M. Yusuf v Public Prosecutor (P-05(M)-18-01/2018)

The appellant, together with four (4) other accused persons, jointly faced five (5) charges at the High Court at Pulau Pinang for offences under the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (“the Act”) and the Poisons Act 1952. The charges read as follows: Pertuduhan Pertama Bahawa kamu bersama – sama pada 8.9.2015, jam lebih kurang 10.00 malam, di Pangkalan Marin Kastam, Pengkalan Weld, di dalam Negeri Pulau Pinang telah didapati mengedar dadah berbahaya iaitu Methamphetamine seberat 5805.1 gram, dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama, yang dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. Pertuduhan Kedua Bahawa kamu bersama – sama pada 8.9.2015, jam lebih kurang 10.00 malam, di Pangkalan Marin Kastam, Pengkalan Weld, di dalam Negeri Pulau Pinang telah didapati mengedar dadah berbahaya iaitu 3,4 Methylenedioxymethamphetamine [MDMA] seberat 4807.2 gram, dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama, yang dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. 3 Pertuduhan Ketiga Bahawa kamu bersama – sama pada 8.9.2015, jam lebih kurang 10.00 malam, di Pangkalan Marin Kastam, Pengkalan Weld, di dalam Negeri Pulau Pinang telah didapati memiliki dadah berbahaya iaitu Ketamine seberat 0.37 gram, dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 12(2) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 12(3) Akta yang sama, yang dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. Pertuduhan Keempat Bahawa kamu bersama – sama pada 8.9.2015, jam lebih kurang 10.00 malam, di Pangkalan Marin Kastam, Pengkalan Weld, di dalam Negeri Pulau Pinang telah didapati memiliki dadah berbahaya iaitu Nimetazepam seberat 0.05 gram, dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 12(2) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 12(3) Akta yang sama, yang dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. Pertuduhan Kelima Bahawa kamu bersama – sama pada 8.9.2015, jam lebih kurang 10.00 malam, di Pangkalan Marin Kastam, Pengkalan Weld, di dalam Negeri Pulau Pinang telah memiliki racun iaitu Pseudoephedrine seberat 994.1 gram, dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 9(1) Akta Racun 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 32(2) Akta yang sama, yang dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. 4

After a trial, the four other persons were acquitted and discharged without their defence being called. The appellant was, however, found guilty of all the charges. He was accordingly convicted and sentenced to death on the charges under s. 39B(2) of the Act and to sentences of imprisonment on the rest of the charges by the High Court on 29 December 2017. The appellant then filed this appeal.

The appeal was heard on 17 April 2019. At the conclusion of the submissions, we allowed the appeal by majority with our learned sister Rhodzariah J dissenting. We set aside the convictions and sentences passed by the High Court and substituted in its place an order for acquittal and discharge. Our reasons for doing so now follow. This will form the majority judgment of the Court.

The prosecution called eight witnesses. The facts leading to the arrest of the appellant were set out in the judgment of the learned Judicial Commissioner (“Judge”) as follows (at pages 15-18, Appeal Record, Vol. 1): 5 “[3] Pada 8.9.2015, SP3 yang bertugas sebagai Penguasa Kastam di Unit Marin, Bahagian Penguatkuasaan, Jabatan Kastam DiRaja Malaysia (JKDM), Pulau Pinang telah mengetuai satu operasi yang melibatkan sepasukan anggota serbuan yang terdiri dari 7 orang Pegawai Kastam untuk memeriksa sebuah Bot. [4] Pada tarikh yang sama, jam lebih kurang 5.00 petang, SP3 dan pasukan yang menaiki Bot Penumpas 051 dari Pangkalan Marin Kastam di Weld Quay menuju ke Dermaga Perai telah merapati Bot KM Pangeran (eksibit P107). Menurut SP3, yang berada di atas Bot KM Pangeran tersebut pada ketika itu adalah OKT2, OKT3, OKT4 dan OKT5. Setelah memperkenalkan diri kepada OKT2 hingga OKT5, SP3 telah bertanyakan siapa tekong Bot (ketua kapal) tersebut dan diberitahu nama OKT1. SP3 juga diberitahu bahawa OKT1 tiada di atas kapal dan SP3 meminta OKT3 untuk menghubungi OKT1 melalui telefon bimbitnya. SP3 kemudian telah bercakap dengan OKT1 melalui telefon bimbit tersebut dan memintanya untuk hadir di Pangkalan Marin Kastam di Weld Quay untuk membuat pemeriksaan lanjut ke atas Bot (eksibit P107) tersebut. [5] Seterusnya OKT2 hingga OKT5 serta 2 orang anggota serbuan telah diminta oleh SP3 untuk berada di atas Bot (eksibit P107) tersebut dan dibawa ke Pangkalan Marin Kastam di Weld Quay sambil diiringi oleh SP3 dan anggota serbuan lain di atas Bot Penumpas 051. Setibanya di Pangkalan Marin Kastam di Weld Quay, Bot (eksibit P107) ditambat dan ketika itu OKT1 tiba pada jam lebih kurang 6.30 petang hari yang sama. [6] SP3 kemudian mengarahkan pemeriksaan menyeluruh dibuat ke atas Bot (eksibit P107), bermula di bahagian atas Bot dahulu sambil 6 disaksikan oleh kelima-lima OKT di atas jeti bersama SP3. Pemeriksaan di atas Bot mengambil masa dalam 30 minit, namun tiada barang salah dijumpai. [7] Kemudiannya, lebih kurang jam 8.30 malam, di atas permintaan bantuan oleh SP3, 2 Pegawai Kastam dari Unit Narkotik JKDM Pulau Pinang telah tiba di Pangkalan Marin Kastam, Weld Quay tersebut dengan membawa anjing pengesan dadah (APD). Dua orang pegawai tersebut adalah SP6 dan Pegawai Kastam C.S. Surenthiran a/l Chandrasegaran (Pegawai Kastam Suren). SP3 telah meminta SP6 dan seorang lagi bersama dengan APD tersebut untuk menjalankan pemeriksaan di bahagian atas kapal dahulu. Hasil pemeriksaan di bahagian atas kapal tersebut dimaklumkan oleh SP6 dan PEGAWAI KASTAM Suren bahawa anjing pengesan dadah (APD) tidak memberi apa-apa respon. [8] Seterusnya, SP3 meminta SP6 dan Pegawai Kastam Suren untuk meneruskan pemeriksaan bersama APD di bahagian badan Bot, iaitu di bahagian meletak kargo dan di bahagian ruangan enjin. Setelah selesai menjalankan pemeriksaan di kedua-dua bahagian tersebut, SP6 dan Pegawai Kastam Suren memaklumkan bahawa anjing pengesan dadah (APD) telah memberi respon ke atas satu bahagian dinding papan yg terletak di satu sudut di bahagian belakang ruang bilik enjin. [9] Seterusnya, pada jam lebih kurang 10.00 malam tarikh 8/9/2015, SP5 telah memanggil SP3 untuk turun ke ruangan enjin kapal tersebut disebabkan kerja-kerja memecah telah selesai dilakukan dan memaklumkan penemuan barang yang mencurigakan. SP3 menyatakan melihat satu ruang kecil yang terdiri daripada 4 petak 7 kecil yang mengandungi bungkusan-bungkusan plastik. SP3 kemudiannya telah melihat hablur kristal di dalam salah satu bungkusan tersebut. SP3 telah mengeluarkan sebanyak 19 bungkusan plastik. [10] Semasa tugas-tugas pembongkaran dibuat, kelima-lima OKT duduk di hadapan SP3 menyaksikan kerja-kerja pembongkaran tersebut. SP3 menyatakan hasil pembongkaran tersebut telah menemui 10 bungkusan yang disyaki dadah jenis syabu, 8 bungkusan yang disyaki mengandungi dadah jenis ecstacy dan satu bungkusan mengandungi 1 pistol, 1 kelopak peluru dan 31 butir peluru. [11] Kesemua rampasan yang mengandungi bahan kristal serta pil/tablet disyaki dadah tersebut telah dihantar oleh SP8 ke Jabatan Kimia Malaysia, Ipoh, Perak Darul Ridzuan untuk dianalisa dan telah disahkan oleh ahli kimia (SP4) di Mahkamah melalui Laporan Kimia (eksibit P38) sebagai mengandungi :

Methamphetamine seberat 5,805.1 gram,

3, 4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) seberat 4,807.2 gram,

Ketamine seberat 0.37 gram,

Nimetazepam seberat 0.05 gram; dan

Pseudoephedrine seberat 994.1 gram [12] Methamphetamine, 3, 4 - Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), Ketamine dan Nimetazepam adalah disenaraikan dalam Jadual Pertama Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952, manakala 8 Pseudoephedrine adalah ditetapkan dalam Jadual Pertama Akta Racun 1952.” [4] At the end of the prosecution’s case, the learned trial judge found that the other four accused persons did not have custody or control of the impugned drugs and poison and therefore the prosecution had failed to make out a prima facie case against them. They were all acquitted and discharged. [5] In the appellant’s case, the learned judge found that the appellant had custody and control of the illicit drugs and the poison as he was the master and owner of the said boat. The learned Judge relied on the presumption in s. 37(f) of the Act to come to a finding that the appellant had knowledge of the concealed drugs. For the element of trafficking, the learned judge relied on s. 2 of the Act and found that the acts of “concealing” and “transporting” a large quantity of drugs had established trafficking. The appellant was then ordered to enter his defence on all the charges. The Defence Case [6] The appellant chose to give evidence on oath. His evidence was summarized by the learned trial judge as follows (at pages 50-52, Appeal 9 Record, Vol. 1): “[68] OKT telah membeli Bot KM Pangeran dari seorang lelaki Acheh bernama Ali melalui seorang kawan di Acheh, Indonesia. OKT menyatakan telah bertemu semula dengan Ali di Pulau Pinang sewaktu Ali menyatakan ingin menyimpan barang dalam Bot OKT. [69] OKT adalah kapten kapal, manakala Mawardi, Sofyan Ali, Alamsyah Piah dan Abdullah. Mhd adalah anak-anak Bot KM Pangeran. Ini adalah kali ketiga OKT masuk ke Pulau Pinang untuk membeli barangan terpakai. [70] Setelah sampai di Pulau Pinang, OKT telah naik ke darat dan minum di sebuah kedai Acheh yang dikenali sebagai 'Kak Beti' berdekatan Hotel Assakin di Weld Quay. OKT telah kemudiannya masuk ke bilik rumah sewa di belakang kedai Acheh. [71] Lebih kurang 3 hari selepas OKT sampai, Ali telah menghubungi OKT melalui telefon memaklumkan akan datang berjumpa OKT untuk kirim barang iaitu jamu. OKT menyatakan Ali telah datang berjumpa OKT di biliknya dan memberitahu mahu menumpang jamu di Bot KM Pangeran untuk dibawa balik ke Acheh. [72] OKT beri kebenaran kepada Ali untuk naiki kapal dan memaklumkan Alamsyah Piah berada di kapal. OKT menyatakan Ali tunjukkan kepadanya kotak-kotak yang dibawanya dalam sebuah beg hitam. OKT telah melihat dan pegang kotak-kotak yang dibawa Ali yang hendak disimpannya di Bot. OKT tidak dapat melihat apa isi kandungan kotak-kotak tersebut. OKT tidak menyangka dan tidak tahu ia mengandungi dadah-dadah, racun, senjata api dan peluru. 10 [73] OKT mempercayai apa yang diberitahu Ali kepadanya bahawa ia berisi jamu. OKT tidak ikut dan menyaksikan Ali menyimpan barang di atas Bot KM Pangeran. Sejam kemudian, OKT menyatakan Ali menelefonnya dan memberitahu sudah menyimpan barang di kapal dan mahu pulang ke Kuala Lumpur kemudian terus ke Acheh. [74] OKT menyatakan Ali memberitahunya bahawa Ali akan mengambil jamu tersebut di Kuala Langgar, Acheh Timur dengan bayaran sebanyak 5 juta Rupiah sekotak dan kesemuanya ada 12 kotak. OKT menyatakan keesokan harinya Ali ada menelefon dari Indonesia dan memberitahu OKT sekali lagi bahawa akan mengambil jamunya di Indonesia. [75] OKT menyatakan telah dihubungi oleh Sofyan Ali dan dimaklumkan Kastam memeriksa Bot dan mahu bawa balik kapal ke Jeti Kastam di Pengkalan Weld. OKT telah pergi ke Jeti Kastam di Weld Quay dan menunggu Bot KM Pangeran tiba. Setelah tiba, Bot telah diperiksa tetapi tidak jumpa apa-apa barang salah. [76] Pada jam 10 malam, Kastam membawa anjing untuk memeriksa Bot dan menjumpai barang salah di bilik enjin kapal. OKT menyatakan barang salah yang dijumpai adalah seperti dalam kes ini dan juga pistol dan peluru. Sewaktu kesemua barang salah dijumpai, ia dibalut dan OKT tidak dapat melihat isi kandungan kesemua bungkusan. Sepanjang masa, OKT menyatakan dia menyangka ianya jamu yang Ali maksudkan. Kesemua barang salah yang dijumpai di atas Bot KM Pangeran adalah kepunyaan Ali dan bukan kepunyaan OKT dan anak-anak kapal OKT. Ia telah diletakkan oleh Ali sendiri di atas kapal. OKT tiada di kapal sewaktu Ali meletakkannya. 11 [77] OKT menyatakan sepanjang masa Ali telah menghubunginya, adalah melalui telefon bimbit OKT jenama Nokia yang kecil. OKT tidak boleh ingat nombor telefon yang Ali gunakan dan OKT tidak menyimpan atau save nombor telefon Ali atas nama 'Ali'. Namun begitu nombor telefon Ali masih ada dalam rekod panggilan telefon atau call records telefon OKT sewaktu OKT ditahan.” [7] At the conclusion of the trial, the learned judge appreciated that the appellant’s testimony with regard to the drugs in question was at variance with the version given by the prosecution witnesses. The learned judge, however, did not accept the version of the appellant and found that the existence of the person Ali was never disclosed during the case for the prosecution and was therefore a recent invention and an afterthought. [8] Now, with respect, this finding is rather tenuous as the existence of Ali was in fact disclosed in the statement of the appellant marked as Exhibit D118 which was recorded four days after the appellant’s arrest. So, the story of Ali being the person responsible for transporting the goods which later turned out to be illicit drugs was not a recent invention. The learned Judge, however, also took issue with the fact that the appellant did not provide sufficient particulars of what had transpired and sufficient particulars of Ali as well. 12 [9] Curiously as well, the learned Judge considered the version given by the appellant to be a mere denial by relying on the dicta in DA Duncan v PP [1980] 2 MLJ 195 and Magendran Mohan v PP [2010] 5 CLJ 390. With respect, we did not think the appellant’s version was a mere denial because the appellant had given a version of events which, if believed, would be consistent with his innocence. In the end, the learned judge found that the appellant had failed to rebut the statutory presumption under s. 37(f) of the Act as well as failed to raise a reasonable doubt on the case for the prosecution. The appellant was accordingly found guilty, convicted and sentenced to death. The Instant Appeal [10] Before us, although several grounds were listed in the petition of appeal, learned counsel for the appellant attacked the findings of the learned trial judge on one pivotal issue only. The contention was the learned Judge had made a fatal error in deciding that a prima facie case had been established at the end of the prosecution’s case. 13 [11] The criticism that was fashioned before us was that the learned Judge had fallen into grave error in finding that the appellant had custody and control of the impugned drugs simply because he was the master and the owner of the boat in which the said drugs were found. It was also asserted that the learned Judge was in error in applying the presumption of knowledge under s. 37(f) of the Act. The argument was that the element of custody and control must first be established before the element of knowledge can be applied to prove mens rea possession. [12] Now, it can sometimes be the case that illicit drugs are discovered by the authorities in a premises, or in a vehicle or as in this case, in a ship or aircraft. In each of these cases, there are presumptions set out in s. of the Act in which knowledge is presumed. We will come back to these presumptions later. [13] However, in order to establish a charge of trafficking, it is trite law that the prosecution must prove that an accused person had possession of the illicit drugs unless, of course, there is evidence of the buying or selling of dangerous drugs. To establish possession, the prosecution must 14 prove that the accused had custody or control of the dangerous drugs. Custody may be sole or joint with others. There is no presumption of custody or control. It must be proved in the normal way. Once custody or control is established, the presumptions of possession and knowledge of the dangerous drugs will apply. [14] In the present appeal, the impugned drugs were found in a boat known as KM Pangeran. The relevant presumption which may assist the prosecution is found in s. 37(f) of the Act which states: “37(f) if any dangerous drugs is found to be concealed in any ship or aircraft it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the said drug was concealed with the knowledge of the master of the ship or aircraft.” [15] The definition of “ship” is expressed in very broad terms under s. of the Act in which “ship” includes every description of ship, boat or craft used in navigation, whether propelled by oars or otherwise, or used for the carriage or storage of goods. [16] Now, the learned Judge was conscious to the fact that the element of custody and control and therefore possession must be established. He 15 had quite rightly referred to the established cases of Chan Pean Leon v PP [1956] MLJ 237 and Leow Nghee Lim v Reg [1956] MLJ 28 for guidance on the meaning of “possession” in relation to offences under the Act. [17] However, although the appellant was never in the boat when the drugs were found and only came later when SP3 had called him on his mobile phone and asked him to be present at the Pengkalan Marin Kastam, the learned Judge went on to hold that the appellant had custody and control of the drugs that were found. This is how the learned Judge put it (at p 41, Appeal Record, Vol. 1): “[49] Dalam kes ini, OKT1 yang merupakan kapten dan juga pemilik Bot KM pangeran (keterangan ini juga tidak dinafikan dan dicabar) tersebut juga dijumpai kad pelautnya (eksibit P15) bersama dengan kad pelaut OKT2 hingga OKT5 serta dokumen lain yang menunjukkan bahawa kapal tersebut adalah milik OKT1 (eksibit P13G (1-8), juga turut ditemui di dalam kapal tersebut oleh SP3. Bersandarkan kepada fakta ini, jelas membuktikan bahawa OKT1 mempunyai kawalan dan penjagaan ke atas Bot tersebut termasuk semua barangan yang berada di atas Bot tersebut.” [18] This finding by the learned Judge suggests that that since the appellant had custody and control of the boat, he must also have had 16 custody of all the items in the boat including the incriminating drugs. The learned Judge then applied the presumption under s. 37(f) of the Act to fasten knowledge of the drugs on the appellant. [19] With respect, we must state at the outset that this finding is untenable. The appellant was never in the boat when the boat was seized by the customs officers. He only arrived much later after he was called. He could not be said to be in custody or control of the boat let alone the impugned drugs at the relevant time. It was actually the 2nd accused who was in charge of the engine room of the boat when it was seized. Even the prosecution witness, customs officer SP3, conceded that the appellant was not in custody and control of the dangerous drugs as he was not in the boat when the raid was conducted. [20] Now, the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor (“DPP”) came up with a rather startling and bizarre response to support the finding of the learned Judge. The learned DPP contended that since the appellant was present when the search was conducted in the boat and when the drugs were found, he was therefore in custody or control of the drugs. If we were to accept this argument, it would open the door to the authorities to trick or 17 force the master of the ship or aircraft to be on board when the ship or aircraft is searched so as to then trigger the presumption under s. 37(f) of the Act. Suffice it to say, this argument was totally devoid of any merit. [21] Coming back to the application of the presumption under s. 37(f) of the Act, we were doubtful as to whether the factual matrix in this case supported the invocation of that presumption. We noted that the presumption only applied to the master of the ship and not its owner. We noted that in the case of drugs concealed in a vehicle, the presumption of knowledge under s. 37(h) of the Act applied also to the owner apart from the person in charge of the vehicle. In the case of drugs found concealed in any premises, the presumption of knowledge under s. 37(g) of the Act was fastened on the occupier of the premises. [22] Considering the way in which the presumptions are set out and on whom they can apply, it must have been the intention of the Legislature to fasten knowledge on the master of the ship or aircraft only in the case where the master of the ship or aircraft was on board when dangerous drugs are discovered. Otherwise, the owner of the ship or aircraft would not have been excluded from the application of the presumption. Since the 18 appellant was not in the boat when the raid on the boat was conducted, the presumption of knowledge under s. 37(f) of the Act does not apply to the appellant. [23] In any event, the factual matrix of the case supported the inference that the appellant could not have had knowledge. If indeed he had known that there were drugs concealed on the boat, he would not have willingly come to the boat as he knew the boat had been seized by the Customs. [24] Be that as it may, there was some confusion as to whether knowledge of the drugs equates to possession. In this context, it is trite that knowledge alone does not establish possession. A person may have all the knowledge but he cannot be said to be in possession if he has no custody or control. To take an obvious example, a person may see someone hiding dangerous drugs in a premises. Even though he may have knowledge and may even know the nature of the drugs, he cannot be said to be in possession as he has no custody or control over them. [25] So, as one cannot have possession without knowledge, knowledge alone without custody and control cannot amount to possession. As 19 alluded to earlier, there is no presumption of custody or control. The presumption arises from custody or control. So, to assert that since one has knowledge it must be presumed that there is custody and control is a fallacious argument. Custody and control must be proved as a fact in the normal way. In the instant case, even if the presumption under s. 37(f) of the Act applied to the appellant, it would at its highest only prove knowledge but not possession (see Leow Nghee v Lim v Reg, supra). Conclusion [24] Given the circumstances as we have alluded to, and for the reasons we have given, we were of the view that the prosecution had failed to establish a prima facie case against the appellant on all the charges. There were certainly merits in the appeal and appellate intervention was warranted. Accordingly, by majority, we allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence passed by the High Court. The appellant was acquitted and discharged. Dated: 20 June 2019 20 Signed (HARMINDAR SINGH DHALIWAL) Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Counsel: For the Appellant: Mohd Irwan Sumadi (with him Selvi Sandrasegaram) (M/s Gooi & Azura)