Schedule
Jadual 6 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 Dan Dalam Perkara Aturan 5, Aturan 7 dan Aturan 88 Kaedah 2 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 Dan Dalam Perkara Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Temerloh Dalam Negeri Pahang, Saman No. CB-NCC-3-04/2022 Low Eng Hock (Plaintif) Lwn Low Eng Yew (Defendan) ANTARA LOW ENG YEW (NO. K/P: 641105-01-6501) … PLAINTIF DAN 1. LOW ENG HOCK (NO. K/P: 730525-06-5283) 2. NG ENG YONG (NO. K/P: 700907-01-5161) 3. USAHA SINARAN ENTERPRISE SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 1129800-V) … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pendahuluan [1] Defendan-Defendan melalui Kertas Mahkamah 4 (KM 4) memohon agar keseluruhan prosiding saman pemula ini digantung sehingga pelupusan muktamad kes Guaman Sivil No. CB-22NCC-3- 04/2022. [2] Alasan permohonan ini adalah prosiding di Guaman Sivil No. CB- 22NCC-3-04/2022 akan memutuskan sama ada Plaintif mempunyai “locus” dalam tindakan ini. Di samping itu pendengaran kes Guaman Sivil No. CB-22NCC-3-04/2022 itu akan menentukan apakah saksi-saksi yang perlu dikemukakan bagi kes Saman Pemula No. CB-24NCC- 2-01/2024 ini. Di samping itu tarikh pendengaran kes Guaman Sivil No. CB-22NCC-3-04/2022 telah ditetapkan dan ia tidak akan memprejudiskan Plaintif. [3] Bagi kes ini iaitu Saman Pemula No. CB-24NCC-2-01/2024, Plaintif memohon perintah deklarasi bahawa Defendan Pertama, Defendan Kedua dan Pengarah-pengarah Defendan Ketiga telah menindas Plaintif dengan mengabaikan kepentingan Plaintif yang berkaitan dengan Penyata Kewangan Defendan Ketiga bagi tahun kewangan 2015, 2016, 2017 dan 2018 dengan mengemukakan penyataan palsu berkenaannya. Penindasan tersebut juga dikatakan berlaku apabila Defendan Pertama, Defendan Kedua dan Pengarah-pengarah Defendan Ketiga tidak membekalkan Penyata Kewangan kepada Plaintif serta tidak memanggil Mesyuarat Agong Tahunan bagi tahun 2021 dan 2022. [4] Seterusnya Plaintif juga memohon agar Defendan Ketiga digulungkan dan segala kos berkaitannya ditanggung oleh Defendan Pertama, Defendan Kedua dan Defendan Ketiga. Di samping itu Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua juga secara bersama memberikan tanggung rugi kepada Plaintif terhadap kenyataan-kenyataan palsu yang didakwa dilakukan oleh Defendan-Defendan kepada pemiutang-pemiutang syarikat. Plaintif juga meminta supaya segala penalti yang dikenakan oleh Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia (SSM) terhadap Defendan Ketiga bagi pengisytiharan palsu dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan. [5] Sebaliknya di dalam prosiding dalam kes CB-22NCC-3-04/2022 remedi yang dipohon oleh pihak Plaintif (Low Eng Hock) dalam kes tersebut adalah seperti yang dinyatakan dalam penyata tuntutan yang dieskibitkan sebagai “L-1" affidavit sokongan Defendan-Defendan yang diikrarkan oleh Low Eng Hock pada 13.02.2022. Tuntutannya adalah seperti berikut: a) Gantirugi am; b) Gantirugi teladan (exemplary damages); c) Satu deklarasi bahawa saham-saham yang dipegang oleh Defendan (Low Eng Yew) dalam Usaha Sinaran Enterprise Sdn. Bhd. (No. Syarikat: 1129800-V) (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai "Syarikat tersebut") dalam nama Defendan (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai "Saham-Saham tersebut") adalah dipegang atas amanah oleh Defendan (Low Eng Yew) bagi pihak Plaintif secara mutlak; d) Satu deklarasi bahawa Plaintif adalah pemilik benefisial saham-saham tersebut yang dipegang oleh Defendan (Low Eng Yew) dalam Syarikat tersebut; e) Satu Perintah bahawa Defendan (Low Eng Yew) hendaklah dalam tempoh tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh Perintah di sini memindahkan kepada Plaintif semua Saham-Saham tersebut dalam Syarikat tersebut untuk Plaintif; f) Satu Perintah bahawa Defendan (Low Eng Yew) hendaklah dalam tempoh tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh Perintah ini meyerahkan semula semua sijil Saham-Saham tersebut (jika ada) dan memindahkan Saham-Saham tersebut kepada Plaintif; g) Bahawa Timbalan Pendaftar/Penolong Kanan Pendaftar Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini hendaklah menandatangani semua memorandum pindahmilik Saham-Saham tersebut dan lain-lain dokumen yang diperlukan untuk pihak Defendan menyerah Saham-Saham tersebut di Syarikat tersebut kembali kepada Plaintif sekiranya Defendan gagal, enggan atau abai menandatangani memorandum pemindahan selepas luput tujuh (7) hari selepas tuntutan bertulis daripada Plaintif dan/atau peguamcaranya; h) Kos; dan i) Sebarang relif lanjutan dan/atau lain-lain relif yang difikirkan patut dan wajar oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia ini. [6] Dalam kes CB-22NCC-3-04/2022 Plaintif dalam kes tersebut adalah Low Eng Hock iaitu Defendan Pertama dalam kes ini (CB- 24NCVC-2-01/2024). Low Eng Hock dalam kes CB-22NCC-3-04/2022 menyatakan bahawa dia dan seorang yang bernama Dato’ Ng Eng Yong telah menubuhkan syarikat Usaha Sinaran Enterprise Sdn Bhd. Defendan dalam kes tersebut yang merupakan Plaintif dalam kes CB- 24NCC-2-02/2024 ini adalah merupakan adik beradik kepada Low Eng Hock. Low Eng Yew dan Low Eng Hock adalah adik beradik. [7] Asas kepada permohonan ini ialah untuk membolehkan mahkamah dalam perbicaraan CB-22NCC-3-04/2022 terlebih dahulu menentukan kedudukan Plaintif sama ada mempunyai “locus” atau tidak untuk tindakan ini. Affidavit Sokongan Plaintif [8] Dalam affidavit sokongan Low Eng Yew dinyatakan bahawa sebelum ini dia pernah memfailkan tindakan yang serupa melalui saman pemula CB-24NCC-4-11/2019 di Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Temerloh terhadap ketiga-tiga Defendan. Namun saman pemula tersebut telah diberhentikan dengan kebebasan untuk memfailkan semula pada 11.03.2020. Seterusnya Plaintif telah diserahkan dengan writ saman CB-22NCC-3-04/2022 yang difailkan oleh Defendan Pertama. Setelah itu Plaintif telah menulis surat kepada Setiausaha Syarikat Defendan Ketiga untuk mendapatkan penyata-penyata akaun bagi tahun 2019 hingga 2022 tetapi Setiausaha Syarikat Defendan Ketiga tersebut menyatakan bahawa pengarah syarikat tidak membenarkan dokumen-dokumen tersebut diberikan kepada Plaintif. Plaintif mendakwa dia meminta dokumen-dokumen tersebut di atas kedudukannya sebagai ahli kepada Defendan Ketiga iaitu Usaha Sinaran Enterprise Sdn Bhd. [9] Seterusnya Plaintif telah berjaya mendapatkan salinan penyata-penyata akaun beraudit bagi tahun 2015, 2016, 2017, dan 2018. Dia juga telah berjaya mendapatkan laporan pendapat awal daripada Tetuan AGS Advisory. Pendapat awal itu telah menunjukkan bahawa terdapatnya penyataan salah kepada pemiutang-pemiutang yang menjejaskan syarikat iaitu Defendan Ketiga. Ini telah menyebabkan Plaintif mempunyai syak wasangka bahawa telah berlaku kesalahan-kesalahan berkaitan pengisytiharan kepada Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri. Begitu juga ketika meneliti penyata kewangan tahun 2019 dan 2020 juga Plaintif mendapati terdapatnya bayaran imbuhan kepada Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua dibuat walaupun tiada sebarang pendapatan pada tahun 2020 dan Defendan Ketiga mengalami kerugian. [10] Apa yang lebih menarik ialah berdasarkan Statement of Financial Position tahun 2020 baki wang tunai di bank pada tahun 2019 ialah RM2,305,591.00 dan sementara bagi tahun 2020 ia berkurangan kepada RM1,479,958.00. Ini telah menyebabkan Plaintif sebagai pihak yang berkepentingan di dalam Defendan Ketiga menimbulkan kemusykilan dan kebimbangan. Plaintif juga mendakwa bahawa pada 15.11.2019 terdapat resolusi syarikat yang bertujuan untuk menyingkirkan pihak Plaintif. Ini semua menyebabkan Plaintif memfailan saman pemula dalam kes ini. [11] Sebaliknya Plaintif dalam affidavit jawapan menyatakan bahawa Defendan-Defendan telah gagal untuk menunjukkan keadaan istimewa mengapakah perlunya pengantungan kepada guaman ini. Ini adalah disebabkan isu-isu yang timbul dalam guaman ini adalah berbeza dengan guaman CB-22NCC-3-04/2022. Ini adalah disebabkan dalam guaman CB-22NCC-3-04/2022 hanya Defendan Pertama dan Plaintif sahaja yang terlibat manakala dalam kes ini semua pihak terlibat. Oleh itu tidak timbul keputusan bagi kes CB-22NCC-3-04/2022 itu perlu diselesaikan terlebih dahulu sebelum pendengaran kes ini. Analisa [12] Penelitian kepada permohonan di KM 4 adalah jelas menunjukkan bahawa Defendan-Defendan ingin supaya pendengaran saman pemula ini ditangguhkan sehingga pelupusan kes CB-22NCC-3-04/2022. Ini adalah disebabkan pada hemat Defendan-Defendan isu-isu berkenaan tuntutan di bawah CB-22NCC-3-04/2022 tersebut mempunyai kaitan dengan kes ini. Sekiranya keputusan dalam CB-22NCC-3-04/2022 tersebut adalah memihak kepada mana-mana pihak ia akan menjejaskan kes CB-24NCC-2-01/2024 ini. Oleh itu menurut Defendan-Defendan prosiding ini perlu ditangguhkan. [13] Adalah didapati bahawa kedua-dua prosiding tersebut adalah berkaitan dengan Syarikat Usaha Sinaran Enterprise Sdn Bhd. Bagi kes CB-22NCC-3-04/2022 ia adalah berkaitan dengan insiden-insiden yang berlaku yang melibatkan Low Eng Hock dan Low Eng Yew yang melibatkan dakwaan Plaintif dalam kes tersebut bahawa terdapatnya pecah amanah oleh Low Eng Yew yang melibatkan keengganan pemindahan saham-saham yang dipegang atas amanah Plaintif. Sebaliknya dalam kes CB-24NCC-2-01/2024 ini adalah berkenaan tuntutan penindasan yang dilakukan oleh Defendan Pertama kepada Plaintif. [14] Mahkamah ini berpendapat walaupun ia melibatkan syarikat yang sama namun ia berkaitan dengan isu yang berbeza iaitu satu berkaitan dengan tuduhan penyalahgunaan kuasa dan pecah amanah oleh Defendan iaitu Low Eng Yew yang perlu diputuskan berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan kelak. Sebaliknya bagi kes CB-24NCC-2-01/2024 ia adalah berkaitan dengan penindasan minoriti yang tertakluk kepada prinsip undang-undang berkaitan penindasan minoriti di bawah Undang-undang Syarikat. Adalah didapati bahawa remedi bagi penindansan telah dinyatakan di bawah seksyen 346 Akta Syarikat 2016 (Akta 777) yang memperuntukkan seperti berikut: “346 Remedi dalam hal penindasan (1) Mana-mana anggota atau pemegang debentur suatu syarikat boleh memohon kepada Mahkamah bagi suatu perintah di bawah seksyen ini atas alasan- (a) bahawa hal ehwal syarikat dijalankan atau kuasa pengarah dijalankan mengikut cara yang menindas seorang atau lebih anggota atau pemegang debentur termasuklah dirinya sendiri atau yang tidak mengambil kira kepentingannya atau mereka sebagai anggota, pemegang syer atau pemegang debentur syarikat; atau (b) bahawa beberapa tindakan syarikat dilakukan atau diancam atau bahawa beberapa ketetapan anggota, pemegang debentur atau mana-mana kelas mereka diluluskan atau dicadangkan yang mendiskriminasi secara tidak adil terhadap atau selainnya menjejaskan seorang atau lebih anggota atau pemegang debentur, termasuklah dirinya sendiri. (2) Jika atas permohonan itu Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa salah satu daripada alasan itu dibuktikan, Mahkamah boleh membuat apa-apa perintah sebagaimana yang difikirkan sesuai oleh Mahkamah dengan tujuan untuk menyelesaikan atau meremedi perkara yang diadukan itu, dan tanpa menjejaskan keluasan subseksyen (1), perintah itu boleh- (a) mengarahkan atau melarang apa-apa tindakan atau membatalkan atau mengubah apa-apa transaksi atau ketetapan; (b) mengawal selia penjalanan hal ehwal syarikat pada masa hadapan; (c) mengadakan pembelian syer atau debentur syarikat oleh anggota atau pemegang debentur lain syarikat itu atau oleh syarikat itu sendiri; (d) dalam hal pembelian syer oleh syarikat itu, memperuntukkan pengurangan dengan sewajarnya bagi modal syarikat; atau (e) memperuntukkan supaya syarikat itu digulung. (3) Jika suatu perintah supaya syarikat digulung dibuat di bawah perenggan (2)(e), peruntukan Akta ini yang berhubungan dengan penggulungan suatu syarikat hendaklah terpakai seolaholah perintah itu dibuat setelah petisyen dikemukakan dengan sewajarnya kepada Mahkamah oleh syarikat itu, dengan apa-apa penyesuaian yang perlu. (4) Jika suatu perintah di bawah seksyen ini membuat apa-apa perubahan dalam atau penambahan kepada mana-mana perlembagaan, maka, walau apa pun apa-apa jua dalam mana-mana peruntukan lain Akta ini, tetapi tertakluk kepada perintah itu, syarikat yang berkaitan tidak mempunyai kuasa tanpa keizinan Mahkamah untuk membuat apa-apa perubahan atau penambahan selanjutnya dalam atau kepada perlembagaan yang tidak selaras dengan perintah itu, tetapi tertakluk kepada peruntukan subseksyen ini yang terdahulu, perubahan atau penambahan yang dibuat oleh perintah itu hendaklah mempunyai kesan yang sama seolah-olah dibuat dengan sewajarnya melalui ketetapan syarikat itu. (5) Suatu salinan pejabat bagi apa-apa perintah yang dibuat di bawah seksyen ini hendaklah diserah simpan oleh pemohon dengan Pendaftar dalam masa empat belas hari dari perintah itu dibuat. (6) Pemohon yang melanggar subseksyen (5) melakukan suatu kesalahan dan boleh, apabila disabitkan, didenda tidak melebihi sepuluh ribu ringgit dan, dalam hal suatu kesalahan yang berterusan, didenda selanjutnya sebanyak lima ratus ringgit bagi setiap hari selama kesalahan itu berterusan selepas sabitan. [15] Penentuan sama ada terdapatnya penindasan adalah bergantung kepada keadaan dan keterangan di dalam suatu kes yang perlu diambil kira oleh mahkamah seperti yang terdapat di dalam kes Dato' Azizan Abd Rahman & Ors v. Concrete Parade Sdn Bhd & Ors And Other Appeals [2024] 5 CLJ 193 apabila salah satu isu yang timbul ialah adakah keputusan Pengarah-pengarah Syarikat yang melakukan suatu proses urus niaga atau tindakan korporat yang lain yang memerlukan persetujuan pemegang-pemegang saham adalah suatu yang termasuk di dalam penindasan. Ini dinyatakan seperti berikut: “ [360] We now turn to the final issue and question (vii). As stated at the outset, the fourth issue in this appeal is whether the use of the oppression provision is indeed the proper means of remedying Concrete Parade's grievances, if such grievances are made out. [361] As we have concluded above, Concrete Parade has failed to establish a contravention of either s. 85 or of s. 223(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Act. Neither has an illegality been conclusively established in relation to s. 67A of the Companies Act 1965 or s. 127 of the Act in relation to the share buy-back transactions. [362] Question (vii) in turn reads as follows: (i) whether, in an application under s. 346 of the Act, the court may make a finding that the affairs of a public-listed company have been conducted oppressively by the directors on the basis that there has been a denial of a shareholder's statutory right to vote on any arrangement or transaction or other corporate exercise requiring shareholders' approval by law when: (a) all shareholders were given the opportunity to vote before the arrangement or transaction or corporate exercise in question became legally binding and effective; (b) the shareholders of the company in general meeting had voted to approve the arrangement or transaction or corporate exercise in question; and (c) the shareholders who voted in favour of the arrangement or transaction or corporate exercise were not made parties to the oppression proceedings against the company and its directors? (ii) Answer to Question (vii): No. We answer Question (vii) in the negative. [363] Our reasons for answering so have effectively been addressed throughout the grounds of judgment. [364] As is stated in the course of the judgment, can Concrete Parade's grievance amount to oppression when the majority of the shareholders approved the merger and the consequent 'dilution' of their shareholding? [365] As the majority approved the merger, meaning that majority rule was in favour of the merger, how can unfairly prejudicial conduct prevail or even come into operation in light of the majority vote of the shareholder organ of the company? [366] The Court of Appeal failed to appreciate or comprehend this fundamental issue in determining this appeal, with respect. (See also In The Matter Of Tong Eng Sdn Bhd [1994] 2 CLJ 775; [1994] 1 MLJ 451; Pan Choon Weng v Mexvin Chow Yew Hoong & Ors [2022] CLJU 2248; [2022] 1 LNS 2248; [2022] MLJU 2357; Seah Eng Toh Daniel & Anor v. Kingsley Khoo Hoi Leng & Ors [2016] 2 CLJ 695). ” [16] Pada masa yang sama mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Low Ean Nee v. SNE Marketing Sdn Bhd [2024] 1 CLJ 24 yang menyatakan berkenaan dengan hak pemegang saham atau pengurus syarikat untuk melindungi kepentingan syarikat sehingga ia boleh menjadi asas kepada suatu tindakan untuk penindasan. “ [43] We agree with the submissions that were made by counsel for the appellant that the commencement of the oppression suit and the lodging of the police report (pertaining to the unlawful assignment of the trademark to SNE-G) which led to LCT and his daughter being charged for CBT cannot be construed as an ulterior or improper motive on the part of the appellant against the respondent itself. The appellant may well have had ulterior motives against others eg, directors and shareholders, but not the respondent itself. [46] As correctly pointed out by counsel for the appellant, the oppression suit and the CBT charge merely demonstrate hostility towards the other directors and shareholders of the respondent and not the respondent itself. But, it was contended by the respondent in its affidavits that the appellant was seeking to obtain the respondent's financial records and documents so as to launch further attacks and was a launch-pad to injure the respondent. With respect, we see no evidence of intention by the appellant to injure the respondent. She may well have an intention to commence other legal proceedings against the directors and shareholders but that is her right. The germane question here is whether there was any evidence that she was intending to injure the respondent. The answer is - no. [56] As such, we are constrained to hold that the learned Judicial Commissioner erred in dismissing the originating summons. Thus, appellate intervention is warranted. Ordinarily, we would have allowed the appeal. However, it is necessary for us to consider the impact of the post High Court event, namely, the appellant's removal as director.” [17] Sebaliknya bagi kes No. CB-22NCC-3-04/2022 ia adalah berkaitan dengan dakwaan bahawa Defendan (Low Eng Yew) telah bertindak secara tidak amanah sebagai pemegang saham bagi pihak Plaintif. Ia adalah jelas berbeza dengan saman pemula CB-24NCC-2- 01/2024 ini. Perbezaan juga dari sudut remedi yang ingin diperolehi dalam saman pemula ini dengan writ saman CB-22NCC-3-04/2022. Mahkamah berpendapat kedua-dua kes tersebut akan diputuskan berdasarkan kepada prinsip undang-undang dan keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan bagi dua jenis tindakan yang difailkan oleh pihak Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan dalam kedua-dua kes tersebut. Apakah wajar penggantungan prosiding dalam kes ini? [18] Persoalannya ialah adakah disebabkan kedua-dua kes tersebut melibatkan syarikat yang sama, pihak yang sama maka ia adalah suatu keadaan khas yang membolehkan penggantungan prosiding bagi kes ini. Adalah mustahak untuk mahkamah membezakan di antara penggantungan pelaksanaan penghakiman dengan penggantungan prosiding. Ini adalah disebabkan ia mempunyai pertimbangan dan kesan yang berbeza. Dalam konteks penggantunggan prosiding kesannya dapat dilihat dalam kes Minister of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Industry v Vehicles and Supplies Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 550 di mana Lord Oliver of Aylmerton menyatakan seperti berikut: “A stay of proceedings is an order which puts a stop to the further conduct of proceedings in court or before a tribunal at the stage which they have reached, the object being to avoid the hearing or trial taking place. It is not an order enforceable by proceedings for contempt because it is not, in its nature, capable of being “breached” by a party to the proceedings or anyone else. It simply means that the relevant court or tribunal cannot, whilst the stay endures, effectively entertain any further proceedings except for the purpose of lifting the stay and that, in general, anything done prior to the lifting of the stay will be ineffective, although such an order would not, if imposed in order to enforce the performance of a condition by a plaintiff (e.g. to provide security for costs), prevent a defendant from applying to dismiss the action if the condition is not fulfilled: see La Grange v. McAndrew (1879) 4 Q.B.D. 210.” [19] Adalah menjadi prinsip undang-undang yang mantap bahawa bagi mendapatkan suatu penggantungan pelaksanaan bagi kes yang telah difailkan rayuan ke Mahkamah Atasan adalah diperlukan untuk ditunjukkan keadaan khas yang membolehkan penggantungan pelaksanaan penghakiman tersebut. Perkara ini telah dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Kosma Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2003] 4 CLJ 1 seperti berikut: “ It is therefore clear beyond doubt that there are many factors that may constitute special circumstances and the fact that an appeal would be rendered nugatory if stay was refused is the most common one. It is an example of special circumstances. In other words special circumstances is the genus of which nugatoriness is a species. If it has been shown that an appeal would be rendered nugatory if stay was refused what it means is that a special circumstance has been established. Thus they cannot be treated as separate heads and one cannot be an alternative to the other. Neither can one be accepted or rejected in favour of the other as they are inter-related. See See Teow Guan & Ors v. Kian Joo Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [1997] 2 CLJ 299 could have withstood scrutiny if it had merely referred to nugatoriness without rejecting special circumstances. As nugatoriness is a species of special circumstances a mere reference to it is sufficient to convey the correct legal impression. Any attempt to restrict the grant of a stay to nugatoriness, quite apart from its impropriety, will severely restrict the grounds on which an applicant may rely. Learned counsel for the applicants is therefore wrong in submitting that the nugatory approach is not a matter for consideration in this case as what is relevant is only the special circumstances. He would have been correct if he had said that he was not relying on nugatoriness but on some other species of special circumstances.” [20] Mahkamah ini juga mendapati bahawa bagi permohonan untuk penggantungan prosiding jenayah garis panduan yang mantap telah dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes PP v. Dato' Sri Mohd Najib Hj Abd Razak [2019] 6 CLJ 561 seperti berikut: “ [32] In summary, in considering an application for stay of criminal proceedings when commencement of the trial is imminent or continuing in the court of first instance, the determinative principles to be derived from the above cases are as follows: (i) There is a strong public interest in the prosecution of crime and in ensuring that those charged with serious criminal offences are tried (R v. Crawley and Others [2014] EWCA Crim 1028 at para. [18]). (ii) It is undesirable that the criminal process be interrupted or fragmented by interlocutory proceedings. The considerations of public interest are of great weight leaning in favour of expeditious resolution of accusations of crime. (iii) The undesirability of fragmenting the criminal process is not confined to any particular part of the criminal process, but rather to the process as a whole. Any interference with any part of the process is antithetical to the proper and just disposition of criminal cases. The caution about the undesirability of fragmentation of criminal process would be more pronounced where a hearing of proceedings has actually commenced. (iv) A stay of proceedings application will require especially compelling justification in a case qualifying for urgent judicial decision. For instance, it is important that anyone charged with serious criminal offences be brought to trial expeditiously. Public interest would not be served by allowing the defence to request for a delay. An accused of serious criminal offences who is not guilty should have the opportunity of clearing his name without excessive delay (Attorney General's Reference No. 2 of 2001 [2003] UKHL 68 at [16]). (v) A stay of proceedings will not normally be granted pending an interlocutory appeal in a criminal trial. It is only in very exceptional or unusual circumstances that a stay order is granted. This is so even if the issuing of the interlocutory appeal is not opposed by the prosecution or in fact supported by both the prosecution and the defence. (vi) The accused's rights over preliminary or interlocutory rulings made by the trial judge are best vindicated by appeal after conviction, if any. It is generally more desirable to consider preliminary or interlocutory rulings made by the trial judge in appeal after conviction upon full trial with the benefit of a concrete factual setting than considering them in the abstract during interlocutory appeal. (vii) The fact that an accused will be put to the expense of a trial is irrelevant and would not qualify as "exceptional circumstances" to justify a stay of a criminal trial pending resolution of an appeal. (viii) The courts should exercise great caution in allowing other forms of collateral challenge, in parallel proceedings such as an application for a declaration or other form of judicial review with similar relief in the nature of certiorari, be it commenced in the same court or another civil or criminal court, which have the net effect of staying the criminal proceedings or would interfere with or impinge directly upon the normal course of proceedings in a criminal trial.” Ia juga telah dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Datin Seri Rosmah Mansor v. PP [2022] 1 CLJ 849. [21] Dalam hal ini wajar sekiranya mahkamah merujuk kepada keputusan dalam kes R (on the application of SB (Sudan)) v Secretary of State for Home Department [2012] EWHC 3483 bagi memahami apakah yang perlu diambil kira dalam menentukan suatu penggantungan prosiding. Penelitian kepada fakta kes tersebut menunjukkan bahawa satu permohonan penggantungan prosiding dibuat dengan alasan terdapat suatu perintah yang berkaitan isu yang sama berkenaan dengan pengusiran Pemohon dalam kes tersebut ke Itali. Kes ini melibatkan Undang-undang Imigresen di United Kingdom. Ini dapat dilihat di perenggan [23] seperti berikut: “[23] Following the publication of the decision in EM and the sealing of the order, there was a suggestion that other claims raising similar issues should be stayed and that the removal of Claimants to Italy should be stayed on terms similar to those in the order. The Secretary of State opposed that suggestion. The present hearing was arranged, and was to be confined to the issue of whether a stay on the proceedings should be granted. Both parties before me, however, have made their submissions also in relation to stay on the Claimant's removal, as indeed was envisaged by a request from the court to consider the following issues: “1. Whether the Court of Appeal's decision to stay the removal of the Appellants in EM and others pending applications for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court should apply to other cases raising the same issues. 2. If so, why this case is so different that it should not be covered by such a stay. 3. What criteria should be considered by the court in determining whether or not this case or any other case is different from EM and others. 4. In how many cases is this issue of stay anticipated to arise.” [22] Dalam kes tersebut MR CMG Ockelton menyatakan seperti berikut berkaitan dengan penggantungan prosiding: “[26] A stay on proceedings may be associated with the grant of interim relief, but it is essentially different. In determining whether proceedings should be stayed, the concerns of the court itself have to be taken into the balance. Decisions as to listing, and decisions as to which cases are to be heard at any particular time are matters for the court itself and no party to a claim can demand that it be heard before or after any other claim. The court will want to deal with claims before it as expeditiously as is consistent with justice. But, on the other hand, it is unlikely to want to waste time and other valuable resources on an exercise that may well be pointless if conducted too soon. If, therefore, the court is shown that there will be, or there is likely to be, some event in the foreseeable future that may have an impact on the way a claim is decided, it may decide to stay proceedings in the claim until after that event. It may be more inclined to grant a stay if there is agreement between the parties. It may not need to grant a stay if the pattern of work shows that the matter will not come on for trial before the event in question. The starting point must, however, be that a Claimant seeks expeditious determination of his claim and that delay will be ordered only if good reason is shown. [27] In cases where a request for a stay on proceedings is coupled, expressly or by necessary implication, with a request for interim relief, the court will need to take into account the factors relevant to both types of decision, and may need to take into account a third: that by securing interim relief and a stay, the Applicant may be asking the court to use its powers to give him, for as long as he can secure it, a benefit that he may not obtain at the trial. [23] Pandangan ini telah disahkan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan di United Kingdom dalam kes AB (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 921 oleh Jackson LJ seperti berikut: “[25] In relation to stays of proceedings, as opposed to stays of enforcement, the judge is making a case management decision. Such decisions will rarely be challenged and even more rarely be reversed on appeal. [26] The judge set out the principles governing the grant of a stay at paras 27-28 of the judgment below as follows: “27 A stay on proceedings may be associated with the grant of interim relief, but it is essentially different. In determining whether proceedings should be stayed, the concerns of the court itself have to be taken into the balance. Decisions as to listing, and decisions as to which cases are to be heard at any particular time are matters for the court itself and no party to a claim can demand that it be heard before or after any other claim. The court will want to deal with claims before it as expeditiously as is consistent with justice. But, on the other hand, it is unlikely to want to waste time and other valuable resources on an exercise that may well be pointless if conducted too soon. If, therefore, the court is shown that there will be, or there is likely to be, some event in the foreseeable future that may have an impact on the way a claim is decided, it may decide to stay proceedings in the claim until after that event. It may be more inclined to grant a stay if there is agreement between the parties. It may not need to grant a stay if the pattern of work shows that the matter will not come on for trial before the event in question. The starting point must, however, be that a Claimant seeks expeditious determination of his claim and that delay will be ordered only if good reason is shown. 28 In cases where a request for a stay on proceedings is coupled, expressly or by necessary implication, with a request for interim relief, the court will need to take into account the factors relevant to both types of decision, and may need to take into account a third: that by securing interim relief and a stay, the Applicant may be asking the court to use its powers to give him, for as long as he can secure it, a benefit that he may not obtain at the trial.” [27] I agree with what is set out in those paragraphs, but wish to add some further comments in relation to immigration cases.” [24] Ia telah dirujuk oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Hj Abd Razak (supra) di atas seperti di perenggan [29] hingga [31] alasan penghakiman seperti berikut: “[29] In the UK, the power of the court to stay a criminal proceeding is inherent in nature. (See: Re Wickham [1887] 35 Ch D 272 at p. 280). Historically, a stay of proceedings "had the draconian effect of bringing proceedings to a conclusion, unless it was of the conditional variety. This has, however, been superseded by contemporary practice". (See: R (on the application of AO & AM) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (stay of Proceedings - principles) [2017] UKUT 168 (IAC) at para. [20]). A stay of proceedings is different from a stay of execution (AB (Sudan) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 921 at para. [25]). In the case of a stay of proceeding, the governing principles formulated by the Court of Appeal in AB (Sudan) (at para. [26]), albeit discussed in the immigration and asylum context, are that: A stay on proceedings may be associated with the grant of interim relief, but it is essentially different. In determining whether proceedings should be stayed, the concerns of the court itself have to be taken into the balance. Decisions as to listing, and decisions as to which cases are to be heard at any particular time are matters for the court itself and no party to a claim can demand that it be heard before or after any other claim. The court will want to deal with claims before it as expeditiously as is consistent with justice. But, on the other hand, it is unlikely to want to waste time and other valuable resources on an exercise that may well be pointless if conducted too soon. If, therefore, the court is shown that there will be, or there is likely to be, some event in the foreseeable future that may have an impact on the way a claim is decided, it may decide to stay proceedings in the claim until after that event. It may be more inclined to grant a stay if there is agreement between the parties. It may not need to grant a stay if the pattern of work shows that the matter will not come on for trial before the event in question. The starting point must, however, be that a claimant seeks expeditious determination of his claim and that delay will be ordered only if good reason is shown. In cases where a request for a stay on proceedings is coupled, expressly or by necessary implication, with a request for interim relief, the court will need to take into account the factors relevant to both types of decision, and may need to take into account a third: that by securing interim relief and a stay, the applicant may be asking the court to use its powers to give him, for as long as he can secure it, a benefit that he may not obtain at the trial. [30] In short, the principles distilled from the English Court of Appeal decision in AB (Sudan) are these: (i) every claimant is entitled to expect expeditious judicial adjudication. The strength of this expectation will be calibrated according to the individual litigation equation; (ii) the judicially imposed delay flowing from a stay order requires good reason; (iii) judicial choreography whereby one case is frozen awaiting the outcome of another is justified for example where the assessment is that the latter will have a critical impact upon the former; (iv) great caution is to be exercised where a stay application is founded on the contention that the outcome of another case will significantly influence the outcome of the instant case. (See: R (on the application of AO & AM) at para. [23]); and (v) a stay application will require especially compelling justification in a case qualifying for urgent judicial decision. (See: R (on the application of AO & AM) at para. [24]). [31] While it is true that the above criteria were discussed in the context of immigration and asylum cases, we do not find any reason to decline adopting and applying the same to criminal proceedings.” [25] Namun demikian pemakaian prinsip di dalam AB Sudan (supra) dalam konteks penangguhan prosiding harus dilihat dalam konteks undang-undang prosedur sivil di United Kingdom. Ini adalah disebabkan kuasa untuk memberikan penangguhan prosiding dimasukkan di Bahagian 3.1 The Civil Procedure Rules 1998 iaitu kuasa mahkamah di dalam pengurusan kes seperti berikut: “The court’s general powers of management 3.1— (1) The list of powers in this rule is in addition to any powers given to the court by any other rule or practice direction or by any other enactment or any powers it may otherwise have. (2) Except where these Rules provide otherwise, the court may — (a) extend or shorten the time for compliance with any rule, practice direction or court order (even if an application for extension is made after the time for compliance has expired); (b) adjourn or bring forward a hearing; [F1(bb) require that any proceedings in the High Court be heard by a Divisional Court of the High Court;] (c) require a party or a party’s legal representative to attend the court; (d) hold a hearing and receive evidence by telephone or by using any other method of direct oral communication; (e) direct that part of any proceedings (such as a counterclaim) be dealt with as separate proceedings; (f) stay(GL) the whole or part of any proceedings or judgment either generally or until a specified date or event; (g) consolidate proceedings; (h) try two or more claims on the same occasion; (i) direct a separate trial of any issue; (j) decide the order in which issues are to be tried; (k) exclude an issue from consideration; (l) dismiss or give judgment on a claim after a decision on a preliminary issue; [F2(ll) order any party to file and [F3 exchange a costs budget];] (m) take any other step or make any other order for the purpose of managing the case and furthering the overriding objective [F4, including hearing an Early Neutral Evaluation with the aim of helping the parties settle the case].” [26] Sementara itu apabila dirujuk kepada Aturan 34 KKM 2012 berkenaan dengan pengurusan kes sebelum bicara didapati tiada peruntukan yang serupa dengan The Civil Procedure 1998 United Kingdom. Aturan 34 KKM 2012 memperuntukkan seperti berikut: 1. Perintah dan arahan bagi penyelesaian prosiding yang adil, cepat dan ekonomi (A. 34 k. 1) ….. 2. Pengurusan kes sebelum bicara apabila diarahkan oleh Mahkamah (A. 34 k. 2) ….. 3. Pemberitahuan pengurusan kes sebelum bicara (A. 34 k. 3) ….. 4. Kehadiran di pengurusan kes sebelum bicara (A. 34 k. 4) ….. 5. Penangguhan pengurusan kes sebelum bicara (A. 34 k. 5) ….. 6. Kegagalan untuk hadir (A. 34 k. 6) ….. 7. Pengakuan dan persetujuan (A. 34 k. 7) ….. 8. Kewajipan memberi semua maklumat di pengurusan kes sebelum bicara (A. 34 k. 8) ….. 9. Kewajipan membuat semua permohonan interlokutori dalam pengurusan kes sebelum bicara (A. 34 k. 9) ….. 10. Arahan automatik dalam tindakan kecederaan diri (A. k. 10) ….. 11. Ketidakzahiran (A. 34 k. 11) ….. 12. Pengguguran tindakan (A. 34 k. 12) ….. [27] Mahkamah ini juga merujuk kepada seksyen 25(2) Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 bersama Jadual Akta yang sama seperti yang dinyatakan di dalam intitulment kes ini bagi meneliti sama ada terdapat peruntukan khusus berkenaan kuasa mahkamah untuk memberikan penggantungan prosiding. Seksyen 25 (2) Akta tersebut memperuntukkan seperti berikut: “25 Powers of the High Court (1) Without prejudice to the generality of Article 121 of the Constitution the High Court shall in the exercise of its jurisdiction have all the powers which were vested in it immediately prior to Malaysia Day and such other powers as may be vested in it by any written law in force within its local jurisdiction. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) the High Court shall have the additional powers set out in the Schedule: Provided that all such powers shall be exercised in accordance with any written law or rules of court relating to the same.”