Mah Yoke Keong v 1. ) Perbadanan Pengurusan Genting Permai Park & Resort (CB-23NCvC-2-08/2022)

PERBADANAN PENGURUSAN GENTING

CHONG AH KOW @ CHONG CHING CHEE

NG YOON KIN (NO. K/P: 520629-02-5109) … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN 11/08/2025 12:42:56 CB-23NCvC-2-08/2022 Kand. 51

Nama baik dan maruah seseorang adalah permata yang amat berharga. Kemuliaan insan adalah wajar dihormati dengan tidak mencalarkannya dengan pernyataan-pernyataan yang tergolong kepada fitnah. Oleh itu, bagi melindunginya undang-undang yang berkaitan dengan fitnah telah menjadi salah satu cabang kepada undang-undang tort.

Pihak yang dikatakan difitnah itu hendaklah membuktikan bahawa pernyataan-pernyataan yang diucapkan atau diterbitkan itu adalah suatu perbuatan adalah termasuk di dalam fitnah. Sebaliknya, pihak yang didakwa membuat atau menerbitkan pernyataan fitnah tersebut hendaklah menunjukkan di dalam pembelaannya bahawa ia bukannya fitnah atau termasuk kepada pembelaan yang dibenarkan di bawah undang-undang. Misalnya justifikasi atau komen yang adil (fair comment).

Mahkamah ini perlu menimbangkan keterangan-keterangan bagi menunjukkan ia adalah suatu fitnah dan memutuskan pembelaan berdasarkan kepada prinsip-prinsip undang-undang berkaitan dengan fitnah.

Plaintif di dalam pernyataan tuntutan menyatakan dia adalah seorang yang mempunyai reputasi yang tinggi di kalangan masyarakat. Plaintif ada bergiat cergas dalam pertubuhan dan persatuan seperti yang dimyatakan di perenggan 5.1 sehingga 5.11 pernyataan tuntutan Plaintif.

Defendan Pertama adalah Perbadanan Pengurusan. Defendan Kedua adalah bekas Pengerusi Badan Pengurusan Genting Permai Park & Resort. Defendan Ketiga adalah merupakan bekas Setiausaha Defendan Pertama.

Plaintif mendakwa bahawa Defendan-defendan telah mengeluarkan pernyataan-pernyataan fitnah di dalam Mesyuarat Kali Ke-114 Jawatankuasa Pengurusan 2020 (Mesyuarat Ke-7 Jawatankuasa Pengurusan Kali Ke-12) pada 28.11.2020, Mesyuarat Kali ke-115 Jawatankuasa Pengurusan 2020 (Mesyuarat Ke-8 Jawatankuasa Pengurusan Kali Ke-12) pada 13.12.2020, Mesyuarat Agong Tahunan Kali Ke-11 pada 30.12.2020 dan Mesyuarat Agong Tahunan Kali Ke-12 pada 11.12.2021. Butiran pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut terdapat di dalam perenggan 12.1 sehingga 12.4 Pernyataan Tuntutan.

Seterusnya, minit mesyuarat-minit mesyuarat tersebut telah diedarkan dan diletakkan pada papan kenyataan di kondominium tersebut. Ini telah menyebabkan semua pelawat dan tetamu Genting Permai Park & Resort membaca minit mesyuarat tersebut.

Plaintif menyatakan butiran-butiran dalam minit-minit mesyuarat tersebut telah menunjukkan seolah-olah Plaintif adalah terlibat di dalam penipuan yang melanggar undang-undang jenayah. Plaintif tidak boleh dipercayai, tidak jujur serta tidak mempunyai integriti.

Ekoran daripada pernyataan-pernyataan tesebut, ia telah menyebabkan pelantikan Plaintif di dalam beberapa jawatan misalnya Pengerusi MCPF bagi Daerah Ulu Selangor ditangguhkan. Plaintif juga menghadapi dalam masalah kesihatan seperti yang dinyatakan di perenggan 18. Ia juga menyebabkan prestasi telah merosot dan perlu mengeluarkan perbelanjaan perubatan bagi menangani masalah kesihatan Plaintif. Plaintif juga telah mengemukakan notis tuntutan kepada Defendan-defendan yang tidak dihiraukan oleh Defendan-defendan.

Plaintif telah memberikan keterangan dalam perbicaraan ini namun Defendan-Defendan memilih untuk tidak memberi keterangan dan berhujah bahawa tiada kes yang perlu dijawab oleh pihak Defendan.

Pernyataan-pernyataan yang dikatakan berunsur fitnah tersebut dapat dilihat di dalam Pernyataan Tuntutan seperti yang berikut:

12.1. Minit Mesyuarat Kali Ke-114 Jawatankuasa Pengurusan 2020 (Mesyuarat Ke-7 Jawatankuasa Pengurusan Kali Ke-12) bertarikh 28.11.2020 “Committee Member : Mr Mah Yoke Keong (MYK) … …

4.0 12. Confiscating of Documents, Cheque Books and Cheque Butts, AGM documents etc belonging to PPGPPR. According to a Police Report made by previous admin assistant Nor Amira on 19 Nov 2019, MYK removed and confiscated the following items from MO office on 18 Nov 2020: i) 30 rubber stamps; ii) Cheque books and cheque butts; iii) Suppliers’ invoices; iv) AGM documents; v) Keys of GP storerooms and vi) 10 duplicate keys for 10 GP apartments. The floor pleaded to him to return the above items. MYK however, denied that he had taken the above items. During a recent conversation with Puan Juliana of COB Bentong, she informed us that MYK used the PPGPPR rubber stamp on his letters to COB which constituted Solid Proof that he is having the PPGPPR rubber stamps with him.

Misconduct By MYK The floor discussed on the series of misconduct by MYK and resolved that: i) PPGPPR to issue a final warning letter on his misconduct and ii) PPGPPR to terminate his role as Head of Security Bureau. With immediate effect. MYK left the MC meeting during the discussion on his misconduct issue…

11.0 Case of Police Report Made Against Mr Alex Gan, the new Building Executive. It was proposed that a final warning be served on MYK. In the same time, the floor resolved to strip him from the post as Head of Security Bureau…”

12.2 Minit Mesyuarat Kali Ke-115 Jawatankuasa Pengurusan 2020 (Mesyuarat Ke-8 Jawatankuasa Pengurusan Kali Ke-12) bertarikh 13.12.2020 “Committee Member : Mr Mah Yoke Keong (MYK) - Absent … …

CONFISCATING OF DOCUMENTS, CHEQUE BOOKS, CHEQUE BUTTS, AGM DOCUMENTS ETC BELONGING TO PPGPPR. According to a Police Report made by previous admin assistant Nor Amira on 19 Nov 2019, MYK removed and confiscated the following items from MO office on 18 Nov 2020: i) 30 rubber stamps; ii) Cheque books and cheque butts; iii) Suppliers’ invoices; iv) AGM documents; v) Keys to GP storerooms and vi) 10 duplicate keys for 10 GP apartments. MYK denied that he had taken the above items. However, the said matter had been clearly reported in the minutes of 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th MC Meeting of the 11th MC. Auditors who are working on the audit for period from 1st June 2019 till 30th Sept 2020 are have challenges in their audit work. … …

8.

UNAUTHORIZED OCCUPATION OF UTILITY ROOM AT BLOCK D BY MYK”.

12.3 Minit Mesyuarat Agung Tahunan PPGPPR Kali Ke-11 bertarikh 30.12.2020 “… …

2.6.6 Land Survey report by Mr. Mah Yoke Keong It was highlighted that Mr. Mah Yoke Keong had collected funds from some GP owners to conduct a perimeter survey on GP’s land boundary. He had since been silent about the progress of the survey work. He submitted a claim for RM 8,500.00 to PPGPPR, LDS and Nusantara Security Sdn Bhd for loss of work hours and derailed schedule. …

2.6.10 Banking Accounts … On 21 Oct 2020, MC had submitted the COB’s letter of confirmation of their appointment and the minutes of MC meetings to Public Bank Berhad, Genting Highlands for the approval of change of signatories. However, on 3rd November 2020, Miss Lim, Assistant Manager of Public Bank Bhd Genting Highlands informed that one of our MC Member Mr. Mah Yoke Keong disputed the eligibility of several MC members with police reports and this had resulted in the delay of the approval process and further suspension of account. After much follow up, the account was finally activated on 18 November. MC was thankful an appreciative that there were so many owners who pledged funds to help pay for the essential service. This has helped and kept GPPR running during the period when we could not get access to the funds. Further continuous Police Reports, Tribunal Actions, complaints to COB, Majlis Perbandaran Bentong and KPKT both by Mr. Mah Yoke Keong and Mr. Ho Wan Seng had prevented MC from submitting application for the change of signatories for other bank accounts. …

2.6.14 EGM Expenditure Claims of RM45,624.35 by Mr. Ho Wan Seng Secretary Ng Yoon Kin reported that on 14 Oct 2020, Mr. Ho Wan Seng as a moderator for EGM submitted his claim of RM45,624.35 to Chairman for the EGM Expenditure in accordance to the SMA 2013, Second Schedule, Section 11, Paragraph (5) & (6) and Tribunal Award TPS/C-0844- 2/20 dated 5 Aug 2020. All MC members except Mr. Mah Yoke Keong were surprised and were puzzled with the amount of RM43,136.00 which Mr. Ho Wan Seng claimed were Legal Fees paid to JK Lim, Advocate & Solicitors. It was found out that the legal fees are for applying for court injunction order to hold the EGM. The matter was discussed during the 6th MC Meeting on 28 Nov 2020 and MC have written to him for further clarifications but received no reply to date. …

2.6.15. Chronology of Misconducts of Mr. Mah Yoke Keong Secretary Ng reported the following: a) “Confiscation” of PPGPPR Rubber stamps, cheque books, cheque butts, suppliers’ invoices, AGM documents, keys of utility rooms by Mr. Mah Yoke Keong. A Police Report was made by previous Admin Assistant Puan Nor Amira, that Mr. Mah Yoke Keong entered the MO office on 18 Nov 2019 and removed the above-mentioned items. At the 7th MC Meeting on 28 Nov 2020, when Mr. Mah Yoke Keong was given an opportunity to clarify, he denied doing what was reported. However the above misconduct was reported in the minutes of the following previous MC meetings on 1 Dec 2019, 14 Feb 2020, 13 March 2020 and 19 June 2020. Because of the missing items from the MO office, auditors had difficulties to perform the audit for the period from 1 June 2019 to date. b) Submitted numerous complaints to COB Bentong, Majlis Perbandaran Bentong, IPD Bentong, Deputy Minister of KPKT, Public Bank on the ineligibility of MC members and calling for their resignation. c) On 16 Nov 2020, Mr. Mah Yoke Keong and Mr. Ho Wan Seng made a police report to prevent Mr. Alex Gan Thin Lia who has been appointed as Building Executive of PPGPPR from entering the Management Office. Sarjan Zakiah had to come all the way to obtain statements from Mr. Alex Gan Thin Lia and Chairman Mr. Chong Ah Kow. d) On 17 Nov 2020, Mr. Mah Yoke Keong made another police report that Mr. Alex Gan Thin Lia did not comply with Covid 19 pandemic SOP as he was not wearing a mask. Policeman came to investigate the case and confirmed that Mr. Alex Gan was alone in the office and it was a non-issue. e) On 22 Nov 2020, Mr. Mah Yoke Keong sent out notice of MC meeting to all MC members calling for a meeting to be held on 28 Nov 2020, with distorted agendas. f) On 22 Nov 2020, Mr. Mah Yoke Keong padlocked the Management Office over the weekend. Mr. Alex Gan Thin Lia lodged a police report on the matter on 30 Nov 2020. Police Officers suggested the padlock be broken in the presence of the Chairman Mr. Chong Ah Kow who had to rush to GPPR to witness the cutting. Another precious day wasted. Mr. Mah Yoke Keong then made another police report that his padlock was broken by someone. g) Mr. Mah Yoke Keong who held the post of Head of Security Bureau was terminated from his portfolio and a warning letter was issued on 28 Nov 2020 for his repeated misconduct. h) Despite this termination, on 13 Dec 2020, Mr. Mah Yoke Keong still unlawfully issued letters of termination of service to Nusantara Security Sdn Bhd, Mr. Alex Gan Thin Lia and Cik Nur Elifa Aiza bt Mustafa. i) Unlawful occupation of Utility Room at Block D A Power failure occurred at Block D on 4 Dec 2020. Power supply switch was installed inside the Utility Room at Block D. However, it was found out that this utility room was illegally occupied by Mah and the only key was held by Mr. Mah Yoke Keong. Mr. Alex Gan again had to report to the Police and broke open the Utility Room to solve the power failure issue. j) During the 4th MC Meeting, Mr. Mah Yoke Keong submitted 2 personal claims to MC. One was a medical claim of RM 4,277.00 for expenses for alleged injuries due to dog bite at GPPR and the other one was RM 8,500.00 on loss of work hours and schedule derailed encountered by a survey team. MC refused to entertain the 2 claims as they were personal in nature and unauthorized work from both ex-and existing MC. k) Both Mr. Mah Yoke Keong and Mr. Ho Wan Seong collaborated on making numerous Police Reports on the eligibility of 5 MC members alleging that, i. Mr. Chong Ah Kow, Chairman’s name did not appear in the Strata Roll ii. Mr. Marcus Lau Ten Chai, MC Member’s name did not appear in the Strata Roll iii. Mr. Ng Yoon Kin, Secretary owned a water bill for RM 7.20 which was due an oversight by MO. iv. Mr. Peter Chow Chee Min, MC Member did not submit Proxy Form from Co-owner (Co-owner, Mr Chow’s wife passed away recently) v. Mr. Loh Siew Fong Nomination Form was signed by Mr. Marcus Lau Ten Chai who they claimed was not a registered owner. l) Similar complaints were lodged with COB Bentong, MPB Bentong, IPD Bentong, TM YB Dato Sri Haji Ismail Bin Haji Abd Muttalib, KPKT Putrajaya and Public Bank Bhd with intention to invalidate their positions as MC Members… …

2.9. Election of committee members Mr. Lim Yau Lee announced the dissolution of existing MC before he invited nominations for new MC candidates and thereafter to decide on size of committee members. Madam Henny Ooi Geok Tin proposed retaining all 9 out of the 10 members of past MC except Mr. Mah Yoke Keong and Mdm Jasmine seconded.”

12.4 Minit Mesyuarat Agung Tahunan PPGPPR Kali ke-12 bertarikh 11.12.2021 “…

2.29 i) CONFISCATING OF PPGPPR RUBBER STAMPS, CHEQUE BOOKS, CHEQUE BUTTS, SUPPLIERS’ INVOICES, AGM DOCUMENTS, KEYS OF UTILITY ROOMS AND APARTMENTS BY MR MAH YOKE KEONG. According to a Police Report made by previous Admin Assistant Puan Nor Amira, MYK entered the MO office, removed and confiscated the above-mentioned items from MO office on 18 Nov 2019. Due to the loss of the above-mentioned items, the auditor was having difficulties to complete the audit for the period from 1st June 2019 – 30th Sept 2020.

2.30 ii) UNLAWFUL OCCUPATION OF UTILITY ROOM AT BLOCK D On 22nd July 2021, MYK padlocked the utility room at Block D.

2.31 iii) Police report Against Chairman, Secretary & Treasurer for UGUT claim by MYK On 19th Nov 2021, Chairman, Secretary & Treasurer were called by the Heavy Crimes Division of IPD Putrajaya for giving their statements based on MYK’s Police Report that he was threatened by the 3 of them at the Tribunal Court on 15th Nov 2021. This was another case of harassment to MC and we wasted another precious day while giving our statements to the police.” Semua pernyataan di atas selepas ini dirujuk sebagai pernyataan-pernyataan fitnah.

Plaintif menyatakan bahawa pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut telah membawa maksud sindiran yang mengaitkan Plaintif dengan tindakan-tindakan yang melanggar undang-undang. Plaintif tidak boleh dipercayai, Plaintif tidak jujur dan Plaintif adalah seorang yang tidak berintegriti serta tidak layak untuk diterima oleh ahli-ahli jawatankuasa Defendan Pertama dan masyarakat.

Sebaliknya pihak Defendan dalam pernyataan pembelaannya menyatakan bahawa pernyataan-pernyataan yang dikatakan terlibat dalam kes ini adalah tidak ditujukan kepada Plaintif dengan niat jahat. Sebaliknya ia diterbitkan demi kepentingan kepada pemilik dan pengguna projek pembangunan dan komuniti setempat.

Pihak Defendan juga menyatakan bahawa pengemukaan minit mesyuarat-minit mesyuarat tersebut melalui penampalan di papan kenyataan kondominium tersebut adalah selaras perenggan 7 Jadual 2 Akta Akta Pengurusan Stara 2013 (Akta 757). Perenggan 7 Jadual 2 Akta tersebut memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut: “7. Penyimpanan rekod dan akaun perbadanan pengurusan

Jawatankuasa pengurusan hendaklah menyimpan minit semua prosidingnya dan minit mesyuarat agung.

Jawatankuasa pengurusan hendaklah-

menyebabkan suatu salinan minit mesyuarat jawatankuasa pengurusan, yang ditandatangani oleh pengerusi mesyuarat atau setiausaha, dipamerkan pada papan notis dalam masa dua puluh satu hari selepas mesyuarat itu; dan

menyebabkan suatu salinan minit mana-mana ketetapan jawatankuasa pengurusan, atau perbadanan pengurusan yang diluluskan mengikut Akta ini dipamerkan pada papan notis dalam masa dua puluh satu hari selepas ia diluluskan.

Suatu salinan mana-mana minit yang disebut dalam subperenggan (2) hendaklah terus dipamerkan pada papan notis sehingga ia digantikan oleh suatu salinan minit mesyuarat yang berikutnya.

Pesuruhjaya boleh menghendaki jawatankuasa pengurusan untuk memberikan kepada setiap pemilik suatu salinan minit yang disebut dalam subsubperenggan (2)(a) atau (b) dalam tempoh yang dinyatakan dalam subsubperenggan itu.

Minit mesyuarat yang ditandatangani oleh pengerusi mesyuarat atau setiausaha boleh diterima dalam mana-mana prosiding undang-undang sebagai keterangan prima facie mengenai fakta yang dinyatakan dalamnya tanpa bukti selanjutnya.

Jawatankuasa pengurusan hendaklah-

menyebabkan apa-apa akaun dan rekod akaun disediakan yang akan menjelaskan transaksi akaun dengan secukupnya dan membolehkan kunci kira-kira, penyata pendapatan dan perbelanjaan dan penyata untung rugi yang benar dan adil disediakan; dan

atas permohonan seorang pemilik atau pemegang gadaian sesuatu petak atau pemilik suatu blok sementara (atau mana-mana orang yang diberi kuasa secara bertulis olehnya), menjadikan buku-buku akaun tersedia untuk pemeriksaan semasa waktu pejabat perbadanan pengurusan, pada suatu fi yang tidak melebihi lima puluh ringgit bagi setiap pemeriksaan.

Jawatankuasa pengurusan hendaklah menyediakan bagi setiap mesyuarat agung tahunan, akaun-akaun yang sepatutnya yang berhubungan dengan semua wang perbadanan pengurusan dan pendapatan dan perbelanjaan perbadanan pengurusan itu.

Jawatankuasa pengurusan hendaklah, dalam masa dua puluh lapan hari dari sesuatu mesyuarat agung, memfailkan dengan Pesuruhjaya salinan yang diperakui benar bagi-

akaun teraudit bagi perbadanan pengurusan dengan laporan juruaudit yang telah dibentangkan pada mesyuarat agung itu;

ketetapan yang diluluskan pada mesyuarat agung itu; dan

minit mesyuarat agung itu.

Jawatankuasa pengurusan hendaklah dalam masa dua puluh lapan hari dari sesuatu mesyuarat agung mengemukakan salinan minit mesyuarat kepada semua pemilik atau mempamerkan minit mesyuarat itu pada papan notis perbadanan pengurusan.

Akaun perbadanan pengurusan hendaklah diaudit secara tahunan oleh seorang juruaudit syarikat yang diluluskan yang dilantik oleh jawatankuasa pengurusan.

Jawatankuasa pengurusan hendaklah membenarkan Pesuruhjaya pada setiap masa yang munasabah, akses penuh dan bebas kepada rekod perakaunan dan rekod lain bagi perbadanan pengurusan, dan membenarkan Pesuruhjaya untuk membuat salinan atau membuat cabutan daripada mana-mana rekod perakaunan atau rekod lain itu.” Analisa

Adalah menjadi undang-undang yang mantap bahawa bagi membuktikan terdapatnya fitnah, perkara-perkara berikut perlu dipenuhi, iaitu:

pernyataan tersebut adalah berbentuk fitnah;

pernyataan tersebut hendaklah merujuk kepada Plaintif; dan

pernyataan tersebut hendaklah disiarkan.

Adakah pernyataan-pernyataan yang diterbitkan di dalam kes ini adalah suatu pernyataan fitnah. Bagi menjawab persoalan ini Mahkamah perlu melihat secara teliti pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut dan menimbangkan sama ada pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut sekiranya fitnah adakah ia adalah satu pembelaan justifikasi atau komen yang adil dengan menggunakan perenggan 7 Jadual 2 Akta Pengurusan Strata 2013.

Apa yang menarik dalam kes ini ialah pihak Defendan telah memutuskan untuk tidak memanggil saksi Defendan dan menyatakan bahawa tiada kes untuk dijawab.

Adalah menjadi undang-undang yang mantap bahawa pihak Defendan boleh membuat keputusan untuk menyatakan bahawa tiada kes untuk Defendan menjawab. Namun ia akan mendedahkan Defendan kepada risiko bahawa penghakiman akan dimasukkan terhadap Defendan disebabkan Defendan tidak boleh mengakaskan tuntutan Plaintif. Prinsip-prinsip berkenaan dengan perkara ini telah dinyatakan misalnya dalam kes UN Pandey v Hotel Marco Polo PTE LTD [1980] 1 MLJ 4.

Sekiranya mahkamah mendapati bahawa pihak Defendan menyatakan bahawa tiada kes untuk dijawab oleh Defendan atau mahkamah mendapati keterangan Plaintif tidak mempunyai kes terhadap Defendan, maka adalah menjadi kewajipan mahkamah untuk mengemukakan pilihan kepada peguam Defendan sama ada beliau ingin mengemukakan keterangan-keterangan Defendan. Ini dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Simirah v. Chua Hock Lee & Anor [1963] 29 MLJ 239 seperti yang berikut: “His Lordship there observed that in cases of negligence if a Judge is asked to rule at the end of the plaintiff’s case that the plaintiff had made out no case it is most desirable that he should put counsel for the defence to his election as to whether he wishes to call evidence for the defence and should refuse to give a ruling unless counsel elects to call no evidence. That statement as to the practice which should be followed in such circumstances has been approved again and again (Laurie v. Raglan Building Co Ltd supra Yuill v. Yuill [1945] P 15; Storey v. Storey [1960] 3 All ER

In the present case it is unfortunate that counsel who made the submission of no case to answer neglected to refresh the Judge’s memory on this point. It is equally unfortunate, and even more surprising, that counsel for the plaintiff should also have failed in this regard. In the circumstances I think we have no option so far as the second defendant is concerned but to order a new trial. In my view, for which I have stated my reasons, the submission of no case to answer should have failed and the position would then have had to be considered in the light of the following passage from the judgment of Lord Greene M.R. in the case of Yuill v. Yuill supra, (at p. 18):- “The practice which has been laid down amounts to no more than a direction to the judge to put counsel who desires to make a submission of no case to his election, and to refuse to rule unless counsel elects to call no evidence. Where counsel has so elected he is, of course, bound: but if for any reason, be it through oversight or (as here) through a misapprehension as to the nature of counsel’s argument, the judge does not put counsel to his election, and no election in fact takes place, counsel is entitled to call his evidence just as if he had never made the submission.”

Prinsip yang sama juga telah dinyatakan dalam kes Takako Sakao (f) v. Ng Pek Yuen (f) & Anor [2009] 6 MLJ 751 seperti yang berikut: “[3] Four main points arise in this appeal. First, whether the High Court’s evaluation of the appellant’s evidence was correct, in particular as to the amount of her contribution to the purchase price. Second, what rights, if any did the appellant acquire under the terms of the mutual understanding between her and the first respondent? Third, whether the appellant may enforce her rights, if any, against the second respondent. And fourth, whether s. 433B of the Code applies to the instant case. Taking the first issue, it is significant that in the present instance the first respondent did not attend court nor give evidence nor take any part in the case. All she did was merely to put forward arguments on why the appellant’s caveat ought to be removed. She could have, if she wished, given evidence and challenged the appellant’s evidence. But as already noted she refrained from doing that. On the facts of this case, there were two persons who were privy to the terms of the arrangement in question and the details of the payments made and the purpose for which they were made: the appellant and the first respondent. The appellant took the witness stand and gave her evidence on the terms of the arrangement and about the sums of money she had provided and the purpose for which they were provided. No evidence was called on the part of the first respondent to refute the appellant’s testimony. Such an important omission was missed by both courts below. [4] In our judgment, two consequences inevitably followed when the first respondent who was fully conversant with the facts studiously refrained from giving evidence. In the first place, the evidence given by the appellant ought to have been presumed to be true. As Elphinstone CJ said in Wasakah Singh v. Bach an Singh [1931] 1 MC 125 atp 128: If the party on whom the burden of proof lies gives or calls evidence which, if it is believed, is sufficient to prove his case, then the judge is bound to call upon the other party, and has no power to hold that the first party has failed to prove his case merely because the judge does not believe his evidence. At this stage, the truth or falsity of the evidence is immaterial. For the purpose of testing whether there is a case to answer, all the evidence given must be presumed to be true. Now, what the trial judge did in the present case is precisely what he ought not to have done. He expressed dissatisfaction with the appellant’s evidence without asking himself that most vital question: does the first defendant/respondent have a case to answer? This failure on the part of the trial judge is a serious non-direction amounting to a misdirection which occasioned a miscarriage of justice. The trial judge was at that stage not concerned with his belief of the appellant’s evidence. She had given her explanation as to the discrepancies in the figures. And her evidence does not appear to be either inherently incredible or inherently improbable. In these circumstances it was the duty of the judge to have accepted her evidence as true in the absence of any evidence from the first respondent going the other way. He however failed to direct himself in this fashion thereby occasioning a serious miscarriage of justice. [5] The second consequence is that the court ought to have drawn an adverse inference against the first respondent on the amount of the appellant’s contribution to the purchase price as well as the existence and the terms of the mutual understanding or agreement that she had with the first respondent. Where, as here, the first respondent being a party to the action provides no reasons as to why she did not care to give evidence the court will normally draw an adverse inference. See Guthrie Sdn Bhd v. Trans-Malaysian Leasing Corp Bhd [1991] 1 MLJ 33. See also Jaafar bin Shaari & Anor (suing as Administrators of the Estate of Shofiah bte Ahmad, deceased) v. Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 693 where Peh Swee Chin FCJ said: ‘The respondents had chosen to close the case at the end of the appellants’ case. Although they were entitled to do so, they would be in peril of not having the evidence of their most important witness and of having an adverse inference drawn against them for failing to call such evidence should the circumstances demand it.’ There are two other authorities that are of assistance on the point. In Wisniewski v. Central Manchester Health Authority [1998] PIQR 324, Brooke LJ when delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal quoted from a number of authorities including the following passage from the speech of Lord Diplock in Herrington v. British Railways Board [1972] AC 877: The appellants, who are a public corporation, elected to call no witnesses, thus depriving the court of any positive evidence as to whether the condition of the fence and the adjacent terrain had been noticed by any particular servant of theirs or as to what he or any other of their servants either thought or did about it. This is a legitimate tactical move under our adversarial system of litigation. But a defendant who adopts it cannot complain if the court draws from the facts which have been disclosed all reasonable inferences as to what are the facts which the defendant has chosen to withhold. Brooke LJ then went on to say this: From this line of authority I derive the following principles in the context of the present case:

ln certain circumstances a court may be entitled to draw adverse inferences from the absence or silence of a witness who might be expected to have material evidence to give on an issue in an action.

lf a court is willing to draw such inferences, they may go to strengthen the evidence adduced on that issue by the other party or to weaken the evidence, if any, adduced by the party who might reasonably have been expected to call the witness.

There must, however, have been some evidence, however weak, adduced by the former on the matter in question before the court is entitled to draw the desired inference: in other words, there must be a case to answer on that issue.

lf the reason for the witness’s absence or silence satisfies the court, then no such adverse inference may be drawn. If, on the other hand, there is some credible explanation given, even if it is not wholly satisfactory, the potentially detrimental effect of his/her absence or silence may be reduced or nullified. The other case is Crawford v. Financial Institutions Services Ltd (Jamaica) [2005] UKPC 40, where Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe when delivering the advice of the Privy Council said: It is well settled that in civil proceedings the court may draw adverse inferences from a defendant’s decision not to give or call evidence as to matters within the knowledge of himself or his employees. [5] Sarkar on Evidence (16th Ed) at p 1837 states: It is the bounden duty of a party personally knowing the whole circumstances to give evidence and to submit to cross-examination. Non-appearance as a witness would be the strongest possible circumstance to discredit the truth of his case Gurbakhsh v. Gurdial AIR 1927 PC 230.”

Begitu juga dalam kes Keruntum Sdn Bhd v. The Director of Forest & Ors [2017] 3 MLJ 281 yang menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “[78] It is settled law that the burden of proof rests throughout the trial on the party on whom the burden lies. Where a party on whom the burden of proof lies, has discharged it, then the evidential burden shifts to the other party (see UN Pandey v. Hotel Marco Polo Pte Ltd [1980] 1 MLJ 4). When the burden shifts to the other party, it can be discharged by crossexamination of witnesses of the party on whom the burden of proof lies or by calling witnesses or by giving evidence himself or by a combination of the different methods. See Tan Kim Khuan v. Tan Kee Kiat (M) Sdn Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 697. [79] The findings made by the learned trial judge are mainly findings of facts and he gave credible reasons for his findings. He had the benefit of hearing testimonies and observing the demeanour of the witnesses. Those findings of facts were affirmed by the Court of Appeal. It would need very clear and convincing reasoning to justify us to reverse what has already been decided. We have looked at those findings of facts by the learned trial judge and the detail reasons given by him and we are satisfied that, on the facts of the case, any reasonable tribunal would have made similar findings.”

Adalah jelas dan nyata bahawa apabila Defendan membuat keputusan untuk tidak menjawab kes Plaintif, Plaintif masih bertanggungjawab untuk membuktikan kesnya. Ini telah dinyatakan dalam kes Syarikat Kemajuan Timbermine Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan Darul Naim [2015] 3 MLJ 609; [2015] 2 CLJ 1037 seperti yang berikut: “[57] We therefore agree with the submission of learned counsel for the defendant to the effect that despite the fact the defendant did not call any witness and that even if the plaintiff's evidence is unopposed (and therefore presumed to be true), this does not automatically equate to that evidence satisfying the burden of proving the existence of the settlement agreement borne by the plaintiff, or mean that the burden of proving on the balance of probabilities no longer applies, or that a case to answer is automatically made out. The evidence adduced by the plaintiff must still be sufficient to prove the existence of the settlement agreement. This crucial point was overlooked by the learned High Court judge. On the factual matrix of the case, it is patently clear that the plaintiff has not discharged the burden. On this basis, the Court of Appeal was in every respect justified in holding that the learned High Court Judge was plainly wrong in making a ruling of law that the settlement agreement had come into existence based on the conduct of both parties. Indeed, the election by the defendant to call no evidence at trial does not preclude the reversal of a plainly wrong findings of the learned High Court

Ia juga turut dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Yui Chin Song & Ors v. Lee Ming Chai & Ors [2019] 7 CLJ 740 seperti yang berikut: “[48] This court in Syarikat Kemajuan Timbermine Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan Darul Naim [2015] 2 CLJ 1037; [2015] 3 MLJ 609 has laid down the principle on this issue in the following words: The respondent's election to call no evidence at the trial did not preclude the reversal of plainly wrong findings of the High Court by the Court of Appeal. Though no witnesses were called by the respondent and even if the appellant's evidence was unopposed and therefore presumed to be true, that did not automatically mean the evidence had satisfied the burden of proving the existence of the settlement agreement borne by the appellant, or mean the burden of proving on balance of probabilities no longer applied or that a case to answer was automatically made out. The evidence adduced by the appellant had to be sufficient to prove the existence of the settlement agreement. The appellant failed to discharge that burden. [49] The above ruling was consistent with the well-established principle that the burden of proof at all times is borne by the plaintiff on the balance of probabilities to establish his case against the defendant or the existence of a legally enforceable claim against the defendant. It is upon the plaintiff, and certainly not the defendant, to discharge that burden. It is for the plaintiff to prove his case and satisfy the court that his claim is well-founded before the court can grant judgment on his claim. The fact that the defendant has led no evidence or called no witnesses does not absolve the plaintiff from discharging his burden in law. [50] … [51] In the present case, the learned judge had exhaustively and painstakingly assessed the evidence of the plaintiffs in its totality in establishing the facts and came to her conclusion, with elaborate reasoning and grounds, that the evidence of the plaintiffs did not meet the requisite standard of proof required, on the balance of probabilities, to establish their claim against the defendants. Even if the first to fourth defendants did not call any evidence to challenge or refute the plaintiffs' witnesses, it does not mean that the trial judge must believe everything the plaintiffs had adduced. The court on its own is duty-bound to assess the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs. The court can only accept the uncontested evidence if it crosses the civil standard of proof recognised by proper rules and procedure.”

Begitu juga dalam inferens bertentangan tidak boleh dikenakan terhadap Defendan di atas keputusannya tidak memanggil saksi apabila menyatakan Defendan tiada kes untuk dijawab. Ini juga dinyatakan dalam kes Syarikat Kemajuan Timbermine Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan Darul Naim (supra) seperti yang berikut: “[58] Learned counsel for the plaintiff also argued that the failure to adduce evidence and call any witnesses would, in his words, 'attract all the usual debilitative factors including the drawing of adverse inferences'. The statutory basis for the drawing of an adverse inference is s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 which provides that the court may presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would if produced be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. Adverse inference under that provision can be drawn if there is a withholding or suppression of evidence and not merely on account of failure to obtain evidence (see Low Kian Boon & Anor v. PP [2010] 5 CLJ 489; [2010] 4 MLJ 425 and Munusamy Vengadasalam v. PP [1987] 1 CLJ 250; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 221; [1987] 1 MLJ 492). We do not detect any oblique motive on the part of the defendant in not producing any witnesses. In any event, such an inference would have been inappropriate in the context of the present case. The termination of the agreements took place around 30 years before the filing of the action. We have said earlier, as a commercial case, this was a document-heavy dispute where the pertinent evidence was reduced to writing. It would not be appropriate to draw the inference where there has been no deliberate withholding or suppression of evidence as all the relevant documents were in the plaintiff's possession. Besides, as rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the defendant, as the question of adverse inference was not raised by either party during the trial, the learned High Court Judge and the Court of Appeal did not make any finding of adverse inference. It is misplaced for the plaintiff to introduce the argument of an adverse inference being drawn at this late stage. Moreover, as regards to the non-calling of any witnesses by the defendant, the ratio in the case of Thong Foo Ching & Ors v. Shigenori Ono [1998] 4 CLJ 674; [1998] 4 MLJ 585 at p. 601 will be applicable in the present case. In that case, Siti Norma JCA (as Her Ladyship then was) in delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal held that it would not be appropriate to draw an adverse inference where a defendant elects not to call any evidence unless the plaintiff has proven its case on a balance of probability. We adopt the principle of law as stated by the Court of Appeal in Thong Foo Ching & Ors v. Shigenori Ono (supra).”

Oleh itu fakta bahawa Defendan-Defendan memilih untuk tidak mengemukakan saksi-saksi atas alasan tiada kes untuk dijawab tidak melepaskan tanggungjawab Plaintif untuk membuktikan kesnya terhadap Defendan-Defendan. Mahkamah juga pada hemat Mahkamah tidak boleh menerima keterangan Plaintif secara begitu sahaja semata-mata disebabkan tiada keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak Defendan. Pada hemat Mahkamah ini keputusan Defendan-Defendan untuk tidak memanggil saksi adalah sesuatu yang dibenarkan oleh undang-undang dan tidak sewajarnya dijadikan asas untuk membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif semata-mata di atas pilihan Defendan.

Sebaliknya Mahkamah ini perlu meneliti keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak Plaintif dan memutuskan sama ada pihak Plaintif telah membuktikan tuntutan terhadap Defendan-Defendan. Mahkamah ini tidak boleh memutuskan kes ini bagi pihak Plaintif semata-mata disebabkan Defendan-Defendan memilih untuk tidak memberikan keterangan atas alasan Defendan-Defendan tidak mempunyai kes untuk dijawab. Ini bermakna Mahkamah perlu meneliti keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh saksi Plaintif yang telah memberikan keterangan di Mahkamah ini bersama-sama dengan dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan serta menggunapakai prinsip undang-undang yang berkaitan dengan tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan-Defendan. Apakah pernyataan-pernyataan Defendan-Defendan adalah fitnah terhadap Plaintif

Penelitian kepada pernyataan-pernyataan yang diucapkan oleh pihak Defendan seperti yang dinyatakan di dalam pernyataan tuntutan dan pada hemat Mahkamah ia tidak dipertikaikan oleh pihak Defendan ini dapat digambarkan melalui fakta-fakta yang dipersetujui yang sama dengan kenyataan dalam penyataan tuntutan dapat yang dinyatakan di perenggan [11] di atas.

Oleh itu adalah jelas dan nyata bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang diungkapkan oleh Defendan-Defendan tidak menjadi isu dalam kes ini. Apa yang menjadi isu ialah adakah pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut adalah fitnah. Inilah yang perlu diputuskan oleh Mahkamah ini.

Adalah menjadi undang-undang yang mantap bahawa Mahkamah akan menentukan sama ada pernyataan-pernyataan yang diberikan itu adalah suatu fitnah atau sebaliknya. Ujian berkenaan dengan perkara tersebut juga telah dapat dilhat dinyatakan oleh Majlis Privy dalam kes Jones v Skelton [1963] 3 All ER 952 di mana Lord Morris of Borth Y-Gest menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “The ordinary and natural meaning of words may be either the literal meaning or it may be an implied or inferred or an indirect meaning: any meaning that does not require the support of extrinsic facts passing beyond general knowledge but is a meaning which is capable of being detected in the language used can be a part of the ordinary and natural meaning of words (see Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd). The ordinary and natural meaning may therefore include any implication or inference which a reasonable reader, guided not by any special but only by general knowledge and not fettered by any strict legal rules of construction, would draw from the words. The test of reasonableness guides and directs the court in its function of deciding whether it is open to a jury in any particular case to hold that reasonable persons would understand the words complained of in a defamatory sense.”

Mahkamah ini juga perlu menimbangkan pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut sama ada ia telah merendahkan pandangan orang kepada Plaintif. Mahkamah juga perlu melihat kepada keadaan di mana kenyataan itu dibuat. Mahkamah juga perlu menimbangkan sama ada kenyataan tersebut telah menjejaskan kedudukan Plaintif dari pandangan khalayak yang biasa dengan Plaintif. Perkara-perkara ini telah dinyatakan secara mendalam di dalam Gatley on Libel and Slander, Ninth Edition, Sweet Maxwell 1998, di muka surat 22 hingga 37.

Penelitian kepada pernyataan-pernyataan yang dinyatakan berkaitan dengan Plaintif dalam kes ini telah membolehkan kesimpulan bahawa Plaintif adalah seorang yang tidak amanah, melakukan salah laku, seorang yang mementingkan diri sendiri serta tidak boleh diamanahkan dengan kewangan pengurusan Perbadanan Pengurusan Genting Permai Park & Resort. Pada hemat Mahkamah ini sekiranya pernyataan-pernyataan itu dilihat menyeluruh ia menyebabkan Plaintif telah dipandang rendah oleh khalayaknya disebabkan salah laku dan sikap tidak beramanah yang dapat dizahirkan daripada pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut. Orang yang munasabah akan membuat kesimpulan sedemikian setelah membaca kenyataan-kenyataan tersebut.

Oleh itu Mahkamah berpendapat pernyataan-pernyataan yang dinyatakan di dalam minit-minit mesyuarat tersebut yang ditampalkan di papan kenyataan di Perbadanan Pengurusan Genting Permai Park & Resort adalah merupakan satu pernyataan fitnah terhadap Plaintif.

Mahkamah juga berpuas hati ia telah disiarkan melalui penampalan di papan kenyataan Perbadanan Pengurusan Genting Permai Park & Resort tersebut. Ia boleh dibaca oleh semua pihak yang memerhatikan papan kenyataan tersebut. Ia telah mencemarkan nama baik Plaintif dalam kes ini.

Penelitian kepada pernyataan pembelaan Defendan-Defendan dan hujahan menunjukkan pergantungan kepada Butiran 7 (3) dan (5) Jadual 2 Akta Pengurusan Strata yang menyatakan bahawa:

Suatu salinan mana-mana minit yang disebut dalam subperenggan (2) hendaklah terus dipamerkan pada papan notis sehingga ia digantikan oleh suatu salinan minit mesyuarat yang berikutnya. …

Minit mesyuarat yang ditandatangani oleh pengerusi mesyuarat atau setiausaha boleh diterima dalam mana-mana prosiding undang-undang sebagai keterangan prima facie mengenai fakta yang dinyatakan dalamnya tanpa bukti selanjutnya.

Defendan berhujah bahawa peruntukan tersebut adalah peruntukan statutori untuk Defendan-Defendan dikehendaki meletakkan di papan kenyataan minit mesyuarat jawatankuasa yang ditubuhkan di bawah Akta Pengurusan Strata tersebut. Ia adalah berdasarkan kepada catatan dalam prosiding mesyuarat tersebut. Oleh itu sebarang penyataan dalam minit mesyuarat tersebut tidak boleh dijadikan asas kepada suatu tindakan fitnah. Ini adalah disebabkan semasa mesyuarat tersebut jawatankuasa tidak menjalankan siasatan dan terpulanglah kepada Plaintif untuk membuat penjelasan berkenaan dengan kandungan minit-minit tersebut di dalam mesyuarat jawatankuasa.

Sebaliknya Plaintif berhujah bahawa peruntukan Jadual 2 Butiran 7 Akta Pengurusan Strata itu tidak boleh dijadikan alasan untuk Defendan diberikan kekebasan untuk menyatakan pernyataan yang membuat kenyataan fitnah dan berlindung di sebalik Jadual 2 Butiran 7 Akta tersebut. Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan pernyataan-pernyataan fitnah boleh diletakkan pembelaan yang salah satunya adalah keistimewaan atau justifikasi pengeluaran pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut.

Apakah Jadual 2 Butiran 7 Akta Pengurusan Strata itu adalah satu keistimewaan yang diberikan kepada Defendan sebagai satu pembelaan bagi tuntutan fitnah. Majlis Privy di United Kingdom telah menjelaskan berkenaan dengan kedudukan laporan-laporan yang disediakan yang dikatakan mempunyai pernyataan fitnah. Adakah ia boleh dijadikan sandaran untuk diedarkan dan diletakkan pembelaan keistimewaan dan justifikasi semata-mata disebabkan ia adalah cabutan minit mesyuarat sesuatu mesyuarat, Perera v Peiris [1949] AC 1 seperti yang berikut: “Reports of judicial and parliamentary proceedings and, it may be, of some bodies which are neither judicial nor parliamentary in character, stand in a class apart by reason that the nature of their activities is treated as conclusively establishing that the public interest is forwarded by publication of reports of their proceedings. As regards reports of proceedings of other bodies, the status of those bodies taken alone is not conclusive and it is necessary to consider the subject-matter dealt with in the particular report with which the court is concerned. If it appears that it is to the public interest that the particular report should be published privilege will attach. If malice in the publication is not present and the public interest is served by the publication, the publication of the report must be taken for the purposes of Roman-Dutch law as being in truth directed to serving that interest. Animus injuriandi is negatived. On a review of the facts their Lordships are of opinion that the public interest of Ceylon demanded that the contents of the report should be widely communicated to the public. The report dealt with a grave matter affecting the public at large, namely, the integrity of members of the Executive Council of Ceylon, some of whom were found by the commissioner improperly to have accepted gratifications. It contained the reasoned conclusions of a commissioner who, acting under statutory authority, had held an inquiry and based his conclusions on evidence which he had searched for and sifted. It had, before publication in the newspaper, been presented to the Governor, printed as a Sessional Paper and made available to the public by the Governor contemporaneously with a Bill which was based on the report and which was to be considered by the Executive Council. The due administration of the affairs of Ceylon required that this report in light of its origin, contents and relevance to the conduct of the affairs of Ceylon and the course of legislation should receive the widest publicity.”

Persoalannya dalam kes ini ialah adakah kepatuhan peruntukan statutori di bawah Akta Pengurusan Strata membolehkan apa-apa catatan-catatan dibuat yang akhirnya didapati ia adalah suatu fitnah. Mahkamah ini berpendapat apa-apa laporan yang dikemukakan dalam satu mesyuarat adalah dipertanggungjawabkan kepada mana-mana pihak yang mengedarkan minit mesyuarat tersebut. Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa adalah menjadi tuntutan statutori untuk laporan atau minit mesyuarat itu disediakan dan diedarkan. Namun demikian ia meletakkan tanggungjawab kepada jawatankuasa tersebut untuk memastikan bahawa sekiranya mana-mana bahagian yang boleh digolongkan sebagai kenyataan berunsur fitnah tidak didedahkan dalam minit mesyuarat tersebut. Mahkamah ini juga menimbangkan hujah pihak Defendan bahawa pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut hanya diketahui sebagai fitnah setelah ia diedarkan. Plaintif sepatutnya mengambil tindakan yang sewajarnya bagi memperbetulkan pernyataan-pernyataan dalam minit mesyuarat tersebut.

Namun Mahkamah ini berpendapat Defendan-Defendan bertanggungjawab untuk memastikan bahawa pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut tidak mengandungi fitnah dan sekiranya akhirnya didapati bahawa kenyataan dalam minit mesyuarat tersebut adalah fitnah jawatankuasa tidak boleh berselindung di sebalik Jadual 2 Butiran 7 Akta tersebut bagi hak pembelaan keistimewaan atau justifikasi. Jika ini dilakukan ia akan menyebabkan minit mesyuarat yang mempunyai pernyataan-pernyataan fitnah akan Defendan Pertama disebarluaskan dan sekiranya tindakan diambil oleh pihak yang berkaitan Defendan akan menggunakan pembelaan keistimewaan dengan menggunakan Butiran 7 Jadual 2 Akta Pengurusan Strata ia adalah pada hemat Mahkamah bercanggah dengan kepentingan awam.

Secara perbandingan Mahkamah ini juga meneliti keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Ng Wai Pin v Ong Yew Teik and other appeals [2025] 3 MLJ 764 bagi memahami apakah kedudukan suatu prosiding kehakiman. Adakah terdapat imuniti kepada keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan dalam prosiding tersebut yang boleh menghalang daripada tindakan pendakwaan dengan niat jahat (malicious prosecution). Ini bagi membolehkan Mahkamah membezakannya dengan kes ini di mana pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut dibuat melalui minit mesyuarat yang ditampalkan di papan kenyataan. Apa yang jelas dalam kes ini minit-minit mesyuarat tersebut bukannya merupakan prosiding perbicaraan tetapi adalah prosiding mesyuarat. Hal ini dapat dilihat dalam kes Ng Wai Pin v Ong Yew Teik and other appeals (supra) melalui keputusan majoriti seperti yang berikut: “[110] Given the authorities regarding witness immunity, it is our view that the High Court was correct in determining that the D1– D5 is entitled to rely on witness immunity or privilege. Whilst the rule is absolute in core immunity, there may be exceptions depending on the context and the specifics. It does not preclude prosecution for perjury, perverting the course of justice or for contempt of court, liability for malicious prosecution or misfeasance in public office (see Jones v Kaney). As the pleadings in the present appeals stand, nothing turns on the exceptions. The pleaded case in the present appeals do not relate to these exceptions. Therefore, the allegations against the defendants in the pleaded case come within the ambit of core immunity as it relates to what was said and things done in court in the course of judicial proceedings. As for things said or done in the course of proceedings and therefore comes within the extension to the core immunity. Absolute immunity applies to the defendants in our present appeals, which covers statements made in the course of judicial proceedings, even those which are untrue and made maliciously. This includes acts that is done from the inception of the proceedings onwards and extends to all pleadings and other documents brought into existence for the purpose of the proceedings. This is necessary to protect the proper functioning of the judicial system and administration of justice. [111] It matters not, whether the action is framed as an action for fraud, tort of conspiracy to injure by unlawful means, tort of abuse of court process, fabrication of documents, preparation and filing of false witness statements and conspiracy to defeat the plaintiff’s claim and malicious prosecution, as in the present appeals, it is a rule of law that no action lies against witnesses in respect of evidence prepared, given, adduced or procured by them in the course of judicial proceedings. Consequently, D1–D5 is immune from any civil action concerning the evidence provided as the witnesses during the trial of Suit 1333 (the first suit), especially given that the plaintiff’s action in the High Court herein is to claim damages against the D1–D5. [112] In the circumstances, the plaintiff’s claim against the D1– D5 is clearly unsustainable and should be struck out. Thus, the decision of the High Court does not warrant any appellate interference by the Court of Appeal. Based on the numerous cases outlined above, the Court of Appeal erred in law and fact by allowing the plaintiff’s appeal and disregarding the application of witness immunity to D1–D5. [113] Given the aforesaid, we answer question (1) in the positive. [114] The determination by this court that the defendants were covered by absolute witness immunity is an overarching point which is sufficient to deal with the present appeals in its entirety. However, we proceed to address the other questions for the sake of completeness.”

Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah juga perlu menimbangkan hujahan pihak Defendan yang menyatakan bahawa butiran-butiran dalam minit mesyuarat tersebut tidak dikemukakan semata-mata dengan niat jahat terhadap Plaintif. Sebaliknya ia adalah merupakan catatan-catatan minit mengenai apa yang berlaku dalam mesyuarat tersebut. Oleh yang demikian sekiranya ia adalah kenyataan fitnah ia termasuk dalam pembelaan keistimewaan bersyarat, komen yang adil. Mahkamah ini berpendapat minit mesyuarat tersebut adalah di dalam kawalan Defendan-Defendan. Adalah amalan yang wajar sekiranya catatan-catatan yang boleh mendedahkan kepada kesan menjatuhkan mana-mana pihak di dalam mesyuarat tersebut harus dikawal dan tidak didedahkan sehingga menyebabkan pihak ketiga tidak dapat mengetahui dengan sebenarnya apkah dakwaan-dakwaan salah laku dalam minit mesyuarat tersebut adalah benar ataupun tidak. Oleh kerana tiada keterangan daripada Plaintif atau Defendan untuk Mahkamah ini mempertimbangkan sama ada terdapatnya pembelaan keistimewaan bersyarat atau komen yang adil maka Mahkamah ini berpendapat Defendan-Defendan tidak boleh berselindung di sebalik justifikasi penyebaran minit mesyuarat tersebut disebabkan keperluan statutori untuk mengedarkannya kepada pihak ketiga. Di samping itu juga Mahkamah ini berpendapat tiada sebarang pembelaan keistimewaan bersyarat atau komen yang adil dapat ditunjukkan kepada Mahkamah.

Oleh yang demikian Mahkamah membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan-Defendan.

Adalah menjadi prinsip undang-undang yang jelas apabila satu tuntutan gantirugi ingin diperolehi maka pihak yang menuntut gantirugi tersebut perlulah menunjukkan kepada Mahkamah kerugian yang dialaminya sama ada ia adalah gantirugi am atau gantirugi khas. Mahkamah juga boleh mempertimbangkan gantirugi yang nominal. Gantirugi nominal tidak membawa maksud gantirugi yang rendah nilainya.

Pada masa yang sama frasa gantirugi nominal juga perlu diteliti bagi menentukan sama ada ia adalah sesuatu yang adil dan setimpal dilihat dalam konteks Perkara 12 Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Mahkamah Pertuanan di United Kingdom dalam kes The Owners of the Steamship “Mediana” v The Owners, Master and Crew of the Lightship “Comet”) The Mediana [1900] A.C. 113 telah memberikan takrifan berkenaan dengan gantirugi nominal melalui penghakiman Earl of Halsbury seperti yang berikut: “ "Nominal damages" is a technical phrase which means that you have negatived anything like real damage, but that you are affirming by your nominal damages that there is an infraction of a legal right which, though it gives you no right to any real damages at all, yet gives you a right to the verdict or judgment because your legal right has been infringed. But the term "nominal damages" does not mean small damages. The extent to which a person has a right to recover what is called by the compendious phrase damages, but may be also represented as compensation for the use of something that belongs to him, depends upon a variety of circumstances, and it certainly does not in the smallest degree suggest that because they are small they are necessarily nominal damages.”

Mahkamah Rayuan di United Kingdom dalam kes Rook v Fairrie [1941] 1 K.B. 507 telah menyatakan berkenaan dengan gantirugi yang boleh diberikan bagi tuntutan fitnah di mana Lord Greene menyatakan seperti yang berikut: Now it is to be remembered that in a libel action the damages awarded are, for the most part and often entirely, without any real connection with any pecuniary loss at all. In a case of personal injury, apart possibly from the element of pain and suffering, the injury complained of is one which can be linked with a pecuniary valuation according to ordinary notions to a greater or less extent, but when you are dealing with damages in a libel case you are endeavouring to express in terms of money several different things which are not really susceptible of a money valuation in any true sense. You are considering the injury which the plaintiff has suffered which may or may not be capable of pecuniary valuation.”

Mahkamah ini berpendapat pertimbangan perlu diberikan kepada kesan daripada pernyataan-pernyataan Defendan-Defendan kepada Plaintif. Mahkamah juga mengambil kira kedudukan Plaintif di dalam komuniti yang terlibat dalam kes ini. Mahkamah juga meneliti kesan kepada Plaintif terhadap beberapa jawatan di dalam badan-badan bukan kerajaan dan badan sukarela yang lain ekoran daripada kesan pernyataan-pernyataan Defendan-Defendan tersebut.

Setelah menimbangkan keterangan-keterangan pihak Plaintif dan hujahan pihak-pihak, Mahkamah memutuskan seperti yang berikut:

Gantirugi am sejumlah RM 150,000.00.

(ii) Defendan-Defendan, sama ada oleh mereka sendiri, pekhidmat atau ejen mereka atau sebaliknya diperintahkan untuk menghapuskan semua pernyataan fitnah atau apa-apa perkataan lain yang serupa dalam apa jua cara atau bentuk dengan berkuat kuasa serta-merta.

(iii) Injunksi yang menghalang Defendan-Defendan sama ada oleh mereka sendiri, pekhidmat atau ejen mereka atau sebaliknya daripada menerbitkan atau menyebabkan penerbitan selanjutnya pernyataan fitnah atau apa-apa perkataan lain yang serupa dalam apa jua cara atau bentuk dengan berkuat kuasa serta-merta;

(iv) Defendan-defendan mengeluarkan pernyataan permintaan maaf yang tidak bersyarat kepada Plaintif (yang kandungannya mesti dipersetujui oleh Plaintif) dan pernyataan permintaan maaf yang tidak bersyarat tersebut mesti disiarkan dalam setiap forum yang diterbitkan yang termasuk tertapi tidak terhad kepada papan kenyataan utama di lobi pejabat Genting Permai Park & Resort dan/atau platform media sosial dan akhbar lain yang mesti dipersetujui oleh Plaintif, dengan berkuat kuasa serta-merta;

Faedah 5 % setahun ke atas jumlah penghakiman dari tarikh penghakiman hingga tarikh penyelesaian penuh; dan

(vi) Kos RM 30,000.00 tertakluk kepada fi alokator. Isu Sampingan

Semasa mengemukakan hujahan pihak Defendan telah menimbulkan isu bahawa disebabkan tiada sebarang terjemahan pernyataan-pernyataan fitnah tersebut ke dalam Bahasa Melayu seperti yang dikehendaki di dalam Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah (KKM) 2012. Maka tuntutan pihak Plaintif tidak sepatutnya dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah di atas ketidakpatuhan kepada KKM 2012 tersebut. Peguam pihak Defendan telah merujuk kepada kes Rekha d/o Munisamy v Ortus Expert White Sdn Bhd & Anor [2021] 5 MLJ 836. Dalam kes tersebut telah dibangkitkan hujahan berkenaan dengan kegagalan untuk menterjemahkan pernyataan fitnah itu dalam Bahasa Melayu. Mahkamah Rayuan setelah meneliti hujahan-hujahan telah berpendapat bahawa adalah menjadi kewajipan untuk menterjemahkannya ke dalam Bahasa Kebangsaan dan memerintahkan supaya kes itu dibicarakan semula. Ini dapat dilihat di perenggan [44] hingga [52] seperti yang berikut: [44] There is no dispute the alleged defamatory statements by the defendant were in English. The defendant submitted these statements must be translated into Bahasa Melayu before the court. First, the defendant referred to O 92 r 1 of the ROC in support of this contention. It states as follows: 1 Language of documents (O 92 r 1)

Subject to para (2), any document required for use in pursuance of these rules shall be in the national language and may be accompanied by a translation thereof in the English language, except that the translation for the purpose of O 11 r 6(4) and r 7(1) shall be prepared in accordance with r 6(5) of that order: Provided that any document in the English language may be used as an exhibit, with or without a translation thereof in the national language.

For Sabah and Sarawak, any document required for use in pursuance of these rules shall be in the English language and may be accompanied by a translation thereof in the national language except that the translation for the purpose of O 11 r 6(4) and r 7(1) shall be prepared in accordance with r 6(5) of that order. (Emphasis added.) [45] The defendant also referred to s 3 of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 (Consolidated and Revised 1989) as to the meaning of ‘national language’. This statutory provision states as follows: ‘National Language’ means the national language provided for by art 152 of the Federal Constitution. [46] In turn, art 152 of the Federal Constitution states as follows:

The national language shall be the Malay language and shall be in such script as Parliament may by law provide … [47] The defendant also referred to s 8 of the National Language Act 1963/67 (Revised 1971) in support of her contention on this point. The statutory provisions states as follows: All proceedings (other than the giving of evidence by a witness) in the Federal Court, Court of Appeal, the High Court or any subordinate court shall be in the national language: Provided that the court may either of its own motion or on the application of any party to any proceedings and after considering the interests of justice in those proceedings, order that the proceedings (other than the giving of evidence by a witness) shall be partly in the national language and partly in the English language. [48] Referring also to the Court of Appeal case of Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Tun Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad [2010] 2 MLJ 41, the defendant reiterated the importance of the translation and quoted Abdul Malik Ishak JCA (as he then was) in this case who said as follows: [49] The importance of the Malay language as the national language cannot be taken lightly. Indeed Nik Hashim JC (later FCJ) in Zainun Bte Hj Dahan lwn Rakyat Merchant Bankers Bhd & Satu Lagi [1998] 1 MLJ 532 at pp 535–536, emphasised the usage of the Malay language in our courts in these erudite terms: Pemfailan ‘notice of motion’ ini dalam bahasa Inggeris bukan sahaja menyalahi A 92 k 1 KMT malah ia juga melanggar s 8 Akta Bahasa Kebangsaan 1963/1967 (‘Akta tersebut) yang memperuntukkan: Segala prosiding (selain daripada pemberian keterangan oleh seseorang saksi) dalam Mahkamah Agung, Mahkamah Tinggi atau mana-mana mahkamah rendah hendaklah dalam bahasa kebangsaan: Dengan syarat bahawa mahkamah boleh, sama ada atas kehendaknya sendiri atau atas permintaan mana-mana pihak dalam mana-mana prosiding dan selepas menimbangkan kepentingan keadilan dalam prosiding itu, memerintahkan supaya prosiding itu (selain daripada pemberian keterangan oleh seseorang saksi) dijalankan sebahagiannya dalam bahasa kebangsaan dan sebahagiannya dalam bahasa Inggeris. Penggunaan Bahasa Melayu di mahkamah tidak boleh dipermudahkan dan diambil ringan. Perlembagaan Persekutuan menetapkan bahasa kebangsaan negara ialah Bahasa Melayu (perkara 152). Dengan peruntukan undang-undang di atas, maka keraguan atas penggunaan Bahasa Melayu dalam prosiding mahkamah tidak boleh dipersoalkan lagi. Jadi, penggunaannya hendaklah dilaksanakan dengan ketatnya oleh semua pihak. Mahkamah hendaklah memainkan peranannya dengan melaksanakan kuasanya dengan sewajarnya. Kaedah-kaedah mahkamah termasuk A 92 k 1 adalah digubal bukan untuk hiasan tetapi untuk dipatuhi supaya prosiding di mahkamah dapat berjalan dengan sempurna. Ketakpatuhan kepada peraturan atau kaedah-kaedah mahkamah akan membawa prosiding di mahkamah menjadi kelam kabut (Sykt Telekom Malaysia Bhd v Business Chinese Directory Sdn Bhd [1994] 2 MLJ 420; [1993] 3 CLJ 629). Permohonan melalui notis usul bukan suatu perkara yang susah atau rumit untuk dibuat dalam Bahasa Melayu. Dalam kes ini, ‘notice of motion’ sengaja dibuat dan difailkan bersekali dengan afidavit serta pernyataan dalam bahasa Inggeris tanpa memperdulikan peruntukan A 92 k 1 KMT, Akta tersebut dan Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Tidak ada sebab mengapa permohonan ini tidak boleh dibuat dalam Bahasa Melayu. Teks yang sahih ialah teks dalam Bahasa Melayu. Sekiranya mahkamah tidak berwaspada dan bertindak dari awal, sudah tentu lampiran 3 ini akan ‘terlepas’ dan pendengaran permohonan diteruskan tanpa mematuhi kaedah tersebut. Ketakpatuhan undang-undang tidak boleh dibiarkan. Permohonan di lampiran 3 adalah sungguh tidak teratur dan ia tidak boleh diterima dan dipertimbangkan oleh mahkamah sama sekali. [50] We categorically say that the mandatory provisions of art 152 of the Federal Constitution read together with s 8 of the National Language Acts, 1963/1967 (Act 32) and s 3 of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 (Act 388) must be adhered to. It requires the appellant to file the memorandum of appeal in the national language. No other language will be entertained. And the failure of the appellant to do so amounts to a blatant breach which would compel us to conclude that no memorandum of appeal has been filed at all. The purported memorandum of appeal in the English language must accordingly be rejected outright without further ado. What is mandatory, must be strictly adhered to. Otherwise dire consequences would follow. [51] Indeed the salutary advice of Chang Min Tat J (as he then was) in Yu Oi Yong & Anor v Ho Toong Peng & Ors [1977] 1 MLJ 120 at p 121, must be heeded. There His Lordship said: There should, in my view, be some adherence to the rules of court, unless required by circumstances, if there is to be any meaning or purpose in such rules. It should I think, be realised by practitioners as well as by judges that while strict and slavish adherence to forms and rules can sometimes hinder the administration of justice, these forms and rules should not be disregarded for no reason whatsoever, since they embody the experience of the courts over the years in the cause ((sic) (course)) of speedy and efficient administration of justice. [52] We observe that the word ‘shall’ appears in s 8 of the National Language Acts, 1963/1967 (Act 32). Likewise, the word ‘shall’ also appear in rr 18(1) and 101 of the Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994. It is quite obvious that the use of the word ‘shall’ raises a presumption that the particular provision is imperative (State of Uttar Pradesh v Manbodhan Lal Srivastava [1958] SCR 533 and Manbodhan Lal Srivastava v State of UP [2021] 5 MLJ 836 at 855 AIR 1957 SC 912 at p 917; State of Uttar Pradesh v Babu Ram AIR 1961 SC 751 at p 765; M/s Sainik Motors, Jodhpur & Ors v State of Rajasthan AIR 1961 SC 1480 at p 1485; and Govind Lal Chaggan Lal Patel v The Agriculture Produce Market Committee & Ors AIR 1976 SC 263 at p 267), and it is also ordinarily mandatory. It is also correct to say that when a statute uses the word ‘shall’, prima facie it is mandatory. And once it is held to be mandatory, the failure to comply with it will invalidate anything done under the statute. [53] Thus, the failure on the part of the appellant to file a memorandum of appeal in Bahasa Malaysia renders the purported record of appeal filed by the appellant useless. It will not qualify as a record of appeal. It is our judgment that there is no proper or competent appeal before us. [49] In the defamation case of Lim Kit Siang v Datuk Dr Ling Liong Sik & Ors [1997] 5 MLJ 523, Zainun Ali JC (later FCJ) held as follows: The authorities are manifest in their approach that it is fundamental that the exact words as uttered (by the first defendant in this case) must be reproduced in the original language with a certified translation in the language of the court, in the absence of which the claim will fail. (Emphasis added.) [50] The statutory provisions and case law authorities as narrated above, relied upon by the defendant on this point are quite clear in requiring such translation to be made by the plaintiffs. These are cogent authorities supporting the defendant’s contention that the alleged defamatory statements must be translated into Bahasa Melayu. [51] In turn, the plaintiffs submitted that although there was no translation into Bahasa Melayu in respect of the defamatory statements, they could still use exhibits which are in English without translation into Bahasa Melayu. In this regard, they specifically referred to O 92 r 1(4)(b) of the ROC which states as follows: … any document in the English language may be used as an exhibit, with or without a translation thereof in the national language. [52] With respect to the plaintiffs, the above reference is only on exhibits. It does not at all refer to pleadings. In the ‘penyataan tuntutan terpinda’ the plaintiffs did not translate the alleged defamatory statements into Bahasa Melayu. Considering the statutory provisions and case law authorities alluded to earlier, this would be fatal against the plaintiffs. As a consequence, the submission of the defendant on this point should be accepted.”

Adalah menjadi prinsip undang-undang yang jelas dan nyata bahawa Mahkamah ini adalah terikat dengan keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan sesuai dengan prinsip duluan kehakiman. Ia membawa maksud keputusan yang dibuat oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dan Mahkamah Persekutuan hendaklah dipatuhi sepenuhnya oleh Mahkamah ini. Apa yang jelas dalam kes ini ialah Mahkamah Rayuan telah memutuskan bahawa di dalam prosiding di Mahkamah dokumen-dokumen yang digunakan hendaklah diterjemahkan ke dalam Bahasa Melayu. Ini menunjukkan bahawa sebarang dokumen berkaitan dengan fitnah yang tidak diterjemahkan ke dalam Bahasa Kebangsaan akan menjejaskan prosiding tersebut. Ini dinyatakan seperti yang berikut: “[52] With respect to the plaintiffs, the above reference is only on exhibits. It does not at all refer to pleadings. In the ‘penyataan tuntutan terpinda’ the plaintiffs did not translate the alleged defamatory statements into Bahasa Melayu. Considering the statutory provisions and case law authorities alluded to earlier, this would be fatal against the plaintiffs. As a consequence, the submission of the defendant on this point should be accepted.”

KKM 2012 telah menegaskan berkenaan dengan Bahasa Mahkamah seperti berikut: “1. Bahasa dokuman (A. 92 k. 1)

Tertakluk kepada perenggan (2), apa-apa dokumen yang dikehendaki untuk kegunaan menurut Kaedah-Kaedah ini hendaklah dalam bahasa kebangsaan dan boleh disertakan dengan terjemahannya dalam bahasa Inggeris, kecuali terjemahan bagi maksud Aturan 11, kaedah 6(4) dan kaedah 7(1) hendaklah disediakan mengikut kaedah 6(5) Aturan itu-Dengan syarat bahawa apa-apa dokumen dalam bahasa Inggeris boleh digunakan sebagai suatu ekshibit, dengan atau tanpa suatu terjemahannya dalam bahasa kebangsaan.

Untuk Sabah dan Sarawak, apa-apa dokumen yang dikehendaki untuk kegunaan menurut Kaedah-Kaedah ini hendaklah dalam bahasa Inggeris dan boleh disertakan dengan terjemahannya dalam bahasa kebangsaan kecuali terjemahan bagi maksud Aturan 11, kaedah 6(4) dan kaedah 7(1) hendaklah disediakan mengikut kaedah 6(5) Aturan itu.

Suatu afidavit yang disediakan dalam bahasa asing hendaklah difailkan dengan suatu terjemahan afidavit itu oleh seorang penterjemah yang berkelayakan atau peguam dengan melampirkan afidavit dan terjemahannya sebagai ekshibit kepada suatu afidavit oleh penterjemah atau peguam yang menentusahkan terjemahan itu.

Dalam hal yang memerlukan tindakan segera, prosiding boleh sebahagiannya dimulakan atau dijalankan dalam bahasa Inggeris atau sepenuhnya bahasa Inggeris dengan syarat bahawa-

suatu perakuan tindakan segera yang menjelaskan perkara tersebut perlu disegerakan difailkan oleh peguam; dan

salinan semua dokumen dalam bahasa kebangsaan hendaklah difailkan dalam dua minggu atau dalam tempoh yang dilanjutkan sebagaimana yang dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah: Dengan syarat bahawa:

apa-apa dokumen dalam bahasa kebangsaan bolehlah digunakan sebagai suatu eksibit, dengan atau tanpa suatu terjemahan dalam bahasa Inggeris; dan

apa-apa dokumen dalam bahasa Inggeris bolehlah digunakan sebagai suatu eksibit, dengan atau tanpa suatu terjemahan dalam bahasa kebangsaan.”

Mahkamah juga sedar dan insaf berkenaan dengan kedudukan Bahasa Melayu sebagai Bahasa Kebangsaan seperti yang dinyatakan dalam Perkara 152 Perlembagaan Persekutuan seperti yang berikut: “152 National language

The national language shall be the Malay language and shall be in such script as Parliament may by law provide: Provided that—

no person shall be prohibited or prevented from using (otherwise than for official purposes), or from teaching or learning, any other language; and

nothing in this Clause shall prejudice the right of the Federal Government or of any State Government to preserve and sustain the use and study of the language of any other community in the Federation.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Clause (1), for a period of ten years after Merdeka Day, and thereafter until Parliament otherwise provides, the English language may be used in both Houses of Parliament, in the Legislative Assembly of every State, and for all other official purposes.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Clause (1), for a period of ten years after Merdeka Day, and thereafter until Parliament otherwise provides, the authoritative texts—

of all Bills to be introduced or amendments thereto to be moved in either House of Parliament; and

of all Acts of Parliament and all subsidiary legislation issued by the Federal Government, shall be in the English language.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Clause (1), for a period of ten years after Merdeka Day, and thereafter until Parliament otherwise provides, all proceedings in the Federal Court, the Court of Appeal or a High Court shall be in the English language: Provided that, if the Court and counsel on both sides agree, evidence taken in the language spoken by the witness need not be translated into or recorded in English.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Clause (1), until Parliament otherwise provides, all proceedings in subordinate courts, other than the taking of evidence, shall be in the English language.

In this Article, "official purpose" means any purpose of the Government, whether Federal or State, and includes any purpose of a public authority.”

Mahkamah ini juga meneliti peruntukan seksyen 2, 3, 4 dan 8 Akta Bahasa Kebangsan 1967 yang menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “2 Bahasa kebangsaan hendaklah digunakan bagi maksud rasmi Kecuali sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan dalam Akta ini dan tertakluk kepada perlindungan-perlindungan yang terkandung dalam Perkara 152(1) Perlembagaan berhubung dengan mana- mana bahasa lain dan bahasa mana-mana kaum lain di Malaysia bahasa kebangsaan hendaklah digunakan bagi maksud rasmi. 3 Penggunaan terjemahan Tiada apa-apa jua dalam Akta ini boleh menyentuh hak Kerajaan Persekutuan atau hak Kerajaan mana-mana Negeri untuk menggunakan apa-apa terjemahan dokumen atau perutusan rasmi dalam mana-mana bahasa lain bagi apa-apa maksud yang difikirkan perlu demi kepentingan awam. 4 Penggunaan berterusan bahasa Inggeris boleh dibenarkan Yang di-Pertuan Agong boleh membenarkan penggunaan berterusan bahasa Inggeris bagi apa-apa maksud rasmi sebagaimana yang difikirkan patut. 8 Bahasa Mahkamah Segala prosiding (selain pemberian keterangan oleh seseorang saksi) dalam Mahkamah Persekutuan, Mahkamah Rayuan, Mahkamah Tinggi atau mana-mana Mahkamah Rendah hendaklah dalam bahasa kebangsaan: Dengan syarat bahawa Mahkamah boleh, sama ada atas kehendaknya sendiri atau atas permintaan mana-mana pihak dalam mana-mana prosiding dan selepas menimbangkan kepentingan keadilan dalam prosiding itu, memerintahkan supaya prosiding itu (selain pemberian keterangan oleh seseorang saksi) dijalankan sebahagiannya dalam bahasa kebangsaan dan sebahagiannya dalam bahasa Inggeris.”

Penelitian kepada peruntukan Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012, Perkara 152 Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan Seksyen 8 Akta Bahasa Kebangsaan adalah jelas dan nyata bahawa semua dokumen dan prosiding dadalam Mahkamah hendaklah dalam Bahasa Kebangsaan iaitu Bahasa Melayu. Ini diperjelaskan lagi dalam kes Dato' Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Tun Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad [2010] 2 MLJ 41 seperti yang berikut: [45] s 8 of the National Language Acts 1963/67 (Act 32) enacts as follows: Language of Courts 8 All proceedings (other than the giving of evidence by a witness) in the [2010] 2 MLJ 41 at 57Federal Court, Court of Appeal, the High Court or any Subordinate Court shall be in the national language: Provided that the Court may either of its own motion or on the application of any party to any proceedings and after considering the interests of justice in those proceedings, order that the proceedings (other than the giving of evidence by a witness) shall be partly in the national language and partly in the English language. [46] s 3 of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 (Act 388) is a definition section and it defines 'National Language' to mean 'the national language provided for by Article 152 of the Federal Constitution'. [47] Then there is r 101 of the Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994 which states as follows: 101 Document shall be in national language

Subject to subrule (2), any document required for use in pursuance of these Rules shall be in the national language and may be accompanied by a translation thereof in the English language: Provided that any document in the English language may be used as an exhibit, with or without a translation thereof in the national language.

For Sabah and Sarawak, any document required for use in pursuance of these Rules shall be in the English language and may be accompanied by a translation thereof in the national language: Provided that any document in the national language may be used as an exhibit, with or without a translation thereof in the English language. [48] And r 18(1) of the Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994 clearly states that it is the appellant who shall prepare a memorandum of appeal. Factually speaking, the absence of the memorandum of appeal in the national language renders the record of appeal filed by the appellant incurably defective and, consequently, the appellant's appeal herein should be dismissed with costs for the simple reason that there is no proper record of appeal before this court. It is as simple as that. [49] The importance of the Malay language as the national language cannot be taken lightly. Indeed Nik Hashim JC (later FCJ) in Zainun bte Hj Dahan lwn Rakyat Merchant Bankers Bhd & Satu Lagi [1998] 1 MLJ 532 at pp 535–536, emphasised the usage of the Malay language in our courts in these erudite terms: Pemfailan 'notice of motion' ini dalam Bahasa Inggeris bukan sahaja menyalahi A 92 k 1 KMT malah ia juga melanggar s 8 Akta Bahasa Kebangsaan 1963/1967 ('Akta tersebut') yang memperuntukkan: Segala prosiding (selain daripada pemberian keterangan oleh seseorang saksi) dalam Mahkamah Agung, Mahkamah Tinggi atau mana-mana mahkamah rendah hendaklah dalam bahasa kebangsaan: Dengan syarat bahawa mahkamah boleh, sama ada atas kehendaknya sendiri atau atas permintaan mana-mana pihak dalam mana-mana prosiding dan selepas menimbangkan kepentingan keadilan dalam prosiding itu, memerintahkan supaya prosiding itu (selain daripada pemberian keterangan oleh seseorang saksi) dijalankan sebahagiannya dalam bahasa kebangsaan dan sebahagiannya dalam bahasa Inggeris. Penggunaan Bahasa Melayu di mahkamah tidak boleh dipermudahkan dan diambil ringan. Perlembagaan Persekutuan menetapkan bahasa kebangsaan negara ialah Bahasa Melayu (perkara 152). Dengan peruntukan undang-undang di atas, maka keraguan atas penggunaan Bahasa Melayu dalam prosiding mahkamah tidak boleh dipersoalkan lagi. Jadi, penggunaannya hendaklah dilaksanakan dengan ketatnya oleh semua pihak. Mahkamah hendaklah memainkan peranannya dengan melaksanakan kuasanya dengan sewajarnya. Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah termasuk A 92 k 1 adalah digubal bukan untuk hiasan tetapi untuk dipatuhi supaya prosiding di mahkamah dapat berjalan dengan sempurna. Ketakpatuhan kepada peraturan atau kaedah-kaedah mahkamah akan membawa prosiding di mahkamah menjadi kelam kabut (Sykt Telekom Malaysia Bhd v Business Chinese Directory Sdn Bhd [1994] 2 MLJ 420; [1993] 3 CLJ 629). Permohonan melalui notis usul bukan suatu perkara yang susah atau rumit untuk dibuat dalam Bahasa Melayu. Dalam kes ini, 'notice of motion' sengaja dibuat dan difailkan bersekali dengan afidavit serta pernyataan dalam Bahasa Inggeris tanpa memperdulikan peruntukan A 92 k 1 KMT, Akta tersebut dan Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Tidak ada sebab mengapa permohonan ini tidak boleh dibuat dalam Bahasa Melayu. Teks yang sahih ialah teks dalam Bahasa Melayu. Sekiranya mahkamah tidak berwaspada dan bertindak dari awal, sudah tentu lampiran 3 ini akan 'terlepas' dan pendengaran permohonan diteruskan tanpa mematuhi kaedah tersebut. Ketakpatuhan undang-undang tidak boleh dibiarkan. Permohonan di lampiran 3 adalah sungguh tidak teratur dan ia tidak boleh diterima dan dipertimbangkan oleh mahkamah sama sekali. [50] We categorically say that the mandatory provisions of art 152 of the Federal Constitution read together with Section 8 of the National Language Acts, 1963/1967 (Act 32) and s 3 of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 s 3 of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 (Act 388) must be adhered to. It requires the appellant to file the memorandum of appeal in the national language. No other language will be entertained. And the failure of the appellant to do so amounts to a blatant breach which would compel us to conclude that no memorandum of appeal has been filed at all. The purported memorandum of appeal in the English language must accordingly be rejected outright without further ado. What is mandatory, must be strictly adhered to. Otherwise dire consequences would follow. [51] Indeed the salutary advice of Chang Min Tat J (as he then was) in Yu Oi Yong & Anor v Ho Toong Peng & Ors [1977] 1 MLJ 120 at p 121, must be heeded. There His Lordship said: There should, in my view, be some adherence to the rules of court, unless required by circumstances, if there is to be any meaning or purpose in such rules. It should I think, be realised by practitioners as well as by judges that while strict and slavish adherence to forms and rules can sometimes hinder the administration of justice, these forms and rules should not be disregarded for no reason whatsoever, since they embody the experience of the courts over the years in the cause ((sic) (course)) of speedy and efficient administration of justice. [52] We observe that the word 'shall' appears in Section 8 of the National Language Acts, 1963/1967 (Act 32). Likewise, the word 'shall' also appear in rr 18(1) and 101 of the Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994. It is quite obvious that the use of the word 'shall' raises a presumption that the particular provision is imperative (State of Uttar Pradesh v Manbodhan Lal Srivastava [1958] SCR 33 and Manbodhan Lal Srivastava v State of UP AIR 1957 SC 912 at p 917; State of UP v Babu Ram AIR 1961 SC 751 at p 765; M/S Sainik Motors, Jodhpur & Ord v State of Rajasthan AIR 1961 SC 1480 at p 1485; and Govind Lal Chaggan Lal Patel v The Agriculture Produce Market Committee & Ors AIR 1976 SC 263 at p 267), and it is also ordinarily mandatory. It is also correct to say that when a statute uses the word 'shall', prima facie it is mandatory. And once it is held to be mandatory, the failure to comply with it will invalidate anything done under the statute. [53] Thus, the failure on the part of the appellant to file a memorandum of appeal in Bahasa Malaysia renders the purported record of appeal filed by the appellant useless. It will not qualify as a record of appeal. It is our judgment that there is no proper or competent appeal before us.”

Mahkamah dalam kes Dato' Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Tun Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad (supra) telah memtuskan bahawa kegagalan memfailkan Memorandum Rayuan dalam Bahasa Melayu telah menyebabkan rayuan tersebut di hadapan Mahkamah Rayuan dianggap sebagai tidak teratur. Ini menunjukkan kepentingan penggunaan Bahasa Melayu dalam penyediaan Memorandum Rayuan di Mahkamah Rayuan. Ia menjadi suluh teladan bagi Mahkamah ini untuk menekankan bahawa penggunaan Bahasa Melayu adalah diwajibkan bagi prosiding di Mahkamah.

Mahkamah Agong dalam kes Sykt Telekom Malaysia Bhd v Business Chinese Directory Sdn Bhd [1994] 2 MLJ 420 juga berkenaan dengan penggunaan Bahasa Kebangsaan ini telah menjelaskan seperti yang berikut ketika meneliti Aturan 92 kaedah 1 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 dengan menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “We find that O 92 r 1 of the RHC, is a mandatory provision which requires that any document which is not in the national language or in the English language must be translated into the national language before it can be admitted as an exhibit. Further, it has been held by the courts that rules of court are to be obeyed. Failure to comply with them will lead to chaos in the conduct of litigation. See Lee Guat Eng v Tan Lian Kim 1, and Ratnam v Cumarasamy & Anor 2. It is regretted that the well-founded submission of learned counsel for the respondent went unheeded in the court below. Secondary, ie oral evidence of the witnesses about the contents of exh P7, a document (a book) in Chinese, should not have been considered by the court below as such evidence would become relevant normally only on the non-availability of exh P7 as when such non-availability is accounted for in same way. Here the exh P7 was available and the appellant in fact submitted it in evidence without a certified translation of the same in the national language in contravention of O 92 r 1 of the RHC. The High Court should not have admitted it as an exhibit. Without this book, there is no evidence to substantiate the appellant's claim, and for this reason, the appellant's claim must, therefore, fail.”

Penelitian kepada KKM 2012 terdapat Aturan 1A yang memperuntukkan bahawa Mahkamah perlu meletakkan kepada keadilan. Ini dinyatakan seperti yang berikut: “1A Mahkamah atau hakim hendaklah memberi perhatian terhadap keadilan Perhatian hendaklah terhadap keadilan (A. 1A) Dalam mentadbir Kaedah-Kaedah ini, Mahkamah atau seorang Hakim hendaklah memberi perhatian pada kepentingan utama keadilan dan tidak hanya kepada ketidakpatuhan teknikal dengan Kaedah-Kaedah ini.”

Aturan yang sama terdapat di bawah Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 melalui pindaan pada 2002 iaitu melalui PU(A) 197/2002 yang berkuatkuasa 17 Mei 2002. Ini bermakna aturan 1A di bawah KKM 1980 telah wujud selepas kes Sykt Telekom Malaysia Bhd v Business Chinese Directory Sdn (supra) tetapi sebelum dari kes Dato' Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Tun Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad (supra).

Penelitian dalam kes Dato' Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Tun Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad (supra) adalah didapati bahawa Mahkamah tidak dirujuk kepada Aturan 1A Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 yang telah terdapat peruntukan tersebut melalui PU(A) 197/2002 tersebut.

Kini, terdapat peruntukan di bawah Aturan 1A KKM 2012 yang mana penggunaannya telah dinyatakan dalam kes Jagdis Singh Banta Singh v. Outlet Rank (M) Sdn Bhd [2013] 3 CLJ 47.

Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Duli Yang Amat Mulia Tunku Ibrahim Ismail Ibni Sultan Iskandar Al-Haj Tunku Mahkota Johor v Datuk Captain Hamzah bin Mohd Noor and another appeal [2009] 4 MLJ 149 telah dijelaskan berkenaan dengan Aturan 1A Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 seperti yang berikut: “[50] As I had mentioned in court, if O 1A is sought to be invoked whenever a party fails to comply with any provision of the rules, then the whole of the Rules of the High Court 1980 would be rendered useless. For example, can failure to enter appearance or file defence within the specified period be considered as an irregularity? Of course it cannot be. A party who is late in filing the relevant papers must obtain an order from the court to extend the time, if such extension is required and is permitted by the RHC. Therefore, the answer to question two is in the negative. [51] On the issue of conditional appearance, I am satisfied that the appellant has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court or waived his right to conditional appearance merely because he had filed the application to strike out the writ and had applied to have his case transferred to the High Court at Johor Bharu. This the appellant did in accordance with the terms allowed by the court when he sought and obtained the order to enter conditional appearance. I need not say more on this issue.”

Mahkamah ini telah meneliti secara terperinci dan menelaah kes Rekha d/o Munisamy v Ortus Expert White Sdn Bhd & Anor [2021] 5 MLJ 836 bagi melihat sama ada Aturan 1A KKM 2012 telah dibincangkan dalam kes tersebut. Adalah didapati bahawa ianya tidak dibawa kepada perhatian Mahkamah dalam kes tersebut.

Penelitian kepada Aturan 1A KKM 2012 dan seksyen 8 Akta Bahasa Kebangsaan jelas terdapat suatu frasa yang sama digunakan iaitu “kepentingan keadilan”. Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa kepentingan keadilan perlu diutamakan bagi memastikan pihak-pihak yang ingin mendapatkan keadilan di Mahkamah tidak akan ditewaskan semata-mata kerana ketidakpatuhan prosedur Mahkamah.

Mahkamah ini berpendapat dalam kes ini kegagalan pihak Plaintif mematuhi Aturan 92 kaedah 1 KKM 2012 amatlah dikesali. Pihak-pihak sepatutnya memastikan bahawa kepatuhan Aturan 92 kaedah 1 KKM 2012 ini dengan memfailkan dokumen-dokumen yang melibatkan pernyataan fitnah itu dalam Bahasa melayu. Ini telah tidak dilakukan. Adalah menjadi amalan yang baik untuk pihak-pihak yang menjalankan prosiding di Mahkamah memastikan Bahasa Melayu dijadikan keutamaan seperti yang dikehendaki di bawah Aturan 92 kaedah 1 KKM 2012 tersebut.

Walau bagaimanapun dalam kes ini isu berkenaan dengan ketidakpatuhan Aturan 92 kaedah 1 KKM 2012 hanya ditimbulkan di penghujung kes setelah perbicaraan selesai dengan Plaintif memberikan keterangan. Persoalannya adakah adil untuk tindakan Plaintif ditolak semata-mata ekoran daripada ketidakpatuhan kepada Aturan 92 kaedah 1 KKM 2012 dan pengabaian pemfailan dokumen-dokumen dalam Bahasa Melayu seperti yang dikehendaki di bawah KKM 2012.

Pada hemat Mahkamah ini tanpa merendahkan atau mengingkari keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan berkaitan dengan pematuhan Aturan 92 kaedah 1 KKM 2012, peruntukan Perkara 152 Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan seksyen 8 Akta Bahasa Kebangsaan, Mahkamah ini berpendapat demi keadilan kepada pihak Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan Mahkamah menggunakan peruntukan di bawah Aturan 1A KKM 2012 bagi memastikan keadilan ditadbirkan dan ia tidak dilengahkan lagi setelah kes ini difailkan pada tahun 2012. Oleh itu ketidakpatuhan dengan gagal mengemukakan terjemahan dalam Bahasa Melayu pernyataan fitnah tersebut tidak menjejaskan perjalanan kes ini kerana ia tergolong di dalam pemakaian Aturan 1A KKM 2012. Bertarikh : 11 hb. Ogos 2025 (ROSLAN BIN MAT NOR) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR Peguam Bagi Pihak Plaintif - Ooi Suan Kim dan Boo Honn Chin Tetuan O S Kim & Associates Kuala Lumpur Peguam Bagi Pihak Defendan-Defendan - Chai Yow San Tetuan Chai Yow San & Co.