants’ undertaking on this is to be found in para 8 of the applicants’ Affidavit-in-Reply No. 2 (see p. 151, Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2). It is not in dispute that the bulk of the assets of the estate consists of the immoveable properties and the respondent is not objecting to the manner of its distribution as specified in the OS. Ironically, it is the respondent’s own intervention that has stalled the application to obtain the order to administer and distribute the estate’s assets to all beneficiaries (including the respondent) without which the accounts of the estate cannot be finalized. [Emphasis is mine]

38. I find the distinction drawn in Lek Eng Hock (supra) to be of considerable assistance. At the material time, the plaintiff was effectively demanding a highly detailed financial disclosure while the estate itself remained in the midst of active administration and contested litigation. The first defendant’s shortcomings in communication and transparency are evident. Greater candour and more structured disclosure would undoubtedly have reduced suspicion and perhaps prevented some of the hostility that later emerged. But poor communication, without more, is not synonymous with fiduciary delinquency warranting removal. In my judgment, the evidence does not establish that the first defendant’s conduct in relation to accounting demonstrates dishonesty, want of proper capacity, or lack of reasonable fidelity within the meaning **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 contemplated in Letterstedt (supra). What has been shown is administrative imperfection, exacerbated by mistrust between the parties.

39. That said, the matter cannot rest there. The executor’s duty to account is continuing and intensifies as the administration moves closer toward debt settlement and eventual distribution. Narrative updates are no longer sufficient for an estate that has now remained under administration for several years. The beneficiaries are entitled to greater clarity than has thus far been provided.

40. The evidence concerning estate monies paid into the personal accounts of the second defendant and DW3, Liang Poh Yen, does warrant careful scrutiny. Executors and those assisting them must exercise considerable caution in handling estate funds, for the appearance of impropriety can itself corrode confidence in the administration. Nevertheless, the evidence before me falls short of establishing actual dissipation or personal appropriation of those monies. The evidence indicates that the sums remained identifiable and were held pending further instructions relating to the estate.

41. Accordingly, while I decline to treat the present deficiencies as sufficient grounds for removal, I consider it necessary to emphasise that the first defendant must now take active steps toward formalising the accounting process. A proper account ought to be prepared, including a verified inventory of assets, a **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 comprehensive statement of liabilities, and a ledger identifying receipts and expenditures. To the extent reasonably necessary for verification, supporting bank statements and vouchers should also be made available. Such disclosure is not merely procedural housekeeping. It is essential to restoring confidence in the administration and to enable the estate to progress toward final resolution without further avoidable dispute. The Failure to Sell Assets and the Scope of Testamentary Discretion

42. I turn next to the plaintiff’s complaint that the first defendant failed to liquidate the estate’s shares and motor vehicles, thereby exposing the estate to depreciation and financial loss. With respect, this is the least persuasive aspect of the plaintiff’s challenge. The argument proceeds on the premise that a prudent executor ought to have sold the assets earlier in order to take advantage of favourable market conditions. The difficulty with that submission is that it pays insufficient regard to the express language of the 2011 Will itself.

43. Clause 5 of the 2011 Will provides:

5. My Executor and Trustee shall have absolute discretion to sell call in and convert all or any of my real and personal property whatsoever and wheresoever situate into money with power to postpone the sale calling in and conversion thereof for so long as she/he shall in her/his absolute discretion think fit without being liable for loss nor to account to anyone. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 [Emphasis is mine]

44. The language employed by the deceased is unmistakably broad. The phrases “absolute discretion” and “without being liable for loss” are not incidental embellishments. They reflect a deliberate testamentary choice to confer upon the executor substantial latitude in determining whether, when, and in what manner estate assets ought to be realised. The Court must therefore approach the plaintiff’s complaint through a narrower question of whether the discretion conferred by the will was exercised dishonestly, capriciously, or in bad faith.

45. The decision of the High Court in Hong Lee Peng & Ors v Hong Shaw Lin (wasi tunggal yang dinamakan di bawah wasiat dan dilantik untuk mentadbir harta pusaka Khee Eng @ Hong Kim Phoh) & Ors [2022] MLJU 2229; [2022] 9 CLJ 919 [2022] 1 LNS 2165 is directly instructive on this issue. In that case, the court observed: “[57] The alleged failure here pertains to the duties of the 1st Defendant as a trustee under the Will. The Plaintiffs contend that as a trustee under a trust for sale, the 1st Defendant has a duty to sell the property in the estate and to distribute the proceeds fairly to the beneficiaries. [58] This contention is premised on the general duties of a trustee under a trust for sale. Several authorities were cited by the Plaintiffs in support. I have no quarrel with the principles stated therein. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 However, it is my view that the application of general principles must take into account the particular facts of each case. [59] The terms of the Will are material. Firstly, the terms expressly provide that the 1st Defendant has the power “to sell the same with power at his absolute discretion to postpone such sale upon trust…”. Secondly, the Will also confers on the 1st Defendant absolute discretion in the determining the distribution of the estate property to any beneficiary. This is obvious from the words “...to distribute to the family member as beneficiary AT HIS ABSOLUTE DISCRETION...” And to further emphasize the full discretion of the executor and trustee, the testator added, “…and nobody shall ever question his exercise of discretion WHATSOEVER!”. [63] The words employed in the Will of the instant case are such that I am left in no doubt that the deceased intended the 1st Defendant to have absolute discretion in the administration of his estate. The Plaintiffs have no right to demand for the assets to be sold and the proceeds to be distributed to them. In the face of such clear terms of the Will, I doubt if the Plaintiffs are even entitled to demand a distributive share of the estate. [64] The issue of the 1st Defendant’s failure to sell the properties and to distribute the proceeds, in my view, does not arise.” [Emphasis is mine]

46. Although the wording of the will in Hong Lee Peng (supra) was even more emphatic than the present one, the underlying principle remains applicable. Where a testator has consciously **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 vested broad discretionary powers in an executor, the Court will be slow to interfere merely because a beneficiary disagrees with the commercial wisdom of the executor’s decisions.

47. In the present case, the plaintiff’s contention that the assets ought to have been sold during a so-called good market is ultimately speculative. No evidence was adduced to establish the existence of such a market, the appropriate timing of liquidation, or the extent of any actual loss suffered by the estate as a consequence of postponement. Assertions that the shares were volatile or that the vehicles were depreciating, without evidential substantiation, cannot by themselves establish fiduciary misconduct. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the true value of several of the vehicles lay not principally in the vehicles themselves, but in their accompanying registration numbers, assets which do not necessarily depreciate in the same manner as ordinary motor vehicles. The plaintiff’s argument therefore proceeds upon an assumption of loss that was never properly proved. Further, the first defendant did provide a rational commercial explanation for the decision not to liquidate the assets immediately. The estate was burdened with substantial liabilities, including the asserted debt owed to Loh Siew Ngoh. The first defendant’s evidence was that asset realisation had to be approached cautiously and strategically in light of ongoing debt negotiations and the uncertain financial position of the estate. That explanation is neither irrational nor inherently implausible. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32

48. The deceased’s intention also looms large in this analysis. The deceased was evidently aware of the nature and composition of his estate, including the shares and vehicles now in dispute. Yet he deliberately chose to confer broad discretionary powers upon the first defendant, including the power to postpone sale for so long as the executor considered appropriate. That language reflects confidence in the executor’s judgment and an intention that administrative flexibility be preserved. The Court must therefore resist the temptation to substitute its own commercial preferences for the discretion expressly granted by the testator. To compel liquidation merely because a beneficiary considers it commercially advantageous would risk impermissibly rewriting the testamentary scheme crafted by the deceased himself. The Court’s role is supervisory, not managerial.

49. In the absence of evidence demonstrating bad faith, dishonesty, irrationality, or a decision so unreasonable as to amount to an abuse of discretion, I am unable to conclude that the first defendant’s decision to postpone the sale of the estate assets constitutes misconduct warranting removal. On the evidence before me, the decision appears to have been a bona fide exercise of the discretion entrusted to him under the 2011 Will. The Challenges Presented by Suit 833 and the Pandemic

50. The plaintiff further contends that the first defendant’s handling of the estate demonstrates negligence and administrative **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 incompetence, relying in particular upon the delays in distribution, the unresolved liabilities of the estate, and the eventual striking out of Suit 833.

51. I accept that the plaintiff felt aggrieved and excluded by the first defendant’s failure to communicate more promptly and fully regarding the extraction of the 2019 Probate. The first defendant ought, as a matter of prudence and good administration, to have informed the plaintiff once the grant had been extracted. His failure to do so understandably fostered suspicion and contributed to the deterioration of relations between the parties. However, the plaintiff’s attempt to elevate that lapse into evidence of deliberate concealment or fiduciary dishonesty goes too far. The Court must carefully distinguish between poor communication and positive misconduct. The evidence before me does not establish that the first defendant procured the 2019 Probate secretly for any improper purpose, nor that he sought to deprive the plaintiff of his beneficial entitlement under the estate.

52. The circumstances surrounding the 2017 Will likewise do not materially advance the plaintiff’s case on the present issue. The disputes concerning the validity of the 2017 Will and the propriety of the 2017 Probate were conclusively resolved by the Consent Judgment in Suit 755. Those matters cannot now be relitigated indirectly under the rubric of alleged concealment in the present proceedings. The Court’s present inquiry is confined to whether the first defendant’s conduct under the 2019 Probate **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 demonstrates such want of honesty, fidelity, or capacity as would justify removal under section 34 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959.

53. The plaintiff further contends that the delay in the administration of the estate, now said to span some eight years from the deceased’s death, is attributable principally to the negligence and incompetence of the first defendant. In particular, the plaintiff submits that the first defendant’s repeated reliance upon Suit 833 as justification for the lack of progress is misconceived and exaggerated. In assessing allegations of delay against an executor, the Court must be careful to distinguish between the total lapse of time since the deceased’s passing and the actual period during which the executor possessed legal authority to administer the estate under a valid grant of probate. The deceased passed away on 3 August 2017. However, the 2017 Will and the 2017 Probate were subsequently invalidated by the Consent Judgment in Suit 755. The first defendant only obtained the valid grant under the 2011 Will on 28 June 2019. Thereafter, the 2019 Probate was surrendered on 29 October

2021. The period during which the first defendant was lawfully clothed with authority under the impugned grant was therefore, in substance, slightly over two years.

54. That period must further be viewed in its proper factual context. A substantial portion of it coincided with the unprecedented disruptions occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic and the various phases of the MCO. Between early 2020 and late 2021, **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 interstate movement was restricted, commercial activity materially disrupted, physical meetings curtailed, and access to governmental and financial institutions significantly impeded. The Court cannot ignore that historical reality when evaluating the pace of the present administration. Moreover, the evidence does not support the suggestion that the first defendant remained wholly inactive during that period. On the contrary, there is evidence that he was engaged in identifying estate assets, addressing liabilities, corresponding with interested parties, negotiating debts, and pursuing Suit 833 in accordance with the deceased’s express directions under clause 3 of the 2011 Will. Whether every step taken was ideal or expeditious is not the question. The question is whether the delay demonstrated such incompetence, indifference, or want of fidelity as to justify removal under section 34 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959.

55. In my judgment, it does not. The plaintiff’s argument proceeds largely by treating the entirety of the eight-year period since the deceased’s death as if it were a continuous and uninterrupted period of administration under the first defendant’s stewardship. That approach overlooks the reality that the estate was first embroiled in litigation concerning the validity of the competing wills, and thereafter affected by both the continuation of Suit 833 and the extraordinary disruptions of the pandemic era. The Court must also bear in mind that Suit 833 was not an invention of the first defendant devised to delay distribution. It was litigation expressly contemplated and directed by the deceased **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 himself in the 2011 Will. The deceased plainly regarded those proceedings as sufficiently important to warrant specific testamentary instruction. In those circumstances, the first defendant cannot fairly be criticised merely for devoting substantial time and attention to a matter which the deceased himself considered integral to the administration of the estate.

56. Embedded within the 2011 Will itself was a specific testamentary directive requiring the executor to continue and, if necessary, commence proceedings relating to the estate of Loh Kim Foh. Clause 3 of the will did not refer to peripheral or optional litigation. It reflected a matter which the deceased himself evidently regarded as important enough to be expressly entrusted to his executor. Clause 3 of the 2011 Will provides:

3. I direct that My Executor and Trustee shall execute and administer the last will and testament of my late father, LOH KIM FOH (NRIC NO. 140414-71-5255) in accordance with the terms of the said last will of the said Loh Kim Foh. I specifically direct that My Executor and Trustee shall continue and/or commence any legal proceedings to recover monies assets unlawfully taken from the said Loh Kim Foh. [Emphasis is mine]

57. The evidence before the Court establishes that Suit 833 was no ordinary proceeding. It involved an extended history spanning approximately two decades and was intertwined with some thirty related suits. The litigation was factually dense, legally **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 protracted, and emotionally charged. Considerable time, coordination, and resources were inevitably required if the proceedings were to be meaningfully pursued. In those circumstances, the first defendant’s decision to devote substantial attention to Suit 833 cannot fairly be characterised as neglect of the estate. On the contrary, it represented an attempt to carry into effect the deceased’s own instructions. Executors are not at liberty to selectively disregard inconvenient testamentary directions merely because compliance renders administration more difficult or prolonged.

58. The plaintiff places considerable emphasis upon the eventual striking out of Suit 833 following the surrender of the 2019 Probate. Certainly, the procedural consequences that followed were unfortunate and resulted in costs exposure to the estate. But it would, in my judgment, be an overstatement to transform that episode into proof of fiduciary incompetence warranting removal. The striking out arose within a highly contentious procedural environment shaped in part by the plaintiff’s own citation proceedings and the resulting complications concerning the first defendant’s standing to continue acting. Litigation of this scale and complexity is seldom immune from procedural setbacks. An adverse procedural outcome, without more, does not establish want of honesty, want of capacity, or want of reasonable fidelity within the meaning contemplated in Letterstedt (supra). **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38

59. Moreover, the evidence demonstrates that the administration was complicated by the deteriorating relationship between the parties and the litigation initiated by the plaintiff himself. The citation proceedings commenced in December 2019, followed by further proceedings thereafter, created an atmosphere in which the executor’s every step became susceptible to immediate challenge. While beneficiaries are unquestionably entitled to invoke the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction where appropriate, repeated litigation inevitably consumes time, attention, and estate resources. In practical terms, the first defendant was administering the estate while simultaneously defending his position as executor. Such circumstances naturally inhibit decisiveness and delay administrative progress. Executors operating under continuous threat of litigation are unlikely to act with the same freedom and efficiency as those administering estates in a cooperative environment.

60. The plaintiff’s own conduct also contributed, at least to some degree, to the difficulties encountered in the administration. His refusal to attend the meeting in Ipoh on 24 February 2021, his refusal to grant access to the Hartamas property without further conditions, and the generally adversarial tenor of the parties’ interactions created an environment ill-suited to efficient administration. This is not to say that the plaintiff’s concerns were wholly unjustified. Given the history of distrust between the parties, some caution on his part was understandable. Nevertheless, the Court cannot ignore the practical reality that estate administration, particularly in a complex estate, requires **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 at least a minimum level of cooperation among those involved. The evidence demonstrates that such cooperation was conspicuously absent here.

61. I also do not accept the plaintiff’s contention of the first defendant’s handling of estate liabilities as evidence of neglect. The evidence shows that the first defendant identified substantial debts allegedly owed by the estate to members of the deceased’s family, including liabilities amounting to several million ringgit. The first defendant further adduced evidence that negotiations had been undertaken in relation to those debts and that at least some reduction had been achieved, including in relation to the company secretary’s claim. Negotiation of substantial family debts is seldom swift or straightforward. Such negotiations often require caution, verification, and considerable tact, particularly where the liabilities themselves may be disputed or intertwined with broader family disputes. Delay alone does not establish dereliction.

62. Viewed cumulatively, the evidence does not persuade me that the delays in administration arose from indifference, dishonesty, or incapacity on the part of the first defendant. What emerges instead is an estate burdened by contentious litigation, strained familial relations, unresolved liabilities, pandemic-related disruption, and the practical difficulties inherent in administering a complex family estate. The administration may well have been imperfect and at times frustratingly slow. But imperfection is not the legal standard for removal. The law intervenes only where **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 the administration has become genuinely unsafe in the hands of the executor. On the evidence before me, that threshold has not been crossed. Plaintiff’s Suitability, Welfare of Beneficiaries, and Testator’s Intention

63. An application to remove an executor does not end with an examination of the alleged misconduct of the incumbent. Removal inevitably raises the further and equally important question of who, if anyone, should replace him? In the present case, the plaintiff does not merely seek the displacement of the first defendant. He seeks, either directly or in substance, to assume control of the administration himself. The Court’s supervisory jurisdiction over executors is exercised not to vindicate personal grievances between beneficiaries, but to safeguard the proper administration of the estate for the benefit of all persons interested in it. The inquiry is therefore necessarily forward-looking. The Court must consider not only whether the current executor should be removed, but whether such removal would genuinely advance the welfare of the estate and its beneficiaries.

64. In Tan Kah Fatt & Anor v Tan Ying [2023] 2 MLJ 583; [2023] 2 CLJ 169, the Federal Court emphasised precisely this consideration. Mary Lim FCJ observed: **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 “[103] Section 34 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959 under which the court was moved for the removal of the first appellant reads as follows: Any probate or letters of administration may be revoked for sufficient cause. [104] With the reasons as explained above, there was no basis or cause for the removal of the first appellant. [105] In any event, in the consideration of whether there was proof of sufficient cause, the welfare, interests and benefit of all the beneficiaries of the estate of the deceased must always be given proper regard. The sufficiency of cause for any removal of an appointment by the court must be taken carefully, weighing the grounds of complaint against the welfare and interests of all beneficiaries. This was explained in Letterstedt v Broers (1884) 9 App Cas 371 and also in Damayanti Kantilal Doshi & Ors v Jigarlal Kantilal Doshi & Ors [1998] 4 MLJ 268; [1998] 4 CLJ 81.” [Emphasis is mine]

65. Those observations are of particular significance in the present case. The estate consists of three beneficiaries, not one. The Court must therefore evaluate the proposed removal through the broader prism of collective welfare rather than individual dissatisfaction. The evidence before me reveals that the second defendant, himself a beneficiary under the 2011 Will, firmly supports the continuation of the first defendant as executor. That support is not determinative, but neither is it irrelevant. It **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 demonstrates that the first defendant has retained the confidence and cooperation of at least one principal beneficiary in the administration of the estate. By contrast, the plaintiff’s conduct throughout this dispute has been marked by persistent antagonism and an increasingly adversarial posture. I do not say this critically in every respect. Some of the plaintiff’s concerns regarding transparency were legitimate and understandable. Nonetheless, the cumulative effect of the citations, the repeated litigation, the disputes concerning access to estate property, and the refusal to cooperate in certain administrative efforts has contributed materially to the paralysis now complained of.

66. The Court must therefore confront a practical reality. Replacing the first defendant with the plaintiff would not heal the fracture within the administration. It would merely invert it. The administration would pass from one deeply contested family member to another equally embroiled in hostility and mistrust. The plaintiff himself candidly admitted that his relationship with the deceased was formal rather than close. The plaintiff, in his witness statement at page 13 of PW1, states that: Q74 How was your relationship with your late father? A: My relationship with my late father was not particularly close. It was a relationship of formality rather than affection. I respect my father **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 for giving me a tertiary education and grateful that he left me some inheritance. [Emphasis is mine]

67. Again, that fact alone does not render him unsuitable. The law does not require emotional intimacy as a condition for executorship. But in the particular circumstances of this estate, especially given the continuing significance of Suit 833 and the family history intertwined with it, the first defendant appears to possess greater familiarity with the deceased’s affairs and intentions.

68. This brings the Court to a consideration of fundamental importance, namely the testator’s own choice. The law has long recognised that a testator’s freedom to appoint his chosen executor forms an integral part of testamentary autonomy. Courts therefore intervene with great reluctance in displacing that choice. In Hsu Yik Chai v Hsu Yaw Tang & Anor [1982] 2 MLJ 227, the Federal Court reaffirmed the governing principle in memorable terms: “The purpose of construction is to give effect to the intention of the testator expressed in the words of the will. On that point we would only refer to what Lord Romer said in Perrin v Morgan [1943] AC 399 at page 420, 420 and also quoted by the learned Judge as follows: — **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 ‘My Lords, I take it to be a cardinal rule of construction that a will should be so construed as to give effect to the intention of the testator, such intention being gathered from the language of the will read in the light of the circumstances in which the will was made. To understand the language employed the court is entitled, to use a familiar expression, to sit in the testator's armchair. When seated there, however, the court is not entitled to make a fresh will for the testator merely because it strongly suspects that the testator did not mean what he has plainly said — …’” [Emphasis is mine]

69. The deceased’s intention in the present case could scarcely be clearer. Under the 2011 Will, he deliberately appointed the first defendant, his eldest son, as sole executor and trustee. He simultaneously vested in him extensive discretionary powers concerning the management and realisation of estate assets and entrusted him specifically with the continuation of the litigation relating to the estate of Loh Kim Foh. This was not a casual appointment inserted mechanically into a standard-form will. The structure and wording of the 2011 Will demonstrate conscious deliberation. The deceased knew the personalities involved. He nevertheless chose the first defendant as the person to whom responsibility for the administration should be entrusted. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45

70. To remove the first defendant in these circumstances would therefore require compelling evidence demonstrating that the administration has become genuinely unsafe in his hands. The jurisdiction under section 34 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959 undoubtedly exists, but it is a jurisdiction to be exercised sparingly and only where the evidence establishes sufficient cause of a serious character. The plaintiff has not discharged that burden. The evidence does not establish dishonesty, bad faith, incapacity, or want of reasonable fidelity on the part of the first defendant. What the plaintiff has established is a pattern of imperfect administration marked by delays, communication failures, and mutual distrust among family members. Those matters are regrettable. They have undoubtedly deepened the divisions within this family. But they do not satisfy the stringent standard required for removal under Letterstedt (supra) and reaffirmed in Tan Kah Fatt (supra).

71. I therefore conclude that the plaintiff has failed to establish sufficient cause to revoke the 2019 Probate or to remove the first defendant as executor and trustee of the estate. That conclusion, however, does not mean the Court should ignore the legitimate concerns that have emerged during the course of this litigation. Equity is not blind to practical realities. An executor who survives a removal application does not thereby become immune from accountability. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46

72. The present administration has reached a point where greater transparency is essential if confidence in the administration is to be restored and the estate is ultimately to be brought to final distribution. Justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done. The current state of partial disclosure and informal narrative updates is no longer sufficient for an estate of this duration and complexity. Conclusion

73. In those circumstances, while the plaintiff’s substantive application for removal fails, it is both necessary and appropriate that the Court grant consequential relief directed toward restoring accountability and facilitating the eventual completion of the administration.

74. Although the defendants have substantially succeeded in resisting the plaintiff’s principal claim for the removal of the first defendant as executor and trustee, this is not a case in which the defendants emerge entirely without criticism. The Court has found that the first defendant’s administration was marked by deficiencies in communication and transparency, particularly in relation to the rendering of proper accounts and supporting financial documentation. While the general rule that costs follow the event ought still to apply in favour of the defendants, the Court considers it appropriate that the costs awarded be moderated to reflect the mixed outcome of the litigation. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 47

75. Accordingly, for the reasons set out above, the plaintiff’s claim against the defendants is dismissed. However, I make the following consequential orders:

(45) days from the date of this judgment furnish to the plaintiff, Loh Gwo Fynne, a full and detailed account of the estate of the deceased, Loh Mui Fah.

(ii) The said account shall include:

(iii) The first defendant shall further provide, upon reasonable request by the plaintiff or his solicitors, copies of such bank statements, vouchers, invoices, and supporting documents as are reasonably necessary to verify the entries contained in the said account and which are within the first defendant’s possession, custody, or control. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 48

(iv) Costs of this suit are awarded to the defendants, fixed at RM30,000.00, subject to allocatur.

76. It is to be hoped that, with these directions in place, the parties may finally turn away from recrimination and toward completion of the administration which their late father intended should benefit them equally. The law can compel accountability. It cannot restore familial harmony. That, regrettably, lies beyond the jurisdiction of any court. Dated the 3rd day of June 2026 -SGN- ……………………………………………….. MOH KOK WAI JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER OF THE HIGH COURT HIGH COURT (CIVIL DIVISION NCvC14) HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF MALAYSIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 49 Counsel for the Plaintiff : Yong Yee Yen & Roger Lo Messrs KJ Lo & Co Counsel for the Defendants : Walston Wai & Ramesh Ravichandran Messrs Walston Wai & Partners **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal