Looi Kam Yong v Chambers of Firdaus (WA-11ANCvC-31-05/2024)

For ease of reference, the respective parties shall be referred to as the Plaintiff and Defendant as they were in the Magistrates Court. BRIEF FACTS [3] The Plaintiff is a registered law firm and has an address of service at Unit J-5-1, 5 th Floor, Parklane Commercial Hub, Jalan SS7/26, Kelana Jaya, 47301 Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan.

The Defendant is an individual who had previously appointed the Plaintiff to act on his behalf on various legal matters.

Around mid-January 2021, the Defendant was looking for legal representation in relation to certain legal suits that were initiated against him, as well as multiple infringement of his rights. Accordingly, the Appellant had taken the decision to appoint the Defendant to act as his solicitors through a Memorandum of Retainer.

According to the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim, the Defendant had failed to pay the legal fees owed to the Plaintiff. The Defendant, on the other hand, had filed a Counterclaim on 1.11.2022, seeking for the refund of a purported excess payment from the Plaintiff.

Later, on 9.2.2024, the Defendant filed an application to amend his Defence and Counterclaim, which was dismissed, hence this appeal. Plaintiff’s Contention [8] The Plaintiff contended that the Defendant’s amendment application was not bona fide as there was no cogent and reasonable reasons for the delay of approximately 1 year and 3 months. Further, the proposed amendment changes the character of the entire Original Defence and Counterclaim. The Plaintiff also contended that if the Defendant’s application is allowed, the Plaintiff would be put into a position where a whole new defence and reply to defence would have to be strategized and prepared and it would cause prejudice to the Plaintiff, that cannot be compensated by costs. Defendant’s Contention [9] The Defendant contended that the amendment was made bona fide as it provides explanation and further particulars. The delay was due to the professional misconduct and negligence by the previous solicitor. The Defendant contended that he should not be prejudiced by the negligence of his former solicitor. The Defendant also contended that by preventing him from relying on the facts and evidences, it would affect the entirety of the trial.

The Learned Magistrate dismissed the Defendant’s application with the following findings- “9. Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa permohonan yang difailkan di sini tidak bona fide. Cadangan pindaan yang ingin dimasukkan adalah berkaitan dengan pembayaran yang dikatakan telah dilakukan oleh pihak Defendan kepada Plaintif. Akan tetapi, semakan mahkamah ini terhadap Afidavit Sokongan Plaintif (Kandungan 54) atau Afidavit Jawapan (Kandungan 68) permohonan ini mendapati tiada sebarang dokumen diekshibitkan bagi menyokong cadangan pindaan ini.

Mahkamah ini juga bersetuju dengan hujahan Plaintif bahawa tiada keterangan (bagi menyokong cadangan pindaan tersebut) yang menjadi sebahagian keterangan dokumentar yang difailkan Defendan di dalam Ikatan Dokumen Bersama kedua-dua pihak.

Mahkamah ini juga tidak bersetuju sekiranya Defendan menyatakan bahawa alasan pindaan di buat pada peringkat ini adalah untuk menyatakan fakta yang lebih jelas. Ini jelas berdasarkan cadangan pindaan tersebut, mahkamah ini mendapati ianya bukan bertujuan untuk menyatakan fakta kes dengan lebih jelas, sebaliknya merupakan satu cubaan untuk mengubah fakta-fakta yang telah diplidkan. Permohonan ini jelas bukan satu permohonan yang bona fide.

Mahkamah ini juga berpendapat, sekiranya permohonan tersebut dibenarkan, ianya akan mengubah karektor pembelaan dan tuntutan balas Defendan di dalam tindakan ini. Perubahan karektor tersebut adalah sepertimana berikut: Pembelaan dan Tuntutan Balas Asal Cadangan Pembelaan dan Tuntutan Balas melalui pindaan yang dicadangkan

Defendan telah membayar RM 260,000.00 kepada Plaintif dan rakan kongsinya sebagai pembayaran pendahuluan. Tiada lagi tunggakan pembayaran oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif. Defendan hanya membayar RM 20,000.00 kepada Plaintif. Manakala RM 240,000.00 telah dibayar kepada rakan kongsi

Pembelaan dan Tuntutan Balas Defendan berkisar mengenai fakta bahawa Defendan telah menyelesaikan Cadangan Pembelaan dan Tuntutan Balas Terpinda menyatakan terdapat perlanggaran terma kontrak apabila rakan kongsi Plaintif keseluruhan pembayaran kepada Plaintif dan terdapat lebihan bayaran. telah mengambil yuran guaman yang dibayar oleh Defendan kepada akaun simpanan peribadi rakan kongsi Plaintif.

Invois sebanyak 185,787.18 telah mengambilkira pembayaran 60,000.00 yang dikatakan sebagai interim payment oleh Defendan. Oleh itu amaun keseluruhan invois adalah sebanyak 245,787.18. Defendan telah membayar 327,211.00 (RM 260,000.00 dan 67,211.00) melalui peguam Defendan Harjinder Singh, kepada Plaintif. Jumlah RM 240,000.00 mesti dilepaskan atau dipulangkan kembali oleh rakan kongsi Plaintif kepada Plaintif

Defendan telah terlebih membuat pembayaran sebanyak RM 81,423.82 kepada Plaintif. Defendan menuntut pemulangan 20,000.00 yang terlebih bayar olehnya.

Oleh itu, kebenaran untuk membuat pindaan pliding tidak sewajarnya dibenarkan oleh mahkamah ini sekiranya pindaan tersebut akan meletakkan Plaintif di dalam keadaan worse position than he would have been if the amended pleading had been delivered in the first instance (Kes Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp v Tang Hong [1959] MLJ 51 dirujuk). Ini akan meletakkan Plaintif di dalam keadaan diprejudiskan yang tidak mungkin dapat dipampas melalui kos.

Mahkamah juga mendapati bahawa terdapat kelewatan yang amat ketara tatkala permohonan ini difailkan. Pertamanya, ianya bukan difailkan berdasarkan penemuan baharu melalui prosiding discovery. Keduanya, ianya hanya difailkan selepas tempoh 1 tahun 3 bulan, tatkala benar-benar sebelum perbicaraan bermula. Ketiganya, adalah jelas segala fakta berkenaan kes ini sejak awal adalah di dalam pengetahuan Defendan.”

Justeru itu, untuk Defendan menyatakan baru sahaja mengetahui berkenaan fakta-fakta material tersebut pada peringkat ini, mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa Defendan telah gagal untuk melepaskan onus untuk mengemukakan sebab yang mustahak dan penting bagi mewajarkan kelewatannya memfailkan permohonan ini, menurut kes Hong Leong Finance Bhd v Low Thiam Hoe and another appeal (supra) tersebut. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Appellate Intervention [11] The “plainly wrong” test is the test applicable when determining whether an appellate Court should intervene with the lower courts’ decision. The “plainly wrong” test means when the “learned trial Judge had gone plainly wrong … in the sense that it could not reasonably be explained or justified and so was one which no reasonable Judge could have reached.” (See: Tengku Dato' Ibrahim Petra Tengku Indra Petra v Petra Perdana Bhd & Another Appeal [2018] 2 MLJ 177; [2018] 2 CLJ 641; [2018] 1 MLRA 263 (FC), Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator Of The Estates Of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Ors [2020] 12 MLJ 67; [2020] 10 CLJ 1; [2020] 6 MLRA 193 (FC), Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1; [2004] 4 CLJ 309; [2004] 2 MLRA 1 (FC). [12] Accordingly, this Court finds that the Learned Magistrate has not erred in his decision when he dismissed the Defendant’s application. This Court agrees with the finding of facts and the determination of the law of the Learned Magistrate. In other words, the Learned Magistrate has not made any appealable error requiring appellate intervention. [13] Thus, there is no necessity to interfere with the findings of the Learned Magistrate. [14] In this regard, for all the reasons aforesaid, this Court finds that there is no merit in this appeal to warrant appellate intervention (See Ong Leong Chiou v. Keller (M) Sdn Bhd (FC) [2021] 4 MLRA 211; [2021] 3 MLJ 622; [2021] 4 CLJ 821, Tengku Dato' Ibrahim Petra Tengku Indra Petra v Petra Perdana Bhd & Another Appeal [2018] 2 MLJ 177; [2018] 2 CLJ 641; [2018] 1 MLRA 263 (FC), Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator Of The Estates Of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Ors [2020] 12 MLJ 67; [2020] 10 CLJ 1; [2020] 6 MLRA 193 (FC) and MMC Oil & Gas Engineering Sdn Bhd v. Tan Bock Kwee & Sons Sdn Bhd [2016] 3 MLRA 144; [2016] 2 MLJ 428; [2016] 4 CLJ 665 (COA)). CONCLUSION [15] As such the appeal is dismissed with costs. Dated: 13 JULY 2025 -SGD- (SUZANA BINTI MUHAMAD SAID) Judicial Commissioner of The High Court NCVC 1 Kuala Lumpur Court. COUNSELS FOR THE APPELLANT/DEFENDANT Tetuan Rabinder Budiman Peguambela & Peguamcara Suite 3B-15-5, Level 15 Block 3B, Plaza Sentral Jalan Stesen Sentral 5 50470 Kuala Lumpur FOR THE RESPONDENT/PLAINTIFF Tetuan Chambers of Firdaus Peguambela & Peguamcara Unit J-5-1, 5th Floor Parklane Commercial Hub Jalan SS 7/26, Kelana Jaya 47301 Petaling Jaya