Lush Developments Sdn. Bhd. v 1. Dato' Abu Hanifah bin Noordin (15-147-2004)

The present case was previously decided in the High Court to which the Appellant has appealed against. Upon the Appeal, the present 2 case is remitted to be reheard again by this Court. This present case is simply an Appeal against the previous High Court decision for the amount of compensation payable for a land acquisition made by the State of Selangor.

The Appellant is a private limited company incorporated in Malaysia under the Companies Act 1950 which carries on the business of land development and sales (“Lush”).

The Respondent is the Land Administrator having jurisdiction over the District of Sepang.

Very succinctly, Lush has entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (“JVA”)dated 23.4.2000 with Perbadanan Kemajuan Pertanian Selangor (“PKPS”) to develop a piece of land held under title No. H.S. (D) 1426 P.T. No. 4466 in the Mukim of Dengkil, District of Sepang, State of Selangor Darul Ehsan measuring approximately to a total of 556.482 acres (“Project Land”). (see Exhibit IOI-1 of Enclosure I, for the JVA) 3

The land was initially owned by PKPS and was only transferred into the Appellant’s ownership on 28.9.2001.

In the midst of the JVA’s performance, a part of the Project Land was scheduled to be acquired by the State of Selangor vide Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor Bil. 1406 on 13.9.2001 under Section Act of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 (“Act”).

As consequence of the acquisition and upon inquiry being conducted, the Land Administrator has awarded the following award; Bahagian Terlibat Orang yang berkepentingan Jenis Kepentingan Bahagian Pemberian Pt 4466, Hs(D) 1426, Mukim Dengkil, Daerah Sepang, Negeri Selangor. Luas tanah diambil:

17.5135 ha Tetuan A Zahari Kanapathy Thulasi (LUSH Development Sdn. Bhd. – Tuan tanah semua bahagian). Stakeholder Tanah: RM8,231,345.00 Pecah Pisah: RM 533,027.00 Kumpulan Jurunilai Sdn. Bhd. Penilai Swasta Kos Penilai: RM 18,546.56 Jumlah Pampasan RM8,782,918.56 4 [8] Being dissatisfied with the award handed down by the Land Administrator, Lush has filed its objection in Form N dated 12.4.2003 to appeal against the amount of compensation set by the State of Selangor in acquiring part of the Project Land. [9] In its Form N, in Paragraph 4 Lush’s grounds of objection is stated as follows: Alasan-alasan bantahan saya ialah seperti berikut: 1) pampasan untuk tanah adalah tidak seiras dengan harga pasaran. 2) kadar pampasan kecacatan tanah akibat kehilangan jalan masuk tidak diberi pertimbangan. 3) kadar pampasan kecacatan tanah akibat pecah pisah tidak diberi pertimbangan mencukupi. [10] This is the alleged cause of action of the present case. This Appeal has previously been referred, heard and disposed by the High Court. Upon appeal against this previous decision, the remittance of the case is premised mainly on two grounds: 5 i. Lush submits that the market value of the land should be valued at RM517,000.00 per hectare or 10% more rather than the decided rate of RM470,000.00 per hectare awarded by the previous High Court decision; and ii. Under the head of severance and injurious affection, Lush submits that the High Court previously has not considered the alleged loss of access to parcel B3 as a consequence of the acquisition. [11] Before this Court, Lush has made the following claims: On the basis of comparison, we are of the opinion that the market value of the subject land to be acquired as at 13

September 2001 is as follows:- 5135 hectares @ RM517,000 per hectare RM9,054,480/- (43.2768 acres) RM209,222 per acre) b)

3.5964 hectares (8.887 acres) RM310,200 per hectare RM1,115,603/- @ 60% depreciated value i.e. (RM125,533 per acre) 6 c)

1.2279 hectares (3.034 acres) RM517,000 per hectare RM634,824/- For “buffer zone” @ (RM209,222 per acre)

171.6778 hectares (424.225 RM103,400 per hectare RM17,751,485/- Acres) @ 20% depreciated (RM41,844 per acre) Value for “loss of access” i.e. Total : RM32,517,863/- [12] In determining Lush’s objection in respect of the award whivh has handed down by the Land Administrator and in arriving at a fair and reasonable amount of compensation, this Court is assisted by the two asssessors namely; Sr Md Badrul Hisham bin Awang (Government Valuer), Sr Tan Hoon Tiong (Private Valuer). [13] Both the assessors have arrived on a consensual decision or opinion and their consensual decision in writing has been submitted to this Court and this Court had accordingly recorded in pursuant to section 7 40C of the LAA. This Court concurs with the decision of the assessors which are as follows; i. Tuntutan ke atas nilai tanah bahagian yang diambil. Bahagian yang diambil berkeluasan 17.5135 ha yang merupakan tanah pertanian yang mempunyai potensi untuk pembangunan. Faktor kelulusan dasar untuk dibangunkan yang diperolehi pada 23/11/2000 iaitu lebih kurang 10 bulan sebelum tarikh nilaian pada 13/09/2001 perlu diambilkira. Oleh yang demikian kami berpendapat nilaian oleh penilai kerajaan yang berasakan kepada nilaian bagi tujuan duti stem untuk lot berkenaan pada 15/05/2001 sebanyak RM470,000.00 sah adalah munasabah. Ini adalah kerana nilaian berkenaan telah mengambilkira kelulusan dasar berkenaan. ii. Tuntutan kerosakkan dan penjejasan bagi Parcel B1. Tuntutan ini dipertimbangkan kerana bahagian ini telah terpisah dari bahagian yang lain. Namun demikian, ianya masih ekonomik untuk dibangunkan secara bersendirian kerana keluasannya 12.7707 ha (luas oleh penilai swasta) dan 8 bentuknya masih sesuai pembangunan. Kebenaran keluar masuk dari lebuhraya juga telah diberikan. Oleh itu kami berpendapat kadar 10% daripada nilai pasaran adalah munasabah untuk gantirugi kerosakkan ini. iii. Tuntutan kerosakkan dan penjelasan bagi Parcel B2. Tuntutan ini dipertimbangkan kerana bahagian ini juga telah terpisah dari bahagian yang lain. Walaupun ianya masih boleh dibangunkan, tetapi ianya sukar kerana bentuknya yang tigasegi dan keluasannya yang agak kecil 3.9654 ha, walaupun kebenaran keluar masuk dari lebuhraya telah diberikan. Oleh itu kami berpendapat kadar 30% daripada nilai pasaran adalah munasabah untuk gantirugi kerosakkan ini. iv. Tuntutan kerosakkan dan penjejasan bagi Parcel B3 (Buffer).) Tuntutan ini tidak dipertimbangkan kerana bahagian ini adalah sebahagian daripada Parcel B3 yang mempunyai luas keseluruhan 172.9057 ha. Ianya bukan sebahagian daripada Parcel B1. Kami berpendapat menjadi tanggungjawab pemaju 9 untuk menyediakan zon buffer yang mencukupi mengikut syarat-syarat kelulusan sesuatu pembangunan. v. Tuntutan kerosakkan dan penjejasan bagi Parcel B3 (South). Tuntutan ini tidak dipertimbangkan kerana bahagian ini adalah sebahagian daripada Parcel B3 yang mempunyai luas keseluruhan 172.9057 ha. Sungguhpun ianya telah terpisah dari bahagian yang lain, ianya masih boleh dibangunkan secara bersendirian kerana keluasannya yang besar 171.6778 ha dan bentuknya masih sesuai untuk dibangunkan. Kebenaran keluar masuk dari lebuhraya juga telah diberikan. vi. Tuntutan pembinaan jambatan. Ianya tidak dipertimbangkan kerana, a. Pada tarikh nilaian tidak dinyatakan terdapat sebarang jambatan bahagian berkenaan. b. Kos pembinaan jambatan juga tidak dituntut oleh Perayu sebagaimana tidak dinyatakan dalam Borang N, Nota Keterangan Pentadbiran Tanah dan Borang O untuk Rujukan Mahkamah. 10 c. Isu yang sebenarnya adalah kemudahan jalan keluar masuk ke atas tanah baki. Isu ini telah selesai apabila pihak SKVE telah member kebenaran untuk kemudahan keluar masuh dari lebuhraya ke tanah baki. d. Jambatan diperlukan hanya selepas pengambilan dibuat bagi menambah daya tarikan kepada pembangunan yang hendak dijalankan. e. Namun demikian, dengan adanya pembinaan lebuhraya di atas lot berkenaan, ianya telah memberikan ‘betterment’ kepada tanah baki kerana telah menjadi lot lapisan pertama dari lebuhraya dan mempunyai kemudahan jalan keluar masuk. Nilaian PARCEL LUAS (Ha) % NILAI ASAS (sha) NILAI (sha) NILAIAN

12.7707 10% RM47,000.00 RM600,222.90 B2 3.5964 30% RM141,000.00 RM507,092.40 B3 Suffer 1.2279 0% B3 South 171.6778 0% JUMLAH RM1,107,315.30 11 [14] With regard to Lush’s claim of damages in respect of injurious affection and claims the costs of the constructing the bridge which Lush has claimed that as consequence of the acquisition for purposes of SKVE, Lush has been deprived of its right of access or the alleged/ claimed of loss of access to parcel B3, this Court must add the followings:

14.1 Lush itself in its submission has submitted its agreement and admission to the amount compensation awarded with regard to the injury affected stemming from the division or “pecah tanah” of the Project Land into separate parcels of land. The Appellant merely sought for an additional award in view of the alleged loss of access.

14.2 The dispute over the alleged loss of access is actually is a non issue. It is Lush’s case that it has a valid right of access to share a path with another company, Tanda Bestari Sdn. Bhd. (“Tanda Bestari”) which was also developing PKPS’s land in Lot 4471 (“Acces Lot”) to link the Project Land with the Damansara – Puchong Highway (“LDP”). Following this 12 alleged right of access, Lush submits that it has lost this access consequent to the acquisition. Thus, Lush asserts that the Respondent is liable to pay the cost of a link bridge which was constructed to regain access to this right of access to LDP. (See Exhibits IOI-4 to IOI 6 for the plans illustrating this alleged deprivation of access)

14.3 The Respondent’s case is simply that the project land itself initially was a land locked land, devoid of any access even before the JVA was entered into. It is also the Respondent’s case that the access vide the Access Lot is an invalid right of access. Thus, it is not incumbent upon the State Government to pay Lush for a non-existent right of access, what more an invalid access vide the Access Lot linked to the LDP.

14.4 Thus, in final determination on the issue of this supposed deprivation of right of access, the single issue to be determined is whether or not Lush has a valid right of access vide the Access Lot linking to the LDP shared with Tanda Bestari. Entailing this determination, this Court would ascertain whether 13 or not there was a deprivation to begin with and whether Lush can rightfully claim for compensation for loss of access. a. WHETHER OR NOT LUSH HAS A VALID RIGHT OF ACCESS VIDE LOT 4471 (ACCESS LOT) SHARED WITH TANDA BESTARI

14.5 In utmost simplicity, the Appellant’s case regarding its alleged right of access primarily hinges on two alleged affirmations: i. PKPS’s letter dated 25.4.2000, issued just two days after the JVA was entered into (“Access Letter) (see Exhibit GTS-2 of Enclosure D) which reads: “Demi memberi kemudahan kepada pembanguan kami di atas PT 4466 sehubungan dengan Perjanjian Usahasama bertarikh 23 April 2000 di antara pihak kami dengan pihak kamu. PKPS bersetuju untuk memberi kebenaran lalu lintas/jalan keluar-masuk ke dan dari PT 4466 melalui PT 4471 kepada pihak kamu. 14 ii. Lembaga Lebuhraya Malaysia’s letter to Tanda Bestari dated 28.12.2001(“LLM’s Letter”). (see Appendix L, Laporan Penilaian bagi Pihak Perayu, Enclosure B): “Setelah diteliti semua maklumat yang dikemukakan, kelulusan LLM adalah diberikan kepada TANDA BESTARI SDN BHD (selepas ini TABES) bagi cadangan pembinaan jalan keluar/masuk dari Persimpangan Bertingkat LDP – Serdang sedia ada di Lebuhraya Damansara – Puchong untuk cadangan pembangunan di atas Lot 4471 tersebut. Walaubagaimanapun ianya tertakluk kepada syarat-syarat berikut…”

14.6 Lush asserts that it has valid right of access when PKPS has already allegedly give the Appellant right to access the Project land vide the Access Lot owned by PKPS.

14.7 It is also the Appellant’s assertion that vide LLM’s Letter, merely because Tanda Bestari and Lush are subsidiary of the same Holding Company, IOI Properties Berhad, and that PKPS is the owner of both the Project Land and the Access Lot, LLM’s Letter authorising access to Tanda Bestari advertently gives shared access to Lush. There was a line of correspondence of 15 this assertion and application for a shared right of access to LDP in Appendix L of Enclosure B.

14.8 Lush refers to the High Court decision in Bertam Consolidated Rubber Co. Ltd v Pemungut Hasil Tanah Seberang Perai Utara, Butterworth [1989] 2 MLJ 178 in submitting that the Respondent ought to be liable to compensate Lush for the cost of building the link bridge as a cost of cure: “In Consolidated Plantation Bhd v PHT, Kelang [1984] 1 MLJ 273…The Federal Court upheld an award by the trial judge representing the cost of turfing the acquired land as such a measure would prevent the apprehended loss of their water supply. In Collector of Land Revenue v Looi Lam [1981] 1 MLJ 300, also a Federal Court case… As a result of the river deviation work, the house belonging to the objector was badly damaged and required extensive repair. It was held that damages for injurious affection to the house could be claimed and was rightly awarded under para 2(d) of the First Schedule to the Act.” b. There were no express approvals for a shared access linked to LDP vide the Access Lot granted to Lush 16

14.9 However, this Court must stress that, there were no documents exhibited in any of the reports or affidavits that support the contention that the Jabatan Kerja Raya (“JKR”) expressly grants Lush such shared access. Upon PKPS’s, Lush and Tanda Bestari’s application for shared access vide Lot 4471 linking to the LDP, the JKR has only responded to ask for further clarification from the applicants and has never given any form of approval be it in any form or manner. This is evident in JKR’s letter dated 31.5.2002 in the last page of Appendix L of Enclosure B. In fact, LLM has never issued any letter with respect of this application for a shared access. c. There were no incoherent response or confusion in the Respondent’s stance regarding the alleged right of access vide the Access Lot

14.10 Lush submitted that the Respondent was incoherent and was dismissive with its stance regarding the right of access vide the Access Lot. Before this Court delves into the final determination 17 of this issue, it is pertinent that this alleged incoherence be dealt with. i. The alleged contradiction between the Respondent’s 1st Valuation Report (Enclosure C) and “Jawapan Penilai Kerajaan Terhadap Laporan Penilai Swasta” (Enclosure H) In Enclosure C, the Respondent reported that the Project land indeed has an access vide a private road BUT however, the access is an invalid access. In Enclosure H, the Respondent then reported that the Project Land does NOT have any access at all from any direction and that the Project Land is originally a land locked lot. Now, what the Appellant sought to prove here is that the Respondent is blowing both hot and cold regarding the existence of such access.

14.11 However, this Court bears no hesitation to refute this assertion. There is nothing contradictory here. Although 18 Enclosure C reports that there was an access, it was also reported that the access is an invalid access. Thus, having an invalid access is akin to NOT having access at all, which is thoroughly coherent and in-line with the ensuing Report in Enclosure H. ii. The alleged admission by the Respondent that the acquisition indeed poses an obstacle to right of access in the Respondent’s Jawapan

14.12 This Court must highlight here that Lush has been very selective in referring to the content of Enclosure H in tailoring the document to its case. So much so that it has painted an utterly inaccurate understanding of the Report. Lush merely relied on this excerpt of the Report and deliberately omitted the ensuing paragraph of paragraph 6.5 of the Report: 19 “Pemohon… juga semasa menandatangi Perjanjian Usahasama… dengan …(PKPS) pada 23 April 2000 telah pun mengetahui perancangan pembinaan lebuhraya dan masalah yang bakal dihadapi untik keluar masuk ke Lot subjek.”

14.13 Based on the limited excerpt above, Lush attempted to attribute the problem of access to the knowledge of the construction of the highway. However, this is verily inaccurate. The actual ground that the Respondent reported that Lush is already fully aware of the problem of access is because the Project Land from the outset does not has an access and has not obtained any approval for access. The next paragraph of the above excerpt reads: “Daripada fakta dan huraian di atas dapat disimpulkan bahawa pada tarikh material Lot Subjek masih belum mempunyai Kebenaran Merancang dan menghadapi masalah jalan masuk”

14.14 Thus, this Court is of the view that there were no such inconsistencies and admission as asserted by the Appellant, Lush. 20 d. LLM’s letter does not give Lush a valid right of access

14.15 It is utterly easy to understand that the literal and simple reading of LLM’s letter that the right of access was given only and exclusively to Tanda Bestari and none other parties. It begs no further question to it. The letter goes as far to define Tanda Bestari, and in fact has not even once mentioned Lush. “Setelah diteliti semua maklumat yang dikemukakan, kelulusan LLM adalah diberikan kepada TANDA BESTARI SDN BHD (selepas ini TABES) bagi cadangan pembinaan jalan keluar/masuk dari Persimpangan Bertingkat LDP – Serdang sedia ada di Lebuhraya Damansara – Puchong untuk cadangan pembangunan di atas Lot 4471 tersebut. Walaubagaimanapun ianya tertakluk kepada syarat-syarat berikut…”

14.16 The recipient of the approval is clearly highlighted and capitalised in bold font to be Tanda Bestari. There is no conceivable justification by the farthest reaches of the legal and logical imagination that the letter should also read that the approval was to be shared with Lush. 21

14.17 In fact, the only party in which has replied to LLM’s letter was Tanda Bestari in its letter dated 9.4.2002 in Appendix L of Enclosure B.

14.18 Lush and PKPS merely have applied to LLM and JKR for a shared access to LDP vide the Access Lot. It is noted that PKPS, Lush and Tanda Bestari have all agreed to share the cost and ultimately share the access to LDP vide the Access Lot. Nevertheless, whether this link to the LDP Highway is a right to be granted or received is not within the purview or jurisdiction of any of those parties to receive or grant. The parties are aware of this fact. Even Tanda Bestari sought to apply for such access to link with the LDP. Even PKPS and Lush have applied for shared access. And as reiterated earlier above, there were NO documents at all appended or exhibited to show that LLM and JKR have both agreed to grant such rights to shared access to the LDP to Lush particularly. Lush cannot simply assert that the approval for Tanda Bestari is also an approval for Lush’s access. When the approval was granted to Tanda Bestari, the LLM has only considered the 22 technicalities and prospect of the project developed by Tanda Bestari. LLM has not at all considered the implications, traffic consideration, and geological considerations of having such shared access with Lush.

14.20 Thus, it is this Court’s considered view that LLM’s letter here, does NOT at all support any contention that the Appellant has a right of access vide the Access Lot linked to the LDP. e. PKPS’s Access Letter also does not give a valid right of access

14.21 Now, it must be stressed here that this Access Letter was issued merely two days after the execution of the JVA. At this moment in time, the Project Land is still owned by PKPS. Thus, it is verily material to note that at the time this letter was issued, PKPS owned both the Project Land and the Access Lot.

14.22 To infer that Lush has right of access as Owners of the Project Land, Lot 4466 through the Access Lot owned by PKPS merely by this Access Letter is verily incorrect. This is because when 23 PKPS gave the rights to access, the rights to access was not given to lot 4466 or the Owner of Lot 4466 as at that point in time PKPS owned lot 4466 together with the Access Lot. Thus, at this moment in time there was never any issue of access. Any access given vide this letter is merely a right to access to the developer to move about all of the land collectively owned by PKPS wherein access would NEVER become an issue.

14.23 The access is not given to Lush as Owners of Lot 4466 but developers of Lot 4466 which incidentally a Lot which is collectively owned by PKPS inclusive of the Access Lot. Thus it is not an access attached to the land title or Ownership of the Project Land.

14.24 Therefore, all the Access Letter stand to prove was merely a permission to access neighbouring lots (Access Lot) which was also owned by PKPS together with lot 4466 (which was also owned by PKPS at that moment in time) where access would NOT become an issue. 24

14.25 PKPS could not have intended to grant such access to Lush as there was never a necessity to do so at that material time owing to the fact that PKPS owned all of the lands, inclusive of lot 4466 and the Acess Lot.

14.26 Thus, it naturally entails that when the Project Land was sold to Lush and there no longer was this collective ownership of Project Land and the Access Lot, an actual right of access becomes necessary to be obtained by Lush as new Owner Project Land. PKPS’s privilege to collectively deal with its own Land ceases when PKPS no longer owns both the Project Land and the Access Lot. This is the material time in which a new and actual right of access becomes necessary. Of which, Lush has ultimately failed to seek and be granted with such right of access. There were never any agreements or documents to prove such granting of right of access between the two Owners, being the Owner of the Access Lot, PKPS, and the Owner of the Project Land, Lush. 25

14.27 Even for a moment, assuming that the Access Letter indeed gave a valid right of access between these Owners (which this Court thoroughly disagrees), the right of Access still remains invalid as reiterated earlier, Lush does not have any express or implied approval to have a shared link to the LDP with Tanda Bestari. Even if Lush be allowed to access the Access Lot, Lush does NOT have rights to access the LDP Highway.

14.28 Thereto, this Court finds no hesitation to find that the Access Letter ultimately does NOT prove any valid right of access in favour of Lush to link the Project Land to the LDP vide the Access Lot. f. WHETHER LUSH WAS DEPRIVED OF THE ALLEGED RIGHT OF

14.29 It naturally entails from the earlier findings that, at no point in time that Lush was ever deprived of a right of access owing to 26 the overwhelming fact that Lush from the get go never has any right of access as alleged by the Lush itself.

14.30 It is undeniable without an inkling of doubt that the Project Land in essence and from the outset, was a Land Locked lot and has no access whatsoever to begin with. Thus, even assuming that there were no acquisitions conducted, it is already incumbent upon Lush that it must bear its own costs to develop and construct access in and out of the Project Land.

14.31 Furthermore, the construction of SKVE was not in any manner a deprivation of a right of access. In fact, the SKVE poses to be a valuable point of access as it is nearer to the Project Land, rather than the LDP Highway which is farther away from the Project Land.

14.32 The fact that the SKVE exercises a closed system is a non-issue as the system does NOT absolutely disallow any developments of access in and out of the Highway. This is 27 evident in Lush’s own Affidavit Tambahan Ke-3 where indeed, LLM has granted approval to build an access to SKVE from the Project Land. The Appellant is not in any manner cornered or coerced to construct the access bridge or link bridge from its own coffer as it is already within Lush’s own responsibility to develop such access to the Land Locked Project Land.

14.33 Thus, this Court is of the considered view that the Appellant is NOT deprived of any right of access due to the fact that the Appellant never has a right of access to begin with. g. The issue of the admissibility of the Appellant’s Affidavit Tambahan Ke-3 is moot

14.34 This Court is of the considered view that the issue of admissibility of the Appellant’s Affidavit Tambahan Ke-3 is rendered immaterial to be determined owing to the fact that the Appellant has no cause of action to claim for damages with respect of the right of access to begin with. 28

[15] This Court hereby orders as follows: Bil Perkara Jumlah Pampasan Award Pentadbir Tanah Jumlah Tambahan Pampasan 1 Nilai Tanah RM8,231,345.00 RM 8,231,345.00 a) Parcel B1 RM600,222.90 b) Parcel B2 RM507,092.40 c) Parcel B3 (Buffer) RM 0.00 d) Parce; B3 (South) RM 0.00 Jumlah: RM1,107,315.30 RM533,027.00 RM574,288.30 Jumlah RM 9,338,660.30 RM 8,764,372.00 RM 574,288.30

Awad Pentadbir Tanah dikekalkan;

Responden hendaklah membayar pampasan tambahan untuk Injuirous Affection terhadap parcel B1 dan parcel B2 sebanyak RM574,288.30 kepada Pemohon;

Faedah sebanyak 8% daripada Borang K;

Deposit sebanyak RM3,000.00 yang dibayar oleh Pemohon dikembalikan kepada Pemohon;

Tiada perintah mengenai Kos Mahkamah; dan 29

Fee dua orang Pengapit Hakim (Assessors) sebanyak RM1000/- setiap seorang hendaklah dibayar oleh pihak Pemohon kepada kedua-dua Pengapit dalam tempoh satu bulan dari Perintah ini. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 23rd December 2015 For the Appellant - Tetuan R Sivagnanam For the Respondent - Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor