Loo Bee Eng v 1. ) Winners Aluminium & Glass Sdn Bhd (PA-28NCC-114-09/2023)

WINNERS ALUMINIUM & GLASS SDN. BHD.

PAN KEE MUN

PHANG KA TING

LIM TECK SENG

LEE CHOON CHIN …RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN (NO. K/P: 780208-07-5547) GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

The Petitioner’s (P) Amended Petition states that the Petition is made under section 465(1)(f) and section 465(1)(h) of the Companies Act 2016 (CA 2016). Hence, P petitions to wind-up the company: Winners Aluminium & Glass Sdn Bhd (Company), on two grounds—

under paragraph (f): that the Company’s directors: the 2nd to 5th Respondents (R2-R5) have acted in the affairs of the Page 3 of 25 Company in their own interests rather than in the interests of the members as a whole, or acted in any other manner which appears to be “unfair or unjust” to members; and

under paragraph (h): where the Court is of the opinion that it is just and equitable that the Company be wound-up.

The first ground has to do with the conduct of the directors. The questions to consider are—in the decisions made for the Company, have the directors acted in their own interests rather than in the members’ (shareholders’) interests? Or have they acted in any manner that “appears” to be “unfair and unjust” to the members? Here, the Company’s shareholders are P and R2.

The second ground has to do with the Ebrahimi-type of winding-up (termed after the House Of Lords’ case of Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (HL))—that it is “just and equitable” to wind-up the Company. It is, however, significant to note that the ground actually is that “the Court is of the opinion” that it is just and equitable that the Company be wound-up.

The facts about the relationship between the two main protagonists (characters) in this dispute (P and R2), and their conduct, span many years. There are numerous relevant facts. I will, however, set out only the pertinent facts concerning this Amended Petition.

These are some of the pertinent facts gleaned from the affidavit evidence— Page 4 of 25 May 1991 The late Kam Soo Kin set up the business Winners Interior Enterprise (Enterprise) with two other persons. P was employed by the Enterprise. P was responsible for bringing in the work and managing the Enterprise’s daily operations i.e. she managed the Enterprise. October 1992 R2 joined the Enterprise as a partner. P asserts that R2 was a mere sleeping partner of the Enterprise. May 2001 The late Kam Soo Kin incorporated the Company. He placed his wife: Madam Hun Kim Yet as his nominee, as the Company’s director and shareholder. There were three shareholders: Madam Hun, P and R2. P asserts that she also managed the Company. December 2001 The Company’s issued and paid-up capital was increased to RM120K. October 2003 The Company’s issued and paid-up capital was increased to RM300K. August 2005 The late Kam Soo Kin left the Enterprise, leaving R2 as the sole proprietor of the Enterprise. October 2005 Madam Hun resigned as a director of the Company and transferred her shares to P and R2 Page 5 of 25 equally. P and R2 became the only shareholders of the Company. February 2012 The Company’s issued and paid-up capital was increased to RM500K. 2018 The dispute between P and R2 started. P asserts that R2 informed P that he was having financial difficulties. He became suspicious about how P was managing the Company. He accused P of misconduct, including allegations that P forged his signature. 2019 R2 refused to approve (sign) the Company’s 2019 financial statements. January 2020 P (through solicitors) proposed a meeting to discuss the terms for R2 to sell his shares in the Company to P. R2 did not respond to the proposal. February 2020 Due to the delay in approving the 2019 financial statements, the Inland Revenue Board (LHDN) imposed on the Company a tax (with penalty) of

2.10.2020 R2 visited the Company’s former company secretary, and demanded to be given the Company’s documents. R2 visited the company Page 6 of 25 secretary with one Neoh Swee Choon (NSChoon), who was not a director nor a shareholder of the Company.

5.10.2020 In response to the 2.10.2020 visit, the former company secretary wrote to the Company’s board of directors to advise about the risk of the Company’s information and documents getting into the hands of NSChoon, who was neither a director nor a shareholder.

7.10.2020 The former company secretary terminated their services to the Company i.e. they stopped representing the Company.

15.10.2020 The Company’s former tax agent and auditors also resigned from representing the Company. October 2020 R2 filed an Originating Summons action against P, the Company and the former company secretary.

20.11.2020 R2 lodged a police report against P for various alleged torts.

5.1.2021 P (through solicitors) proposed a buy-out i.e. one shareholder buying out the shares of the other shareholder, to settle the dispute. R2 rejected the proposal. Page 7 of 25 April 2021 The Company did not submit its 2020 financial statements. The LHDN imposed a tax (with penalty) of RM460,374.77.

10.5.2021 R2 appointed NSChoon as his personal assistant.

17.8.2021 Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad suspended part of the unutilized portion of the Company’s trade financing facility. P asserts that the reason for this suspension was because R2 made the allegations of forgery of Company documents by

25.8.2021 R2 refused to give his director’s guarantee to the Company’s biggest aluminium supplier: PMB Aluminium Sdn Bhd. As a result, PMB Aluminium stopped supplying aluminium to the Company. October 2021 R2 filed another Originating Summons against P and the Company.

11.11.2021 Another company secretary resigned as the Company’s company secretary. March 2022 R2 filed another Originating Summons action against P and the Company.

6.3.2023 At an extraordinary general meeting (EGM), a resolution was passed to remove P as a director of the Company (even though P and R2 were the only shareholders). A resolution was also passed to appoint R3 as a director.

15.3.2023 R4 and R5 were appointed as the company’s directors. April 2023 P filed an Originating Summons action against R2 to R5 for a declaration that P’s removal as a director and R3 to R5’s appointment as additional directors were null and void.

26.4.2023 Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad issued a notice to terminate and recall the facilities given to the Company and demanded the sum of approximately RM1.623 million. September 2023 Maybank Islamic filed a Writ action against the Company, and P and R2 as guarantors, for a debt of RM554,387.42 + P filed this winding-up Petition.

5.10.2023 P received a letter from the company secretary about R2 proposing a new allotment of 5,000 shares of RM1.00 each.

30.10.2023 At a members’ meeting, a resolution was passed to increase the Company’s issued and paid-up capital to RM505K (by allotting 2,500 shares each to P and R2). December 2023 P received a LHDN notice that the Company’s outstanding tax (with penalty) due was

21.12.2023 P (through solicitors) asked for the minutes of the members’ meetings for P to inspect.

28.12.2023 The company secretary informed P that they no longer had the minutes because the minutes were in R2’s possession.

29.12.2023 R2 (through NSChoon) refused P’s inspection of the minutes. P was also denied access to the Company’s business office.

15.1.2024 R2 (through solicitors) stated that the minutes were not in R2’s possession, and that the minutes were handed over to the police.

4.7.2024 P received from the company secretary a notice of general meeting, for the resolution that the issued and paid-up capital of the Company be increased to RM5,505,000.00 i.e. an increase of five million shares of RM1.00 each. Page 10 of 25

The principles pertinent to this Petition include the following principles. First—the winding-up of a company on just and equitable grounds is “a sound and rational” development in company law— Ebrahimi (supra), particularly the judgment of Lord Wilberforce.

The House Of Lords propounded—“…a limited company is more than a mere legal entity, with a personality of its own: that there is room in company law for recognition of the fact that behind it, or amongst it, there are individuals, with rights, expectations and obligations inter se which are not necessarily submerged in the company structure”. A company’s structure is defined by the Companies Act and by the articles of association, by which the shareholders agree to be, and are, bound. Although the just and equitable ground does not mean that a party can disregard his or her obligations when they enter a company—equity “enable the court to subject the exercise of legal rights to equitable considerations, that is, of a personal character arising between one individual and another, which may make it unjust or inequitable, to insist on legal rights, or to exercise them in a particular way”—Ebrahimi per Lord Wilberforce.

Second—an obiter from Lord Wilberforce in Ebrahimi (supra) is that if there is any criticism of the cases that propounded and developed the just and equitable principle is that: the courts may sometimes have been “too timorous in giving” the just and equitable principle “full force”. In other words, Lord Wilberforce was Page 11 of 25 of the view that the Courts should be more prepared—more robust—to give effect to the just and equitable ground to wind-up a company.

The Court Of Appeal analysed the Ebrahimi principle in Varusay Mohamed Shaik Abdul Rahman v SVK Patchee Brothers (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2002] 3 MLJ 674 (CA), at MLJ pages 680- 681; [2002] 3 AMR 3262, at AMR pages 3271-3272 ; [2002] 3 CLJ 741 at CLJ pages 747-748; [2002] 1 MLRA 424.

Third—what is just and equitable “would vary from case to case”. “So many reasons can be advanced to wind-up a company under the just and equitable principle”— Gulf Business Construction (M) Sdn Bhd v Israq Holding Sdn Bhd [2010] 5 MLJ 34 (CA); [2010] 8 CLJ 775 at CLJ paragraph [23]; [2010] 2 MLRA 411.

In Gulf Business (supra), the Court Of Appeal gave some pertinent examples of what constitutes a just and equitable ground to wind-up a company—

where the substratum of the company “has gone”;

where the company’s “main object for its existence” has lapsed;

where the company is carrying on its business at a loss and “the remaining assets of the company are insufficient to pay its debts”;

where the parties’ relationship has “broken down irretrievably”; Page 12 of 25

where there is “a lack of confidence among the shareholders that threaten the very existence of the company”;

where the winding-up of the company would “open the door to investigate the misconduct of the directors”. WAS THERE AN IRRETRIEVABLE BREAKDOWN IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SHAREHOLDERS: P AND R2 The case law authority 12. On this issue, several case law authorities are pertinent, and they guide me.

One—the “numerous litigation and drawn out battles in court speak of the acrimony between the parties”— Dato’ Ting Check Sii v Marine Utama Sdn Bhd & Anor [2013] 9 MLJ 527 (HC); [2013] AMEJ 0012; [2013] CLJU 1351; [2013] MLRHU 946, at paragraph [26].

Two—the serious allegations and counter-allegations that P and R2 have levelled at each other demonstrate that there is “no longer any relationship of trust and confidence” between them. The several suits they filed against each other disclose that the relationship of mutual trust and confidence that they used to have for each other has irretrievably broken down. The litigation between them is irrefutable evidence of the now-acrimonious relationship between P and R2—Tai Hean Leng @ Tek Hean Leng v New Future Capital Sdn Bhd [2018] 8 AMR 163 (HC); [2018] MLJU 1599; [2018] CLJU 1647; [2018] MLRHU 1324, at paragraph [40]

Three—”It is obvious from the actions of both sides that the mutual trust and confidence” between them…have totally deteriorated”. And “the presence of the various litigations between the parties…show the true feelings they have against each other”, making it “impossible to run the company as a successful entity”— Narayani Sivaprakaspillai & Ors v Teluk Anson Agricultural Enterprises Sdn Bhd [2011] 9 MLRH 258 (HC); [2011] CLJU 989. My findings 16. R2 and P filed several suits against each other. R2 alleges that P forged his signature on the Company’s documents, including his guarantees given to the banks to secure loans and facilities.

R2 lodged a police report against P.

R2 alleges that P had wrongfully taken the Company’s assets and documents.

P’s response to these allegations includes—

these allegations are implausible given the fact that there was “no wrongful gain or wrongful loss”;

the banking facilities given to the Company were used only for, and by, the Company;

no criminal action was taken against P;

R2 falsified the minutes of the 6.3.2023 EGM (to remove P as a director) and the 30.10.2023 members’ meeting (to increase the Company’s share capital). Page 14 of 25

In this winding-up proceeding, I am mindful not to make any findings on the rightness or the wrongness of the parties’ respective conduct. Nor to determine the allegations and counter-allegations of fact that they make against one another. That is not the purview of this winding-up Court.

Instead, I am to investigate and make a finding as to whether there has been an irretrievable breakdown in the relationship of mutual trust and confidence between P and R2. The several suits that they have taken against each other, and the serious accusations that they have levelled against each other, compel me to form the opinion that there has been an irretrievable breakdown in the previous relationship of trust and confidence between the parties— making it just and equitable to wind-up the Company. So that the Company can go into liquidation, with the liquidator doing his or her job of administering all the assets (and liabilities) of the Company, paying the creditors, and distributing any surplus of funds to the shareholders. ARE THE SHAREHOLDERS IN A DEADLOCK? Case law authority 22. On this issue, a couple of case law authorities are pertinent and instructive.

One—when the shareholding in a company is “equally split” between the opposing shareholders (as it is here in this Petition), “the body of members in the company is said to be in a deadlock”. When the board of directors of a company is “equally split between Page 15 of 25 directors with opposing views” (as it also is here in this Petition), the management of the company is also “said to be in a deadlock”— Perak Integrated Networks Services Sdn Bhd v Urban Domain Sdn Bhd & Anor [2018] 4 MLJ 1 (FC); [2018] 3 AMR 865; [2018] 5 CLJ 513; [2018] 3 MLRA 249; at paragraph [58].

Two—maintaining the “unhappy status quo” of the shareholders being in a deadlock has no “long-term solution”. When the shareholders are in a deadlock, “directors’ remuneration cannot be approved, annual accounts cannot be passed, and annual meetings cannot be held or any other shareholders’ meetings”. Under these circumstances, the relationship between the fighting shareholders has irretrievably broken down, and “it would appear that it is just and equitable for the company to be wound-up”— Liew Then Song & Anor v Percetakan Yelian Sdn Bhd & Ors [2019] 10 MLJ 73 (HC); [2019] 6 AMR 170; [2019] 9 CLJ 139; [2018] MLRHU 1813; at paragraph [41]. My findings 25. It is a fact that the two fighting shareholders (P and R2) are in a deadlock (impasse, stalemate). P and R2 both own 50% of the shares in the Company. Even when the Company issued more shares to increase its paid-up capital, the shareholders each subscribed to the new shares, keeping the deadlock in place.

This circumstance makes it unfeasible and practically impossible for any meaningful decision to be made for the Company; or to harmoniously run the Company to be as profitable as it was before; or to run the Company such that it does not incur the tax liabilities Page 16 of 25 (with penalties) that it incurred in recent years (e.g. the years of assessment 2019 and 2020); or to run the Company such as to avoid the banks filing recovery-of-loan suits against the Company and its guarantors, who are none other than P and R2 themselves.

Since the shareholders are in a deadlock, it is a factor to further compel me to form the opinion that it is just and equitable to wind-up the Company. HAVE THE DIRECTORS ACTED IN THEIR OWN INTERESTS AND NOT IN THE INTEREST OF THE MEMBERS? Case law authority 28. I am instructed and bound by the reasoning of this Court Of Appeal case law authority. The section 465(1)(f) CA 2016 ground— directors acting in their own interests and not in the interest of the members of the Company as a whole, or acting in a manner that is unfair or unjust to members— does not involve an evaluation of the directors’ conduct as to whether it was “unlawful or illegal”. It, however, entails an evaluation of the directors’ conduct according to the standard or perspective of whether the conduct was “unfair or unjust” to the members. I bear in mind that at the material time, the two directors and the two shareholders were the same, namely P and R2. The directors’ conduct “should be set against an equitable standard that accords with the nature of a higher duty, that of a fiduciary”—Suki Mee v Far Origin Sdn Bhd [2020] 6 MLRA 494 (CA); [2020] AMEJ 1033; [2020] CLJU 1057; [2020] MLJU 1408; at paragraphs [96], [100]. The cross-assertions that P and R2 have made against each other

P’s assertions of R2’s conduct that are not in P’s interest (as a member/shareholder) and that are unfair and unjust to P, include—

R2 removed P as a director of the Company, thus taking control of the management and decision-making aspect of the Company.

R2 delayed approving the Company’s financial statements, causing a tax liability (with penalty) to be imposed on the Company.

R2 caused the Company to default in paying the monthly loan instalments to Maybank and CIMB, causing Maybank and CIMB to file recovery-of-debt suits against the Company, and P and R2, to recover the debts due.

R2 caused the Company to pay several firms of solicitors who acted not for the Company but for R2 personally for several legal matters.

R2 caused the Company to pay himself RM796,241.49 as an allowance, or at least provided for it, from March 2023 to October 2023, when the Company was not actively doing any business in that period.

R2 caused the Company to incur RM78K and RM600K to be paid to NSChoon for consulting and advisory services, and as an allowance in the same period between March 2023 and October 2023. These are contained in R2’s own document called the “Summary Of Overhead Expenditure after EGM of 6.3.2023 (Removal of Loo Bee Eng)”. Page 18 of 25

Conversely, R2’s assertions of P’s conduct that are not in R2’s interest as a member/shareholder, and that are unfair and unjust to R2, include—

P performed or caused to be performed (particularly with her two sons) a competing business, and diverted the Company’s business to the competing company.

P wrongfully transferred equipment, machinery, lorries, vehicles and workers from the Company to the competing company.

P owns a property with the address No. 225, Jalan Baru, Batu Maung, 11960 Penang. P had leased that property to the Company for a rent of RM7K for 5 years (from 2017 to 2022). But the Company did not occupy that property. It was the competing company which occupied the property. This constitutes a fraud on the Company and the other shareholder of the Company: R2.

P breached her fiduciary duty to the Company. P abused her position as director to misuse the Company’s assets, including funds, to the Company’s detriment and loss. My findings 31. I find that there is prima facie evidence (from the affidavit averments and more particularly from the documentary evidence exhibited) that the Company’s directors (both P and R2) have acted in the affairs of the Company in their own interests instead of the members’/shareholders’ interests. Page 19 of 25

I also find that there is prima facie evidence (the same evidence) that the directors (P and R2) have acted in a manner which appears to be unfair and unjust to the members/shareholders, who, in the facts of this Petition, is each other (since the Company has only two shareholders: P and R2).

I must clarify here that I am making these findings in the context of the grounds prescribed under section 465(1)(f) and section 465(1)(h) of the CA 2016, and to determine this winding-up Petition. In other words, firstly, I am making these findings in the context of the elements of the ground provided for in section 465(1)(f) i.e. whether the directors have acted in the affairs of the Company in their own interests rather than the interests of the members as a whole, and whether the directors have acted in a manner which appears to be unfair or unjust to the members. And secondly, I am also making these findings in the context of the ground under section 465(1)(h) i.e. whether, in my opinion, it is just and equitable to wind-up the Company.

I am, however, not making these findings to satisfy the elements of any other cause of action, or proceedings, that the parties may have against each other. For instance, if a party here, either P or R2, takes an action against the other for, say, breach of fiduciary duty, she or he has to prove, by the preponderance of evidence in that proceeding, the facts that satisfy the elements of the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. That proceeding will have to be fought, and determined, on its own merits.

R2 also mounts other arguments. One—R2 argues that in the members’ meeting of 30.10.2023, the Company resolved to increase the Company’s shares by 5,000 shares. P subscribed i.e. paid for 2,500 (50%) of those new shares. Additionally, there was a term (a sentence) in the Minutes of the meeting that states that both parties i.e. shareholders agreed to ensure that the Company continue to operate. The words used were: “It was concluded that both parties agreed to ensure the Company stay in continuality [sic] of operation”.

R2 argues that by attending that meeting, even if it was by proxy, P agreed to the resolution for the Company to continue operating. And by subscribing to the new shares, P also agreed that the Company should continue to operate. Presenting this winding-up Petition to wind-up the Company, contradicts P’s agreement for the Company to continue to operate. My findings 37. I find that P’s conduct concerning attending the 30.10.2023 members’ meeting and subscribing for the new shares is not contradictory conduct that negatively affects the merits of this Petition. Firstly, P presented this winding-up Petition on 15.9.2023 i.e. before the 30.10.2023 members’ meeting. Attending the 30.10.2023 meeting and subscribing for the new shares cannot be taken to be conduct that extinguished P’s right to pursue this winding-up Petition.

Secondly, as a member/shareholder of the Company, P has every right to attend the 30.10.2023 meeting, and every right to subscribe for the new shares issued, regardless of the purpose for which the Company was issuing the new shares, whether it was to raise capital to continue operating or any other purpose. In other words, P’s act of attending the 30.10.2023 members’ meeting and subscribing for the new shares does not dilute her merits in presenting this winding-up Petition.

Thirdly, and more critically, the evidence of the transcript of P’s proxy’s (Goh Ah Siew’s) audio recording of the meeting reveals that there was no resolution or even discussion (during the meeting) about agreeing to ensure that the Company continues to operate.

Two—R2 alleges that P had caused the Company to pay RM7K in rent to P for the property at No. 225, Jalan Baru, Batu Maung, which she owns, and which was occupied by the competing company. The thrust of this allegation is that P caused the Company to pay rent to herself (the owner) for a property that the competing company occupied and used. This is a form of fraud.

To support this allegation, R2 produces a Delivery Order dated 25.4.2022 (DO), issued by a supplier: UCM Metal, addressed to the Company’s address nearby at No. 354, Jalan Baru, Batu Maung. But the goods were delivered to the property at No. 225.

But what evidence do the documents disclose? The documentary evidence discloses that—

R2 signed the lease dated 1.3.2018 on behalf of the Company to lease No. 225 from P, for the Company;

the DO was dated 25.4.2022, while the Company had possession of, and was using, No. 225;

R2 caused the Company to terminate the lease over No. 225 only on 30.9.2022 (five months after the facts of the DO and the delivery of goods related to it).

The documentary evidence makes R2’s assertion untenable.

The parties here (P on the one side, and R2-R5 on the other) raised other issues for and against this Petition. But I do not propose to analyse and answer every issue (or argument) raised.

To determine this Petition, it suffices that I analyse and make a finding on the pertinent and cogent issues canvassed, which I have dealt with above.

P and R2 are the only directors and the only shareholders in the Company. For the reasons alluded to above, I find that the directors (P and R2) have acted, in the affairs of the Company, in their own respective interests instead of the interest of the members/shareholders as a whole i.e. in the interest of the other member/shareholder. I also find that they have acted in a manner that appears to be unfair and unjust to the other member/shareholder.

Further, I am of the opinion that it is just and equitable to wind up the Company.

I therefore allow the Amended Petition, at—

prayer 139(a): to wind-up the Company under section 465(1)(f) and section 465(1)(h) of the CA 2016;

prayer 139(c): to appoint Mr. Neoh Chin Wah as the liquidator;

prayer 139(d), but reworded as follows: “that all the properties in the name of the 1st Respondent Company be liquidated and collated into money, including the immovable properties in the name of the 1st Respondent Company be sold and the net proceeds, with the other moneys collated, be shared equally between the Petitioner and the 2nd Respondent, after taking into account and deducting debts due to creditors and statutory debts”;

prayer 139(f): costs of RM20K for this proceeding to be paid to P out of the assets of the Company. Costs are subject to the allocatur.

Finally, I direct P to convey this direction to the liquidator: Mr Neoh Chin Wah—“This Court directs the appointed liquidator to note not just the powers of a liquidator but also the duties and obligations of a liquidator as provided for by statute law and case law”. Dated: 21 July 2025 Page 24 of 25 KENNETH ST JAMES HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA GEORGETOWN PULAU PINANG Peguam bagi pihak Pempetisyen : YC Wong, Ho Hui Ying, Jean Aw Messrs. Y. C. Wong (Kuala Lumpur) Peguam bagi pihak Responden- : Karin Lim, Shamsul Jamil, Anis Responden Nadhira (Pelatih Dalam Kamar) Messrs. Presgrave & Matthews (Georgetown) Legislation referred to:

Section 465(1)(f) of the Companies Act 2016.

Section 465(1)(h) of the Companies Act 2016. Cases referred to:

Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (HL)

Varusay Mohamed Shaik Abdul Rahman v SVK Patchee Brothers (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2002] 3 MLJ 674 (CA); [2002] 3 AMR 3262; [2002] 3 CLJ 741; [2002] 1 MLRA 424.

Gulf Business Construction (M) Sdn Bhd v Israq Holding Sdn Bhd [2010] 5 MLJ 34 (CA); [2010] 8 CLJ 775; [2010] 2 MLRA 411.

Dato’ Ting Check Sii v Marine Utama Sdn Bhd & Anor [2013] 9 MLJ 527 (HC); [2013] AMEJ 0012; [2013] CLJU 1351; [2013] MLRHU 946.

Tai Hean Leng @ Tek Hean Leng v New Future Capital Sdn Bhd [2018] 8 AMR 163 (HC); [2018] MLJU 1599; [2018] CLJU 1647; [2018] MLRHU 1324.

Narayani Sivaprakaspillai & Ors v Teluk Anson Agricultural Enterprises Sdn Bhd [2011] 9 MLRH 258 (HC); [2011] CLJU 989.

Perak Integrated Networks Services Sdn Bhd v Urban Domain Sdn Bhd & Anor [2018] 4 MLJ 1 (FC); [2018] 3 AMR 865; [2018] 5 CLJ 513; [2018] 3 MLRA 249.

Liew Then Song & Anor v Percetakan Yelian Sdn Bhd & Ors [2019] 10 MLJ 73 (HC); [2019] 6 AMR 170; [2019] 9 CLJ 139; [2018] MLRHU

1813.

Suki Mee v Far Origin Sdn Bhd [2020] 6 MLRA 494 (CA); [2020] MLJU 1408; [2020] AMEJ 1033; [2020] CLJU 1057.