Lokman Naim Bin Abdullah (JH-62JSK-24-11/2022)

Kanun Tatacara Jenayah memperuntukkan 18 bahawa pihak Pendakwaan perlu membuktikan satu kes “prima facie” di 19 akhir kes Pendakwaan seperti berikut: 20 21 “Procedure in summary trials 22 23 173. The following procedure shall be observed by 24 Magistrates in summary trials: 25

… 1 … 2

(i) When the case for the prosecution is concluded the 3 Court shall consider whether the prosecution has made out a 4 prima facie case against the accused.

(ii) If the Court finds that the prosecution has not made out a 6 prima facie case against the accused, the Court shall record 7 an order of acquittal. 8 …” 9 10 19. Definisi bagi perkataan “prima facie” telah banyak diterangkan, 11 dibincangkan dan diputuskan oleh kes-kes di Mahkamah Tinggi 12 hinggalah ke Mahkamah Persekutuan. Di dalam kes BALACHANDRAN 13 v. PP [2005] 1 CLJ 85, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memutuskan 14 bahawa: 15 16 “The standard of proof on the prosecution at the end of its 17 case and at the end of the whole case has thus been 18 statutorily spelt out in clear terms. The submission made 19 must therefore be ratiocinated against the background of the 20 meaning of the phrase “prima facie case”. … A prima facie 21 case is therefore one that is sufficient for the accused to 22 be called upon to answer. This in turn means that the 23 evidence adduced must be such that it can be 24 overthrown only by evidence in rebuttal.” 25 26 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw 8 20. Prinsip di dalam kes BALACHANDRAN ini diikuti seterusnya di 1 dalam kes AHMAD NAJIB BIN ARIS LAWAN PENDAKWA RAYA 2

2 CLJ 800, di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menyatakan 3 kedudukan undang-undang di akhir kes Pendakwaan seperti berikut: 4 5 “In dealing with the question as to the position of the law at 6 the end of the prosecution’s case and the steps to be taken 7 by the trial Judge, useful reference may be made to the 8 judgment of this Court in Balachandran v. P.P. (2005)1 9 AMR 321 [(2005) 2 MLJ 301- Tag 2] where the following 10 pronouncements were made:

In deciding whether a prima facie case has been 12 established under the new section 180 CPC, a 13 maximum evaluation of all the evidence adduced by 14 the prosecution must be done and a prima facie case is 15 one that is sufficient for the accused to answer, and the 16 evidence adduced must be such that it can only be 17 surmounted by evidence in rebuttal. 18 19

If the evidence is unrebutted, and the accused 20 remains silent, he must be convicted. Therefore, the 21 test to be applied at the end of the prosecution’s 22 case is whether there is sufficient evidence to 23 convict the accused if he chooses to remain silent, 24 which if answered in the affirmative, means that a 25 prima facie case has been made out. 26 27

Whenever the accused has chosen to remain silent, 1 there is no necessity to re-evaluate the evidence to 2 determine whether there is a reasonable doubt in the 3 absence of any further evidence.” 4 5 21. Di dalam kes LOOI KOW CHAI & ANOR V PP [2003] 1 CLJ 734, 6 Mahkamah juga telah memutuskan bahawa: 7 8 ‘’The correct test to be applied whether a prima facie case 9 had been made out under S. 180 CPC was that as 10 encapsulated in the judgment of Hashim Yeop Sani FJ in 11 Dato’ Mokhtar Hashim & Anor v PP. Therefore, a judge 12 sitting alone under S.180 of the CPC must subject the 13 prosecution evidence to maximum evaluation and to ask 14 himself the question “if I decide to call upon the accused to 15 enter his defence and he elects to remain silent, am I 16 prepared to convict him on the totality of the evidence 17 contain in the prosecution case?’’ if the answer was in the 18 negative, then no prima facie case had been made out and 19 the accused would be entitled to an acquittal….” 20 21 22. Berdasarkan ini peruntukan dan kes yang dirujuk di atas, adalah 22 jelas bahawa Mahkamah bertanggungjawab untuk membuat penilaian 23 dan pertimbangan maksimum terhadap keterangan yang telah 24 dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan di peringkat Pendakwaan sama ada 25 ia dapat menimbulkan satu kes “prima facie” terhadap Tertuduh. 26 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw 10 1 D. ELEMEN-ELEMEN PERTUDUHAN DI BAWAH SEKSYEN 376 (1) 2 KANUN KESEKSAAN 3 4 23. Terdapat 4 elemen yang perlu dibuktikan di bawah Seksyen 376 (1) 5 Kanun Keseksaan iaitu: 6 7 i. Tertuduh telah melakukan hubungan seksual atau 8 persetubuhan (sexual intercourse) dengan mangsa iaitu SP5; 9 10 ii. Hubungan seksual atau persetubuhan tersebut termasuk 11 salah satu keadaan di bawah Seksyen 375 Kanun 12 Keseksaan; 13 14 iii. Terdapat kemasukan kemaluan Tertuduh ke dalam 15 kemaluan SP5 (penetration); dan 16 17 iv. SP5 bukan isteri Tertuduh. 18 19 24. Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes PP v. MUHAMMAD NOR 20 AZMIL KHAIRUDDIN [2015] 1 CLJ 276, di mana Mahkamah telah 21 dinyatakan sebagaimana berikut: 22 “[13] The prosecution must therefore prove the ingredients of 23 the offence of rape which in this case is as follows: 24

The accused had sexual intercourse with the woman 1 in question;

(ii) The sexual intercourse took place under the 3 circumstances falling under any one of the five 4 paragraph to s. 375;

(iii) There was penetration;

(iv) The victim was not the wife of the accused or if she 7 was his wife, she was under sixteen years of age at the 8 material time.” 9 10 25. Mahkamah mendapati bahawa Tertuduh tidak mempertikaikan 11 elemen (iv) iaitu SP5 bukan isteri Tertuduh. Sebaliknya elemen (i), (ii) 12 dan (iii) dipertikaikan iaitu Tertuduh telah melakukan hubungan seksual 13 atau persetubuhan (sexual intercourse) dengan mangsa iaitu SP5, 14 hubungan seksual atau persetubuhan tersebut termasuk salah satu 15 keadaan di bawah Seksyen 375 Kanun Keseksaan dan terdapat 16 kemasukan kemaluan Tertuduh ke dalam kemaluan SP5 (penetration). 17 18 Elemen pertama dan ketiga – sama ada Tertuduh telah melakukan 19 hubungan seksual atau persetubuhan (sexual intercourse) dengan 20 mangsa iaitu SP5 dan sama ada terdapat kemasukan kemaluan 21 Tertuduh ke dalam kemaluan SP5 (penetration) 22 23 26. Elemen pertama dan ketiga adalah persoalan pokok atau 24 persoalan utama yang perlu diteliti dan dipertimbangkan oleh 25 Mahkamah ini iaitu sama ada Tertuduh telah melakukan hubungan 26 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw seksual atau persetubuhan (sexual intercourse) dengan mangsa iaitu 1 SP5 dan sama ada terdapat kemasukan kemaluan Tertuduh ke dalam 2 kemaluan SP5 (penetration). 3 4 27. SP5 cam Tertuduh sebagai individu yang didakwa melakukan 5 hubungan seksual atau persetubuhan (sexual intercourse) dengan SP5. 6 Sepanjang perbicaraan berjalan, SP5 dengan konsisten memberikan 7 keterangan bahawa Tertuduh adalah individu yang melakukan 8 hubungan seksual atau persetubuhan (sexual intercourse) dengannya. 9 10

SP5 juga mengenali Tertuduh dan mendakwa Tertuduh adalah 11 kenalan SP5. Pengecaman SP5 terhadap Tertuduh di dalam Mahkamah 12 juga positif. 13 14 29. Mahkamah ini merujuk kes DATO MOKHTAR BIN HASHIM & 15 ANOR v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [1983] 2 MLJ 232 di mana 16 Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan seperti berikut: 17 18 “As regards all these three witnesses it is important in my 19 opinion to draw a distinction between recognition and 20 identification. Recognition is more reliable than mere 21 identification. Recognition of a person known to the 22 witness would be more reliable than identification by a 23 witness of a stranger. Some pertinent questions were put 24 by the Lord Chief Justice in the judgment of the Court of 25 Appeal in Raymond Turnbull & Ors (1976) 63 Cr App R 132.” 26 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw 13 1 30. Mengenai isu sama ada terdapat kemasukan kemaluan Tertuduh 2 ke dalam kemaluan (penetration), telah memberikan 3 keterangan bahawa SP5 nampak dengan jelas kemaluan Tertuduh 4 memasuki kemaluan SP5. Keterangan SP5 pada peringkat ini jelas 5 menunjukkan kemasukan kemaluan Tertuduh ke dalam kemaluan SP5 6 telah benar-benar berlaku. Keterangan ini juga menafikan kemungkinan 7 Tertuduh memasukkan jari atau objek lain ke dalam kemaluan SP5. 8 9 31. Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes SIDEK BIN LUDAN v PUBLIC 10 PROSECUTOR [1995] 3 MLJ 178, di mana Mahkamah Tinggi 11 menyatakan bahawa: 12 13 “It is now established that to constitute the offence of rape, 14 there must be penetration (R v Hill (1781) 1 East PC 439). I 15 may add that even the slightest penetration, like in the 16 instant appeal, will be sufficient. So long as penetration is 17 proved but its depth will not injure the hymen, it is sufficient 18 to constitute the crime of rape (R v M'Rue (1938) 8 C & P 19 641; R v Allen (1839) 9 C & P 31). Put differently even if 20 the hymen is intact in that there is no rupture, so long as 21 there is penetration it is sufficient to constitute rape (R v 22 Hughes (1841) 2 Mood 190).” 23 24 32. turut memberikan keterangan bahawa merasai 25 kemasukan dan kesakitan pada bahagian kemaluan akibat kemasukan 26 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw zakar Tertuduh ke dalam kemaluannya. Bahkan semasa ditanya 1 berkenaan dengan posisi semasa kejadian berlaku juga, SP5 2 menerangkan SP5 berada dalam keadaan baring, Tertuduh naik ke atas 3 badan SP5 lalu memasukkan kemaluannya ke dalam kemaluan SP5. 4 juga telah menunjukkan simulasi bagaimana kejadian rogol 5 tersebut berlaku dengan menggunakan anak patung. 6 7 33. SP5 juga dapat camkan tempat kejadian selain dapat memberi 8 keterangan mengenainya semasa ditanya mengenai lokasi kejadian 9 SP5 dirogol. SP5 dengan pasti mengecam dan mengenal pasti tempat 10 tersebut dan SP5 mengesahkan bahawa kejadian tersebut berlaku 11 adalah seperti di dalam gambar yang dirujuk kepadanya. 12 13 34. Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada maxim "evidence is to be weighed 14 and not counted" yang bermaksud kualiti keterangan atau bukti adalah 15 lebih penting berbanding kuantiti. SP5 selaku mangsa dalam kes ini 16 telah memberikan pengecaman positif terhadap Tertuduh dan lokasi 17 kejadian SP5 dirogol. 18 19 35. Bagi isu keterangan sokongan (corroboration), Mahkamah ini 20 merujuk kes DATO' SERI ANWAR IBRAHIM v. PP & ANOTHER 21 APPEAL [2015] 2 CLJ 145, di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa: 22 23 “[81] A judge is entitled in law to convict even without 24 corroboration if convinced of the truth of a 25 complainant's evidence (Chiu Nang Hong v. PP [1964] 1 26 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw LNS 24; [1965] 1 MLJ 40 PC). If the evidence of a 1 complainant in a sexual offence inspires confidence then it 2 should be relied upon without the need of corroboration. It 3 has been said that a refusal by the courts to convict 4 based on the testimony of a victim of a sexual offence 5 alone in the absence of corroboration, amounts to 6 "adding insult to injury" (Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. 7 State of Gujarat [1983] SC 753).” 8 9 36. Justeru itu, Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa elemen pertama 10 dan ketiga telah berjaya dibuktikan oleh pihak Pendakwaan melalui 11 keterangan SP5. 12 13 Elemen kedua – sama ada hubungan seksual atau persetubuhan 14 tersebut termasuk salah satu keadaan di bawah Seksyen 375 15

Kanun Keseksaan 16 17 Bagi elemen pertuduhan yang kedua, Mahkamah ini berpandangan 18 bahawa persetubuhan yang dinyatakan di elemen pertama dan ketiga 19 tadi hendaklah termasuk di bawah salah satu keadaan di bawah 20 seksyen 375 Kanun Keseksaan. 21 22 38. Seksyen 375 Kanun Keseksaan memperuntukkan seperti berikut: 23 24 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw “375. A man is said to commit “rape” who, except in the case 1 hereinafter excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman 2 under circumstances falling under any of the following 3 descriptions:

with or without her consent, when she is under 5 sixteen years of age.” 6 7 39. Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa semasa kejadian SP5 masih 8 lagi di bawah umur 16 tahun berdasarkan kad pengenalan SP5 yang 9 bernombor 080219-01-1066. Mahkamah ini merujuk kes MOHD 10 SALLEH BIN MK MOHD YUSOF v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [2005] 4 11 MLJ 733, di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut: 12 13 “[7] Reading the High Court judgement in that case, it is 14 apparent that the identity card of the woman in that case was 15 one issued under the National Registration Regulations 1990, 16 the First Schedule to which prescribes the form of an identity 17 card and the particulars that it must contain, which do not 18 include the holder’s date of birth. Accordingly the identity 19 card of the woman in that case did not bear an entry 20 described as the woman’s date of birth. It must have 21 contained a number which the First Schedule prescribes as 22 the identity card number. It had been common knowledge 23 that the first six digits of that number were meant to 24 represent the date of birth of the holder but the judge did 25 not take them into account, presumably because in law, 26 that is according to the First Schedule, the whole 27 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw number was the identity card number and the date of 1 birth was not required to be given. So he found that the 2 date of birth was not given in the identity card. It is only by 3 an amendment in 2001 [PU(A) 232/01], after Jamaluddin, 4 that it is stated as a matter of law that the first six digits 5 represent the date of birth. That is to be seen in para (2A) 6 of reg 5 of the 1990 Regulations. 7 [8]….. 8 [9] The decision in Jamaluddin was therefore an entirely 9 wrong basis on which to argue against the acceptability 10 of the identity card in this case as proof of the date of 11 birth of F. En Karpal Singh did not seem to realise the 12 difference between the identity card in Jamaluddin and that 13 in this case. Neither did we, when we heard the appeal. 14 Neither presumably did the DPP. Had En Karpal Singh 15 realised it and still wished to urge us not to accept the 16 identity card in this case as prima facie proof of date of birth, 17 he would have had to come up with reasons different from 18 those furnished by the case of Jamaluddin, which reasons 19 we reject as inapplicable to the present case. The question 20 would have been whether an identity card issued under the 21 1960 regulations and bearing the date of birth as required by 22 the regulations furnishes legal proof of the date of birth of the 23 person concerned. That question has not been argued 24 before us and we refrain from answering it. We would treat 25 the question as not having been raised before us in this 26 appeal and we would therefore regard the admissibility 27 of F’s identity card as proof of her age, which as we said 28 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw was not an issue in the courts below, as not an issue 1 before us.” 2 3 40. Memandangkan SP5 berumur di bawah 16 tahun semasa kejadian 4 rogol ini berlaku, Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa persetubuhan 5 yang dinyatakan di elemen pertama dan ketiga tadi adalah termasuk di 6 bawah salah satu keadaan di bawah seksyen 375 Kanun Keseksaan 7 seperti yang dinyatakan di atas. 8 9 Isu-isu lain yang berbangkit 10 11 41. Bagi isu kesan kemasukan (penetration) sepertimana yang 12 dinyatakan di dalam laporan perubatan SP5, Mahkamah ini merujuk kes 13 SYED ABU TAHIR A/L MOHAMED ESMAIL v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR 14 [1988] 3 MLJ 485, di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa: 15 16 “In my opinion the evidence of the girl was sufficiently 17 corroborated by the two doctors who examined the girl and 18 the appellant respectively. In a case of this nature, medical 19 evidence is sufficient to corroborate the evidence of the 20 girl:” 21 22 42. Laporan perubatan SP5 sahkan terdapat koyakan lama pada 23 kemaluan SP5. Namun begitu, Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa 24 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw laporan perubatan ini semata-mata adalah tidak mencukupi untuk 1 menyokong keterangan SP5 kerana tempoh masa kejadian yang lama. 2 3 43. Sebaliknya laporan polis yang dibuat oleh SP5 yang dilihat 4 menunjukkan konsisten dengan keterangan mengenai 5 kejadian yang didakwa berlaku. Mahkamah ini merujuk kes PP v 6 MOHAMMAD TERANG AMIT [1999] 5 CLJ 156, di mana Mahkamah 7 Tinggi menyatakan: 8 9 “Finally on the issue of the police reports lodged by PW7, 10 PW8 and PW9, the learned magistrate noted that he was 11 entitled and even encouraged to infer that the complainants' 12 allegations against the accused was either totally or 13 substantially untrue "by virtue of the facts that the complaints 14 were not lodged at the first reasonable opportunity." The 15 complaint made at the first reasonable opportunity 16 depends on the circumstances in each case. In R v. 17 Cummings [1948] 1 All ER 551 (CA), Lord Goddard CJ said: 18 It is objected that she did not make a complaint 19 immediately, and therefore, that evidence of the fact 20 that she made a complaint ought not to have been 21 admitted. The law on the subject was laid down once 22 and for all in R v. Lillyman [1896] 2 QB 167 which 23 reviewed all the authorities. Hawkin J in delivering the 24 judgment of the Court of Crown Cases Reserved, in 25 that case, said: 26 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw It is too late, therefore, now to make serious objection 1 to the admissibility of evidence of the fact that a 2 complaint was made, provided it was made as speedily 3 after the acts complained of as could reasonably be 4 expected. 5 However, the learned magistrate failed to consider that 6 the complainants were all school children who resided 7 at the hostel of the school they were studying. PW7 was 8 12 years old at the time of the incident and so was PW8. 9 PW9 was even younger then, she was only ten years old. 10 In reality, would they have the opportunity or access to 11 lodge the police reports? More importantly did they 12 possess the idea and know how to lodge a police report 13 in view of their tender age? These are factors which the 14 learned magistrate should have considered before 15 rejecting the admissibility of the police reports. In 16 addition, the police reports lodged by PW7, PW8 and PW9 17 can be admitted by virtue of s. 108A of the Criminal 18 Procedure Code which provides that: 19 …………………………………. 20 Such a report which generally have been accepted and 21 known as a first information report can never be considered 22 as a piece of substantive evidence to prove a fact. At the 23 most, it is only of corroborative value……….. 24 Indeed, the police reports P6, P7 and P8 should have been 25 admitted by the learned magistrate under s.108A of the 26 Criminal Procedure Code. Nevertheless, it must be 27 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw emphasised that the evidence so admitted are not meant 1 to show the truth of the allegations as contained therein 2 but to underline the consistency of the stories.” 3 4 44. Dalam kes ini, laporan polis telah dibuat lewat selama lebih kurang 5 4 hari selepas kejadian berlaku. Namun begitu, apabila ditanya 6 mengapa SP5 lambat membuat laporan polis, SP5 telah memberikan 7 penjelasan, yang pada pandangan Mahkamah ini, adalah munasabah 8 i.e SP5 pada masa kejadian adalah berumur lingkungan hanya 14 tahun. 9 Hanya setelah mengetahui perbuatan yang dilakukan oleh 10 Tertuduh terhadap SP5 sebagai perbuatan yang salah, SP5 terus 11 membuat laporan polis berkenaan dengan kejadian yang berlaku tanpa 12 kelengahan yang tidak munasabah. Nama Tertuduh juga dinyatakan 13 dengan jelas di dalam laporan polis SP5. 14 15 45. Mahkamah ini berpandangan laporan polis tersebut boleh 16 digunakan sebagai keterangan sokongan (corroboration) kepada 17 keterangan SP2. Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes TAN CHENG KOOI 18 & ANOR v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [1972] 2 MLJ 115, Mahkamah 19 memutuskan: 20 21 “Now the importance of a first information report has been 22 stressed in a number of decisions. It is not a substantive 23 piece of evidence and it is inadmissible for the purpose 24 of proving that the facts stated in it are correct. But it 25 can be used by way of corroboration or contradiction: 26 per Carnduff J. in 17 C.W.N. 1213: 27 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw "The first information is a document of great 1 importance and in practice it is always and very rightly 2 produced and proved in criminal trials. But it is not a 3 piece of substantive evidence and it can be used 4 only as a previous statement admissible to 5 corroborate or contradict the author of it.” 6 7 46. Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dikemukakan di atas, pada 8 penilaian maksima berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan saksi 9 Pendakwaan, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa pihak Pendakwaan telah 10 berjaya membuktikan kes ‘prima facie’ terhadap Tertuduh bagi 11 pertuduhan tersebut dan Tertuduh telah dipanggil untuk membela diri. 12 13 E. BEBAN PEMBUKTIAN DI AKHIR KES PEMBELAAN 14 15 47. Beban pembuktian di akhir kes Pembelaan ialah Mahkamah ini 16 perlu mempertimbangkan semua keterangan yang telah dikemukakan di 17 hadapan Mahkamah dan perlu memutuskan sama ada pihak 18 Pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan kes melampaui keraguan 19 munasabah (proof beyond reasonable doubt). 20 21 48. Perkara ini telah dinyatakan dalam Seksyen 173 (m) Kanun 22 Tatacara Jenayah seperti berikut: 23 24 “Procedure in summary trials 25 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw 23 173. The following procedure shall be observed by 1 Magistrates in summary trials:

… 3 … 4

(i) At the conclusion of the trial, the Court shall 5 consider all the evidence adduced before it and shall 6 decide whether the prosecution has proved its case 7 beyond reasonable doubt. 8 9

(ii) If the Court finds that the prosecution has proved its 10 case beyond reasonable doubt, the Court shall find the 11 accused guilty and he may be convicted on it and the 12 Court shall pass sentence according to law. 13 14

(iii) If the Court finds that the prosecution has not 15 proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, the Court 16 shall record an order of acquittal. 17 …” 18 19 49. Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes BALACHANDRAN v PP [2005] 20 1 CLJ 85, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menyatakan bahawa: 21 22 “The test at the close of the case for the prosecution would 23 therefore be: Is the evidence sufficient to convict the accused 24 if he elects to remain silent? If the answer is in the affirmative 25 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw then a prima facie case has been made out. This must, as of 1 necessity, require a consideration of the existence of any 2 reasonable doubt in the case for the prosecution. If there is 3 any such doubt there can be no prima facie case. 4 5 As the accused can be convicted on the prima facie 6 evidence it must have reached a standard which is 7 capable of supporting a conviction beyond reasonable 8 doubt.” 9 10 50. Berdasarkan nas perundangan yang dinyatakan di atas, adalah 11 jelas bagi Mahkamah ini bahawa tugas pihak Pendakwaan adalah untuk 12 membuktikan kes melampaui keraguan munasabah (proof beyond 13 reasonable doubt) manakala tugas pihak Pembelaan adalah 14 menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah (reasonable doubt) ke atas 15 kes Pendakwaan. Standard yang diperlukan adalah menimbulkan 16 keraguan munasabah (reasonable doubt) dan bukannya keraguan yang 17 direka-reka (fanciful doubt). Ianya juga hendaklah sesuatu Pembelaan 18 yang tidak diselaputi oleh elemen-elemen “fictitious”, “mere denials” 19 ataupun “afterthought”. 20 21 51. Tertuduh telah memilih untuk memberi keterangan bersumpah dari 22 kandang saksi dan memanggil 1 lagi saksi untuk kes Pembelaan. 23 Secara keseluruhan, pihak Pembelaan telah memanggil 2 orang saksi 24 semasa peringkat Pembelaan. 25 26 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw 25 52. Semua saksi-saksi Pembelaan secara keseluruhannya telah 1 memberikan keterangan bagi membolehkan Mahkamah ini membuat 2 pertimbangan sama ada pihak Pembelaan, di akhir kes Pembelaan, 3 telah berjaya menimbulkan satu keraguan yang munasabah terhadap 4 kes pihak Pendakwaan. 5 6 Pembelaan bersifat rekaan (fictitious) dan pemikiran terkemudian 7 (afterthought) 8 9 53. Tertuduh telah memberikan keterangan bahawa Tertuduh yakin 10 semasa ingin tidur, kawan Tertuduh bernama “Faiz” ada bersamanya 11 tanpa kehadiran SP5 mahupun SP2. Tertuduh yakin semasa tidur 12 sehinggalah bangun pada paginya, Tertuduh masih lengkap berpakaian 13 baju sejuk hoodie (sweater with hoodie) beserta berseluar jeans. 14 15 54. Tertuduh, semasa bangun dari tidur, terkejut kerana melihat SP5 16 berada di hujung katil sambil bermain telefon bimbit milik Tertuduh. 17 Tertuduh menyatakan telah bertanya kepada SP5 dimana “Faiz” dan 18 SP5 menjawab “Faiz” di bilik sebelah bersama SP2. Tertuduh kemudian 19 telah pergi ke bilik nombor 2024 dan telah melihat “Faiz” tidak 20 berpakaian manakala SP2 menutup badannya dengan selimut. 21 22 55. Tertuduh menyatakan bahawa memandangkan tiada apa-apa 23 yang berlaku antaranya dengan SP5 pada malam tersebut, Tertuduh, 24 SP5, “Faiz” dan SP2 telah keluar dari hotel tersebut seperti biasa dan 25 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw terus mencari kedai motosikal untuk membaiki tayar yang pancit dan 1 kemudiannya telah pulang ke Pasir Gudang, Johor. 2 3 56. Mahkamah mendapati bahawa keterangan Tertuduh ini dari mula- 4 mula disoal siasat hinggalah perbicaraan adalah konsisten. Mahkamah 5 juga telah dirujuk percakapan Seksyen 112 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah 6 Tertuduh. 7 8 57. SD2 pula merupakan bekas teman wanita Tertuduh. SD2 menjadi 9 teman wanita Tertuduh sejak tahun 2019 dan telah merancang untuk 10 berkahwin dengan Tertuduh selepas habis SPM namun kini SD2 dan 11 Tertuduh sudah tidak bercinta lagi. SD2 menjadi saksi kepada Tertuduh 12 kerana tahu serba sedikit mengenai kes ini. 13 14 58. SD2 menyatakan pada 6 September 2022 iaitu sehari sebelum 15 Tertuduh ditahan polis, SD2 telah menerima klip video dari kakak SP2 16 bernama Mel dimana video tersebut jelas menunjukkan SP5 datang 17 mendekati Tertuduh yang sedang tidur di hujung katil. SD2 menyatakan 18 ketika waktu tersebut, Tertuduh berpakaian lengkap berbaju sejuk 19 berhoodie (sweater with hoodie) serta berseluar jeans. SP5 dilihat 20 berpakaian lengkap. Klip video tersebut tidak dapat dikemukakan kerana 21 telefon bimbit milik SD2 telah rosak. 22 23 59. Meskipun klip video tersebut tidak dapat dikemukakan kerana 24 telefon bimbit milik SD2 telah rosak, Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa 25 keterangan SD2 dilihat menyokong keterangan Tertuduh berkenaan 26 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw Tertuduh berpakaian lengkap berbaju sejuk berhoodie (sweater with 1 hoodie) serta berseluar jeans semasa kejadian didakwa berlaku. 2 Mahkamah ini juga berpandangan bahawa adalah munasabah apabila 3 SD2 mengatakan bahawa dia tidak mengingati setiap butiran di dalam 4 klip video tersebut dan hanya dapat menghuraikan butiran berdasarkan 5 apa yang dilihat olehnya sahaja, contohnya pakaian yang dipakai oleh 6 tertuduh semasa mangsa merakamkan video. 7 8 60. Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes RASOUL BAGHERBEJANDI 9 AHMAD v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR AND ANOTHER APPEAL [2016] 1 10 MLJ 272, di mana Mahkamah Rayuan telah menyatakan bahawa: 11 12 “[35] Being the core of their defence we would expect that 13 these issues (as in paras 32 and 34 above) should be 14 featured prominently in the crossexamination of SP8, SP11 15 and SP12. Apart from their own testimonies, their defence 16 can equally be ascertained from the line of crossexamination 17 of the prosecution witnesses. It is also incumbent upon the 18 defence to put forth their case at the earliest possible 19 stage. 20 [36] Both the appellants’ failure to do so had occasioned 21 a breach of the rule of essential justice, as apart from 22 springing surprises, it also leaves no room for rebuttal, 23 denial or explaination by the prosecution witnesses. In 24 Alcontara a/l Ambross Anthony v Public Prosecutor [1996] 1 25 MLJ 209, the Federal Court, at p 218, stated: 26 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw Speaking generally, in criminal trial, the whole 1 point and purpose of the defence having to put its 2 case as might be in position to admit or deny it, is 3 to enable the prosecution to check on whether an 4 accused’s version of the facts is true or false, and 5 thus avoid the adverse comment, that the defence 6 is a recent invention – in other words, ‘kept up its 7 sleeve’, as it were revealed for the first time when 8 the accused makes his defence from the witness 9 box or dock, thus detracting from the weight to be 10 accorded to the defence. In our view, there has 11 been a belated disclosure of the defence which 12 suggested concoction.” 13 14 61. Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa “evidence in rebuttal” yang 15 dikemukakan oleh pihak Pembelaan untuk menyangkal keterangan yang 16 dikemukakan oleh Pendakwaan melalui keterangan saksi pihak 17 Pembelaan tersebut telah berjaya menimbulkan keraguan yang 18 munasabah pada kes pihak Pendakwaan, 19 20 62. Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dikemukakan di atas, Mahkamah 21 ini berpandangan bahawa keterangan Tertuduh dan saksi pembelaan 22 adalah tidak bersifat rekaan (fictitious) dan pemikiran terkemudian 23 (afterthought) semata-mata. 24 25 26 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw Pembelaan bersifat penafian semata-mata (mere denials) 1 2 63. Sepertimana yang telah dinyatakan di atas, Tertuduh telah 3 memberikan keterangan yang konsisten bahawa tiada apa-apa yang 4 berlaku antara Tertuduh dengan SP5 pada malam tersebut dan semasa 5 tidur sehinggalah bangun pada paginya, Tertuduh masih lengkap 6 berpakaian baju sejuk hoodie (sweater with hoodie) beserta berseluar 7 jeans. 8 9 64. Setelah meneliti keterangan Pembelaan di peringkat Pembelaan, 10 Mahkamah ini mendapati terdapat keterangan untuk Mahkamah ini 11 mempertimbangkan bahawa keterangan Tertuduh bukanlah merupakan 12 satu bentuk penafian semata-mata (bare denial) atau merupakan satu 13 pemikiran terkemudian (afterthought). 14 15 65. Ini adalah kerana gabungan semua keterangan secara 16 keseluruhannya atau secara “totality” menghasilkan keraguan terhadap 17 fakta kejadian yang mana tidak semuanya menjurus kepada penglibatan 18 Tertuduh dalam melakukan kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 376 (1) Kanun 19 Keseksaan yang boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen yang sama. 20 21 66. Akibat ketiadaan bukti-bukti tersebut tersebut, Mahkamah ini 22 berpandangan bahawa penafian Tertuduh bahawa Tertuduh tidak 23 melakukan kesalahan seperti yang dipertuduhkan ke atasnya bukanlah 24 bersifat penafian semata-mata (mere denials) semata-mata. Terdapat 25 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw keterangan saksi yang menyokong pembelaan Tertuduh dalam 1 menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap pertuduhan. 2 3 67. Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes PUBLIC PROSECUTOR v 4 LING TEE HUAH [1982] 2 MLJ 324, di mana Mahkamah memutuskan 5 seperti berikut: 6 7 “A mere denial without other proof to reasonably 8 dislodge the prosecution's evidence is not sufficient.” 9 10 68. Mahkamah ini turut merujuk kepada kes PP lwn HO SEK KONG 11 [2006] 5 CLJ 49, di mana YA Hakim Abdul Hamid Embong menyatakan: 12 13 “There was nothing in the defence which merits any 14 consideration as a defence that could raise a reasonable 15 doubt in the prosecution’s case. In his testimony, the 16 accused had not adverted to his confession, save for a 17 total denial. He also did not refer to the telephone 18 conversations he had with his sister, SP3 and to the fact that 19 he had told SP3 that the deceased had vomited a lot of blood. 20 A total appraisal of the accused’s evidence shows 21 nothing more than a bare denial which in law is not a 22 true defence. The duty now on the accused is only to 23 cast a reasonable doubt on the prosecution case; he is 24 not required to prove his innocence (see Mohd Radhi bin 25 Yaakob v. PP [1991] 3 CLJ 2073; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 311). 26 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw This is now the question that this court needs to address, 1 even when disbelieving the story of the accused (Mat v. PP 2 [1963] 29 MLJ 263). In the instant case however there was 3 no explanation forthcoming to even consider whether it had 4 raised a reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s case.” 5 6 69. Berdasarkan nas perundangan tersebut, adalah jelas bagi 7 Mahkamah ini bahawa pembelaan Tertuduh bukanlah penafian kosong 8 semata-mata. Justeru itu ianya berjaya menimbulkan keraguan yang 9 munasabah. 10 11 70. Di dalam menilai dan mempertimbangkan sama ada pihak 12 Pembelaan berjaya menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah 13 (reasonable doubt) ke atas kes Pendakwaan, Mahkamah ini merujuk 14 kepada kes PUBLIC PROSECUTOR v SAIMIN & ORS [1971] 2 MLJ 16 15 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan: 16 17 “The following definition of "reasonable doubt" is often 18 quoted: 19 "It is not mere possible doubt, because everything 20 relating to human affairs and depending upon 21 moral evidence is open to some possible or 22 imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which 23 after the entire comparison and consideration of all 24 the evidence leaves the minds of the jurors in that 25 condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding 26 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the 1 charge." 2 3 It has again been said that "'reasonable doubt' is the doubt 4 which makes you hesitate as to the correctness of the 5 conclusion which you reach. If under your oaths and upon 6 your consciences, after you have fully investigated the 7 evidence and compared it in all its parts, you say to yourself I 8 doubt if he is guilty, then it is a reasonable doubt. It is a 9 doubt which settles in your judgment and finds a resting 10 place there." Or as sometimes said, it must be a doubt so 11 solemn and substantial as to produce in the minds of 12 the jurors some uncertainty as to the verdict to be given. 13 A reasonable doubt must be a doubt arising from the 14 evidence or want of evidence and cannot be an 15 imaginary doubt or conjecture unrelated to evidence.” 16 17 71. Memandangkan penafian kosong semata-mata bukanlah satu 18 pembelaan dan ianya tidak boleh menimbulkan keraguan yang 19 munasabah, Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada panduan yang dinyatakan di 20 dalam kes MAT v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [1963] 29 MLJ 263, di mana 21 YA Hakim Suffian telah menyenaraikan langkah-langkah yang perlu 22 diambil oleh pihak Mahkamah dalam mencapai keputusan di akhir kes 23 pembelaan. Mahkamah menyatakan bahawa: 24 25 “The position may be conveniently stated as follows:– 26 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw

If you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the 1 accused's guilt………………………………………….. Convict.

If you accept or believe the accused's 3 explanation……………………………………………… Acquit.

If you do not accept or believe the accused's 5 explanation……………………………………… Do not convict 6 but consider the next steps below.

If you do not accept or believe the accused's explanation 8 and that explanation does not raise in your mind a 9 reasonable doubt as to his guilt……………………….Convict.

If you do not accept or believe the accused's explanation 11 but nevertheless it raises in your mind a reasonable doubt as 12 to his guilt……………………………………………….. Acquit.” 13 14 72. Pengemukaan “evidence in rebuttal” yang dikemukakan oleh pihak 15 Pembelaan untuk menyangkal keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh 16 Pendakwaan melalui keterangan saksi pihak Pembelaan telah 17 menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah pada kes pihak Pendakwaan, 18 maka terbuktilah bahawa kesemua elemen kesalahan di bawah 19 Seksyen 376 (1) Kanun Keseksaan yang boleh dihukum di bawah 20 Seksyen yang sama terhadap Tertuduh tidak berjaya dibuktikan oleh 21 pihak Pendakwaan melampaui keraguan munasabah. 22 23 73. Memandangkan pihak Pembelaan telah berjaya untuk 24 menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes Pendakwaan 25 dan pihak Pendakwaan sebaliknya tidak berjaya membuktikan kes 26 S/N 7FECbD5/yUayo5jP1gTdkw hingga tiada keraguan yang munasabah terhadap Tertuduh, Tertuduh 1 didapati tidak bersalah seperti mana pertuduhan. Tertuduh dilepas dan 2 dibebaskan. 3 4 F. KESIMPULAN 5 6 74. Memandangkan pihak Pendakwaan tidak berjaya membuktikan 7 kes hingga tiada keraguan yang munasabah terhadap Tertuduh 8 manakala pihak Pembelaan pula telah berjaya untuk menimbulkan 9 keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes Pendakwaan, Tertuduh 10 didapati tidak bersalah seperti mana pertuduhan serta Tertuduh 11 dilepaskan dan dibebaskan. 12 13 Sekian, terima kasih. 14 15