Low Huei Ying v Andrew Gregory Sewell (WA-24F-216-06/2022)

There are three sets of legal proceedings between the Plaintiff and the Defendant: two in the Family Court and one in the Civil Court. The Family Court proceedings consist of the present suit and another vide Originating Summons No. WA-24F-245-07/2022 (“Suit No. 245”), both of which concern applications relating to custody and access to the Parties’ child.

The Civil Court proceedings comprise Suit No. WA-22NCvC-257- 05/2022 (“Suit No. 257”), commenced by the Plaintiff. In that action, the Plaintiff sought, among other reliefs, an injunction restraining the Defendant from disclosing information alleged to be confidential and privileged.

In the present proceedings, the Defendant filed an application in enclosure 56 under Order 52 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“the Rules of Court”) to commit the Plaintiff for contempt of court, arising from the Plaintiff’s alleged non-compliance with a consent order dated 16 March 2023. In response, the Plaintiff filed an application in enclosure 59 to set aside the order granting the Defendant leave to commence committal proceedings. Both applications in enclosures 56 and 59 (“both Applications”) were heard together. 28 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 3 The factual background [4] The Plaintiff, a banker, and the Defendant, an advocate and solicitor, (collectively, “the Parties”), aged 51 and 56 respectively at the time of the hearing, commenced an intimate relationship after meeting in January 2020. This relationship led to the birth of a child in February 2021 (“the Child”). The Plaintiff is also the mother of an older child, born in July 2010 from her previous marriage, while the Defendant is the father of six other children from his prior marriages and relationships.

The relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant broke down on highly acrimonious terms soon after the birth of the Child, leading to bitter and hostile allegations exchanged between them.

Subsequently, in May 2022, the Plaintiff filed Suit 257 in the Civil Court, seeking an injunction against the Defendant from disclosing information. The Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant was her solicitor at the material time and, by virtue of that, information that she had disclosed to him during their relationship remained confidential and privileged.

In June 2022, the Plaintiff filed an application in the Family Court, relating to guardianship and custody of the Child as well as child maintenance.

In July 2022, the Defendant filed a similar application vide Suit 245 in the Family Court, seeking various orders, including custody, care and control of the Child, as well as access arrangements. 28 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 4

In March 2023, the Parties entered into a consent order (“the Consent Order”) in respect of both Suit 245 and the present proceedings. Under its terms, the Plaintiff was granted custody, care and control of the Child, while the Defendant was accorded access on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays from 12.30pm to 7.30pm at the babysitter’s residence.

Clause 5 of the Consent Order reads:

Hak akses terhadap ****** (“Anak Tersebut”) diberikan kepada Andrew Gregory Sewell seperti berikut:- a) setiap hari Selasa (bermula dari 21hb Mac 2023), Rabu dan Khamis (‘tarikh akses’) dari tempat pengasuh (‘day care centre’) pada jam 12.30 tengah hari sehingga jam 7.00 malam. Andrew Gregory Sewell akan menghantar kembali Anak Tersebut pada jam 7.00 malam kepada Low Huei Ying dan/atau wakil Low Huei Ying (kecuali anak sulung Low Huei Ying yang bernama *****) di lobi kawasan perumahan Low Huei Ying di *****; [Emphasis added.] [11] However, beginning January 2025, the Plaintiff had sought to unilaterally alter the terms of the Consent Order by proposing that the Defendant’s access on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays be limited to 4.30pm to 7.30pm. This proposal was expressly rejected by the Defendant. [12] Despite the Defendant’s rejection of the Plaintiff’s proposal, the Plaintiff proceeded to enrol the Child in Kuen Cheng Kindergarten, with classes running from 11.30am to 3pm, thereby effectively curtailing the Defendant’s access to the Child. 28 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 5 [13] The Plaintiff's application in enclosure 48 (filed in February 2025) to vary the terms of the Consent Order was still pending at the time the Court heard the applications in enclosures 56 and 59. [14] Subsequently, in March 2025, the Defendant filed (“the Leave Application”) and obtained an ex parte order (“the Leave Order”) granting him leave to initiate committal proceedings against the Plaintiff for alleged non-compliance with the Consent Order. [15] The substantive application for committal in enclosure 56 was thereafter filed in April 2025 (“the Committal Application”). In May 2025, the Plaintiff in turn filed an application in enclosure 59 to set aside the Leave Order (“the Application to Set Aside”). The issues [16] The Application to Set Aside was based on the following conduct of the Defendant, namely:

Failure to make full and frank disclosure of material facts;

Failure to particularise material and specific wrongdoings;

Failure to effect personal service; and

Abuse of process of Court. [17] The issue pertaining to the Committal Application was whether there was willful refusal by the Plaintiff to comply with the terms of the Consent Order. 28 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 6 [18] In my view, the issues raised with regard to the Application to Set side were intertwined with the issues pertaining to the Committal Application. Hence both applications were heard together. [19] I dismissed the Application to Set Aside and allowed the Committal Application. The Plaintiff, however, was merely reprimanded and ordered to pay costs for each application. No other sanction was imposed. [20] The following were my reasons. Contentions, evaluation, and findings Whether there was failure by the Defendant to make full and frank disclosure [21] In the Application to Set Aside, the Plaintiff argued that the Defendant had failed to make full and frank disclosure of material facts, and that by virtue of Order 29 rule 2A of the Rules of Court, such disclosure of facts was crucial. Order 29 rule 2A reads: Order 29 – Interlocutory injunctions, interim preservation of property …

The affidavit in support of an application made ex parte must contain a clear and concise statement of-

the facts giving rise to the claim;

the facts giving rise to the application for interim injunction;

the facts relied on to justify the application ex parte, including details of any notice given to the other party or, if notice has not been given, the reason for not giving notice; 28 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 7

any answer by the other party (or which he is likely to assert) to the claim or application;

any facts which may lead the Court not to grant the application ex parte or at all;

any similar application made to another Judge, and the order made on that application; and

the precise relief sought. [22] The Plaintiff had specifically alleged that there were occasions when the Defendant himself had not exercised his access to the Child. The Plaintiff further claimed that she had, in the past, sought adjustments to the Defendant’s access schedule, which he had agreed to accommodate. [23] I found these contentions untenable for the following reasons. [24] First, although Order 29 rule 3A of the Rules of Court prescribes a detailed list of facts to be disclosed in an ex parte application, Order 29 is confined to interlocutory injunctions and interim preservation of property. It has no application whatsoever to committal proceedings. The reliance placed on Order 29 of the Rules of Court was, therefore, fundamentally misconceived. [25] My attention was drawn to the decision in Mi Technovation Berhad & Anor v Chin Yong Keong & Ors [2024] CLJU 1438, where the Court dismissed an application to set aside a leave order to initiate committal proceedings, and reiterated that the purpose of the supporting statement is to enable the proposed contemnor to meet the charge. 28 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 8 The court further rejected the argument that the requirements under Order 29 of the Rules of Court apply to committal proceedings. It was held by the learned judge: [73] I now turn to my reasons for dismissing the Respondents' application to set aside the leave order (Enclosures 103, 104 and 105). Their grounds are these. They alleged that in the ex parte leave application, P failed to:-

make a full and frank disclosure; (b) set out facts likely to be raised by the Respondents; (c) set out facts likely to be disputed by the Respondents; and (d) disclose facts which are unfavourable to P. [74] The position at law is this. The object of the statutory statement is to allow a proposed contemnor to know what the alleged contempt is against him, and to enable him to meet the charge and prepare his defence. (See the Federal Court cases of Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd v. Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd [2002] 4 MLJ 241; Rozali Ismail (supra)). In other words, the statutory statement is akin to a charge sheet in a criminal proceeding. [80] Accordingly, in an application to set aside an order granting leave to commit, the relevant question is this. Does the matter alleged to have been omitted from the statutory statement affect the proposed contemnor's ability to understand the charge preferred against him, or hinder his ability to meet the charge therein? If the answer is in the negative, then that matter complained of is of no significance and need not be set out in the statutory statement. [81] It must be understood that an application for leave to commit, though made ex parte, is not made pursuant to Order 29 of the Rules of Court 2012. Thus, the requirements set out in Order 29 rule 1(2A) do not apply here. I would not read the requirements of Order 29 rule 1(2A) into Order 52 rule 3(2) of the Rules of Court. [84] The aforesaid position is supported by the Federal Court decision in Tan Poh Lee v. Tan Boon Thien [2021] MLJU 2749, which held that "the Rules of Court ensure that the potential contemnor is fully safeguarded. This takes the form of Order 52 Rules 3 and 4". In other words, the procedural safeguards are contained in Order 52, not in Order 29 rule 1(2A) of the Rules of Court. [85] In the present proceeding, I find that P has met the legal requirement set out as aforesaid. The statutory statement in Enclosure 43 has set out, with sufficient particularity, the person sought to be committed and the grounds on which he is alleged to be in contempt. The Respondents are 28 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 9 able to understand from the statutory statement, what are the charges preferred against them. It appears that the Respondents have no problem meeting the charges, as evinced by the affidavits in opposition filed by them. [86] Nowhere in the Respondents' affidavits have they contended that they do not know what were the charges made against them. They failed to explain what is lacking in the statutory statement, which leads to their inability to understand the charges made against them. The complaints they made in their affidavits do not relate to the "sufficient particularity test" as aforesaid. On the whole, I am satisfied that the material facts leading to the charges preferred against the Respondents have been sufficiently set out in the statutory statement. [Emphasis added.] [26] Secondly, as the applicable provision was Order 52 of the Rules of Court, the Defendant’s obligation extended no further than to clearly set out the alleged acts of non-compliance in his statement under Order 52 rule 3 of the Rules of Court The rule requires nothing beyond this. It provides as follows: Order 52 – Committal …

No application to a Court for an order of committal against any person may be made unless leave to make such an application has been granted in accordance with this rule.

An application for such leave must be made ex parte to the Court by a notice of application supported by a statement setting out the name and description of the applicant, the name, description and address of the person sought to be committed and the grounds on which his committal is sought, and by an affidavit, to be filed before the application is made, verifying the facts relied on. [Emphasis added.] 28 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 10 [27] In my view, the duty of disclosure, even if it applied to the present case, extended only to facts that were material to the proceedings. The focus in the current case was that the Plaintiff had unilaterally enrolled the Child in school, where the schooling hours covered the periods expressly allocated as the Defendant’s access time under the Consent Order. Such conduct constituted a plain and deliberate departure from the terms of the Consent Order and could not be justified. [28] The Plaintiff could not now rely on instances where the Defendant had, in the past, voluntarily accommodated her requests to vary access times as a basis to assert an ongoing entitlement to disregard or unilaterally modify the terms of the Consent Order. Prior indulgence by the Defendant did not confer upon the Plaintiff the right to continuously breach court-ordered access arrangements. Whether there was failure by Defendant to specify alleged non-compliance [29] The Plaintiff further contended that the Committal Application was defective and tainted on the basis that the Defendant had allegedly failed to specify and particularise the wrongdoings said to constitute contempt. [30] I found this contention baseless, as a perusal of the Order 52 statement revealed that the alleged breaches had been set out with sufficient clarity and particularity to meet the requirements of the law. The statement had adequately identified the specific conduct complained of, the terms of the Consent Order said to have been breached, and the manner in which the Plaintiff’s conduct amounted to non-compliance. 28 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 11 [31] In any event, the Plaintiff’s own affidavit in reply demonstrated that she had more than understood the substance of the allegations against her. Her detailed responses to the alleged breaches made it plain that she was neither taken by surprise nor prejudiced in mounting her defence. [32] It must be stressed that the Plaintiff could not now profess ignorance of the alleged breaches, given that the Consent Order was made with her full agreement to its terms. Further, her subsequent filing of a Variation Application underscored her awareness of non-compliance, as it was pursued only after the Defendant’s solicitors had threatened legal action. [33] Accordingly, I took the view that the Plaintiff’s contention of insufficient particularity in the Order 52 statement was devoid of merit. Whether failure by Defendant to effect personal service was fatal [34] The Plaintiff further contended that the Committal Application was tainted by procedural defects as the Defendant had failed to effect personal service on her of the cause papers. [35] In respect of the mode of service, while Order 52 rule 4(3) of the Rules of Court provides that the notice, accompanied by a copy of the statement and affidavit in support of the application, and the order for leave, must be served personally, Order 52 rule 4(4) of the Rules of Court, on the other hand, clearly provides for an exception where personal service may be dispensed with, if the Court thinks just to do so. The provision reads: 28 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 12 Order 52 – Committal … Rule 4 - Application for order after leave to apply granted …

Subject to paragraph (4), the notice, accompanied by a copy of the statement and affidavit in support of the application for leave under rule 3 and the order granting such leave, must be served personally on the person sought to be committed.

Without prejudice to the powers of the Court or Judge under Order 62, rule 5, the Court or Judge may dispense with service of the notice under this rule if it or he thinks it just to do so. [Emphasis added.] [36] Given the acrimonious and hostile history between the Parties, the High Court in Suit 257 had granted an interim prohibitory injunction restraining the Defendant from contacting or communicating directly with the Plaintiff, save through the Plaintiff’s solicitors. In light of this background, it was the view of this Court, at the hearing of the Leave Application, that it would be just and appropriate to exercise its discretion to dispense with personal service and to direct that service be effected on the Plaintiff’s solicitors instead. [37] In any event, I was unable to discern any prejudice suffered by the Plaintiff, given that she had, in her affidavit in reply, addressed in detail, the breaches alleged by the Defendant. It was, therefore, difficult for this Court to understand the basis of the Plaintiff’s complaint, on the absence of personal service on her of the cause papers. 28 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 13 [38] On this note, my attention was brought to the case of R Renuga Ramayah v Ramesh Sengaran [2024] 9 CLJ 924, wherein the Court had refused to set aside the committal application on technical grounds as the cause papers had been duly served on the solicitors as the respondent wife in that case, had filed an affidavit to oppose the application: [29] In any event, the court has the discretion to dispense with service of the cause papers for the committal proceedings altogether if the court thinks it just to do so and I am of the view that it is just to do so in this instant case. [30] Without meaning to repeat myself, I am of the considered opinion that it is unjust and inequitable of the RH to seek for the committal application to be set aside on technical grounds when the cause papers had been duly served on the RH’s solicitors and the RH had, without missing a beat, filed an affidavit to oppose the application. [Emphasis added.] [39] In the same vein, the issue of absence of personal service in the present case raised by the Plaintiff did not, in my view, furnish a basis to set aside the Leave Order. Whether this Application was an abuse of process [40] The Plaintiff contended that the Committal Application constituted an abuse of process, alleging that it was brought by the Defendant not for legitimate purposes, but rather as a means of exacting vengeance and inflicting punishment upon the Plaintiff in light of the ongoing proceedings in Suit No 257. 28 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 14 [41] In my assessment, I acknowledged that Suits 257, 245, and the present proceedings were closely interrelated and stemmed from the same underlying disputes between the Parties. I further observed that the relationship between the Parties had deteriorated into a highly acrimonious state, marked by serious allegations traded against one another. That said, I was unable to accept the Plaintiff’s submission that the Defendant’s resort to committal proceedings was, by that fact alone, an abuse of process. It must be borne in mind that a litigant is entitled, as of right, to invoke the remedies provided by law. The mere existence of concurrent or overlapping proceedings does not in itself transform the exercise of that right into an abuse of process. [42] It was also important, at this juncture, to remind Parties that contempt of court is not about enabling one party to punish the other for failing to comply with a court order that may advantage or disadvantage them personally. Rather, contempt proceedings address conduct that threatens the authority, dignity, and effectiveness of the judicial system as a whole. Compliance with court orders is fundamental to the rule of law, and any wilful disobedience undermines the administration of justice. The principles governing contempt apply universally and impartially, regardless of a party’s identity, status, or personal circumstances. [43] On this note, I found instructive the explanation by Arifin Zakaria CJ in the Federal Court in Tan Sri Dato’ Dr Rozali Ismail v Lim Pang Cheong [2012] 3 MLJ 1 in adopting the definition of contempt of court as stated in Oswald’s Contempt of Court: 28 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 15 [20] In dealing with the applications to set aside the leave for committal proceedings, it is necessary for us to consider the law of contempt. A good starting point would be the definition of contempt of court itself. Oswald's Contempt of Court (3rd Ed), at p 6 gives a general definition of contempt of court as follows: To speak generally, contempt of court may be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard, or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigants, or their witnesses during the litigation. [21] The jurisprudence for arming the court with the power to punish a contempt is best expounded by Brown J in Re HE Kingdon v SC Goho [1948] MLJ 17 as follows: But the root principle on which this inherent power to punish for contempt is founded, and the purpose for which it must be exercised, is not to vindicate the dignity of the individual judge or other judicial officer of a court or even of the court itself, but to prevent an undue interference with the administration of justice in the public interest. [22] Hence, the power to punish a contempt is not derived merely from statute nor truly from common law but instead flows from the very concept of a court of law (see Borrie & Lowe's The Law of Contempt (3rd Ed), at p 465; and Master Jacob (1970) 23 Current Legal Problems 23). [Emphasis added.] [44] Following from the paragraphs above in Tan Sri Dato’ Dr Rozali Ismail v Lim Pang Cheong, it was, therefore, essential to underscore to both Parties that the Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the terms of the Consent Order was not a matter of preserving the dignity of this Court; rather, it was directly linked to the Court's authority to guarantee that the administration of justice was neither obstructed nor thwarted. 28 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 16 [45] Reference was made also to the case of Lee Chang Yong v Teng Wai Yee [2017] MLJU 1841, where the rationale of the law of contempt was highlighted in the following passage: The object of the law of contempt is not to protect Judges and their dignity but to protect the rights of the public by ensuring that the administration of justice is not obstructed or prevented. To constitute contempt of court, there must be some “act done, or writing published calculated to bring a Court or Judge of the Court into contempt or to lower his authority” or “calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the Courts”. [Emphasis added.] [46] I also drew guidance from the case of Chandra Sri Ram v Murray Hiebert [1997] 3 CLJ Supp 518, where it was stated that the ‘Courts must fulfil its responsibilities by passing an appropriate sentence to reflect the extreme seriousness of the instant case, in particular, the respondent’s unrelenting interference with due administration of justice and the unmitigated culpability of the respondent as demonstrated in his article. Our courts would not be doing their duties and indeed would be acting against public interest, especially having regard to the facts and circumstances of the instant case, by imposing a mere fine’ – per Low Hop Bing J (as he then was). [47] Contempt of court is, therefore, less about an individual's personal failure to follow orders and more about the broader principle that the judicial system must be respected and able to operate without interference. No one, should be allowed to thumb their nose at any court order, regardless of his or her position. 28 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 17 [48] Moreover, I could not ignore that the Plaintiff herself was not a stranger to such recourse. In fact, she had previously initiated committal proceedings against the Defendant in Suit No 257. Having resorted to the very same remedy in the course of litigation, the Plaintiff could hardly be heard to say that the Defendant’s resort to committal was improper. In this regard, the familiar maxim what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander aptly applies. [49] As such, I dismissed the Plaintiff’s Application to Set Aside. Whether non-compliance by Plaintiff was wilful [50] The Plaintiff did not dispute her non-compliance with the terms of the Consent Order. However, she contended that her failure to comply was not deliberate. Her explanation was that she had enrolled the Child in school, which inevitably resulted in a reduction of the Defendant’s access to the Child. [51] The Plaintiff further asserted that she had filed an application to vary the Consent Order so as to align it with the Child’s school schedule. According to the Plaintiff, her departure from the terms of the Consent Order was justified, as it was done in the best interests and for the welfare of the Child. [52] In my view, the Plaintiff’s arguments were inadequate and did not absolve her from contempt, for the following reasons. [53] It is trite that contempt proceedings should be founded on a deliberate and wilful refusal to comply with a court order. This principle finds 28 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 18 resonance in the words of Chief Justice Lee Hun Hoe (Borneo), who, while referencing the case of Fairclough & Sons v. Manchester Ship Cane Co. (No 2) [1897] WN 7 in T O Thomas v Asia Fishing Industry Pte Ltd [1977] 1 MLJ 151, underscored that, to establish contempt of court, ‘an order of court must have been contumaciously disregarded. It is no good if it is casual, accidental, and unintentional.’ [54] In my view, the term ‘intention’ as elucidated by Lee Hun Hoe (Borneo) CJ in T O Thomas v Asia Fishing Industry Pte Ltd pertained to the clarity and unambiguity of a court order. In any event, in the same case, on the issue of ‘intention’, it was further stated by Lee Hun Hoe (Borneo) CJ, in the following passage: Intention is of no consequence in the matter of contempt by disobedience to a court order: A-G v. Walthamstow Urban District Council; [1895] 11 TLR

Stancomb v. Trowbridge Urban District Council [1910] 2 Ch. 190. In particular, Donovan LJ expressed his view clearly in Re A-G's Application, A-G v. Butterworth [1963] 1 QB 696 in these words: - I conceive the position, however, to be this. Regina v. Odham's Press Ltd [1957] 1 QB 73 ex parte A-G [1956] 3 All ER 494 makes it clear that an intention to interfere with the proper administration of justice is not an essential ingredient of the offence of contempt of court. It is enough if the action complained of is inherently likely so to interfere. [Emphasis added.] [55] My attention was also brought to the case of Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd v. Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 577, where it was held that ‘mens rea is not an ingredient to be proved in contempt proceedings’ and that ‘the corollary of there being no necessity to prove mens rea is that lack of intention does not prevent an alleged contemnor from being found 28 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 19 guilty of contempt’. Thus, the Plaintiff’s intention, or lack of it, did not have any bearing on her conduct in not complying with the terms of the Consent Order. [56] In my view, the issue of the welfare of the Child raised by the Plaintiff as a justification of her non-compliance of the terms of the Consent Order was not relevant to the Committal Application. [57] Even if I agreed that the welfare of the Child was relevant to the Committal Application, it was necessary for the Plaintiff to understand the meaning of 'welfare of the child'. On this note, reference was made to a plethora of cases including Teh Eng Kim v. Yew Peng Siong [1977] CLJU 138; [1977] 1 LNS 138; [1977] 1 MLJ 234; Mahabir Prasad v. Mahabir Prasad [1981] CLJ Rep 182; [1982] 1 MLJ 189; Tan Sherry v. Soo Sheng Fatt [2016] CLJU 1586; [2016] 1 LNS 1586;Tan Erh Ling v. Ong Khong Wooi [2021] CLJU 1325; [2021] 1 LNS 1325;Tan Siew Kee v. Chua Ah Boey [1987] CLJU 77; [1987] 1 LNS 77; and Sean O'Casey Patterson v. Chan Hoong Poh & Ors [2011] 3 CLJ 722, where the meaning of 'welfare of the child' had been considered in the widest sense and, as such, must include the right of the Child to bond equally with both his parents. [58] Although it was my view that the Plaintiff should have sole custody, care and control of the Child, no one parent is superior to the other. The dynamics of the relationship between the Child and his father and that with his mother are different. It does not mean that a father's rights with regard to the Child are inferior to that of the mother. 28 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 20 [59] The traditional roles of a father and a mother have evolved since the enactment of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976. There has since been a shift in cultural norms, and as such, the role of a father is no longer relegated to secondary status. The relationship between a father and child has evolved and is more complex than one assumes. [60] Just because the Child was born out of wedlock did not mean that the Defendant, as the biological father, had any lesser right or standing to parent the Child. The status of a Child’s birth or condition cannot be used to diminish or curtail the parental role and responsibilities of either parent. The law recognises that both mother and father, regardless of their marital status, share an equal duty to care for, nurture, and provide for their child. To hold otherwise would unfairly penalise the Child for circumstances beyond his control, and would run contrary to the principle that the welfare and best interests of the Child must remain paramount. [61] In any event, if the Plaintiff genuinely believed that her subjective assessment of the Child’s welfare should take precedence over strict compliance with the terms of the Consent Order, the proper course of action available to her was to apply to Court for a variation of those terms. A party cannot simply take matters into their own hands and unilaterally decide which parts of a Court order to follow or disregard. Her contention that she had, in fact, filed the Variation Application, did not withstand scrutiny, as that application was only filed in February 2025, well after the breach had occurred. 28 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 21 [62] In the present case, the Child was only 4 years old at the time of the hearing of both Applications. At such a tender age, formal schooling is not yet a significant or demanding part of his daily life, and thus could not reasonably be used by the Plaintiff as a valid justification to curtail or restrict the Defendant’s access to him. The Plaintiff’s reliance on the Child’s schooling as a ground to diminish contact was, in my view, not only misplaced but also demonstrated a self-serving attitude, as it placed her own convenience above the Child’s right to maintain a meaningful bond with both parents. [63] In the circumstances, the Plaintiff’s conduct appeared calculated to antagonise the Defendant further, thereby heightening the conflict between the Parties rather than fostering cooperation in the Child’s best interests. [64] Furthermore, the timing of the Variation Application was telling. The Plaintiff had only filed the Variation Application after receiving correspondence from the Defendant’s solicitors, who had made clear that they were contemplating contempt proceedings against her. This sequence of events strongly suggested that the Variation Application was a defensive move to mitigate the consequences of the Plaintiff’s non-compliance, rather than a bona fide step taken in pursuit of the Child’s welfare. [65] In these circumstances, there could be no doubt that the Plaintiff had acted in breach of the Consent Order and was thereby in contempt of Court. 28 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 22 [66] In the final analysis, I found the Plaintiff’s conduct to be deliberate, intentional and a willful refusal to comply with the terms of the Consent Order. It was also indicative of her impertinence and total disrespect to the administration of justice, which this Court took an extremely dim view of. [67] In such circumstances, and in the broader interest of justice, I undertook a careful and scrupulous examination of all the evidence before this Court, together with the submissions of learned Counsel for both Parties. Having weighed these matters judiciously, and for the reasons already alluded to above, I was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Plaintiff had acted in contempt of court. Consequently, the Application to Set Aside was dismissed whilst the Committal Application was allowed, with costs awarded to the Defendant in respect of each application. Appropriate sanction for Plaintiff’s non-compliance with Consent Order [68] The power of this Court to punish the Plaintiff for contempt of court is found in article 126 of the Federal Constitution, and section 13 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, both of which read: Federal Constitution Article 126 – Power to punish for contempt The Federal Court, the Court of Appeal or a High Court shall have power to punish any contempt of itself. ****** Courts of Judicature Act 1964 Section 13 - Contempt 28 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 23 The Federal Court, the Court of Appeal and the High Court shall have power to punish any contempt of itself. [69] The Defendant argued that the circumstances of the case justified the imposition of a strict sentence for the Plaintiff due to her deliberate, intentional, and wilful refusal to comply with the terms of the Consent Order. [70] While it was undeniable that the Plaintiff had indeed disobeyed the Court Order, it was emphasised that these proceedings should not be used as a platform for Parties to engage in personal vendettas. [71] The primary function of the Court is to administer justice impartially, not to be used as a vehicle for one party to exact revenge against the other. Consequently, any punishment imposed must serve the interests of justice rather than act as retribution for the Defendant. The purpose of the contempt proceedings was not to vindicate the Defendant in this case but to uphold the Court’s authority and ensure compliance with its orders. [72] Although I had confined myself to issuing only a reprimand against the Plaintiff, without imposing any further sanction, it was evident that the Plaintiff displayed neither remorse nor genuine contrition in her apology to the Court despite being reprimanded. Her conduct suggested that the apology was tendered merely as a formality, rather than as a sincere acknowledgment of wrongdoing. [73] Nevertheless, apart from the formal reprimand imposed, I did not consider it just or appropriate to order any further sanction against the 28 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 24 Plaintiff, notwithstanding my finding beyond reasonable doubt that she had deliberately and wilfully breached the terms of the Consent Order. In so deciding, I took into account her position as the mother of two children. Dated: 28 September 2025 SIGNED …………………………………………. (EVROL MARIETTE PETERS) Judge High Court, Kuala Lumpur Counsel: For the Plaintiff – S Ravichandran and Brian Lim; Messrs Seah Balan Ravi & Co For the Defendant – Gurbinder Singh Gill and Au Ching Yi; Messrs Manjit Singh Sachdev, Mohammad Radzi & Partners