that on other grounds it is just and equitable to grant relief, may, on the application of the company or any person interested, and on such terms and conditions as seem to the Court just and expedient, by order, extend the time for registration or order that the omission or mis-statement be rectified." [15] Three features of the section bear emphasis. First, the provision is remedial in character. It exists precisely to permit the correction of bona fide errors in the register without compromising the integrity of the registration system. The section is to be construed in a manner consistent with that remedial purpose, but its conditions remain the gateway through which any applicant for relief must pass. Secondly, the conditions in paragraph (a) are disjunctive: relief may be granted where the error was accidental, or due to inadvertence, or due to some other sufficient cause, or where it is not of a nature to prejudice the position of creditors or shareholders. Paragraph (b) furnishes a freestanding ground of relief on grounds of justice and equity, the inclusion of which reflects the legislature's recognition that the categories in paragraph (a) cannot exhaust the circumstances in which corrective relief may properly be granted. Thirdly, the closing words of subsection (1) empower the Court to grant relief "on such terms and conditions as seem to the Court just and expedient", which permits, where appropriate, a saving for the rights of intervening third parties. [16] The procedural vehicle for an application of this kind is Order 88 rule 2 of the Rules of Court 2012, under which proceedings under the Companies Act 2016 (other than those required to be commenced by petition) shall be commenced by originating summons supported by affidavit. The present application has been commenced and supported in accordance with that rule. [17] One further observation about the operation of Section 361 is appropriate before turning to the application of the section to the facts. The section identifies, in paragraph (a), "creditors or shareholders of the company" as the class whose interests are to be protected. This statutory focus directs the Court's attention not to the parties to the charge the chargor and the chargee, who are typically aligned in seeking corrective relief but to those third parties who may have ordered their affairs by reference to the public state of the register. The applicant for relief therefore bears the burden of placing before the Court evidence sufficient to enable a judgment to be formed about the position of any such third party. Where, as here, the evidence and the circumstances afford no basis for thinking that any creditor or shareholder has acted to its detriment in reliance on the register as it presently stands, the protective concern that paragraph (a) embodies is not engaged in any substantive way, and the section then falls to be applied without that complication. The section thus contains within itself the protective machinery necessary for its faithful and balanced application; the Court is not driven to extrinsic doctrines to give it effect. E. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION Issue 1: Whether the error is a "mis-statement" within Section 361(1) [18] The first matter is whether the error in question falls within the descriptive scope of Section 361(1). The section is engaged where there is, relevantly, a "mis-statement of any particular with respect to any such charge". Each of those words is to be given its natural and ordinary meaning, read in the statutory context. [19] The four registered Statements of Particulars each record the date of creation of the charge as "9 October 2025". The unchallenged evidence in the Affidavit of Yong Choy Siah, corroborated by the Facilities Agreement (Exhibit "A") and the Deeds of Assignment (Exhibit "B"), establishes that the Deeds of Assignment were executed by the Plaintiff on 11 September 2025. The recorded date is therefore not the date on which the charge was created. [20] The date of creation of a charge is, by any measure, a "particular" of the charge — indeed, it is a particular of central importance. It governs the running of the thirty-day period under Section 352(2) within which registration must be effected; and it is the temporal anchor by reference to which competing interests are ordered. A factual error in that field is, on any natural reading, a "misstatement" of a "particular" within Section 361(1). I have no hesitation in so holding. [21] Accordingly, the threshold descriptive requirement of Section 361(1) is satisfied. Issue 2: Whether the conditions for the grant of relief are satisfied [22] The next, and principal, question is whether one or more of the alternative conditions for the exercise of the discretion in Section 361(1) are satisfied. For the reasons that follow, the Court is satisfied that they are, on more than one independent footing. [23] On the evidence, the mis-statement was due to inadvertence within the meaning of paragraph (a). At paragraph 8 of her Affidavit, Yong Choy Siah states that, in completing Item 2 of each Statement of Particulars, she inadvertently entered the date on which stamp duty had been paid (9 October 2025) in lieu of the date of execution of the Deeds of Assignment (11 September 2025). That explanation is intrinsically credible. Stamp duty under the Stamp Act 1949 is payable, in the case of an instrument executed, within thirty days of execution; and the dates of execution and of stamping are routinely held side by side on the conveyancing file. The juxtaposition of the two dates within a single working file is a familiar source of clerical error, particularly where, as here, the stamping date falls only a matter of weeks after execution. The explanation is not contradicted; it is supported by the documentary record; and it is consistent with the very form in which the error appears. There is, moreover, a second and independent ground on which paragraph (a) is satisfied. The mis-statement is "not of a nature to prejudice the position of creditors or shareholders of the company". The amendment sought does not enlarge the charges, alter their amount, or change the identity of the chargee. It corrects only the date of creation. The effect of the correction, indeed, is to place the charges on the register at an earlier date than that presently recorded. Whatever forensic effect such an amendment might have can only operate, if at all, against the interest of the chargor (the Plaintiff itself) and the chargee (Public Bank Berhad), neither of whom complains. The Affidavit of Yong Choy Siah discloses no creditor of the Plaintiff who advanced credit between 11 September 2025 and 9 October 2025 in reliance on the register being clear of the charges; and the Defendant, who as the keeper of the register would be best placed to draw any such matter to the Court's attention, has filed nothing to suggest that any such interest has crystallised. Even were the Court to take a more demanding view of paragraph (a), the case is, in any event, one in which the equitable ground in paragraph (b) is plainly engaged. The substantive transaction between the Plaintiff and Public Bank Berhad on 11 September 2025 is established by contemporaneous documentary instruments. To leave the register uncorrected would be to perpetuate, on a public register, an inaccuracy at variance with that documentary record, and to do so for no better reason than the residue of a clerical slip. The registration regime exists to give creditors and the public a reliable picture of the encumbrances over corporate property; it is no service to that purpose to refuse rectification where the error is documented, the explanation candid, and the amendment unopposed. On those facts, it is just and equitable, within the meaning of paragraph (b), to grant relief. [26] Drawing the threads of paragraphs [23] to [25] together, each of the alternative limbs of Section 361(1) is independently satisfied on the evidence: the mis-statement was due to inadvertence within paragraph (a); it is not of a nature to prejudice the position of creditors or shareholders within the same paragraph; and, on other grounds, it is just and equitable to grant relief within paragraph (b). The statutory threshold for the exercise of the Court's discretion is therefore met on three independent footings. Nothing in the evidence displaces the propriety of exercising the discretion in the Plaintiff's favour, and the discretion will accordingly be so exercised. Issue 3: Whether the rectification should operate retrospectively [27] Prayer 6 of the Amended Originating Summons seeks an order that the rectification take retrospective effect ("kesan ke belakang") from 11 September 2025, being the true date of creation of the charges. [28] It is necessary, at the outset, to be precise about what is being sought. The application is not, properly understood, an application to extend the time for registration. Registration was lodged on 17 October 2025, which is within thirty days of the true date of creation (11 September 2025) and is, accordingly, in conformity with the time limit prescribed by Section 352(2) of the Companies Act 2016. What is sought is the correction of a particular within an otherwise timely registration. The earlier framing of the matter as one of "extension of time" in the unamended Originating Summons was, in my judgment, infelicitous; and the Plaintiff was right to recast its prayers in the Amended Originating Summons so as to confine itself to the relief that the case actually requires. [29] Once a mis-stated particular is corrected, the natural and orderly course is for the corrected register to read, from the date of creation, as it would have read had the error never been made. Any other course would mean that, even after rectification, the register would record a charge as having come into existence on a date when, in truth, it did no such thing which is the very mischief that rectification under Section 361 is designed to cure. To confine the rectification to prospective operation would be to leave half the work undone, and would defeat the corrective purpose for which the section was enacted. [30] That course is also supported by the structure of Section 361 itself. The closing words of subsection (1) empower the Court to grant relief "on such terms and conditions as seem to the Court just and expedient". The legislature thus contemplated that the Court would, in appropriate cases, attach conditions to an order to safeguard intervening interests. The implicit corollary is that, where no such intervening interest is shown, the order may operate without restriction from the date the legislature itself has identified as the temporally significant one, namely the date of creation of the charge. To confine the rectification to prospective operation in the present case, where the chargee has done what Section 352(2) requires of it and the only defect lies in the accuracy of the recorded particular, would be to read into Section 361 a limitation that the text does not impose and that no factual circumstance presently before the Court justifies. [31] It remains to consider whether the Court should attach a saving for intervening third-party rights pursuant to the discretion conferred by the closing words of Section 361(1). The Court would ordinarily reserve the rights of any person who, between the original (incorrect) registration on 17 October 2025 and the date of this Order, has acquired an interest in the property in good faith and for value in reliance on the register as it then stood. The evidence in the Affidavit of Yong Choy Siah discloses no such intervening interest, and the period between original registration and this Order is short. In those circumstances, no formal saving need be inserted in the operative order; it is sufficient to record that the order operates in the absence of any intervening interest having crystallised, and that nothing in this judgment should be read as foreclosing the rights of any such person, should one come forward. F. CONCLUSION [32] Pulling the threads together: the recordal of "9 October 2025" in Item 2 of each of the four Statements of Particulars is a misstatement of a particular within Section 361(1) of the Companies Act 2016; the conditions for the grant of relief under that section are satisfied on independent grounds, both as a matter of inadvertence and as a matter of the absence of prejudice to creditors or shareholders within paragraph (a), and as a matter of justice and equity within paragraph (b); and there is no good reason of statutory text or of fact to confine the relief to prospective operation. The application stands to be allowed in the terms of the Amended Originating Summons, with such consequential directions as are necessary to give effect to the order and to ensure that the rectification is duly entered upon the register. G. ORDERS OF THE COURT [33] The Court accordingly orders as follows: