Long Kee Piling Works Sdn. Bhd. v Chang Kian Chiang (JA-29NCC-597-09/2023)

Pemiutang Penghakiman (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “JC”) telah memulakan tindakan kebankrapan terhadap Penghutang Penghakiman (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “JD”) berdasarkan perintah-perintah berikut:-

Perintah lampiran 1 bertarikh 8.6.2022 melalui Saman Pemula JA-24NCC-21-10/2021;

Perintah lampiran 45 dan 52 bertarikh 8.6.2022 melalui Saman

Perintah lampiran 1 bertarikh 4.12.2022 melalui Saman Pemula bernombor JA-24NCvC-974-10/2022;

Perintah lampiran 21 bertarikh 24.5.2023 melalui rayuan bernombor J-02-(NCC)(A)-1065-06/2022; dan

Perintah lampiran 17 bertarikh 4.7.2023 melalui Saman Pemula JA-24NCvC-974-10/2022.

Notis Kebankrapan tersebut telah disampaikan kepada JD secara penyampaian ganti dan memandangkan JD gagal memenuhi tuntutan Notis Kebankrapan tersebut dan telah melakukan perbuatan kebankrapan pada 21.11.2023, JC telah memfailkan Petisyen Pemiutang terhadap JD pada 13.12.2023.

Sementara itu, JD telah memfailkan permohonan di Mahkamah ini antara lain bagi menggantung prosiding kebankrapan sementara menunggu pelupusan Saman Pemula No. JA-24NCC-29-11/2023 yang menjadi subjek pertikaian di hadapan Mahkamah. S/N y0Z2mwag6ki2BhJeJ03oXA Analisis dan keputusan

Mahkamah merujuk kepada seksyen 97 Akta Insolvensi 1967 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “JD”) yang memperuntukkan bahawa:- “The court may at any time, for sufficient reason, make an order staying the proceedings under a bankruptcy petition, either altogether or for a limited time, on such terms and subject to conditions as the court thinks just.”

Dalam mentaksirkan peruntukan seksyen 97 Akta Tersebut, terutama berkenaan frasa “sufficient reason”, Mahkamah dalam kes Re Rosli Abdul Kadir; Ex-Parte Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia [2008] MLJU 1096; [2008] 5 CLJ 691; [2008] 1 MLRH 819 memutuskan bahawa:- “[7] Certainly, the weight and degree of burden to be proved to satisfy the court in 'special circumstances' test is higher than the 'sufficient reason' test and the weight and the degree of burden to be proved to satisfy the court in 'sufficient reason' test is lower than in the 'special circumstances' test… [15] The test of 'sufficient reason' is exclusively provided for in an application for a stay of bankruptcy proceeding whereas in an application for a stay of execution of a judgment, the stay is against all form of execution and the test should rightly be 'special circumstances'… [19] Furthermore, as said earlier, the 'special circumstances' test is the creation of the courts in an application for a stay of execution (normally in pending appeal)

Prinsip ini kemudiannya telah disahkan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Chen Ying v Export-Import Bank of Malaysia Bhd [2016] 4 MLJ 324; [2016] 7 CLJ 475; [2016] 5 MLRA 283; [2015] 4 AMR 274 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa:- “[32] We agree. We are of the opinion that express statutory provision cannot be ignored nor can we try and draw parallels with the other test of stays of enforcement or execution of orders. In considering whether to exercise its discretion and grant a stay of the bankruptcy proceedings, there must be sufficient reason placed before the court to persuade the court to grant that order. This test is set on a lower burden than the test of 'special circumstances' in relation to the execution of court orders or judgments. This is understandable given the far-reaching consequences of not just a receiving order but an adjudication order. These orders have immediate operative effect on not just the assets of the debtor now adjudged a 'bankrupt' but also the qualifications of the adjudged bankrupt to occupy positions of public office and the like. These statutory disqualifications cannot be downplayed… [37] With bankruptcy proceedings really as a matter of last resort, these reasons relied on by the appellant are more than sufficient reasons to warrant a stay of the bankruptcy proceedings against the person of the appellant. Although the bankruptcy court had acknowledged the existence of two tests, it failed to appreciate that the s. 97 test was in effect a lower test than a 'special circumstances' test. Ultimately, the bankruptcy court applied a 'special circumstances' test and that it is in principle, erroneous warranting appellate intervention.”

Mahkamah sedia maklum bahawa keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan tersebut telah diterbalikkan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah membenarkan rayuan dan mengetepikan perintah Mahkamah Rayuan tersebut melalui perintah bertarikh 15.2.2017 (lihat [2017] 1 LNS (O) 13 [FC]), namun dalam keadaan ketiadaan alasan penghakiman, wujud keraguan sama ada prinsip perbezaan di antara ujian “special circumstances” dan “sufficient reason” yang diutarakan dalam nas-nas di atas telah diterbalikkan Mahkamah Persekutuan, memandangkan terdapat 2 persoalan undang-undang yang perlu diputuskan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam rayuan tersebut (lihat [2016] 1 LNS(O) 12 [FC]). S/N y0Z2mwag6ki2BhJeJ03oXA

Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Thanesh Rao Moorthy v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors [2022] MLJU 1584; [2022] 1 LNS 1529 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[11] Learned counsel for the applicant referred this court to the recent cases decided by the Federal Court Izham bin Muhammad [HC 223/10/2021 (B)] and Cheng Eng Ang [HC 256-11/2021 (B)]. At the point of time, there were no grounds available. When there are no grounds available, this court is not bound to follow the decision. In the case of Vishnu Telagan v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2019] 9 CLJ 177. "[45] In Vishnu Telagan v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Ors [2019] 9 CLJ 177 this court observed as follows at paragraph [40]: [40] The respondents argue that the Federal Court there had heard a similar argument on this point and refused the detainee a writ of habeas corpus. As at the date of our decision in this appeal, no written grounds had been delivered in respect of that case and so we are therefore unable to glean any reasons why such a decision was made. Therefore, we did not see how the said judgment lent any support to the respondent's case. Surely, in arriving at our decision, we had to consider and apply the law according to the facts and circumstances of this case." [12] Hence, founded on the case of Vishu Telagan (supra) this court is no bound by the decision of the apex court if no grounds of the decision is available. Based on that principle, this court is of the view it is not bound to the decisions offered by learned counsel for the applicant from the Bar.”

Maka, Mahkamah percaya nas-nas di atas yang merumuskan penggunaan prinsip “sufficient reason” bagi prosiding penggantungan di bawah seksyen 97 Akta Tersebut masih terpakai.

Dalam hal ini, JC berhujah bahawa dalam guaman Saman Pemula JA- 24NCC-29-11/2023, JD menuntut RM816,237.65 terhadap JC. JC mendakwa bahawa tuntutan ini telah dipertimbangkan dan diputuskan dalam Petisyen Penindasan di antara JD dan JC dalam guaman JA- 24NCC-21-10/2021 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi telah menolak Petisyen Penindasan tersebut. S/N y0Z2mwag6ki2BhJeJ03oXA

Maka, JC berhujah bahawa Saman Pemula JA-24NCC-29-11/2023 yang dibawa JD kini adalah dihalang menurut prinsip “res judicata”. Sebagai sokongan, JC merujuk kepada kes Lim Wen Chih & Anor v Pacific Forest Industries Sdn Bhd & Anor [2023] 5 MLJ 422; [2023] 8 CLJ 671; [2023] 6 MLRA 1; [2023] AMEJ 1589 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[34] In deciding that the facts and circumstances of this case fall within the res judicata in the wider sense, we referred to what the Supreme Court held in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v. Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 CLJ 783; [1995] 3 MLJ 189. Peh Swee Chin FCJ (delivering the judgment of the court), in accepting the well-established meaning, utility and necessity of res judicata, acknowledged the difference of opinion and school of thought as to its precise limits and application in particular cases. [35] The Supreme Court preferred the view that issues which might have been and which were not brought forward, either deliberately or due to negligence or inadvertence, though not actually decided by the court, are still covered by the doctrine of res judicata…”

Dalam hal ini, JD berhujah bahawa isu sama ada tindakan JD adalah “res judicata” adalah untuk diputuskan oleh Mahkamah bicara dan bukan dalam bidang kuasa Mahkamah Kebankrapan. JD juga berhujah bahawa sekiranya JD berpandangan bahawa tindakan JD adalah dihalang oleh “res judicata”, JC seharusnya memfailkan permohonan untuk membatalkan (strike out) Saman Pemula JD, namun sehingga kini, JC gagal berbuat demikian.

Mahkamah dalam hal ini secara dasar bersetuju dengan hujahan JD bahawa sama ada atau tidak tindakan Saman Pemula JD adalah dihalang oleh “res judicata” adalah dalam bidang kuasa Mahkamah Bicara dan Mahkamah ini tidak seharusnya menghalusi isu tersebut. S/N y0Z2mwag6ki2BhJeJ03oXA

Namun, memandangkan isu ini telah ditimbulkan oleh JC, tanpa mengikat pihak-pihak berkenaan merit hujahan tersebut, Mahkamah ingin membuat pemerhatian kepada hujahan JC. JC merujuk kepada keputusan kes terdahulu yang dilaporkan sebagai Chang Kian Chiang v Loke Kee Piling Works Sdn Bhd & Ors [2022] MLJU 1787; [2022] CLJU 1773 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[27] On the allegation that Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiff's outstanding debts of RM816,237.65 as a director, I find that this prayer is outside the scope of s. 346 of the CA as it relates to the Plaintiff's monetary claim as a director and not in his capacity as a shareholder. [28] The issue of invoking s. 181 of the Companies Act 1965 (which is similar to s. 346 of the CA ) as to force the company to pay the director's debt was ventilated in Soh Jiun Jen (supra) where the Court of Appeal held that - [34]Section 181 does not provide any assistance to the appellant to exert pressure on the 1st respondent company to pay him the director's fees. Section 181 is not meant to be used as 'debt collection facility' by a director against the company. If at all the said amount is due to the appellant as director's fees, the appellant may file a civil claim against the 1st respondent, but surely not by way of a petition under s. 181. [29] Furthermore, I find that the debt certificate produced was signed by the Plaintiff himself without any supporting evidence.”

Berdasarkan penelitian penghakiman tersebut, adalah jelas bahawa sekiranya JD ingin menuntut apa-apa tuntutan sebagai Pengarah Syarikat, tuntutan tersebut tidak dapat dipertimbangkan dalam Petisyen Penindasan yang dibawa dalam kapasiti seorang Pemegang Saham dan JD seharusnya membawa tindakan sivil berasingan terhadap JC dan bukan melonggokkan tuntutan tersebut dalam Petisyen Penindasan di bawah seksyen 346 Akta Syarikat 2016. S/N y0Z2mwag6ki2BhJeJ03oXA

Maka, wujud persoalan sama ada Mahkamah telah sememangnya telah mendengar atas merit tuntutan JD dalam Petisyen Penindasan tersebut. Undang-undang adalah mantap bahawa apabila sesuatu pihak yang sama yang boleh membawa tindakan undang-undang dalam kapasiti yang berlainan, maka sesuatu keputusan yang dibuat berkenaan tindakan pihak tersebut dalam sesuatu kapasiti tidak akan menghalang pihak tersebut dalam membawa tindakan kedua dalam kapasiti berlainan. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Noor Zela Sa’im v Putra Specialist Hospital (Melaka) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2022] CLJU 2355 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[42] It is trite that the principle of res judicata, both in its narrow and broader sense is to prevent a party from bringing a new action or raising a new issue which had been disposed of on its merits or which could have been brought up in the earlier action but was not. See Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v. Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 CLJ 783. [43] The basis on which the doctrine of res judicata rests is founded on the consideration of public policy that it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation and decisions made by courts of competent jurisdiction, and that "no one should be vexed twice for the same kind of litigation". See Kerajaan Malaysia v. Mat Shuhaimi bin Shafiei [2018] 3 CLJ 1; [2018] MLJU 32. [44] During deliberating and deciding on the issues of multiplicity of actions and limitation, I had emphasized on the fact that the section 7 and section 8 were based on different causes of action and the reliefs sought were different. That being so it cannot therefore be said that the Defendants were being "vexed twice for the same kind of litigation". [45] After I had decided in the first suit that the Plaintiff did not have the requisite locus standi to act on behalf of the estate of the deceased and dismissed the Plaintiff's application to amend their Statement of Claim, the only cause of action to survive in the first suit was the section 7 dependency claim. The locus standi to bring the action on behalf of the estate was never available to the Plaintiff in the first suit because the doctrine of relation back did not apply in the circumstances. The Plaintiff did not have the capacity to sue on behalf of the estate in the First suit. [46] It is an undisputed fact the second suit was only filed in relation to the section 8 estate claim. Before the second suit was filed the Plaintiff had obtained LA on 6.4.2022. In the Government of Malaysia v. Dato Chong Kok Lim S/N y0Z2mwag6ki2BhJeJ03oXA [1973] 1 LNS 35; [1973] 2 MLJ 74 Sharma J made the following pertinent observation: It is only where the plea which is sought to be raised in the subsequent proceedings was not available to the party at the time of the previous proceedings that the decision cannot be constructively res judicata. (Emphasis added) [47] I am also of the view that the issue that had been determined in the first suit (i.e. absence of or non-availability of locus standi to the Plaintiff) was not an issue to be determined in the second suit as the Plaintiff had obtained LA at the commencement of the second suit. In such circumstances res judicata did not arise when the second suit was filed.”

Namun, sebagaimana diputuskan di atas, isu ini adalah sewajarnya diputuskan Mahkamah bicara dalam tindakan sivil yang dibawa JD terhadap JC dan Mahkamah ini tidak sewajarnya membuat sebarang keputusan berkenaan isu ini.

JC seterusnya berhujah bahawa Saman Pemula JD antara lain memohon untuk deklarasi bagi memasukkan semula RM816,237.65 dalam Penyata Kewangan JC yang telah dikeluarkan (wiped off) dari laporan audit tahun 2021, dan seterusnya turut menuntut untuk jumlah tersebut dibayar kepada JD. JC berhujah bahawa JD sedia maklum isu ini melibatkan pertikaian fakta yang besar. Maka, JC berhujah bahawa tindakan JD dalam memfailkan Saman Pemula yang hanya dapat diputuskan melalui penukaran afidavit-afidavit tanpa membolehkan saksi-saksi dipanggil untuk memberi keterangan lisan sebagaimana dalam tindakan writ saman, adalah penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah.

JD berhujah bahawa isu ini seharusnya ditangani di Mahkamah bicara. Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan JD bahawa isu ini seharusnya dalam domain mahkamah bicara. Dalam apa jua keadaan, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa sekiranya Mahkamah S/N y0Z2mwag6ki2BhJeJ03oXA Bicara berpendapat bahawa kes tersebut sepatutnya dimulakan secara Writ Saman, Aturan 28 Kaedah 8 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan jelas memberi kuasa kepada Mahkamah Bicara untuk memberi perintah bahawa prosiding yang dimulakan secara Saman Pemula diteruskan seolah-olah sebagai writ saman. Aturan 28 Kaedah 8(1) Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 memperuntukkan bahawa:-

Where, in the case of a cause or matter begun by originating summons, it appears to the Court at any stage of the proceedings that the proceedings should for any reason be continued as if the cause or matter had been begun by writ, it may order the proceedings to continue as if the cause or matter had been so begun and may, in particular, order that pleadings shall be delivered or that any affidavits shall stand as pleadings, with or without liberty to any of the parties to add thereto or to apply for particulars thereof.

Dalam hal ini, sebagaimana dihujahkan peguam JD, JC tidak pernah memfailkan apa-apa permohonan sehingga ke tarikh pendengaran berkenaan kesesuaian pemfailan Saman Pemula sebagai mod permulaan di Mahkamah Bicara, maka Mahkamah bersetuju bahawa isu tersebut tidak sesuai untuk dipertimbangkan di Mahkamah ini.

JC seterusnya berhujah bahawa JD seharusnya memuaskan hati Mahkamah Kebankrapan bahawa JD mempunyai tuntutan balas, tuntutan silang atau set off sebelum perbuatan kebankrapan dilakukan sebagaimana diperuntukkan dalam seksyen 3 Akta Tersebut. Seksyen 3 Akta Tersebut memperuntukkan bahawa:-

A debtor commits an Act of bankruptcy in each of the following cases:

if a creditor has obtained a final judgment or final order against him for any amount and execution thereon not having been stayed has served on him in Malaysia, or by leave of the court elsewhere, a bankruptcy notice under this Act requiring him to pay the judgment debt or sum ordered to be paid in accordance with the terms of the judgment or order with interest quantified up to the date of S/N y0Z2mwag6ki2BhJeJ03oXA issue of the bankruptcy notice, or to secure or compound for it to the satisfaction of the creditor or the court; and he does not within seven days after service of the notice in case the service is effected in Malaysia, and in case the service is effected elsewhere then within the time limited in that behalf by the order giving leave to effect the service, either comply with the requirements of the notice or satisfy the court that he has a counter-claim, set off or cross demand which equals or exceeds the amount of the judgment debt or sum ordered to be paid and which he could not set up in the action in which the judgment was obtained or in the proceedings in which the order was obtained:

JD berhujah balas bahawa tindakan sivil melalui Saman Pemula tersebut telah dimulakan pada 14.11.2023, iaitu sebelum berlaku perbuatan kebankrapan yang didakwa pada 21.11.2023. JD juga berhujah bahawa JD telah berulangkali membuat tuntutan bertulis sejak Oktober 2021 namun tidak dilayan oleh JC.

Dalam hal ini, permohonan JD di sini adalah bukan untuk menuntut balas, menuntut silang atau set off terhadap tuntutan JC sebagaimana di bawah seksyen 3 Akta Tersebut tetapi untuk menggantung prosiding kebankrapan di bawah seksyen 97 Akta Tersebut sementara menunggu pelupusan Saman Pemula yang difailkan JD. Kedua-dua kausa tindakan tersebut adalah ternyata berbeza sekali. Dalam hal ini, permohonan untuk menggantung prosiding boleh didengar pada bila-bila masa sama ada sebelum pendengaran Petisyen Pemiutang mahupun setelah Petisyen Pemiutang telah didengar dan dilupuskan. Perkara ini ada diputuskan dalam kes Chen Ying (supra) seperti berikut:- “[33] It is also pertinent to note that the power to stay under s. 97 is one which may be exercised at any time of the bankruptcy petition. The power is best exercised when the petition is yet to be disposed. Arguably, where the petition has already been made, there is no longer a petition to speak of but adjudication orders and receiving orders…” S/N y0Z2mwag6ki2BhJeJ03oXA

Berdasarkan keputusan tersebut, memandangkan Petisyen Pemiutang yang telah difailkan belum dilupuskan Mahkamah, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa permohonan JD masih boleh didengar atas merit. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan JD bahawa sekiranya tindakan JD dibenarkan kelak di Mahkamah Tinggi, maka JD akan mempunyai tuntutan yang lebih besar berbanding tuntutan JC di sini dan dalam keadaan tersebut, sekiranya pendengaran Petisyen di sini diteruskan tanpa pelupusan Saman Pemula di Mahkamah Tinggi, maka perkara tersebut akan menyebabkan JD akan mengalami kesukaran (hardship) yang lebih besar berbanding JC. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Chen Ying (supra) yang memutuskan bahawa:- “[35] It is our considered view that the appellant's application for stay has merit and has met the test prescribed under s. 97. The two reasons offered are not only credible but are real options that the respondent had itself considered and more importantly, acted upon. The respondent has embarked on a course of action against the principal borrower before the Higher People's Court in Liaoning Province in China. That China suit is pending. Although this ground is now abandoned in these proceedings, the existence of this course of conduct on the part of the respondent cannot be ignored… [38] The bankruptcy court further failed to appreciate that hardship will surely ensue to the appellant. Like the circumstances in Re Tosrin Jarvanthi, the China suit is already afoot although none have been taken in respect of the securities”

Mahkamah juga berpendapat bahawa perintah penggantungan yang dipohon JD tidak akan memprejudiskan JC kerana pada tarikh bicara di hadapan Mahkamah ini, Saman Pemula JD telahpun ditetapkan untuk perbicaraan pada 21 Mei 2024 dan hujahan-hujahan bertulis telahpun difailkan di Mahkamah. Maka, dalam masa yang singkat, Saman Pemula JD dapat dilupuskan dengan segera. Faktor ini juga adalah faktor relevan sebagaimana diputuskan dalam kes Re Thangarajoo Vyran; Ex P Denko Industrial Corporation Bhd [2012] 7 MLJ 711; [2013] 1 CLJ 286; [2011] 11 MLRH 184 seperti berikut:- S/N y0Z2mwag6ki2BhJeJ03oXA “The issue in this connection is thrown in sharper relief when the present speed in the disposal of appeals by the Court of Appeal is considered. The fixing of the hearing date for the appeal was a matter of time, when the application for stay came before this court. It would not have resulted in any undue prejudice to the judgment creditor if it be made to patiently wait for a short duration for the appeal to be heard and disposed.”

Malah, Mahkamah juga dapati JC telahpun memfailkan Petisyen Pemiutang di Mahkamah pada 13.12.2023 memandangkan Notis Kebankrapan telah diserahkan kepada JD. Malah, JC turut telah memperolehi perintah penyampaian ganti Petisyen Pemiutang terhadap JD pada 14.4.2024. Dalam keadaan pelupusan Saman Pemula yang berpihak kepada JC kelak, JC boleh meneruskan prosiding di sini dengan serta merta untuk pendengaran Petisyen Pemiutang setelah penyampaian Petisyen Pemiutang secara penyampaian ganti telah disempurnakan.

Maka, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa tiada prejudis serius dialami JC dalam kes ini sekiranya penggantungan prosiding kebankrapan dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah ini. Elemen ketiadaan prejudis kepada JC ada dipertimbangkan dalam kes Ber: Liew Hon Kong @ Liew Kwan Voon v Ex-Parte: Bank Pertanian Malaysia Berhad [2020] MLJU 701; [2020] 1 LNS 573; [2020] MLRHU 506; [2020] AMEJ 0542 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[22] I am also minded to allow the Stay Application as there is my considered view no prejudice against the JC in this court granting the Stay Application as the JC maybe compensated by an order as to costs as compared with the prejudice that the JD would suffer in the sense of undue hardship which will surely ensue to the JD and the irreparable harm on the JD for the reasons that I have elucidated above in respect of the consequences of the bankruptcy order against the JD.” S/N y0Z2mwag6ki2BhJeJ03oXA

Tambahan lagi, undang-undang adalah mantap bahawa penggantung prosiding kebankrapan menurut seksyen 97 Akta Tersebut adalah bagi tujuan terhad dalam prosiding kebankrapan semata-mata dan JC masih bebas mengambil tindakan pelaksanaan lain bagi menikmati hasil penghakiman tersebut. Perkara ini ada diputuskan dalam kes Rosli Abdul Kadir (supra) seperti berikut:- “[14] On the otherhand, in an application for a stay of bankruptcy proceeding, the application is not made before the same court that gives the judgment but is applied before the bankruptcy court of which the bankruptcy petition is presented. The bankruptcy petition, if postponed, pending the disposal of the matter in issue, will not restrain the judgment creditor from proceeding with any other numerous form of execution available to the judgment creditor, the example of which are stated above, to enforce the judgment obtained against the judgment debtor. Therefore, it will not be right to say that, by merely postponing the bankruptcy proceeding, the judgment creditor is deprived of the 'fruits' of its litigation, since there are many other 'fruits' (through various other forms of execution) available to the judgment creditor other than the bankruptcy proceeding…”

Maka, berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, sekiranya permohonan penggantungan tidak dibenarkan dan seterusnya sekiranya Saman Pemula JD dibenarkan kelak, maka kesan prejudis yang dialami JD adalah lebih besar berbanding prejudis yang dialami JC, sekiranya permohonan penggantungan dibenarkan. Dalam apa jua keadaan, sebarang prejudis dialami JC boleh dipampas dengan kos dengan sewajarnya. Maka, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa JD telah mendemonstrasi alasan mencukupi (sufficient reason) bagi Mahkamah menggunakan budi bicara untuk memerintahkan perintah penggantungan yang dipohon JD. S/N y0Z2mwag6ki2BhJeJ03oXA

Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah membenarkan permohonan JD dalam lampiran 11 untuk penggantungan prosiding kebankrapan menurut seksyen 97 Akta Tersebut sementara menunggu pelupusan Saman Pemula JA- 24NCC-29-11/2023 di Mahkamah Tinggi. Berkenaan kos, Mahkamah memerintahkan kos permohonan ini adalah kos dalam kausa tindakan Saman Pemula JA-24NCC-29-11/2023. Bertarikh: 30 April 2024 Disediakan oleh, …………………………………. ARUN A/L NOVAL DASS Timbalan Pendaftar Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Johor Bahru S/N y0Z2mwag6ki2BhJeJ03oXA

Tetuan Tay Chambers Peguambela & Peguamcara Peguam Pemiutang Penghakiman No.28, Jalan Ponderosa 2/1, Taman Ponderosa, 81100 Johor Bahru, Johor (Ruj:23491/LKPWSB/L/BN/VK) … Puan Sek Chia Yin 2. Tetuan S.K Song Peguambela & Peguamcara Peguam Penghutang Penghakiman No.44A, Jalan Dedap 4, Taman Johor Jaya, 81100 Johor Bahru Johor (Ruj: J/30612) … Encik T S Goh S/N y0Z2mwag6ki2BhJeJ03oXA Kes-kes yang dirujuk:

Re Rosli Abdul Kadir; Ex-Parte Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia [2008] MLJU 1096; [2008] 5 CLJ 691; [2008] 1 MLRH 819

Chen Ying v Export-Import Bank of Malaysia Bhd [2016] 4 MLJ 324; [2016] 7 CLJ 475; [2016] 5 MLRA 283; [2015] 4 AMR 274

Thanesh Rao Moorthy v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors [2022] MLJU 1584; [2022] 1 LNS 1529

Lim Wen Chih & Anor v Pacific Forest Industries Sdn Bhd & Anor [2023] 5 MLJ 422; [2023] 8 CLJ 671; [2023] 6 MLRA 1; [2023] AMEJ 1589

Chang Kian Chiang v Loke Kee Piling Works Sdn Bhd & Ors [2022] MLJU 1787; [2022] CLJU 1773

Noor Zela Sa’im v Putra Specialist Hospital (Melaka) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2022]

CLJU 2355 Re Thangarajoo Vyran; Ex P Denko Industrial Corporation Bhd [2012] 7 MLJ 711; [2013] 1 CLJ 286; [2011] 11 MLRH 184

Ber: Liew Hon Kong @ Liew Kwan Voon v Ex-Parte: Bank Pertanian Malaysia Berhad [2020] MLJU 701; [2020] 1 LNS 573; [2020] MLRHU 506; [2020] AMEJ 0542 S/N y0Z2mwag6ki2BhJeJ03oXA