where he could not reasonably have failed to understand that instruction or training was being provided there wholly or partly for such purposes, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine.” [7] Similar mitigating factors raised by the appellant in the Court below were repeated before us. All the factors raised such as personal and family hardship, being a first offender and had shown remorse by pleading guilty to the charge had been considered by the learned trial Judge. In his plea of mitigation, the appellant further submitted that he is a 36 year old divorcee with 4 children aged between 5 to 9 years old, has an old-aged and sickly parents who are now taking care of his children and was gainfully employed as a general worker prior to his arrest, had also been considered by the learned trial Judge. [8] The learned trial Judge in his grounds took into consideration that offences involving terrorist and security offences are alarming prevalent nowadays. The learned trial Judge also took into account the gravity and seriousness of the offence and for those who indulge such offences must be ready to face the consequences of a severe sentence. Otherwise the Court would be failing in its duty in protecting the public interest if lenient sentences are imposed on offenders who commit similar offences. Criminal Appeal No: W-05(SH)-530-10/2018 10 [9] We agree with the views of the learned trial Judge. The public must be protected and it lenient sentences is not likely to achieve the aim of protecting public interests. As Hilbery J in R v. Blake [1962] 2 QB 377 said: “It is of the highest importance perhaps particularly at the present time, that such conduct should not only stand condemned, should not only be held in utter abhorrence by all ordinary men and women but should receive, when brought to justice, the severest possible punishment. This sentence had a threefold purpose. It was intended to be punitive, it was designed and calculated to deter others, and it was meant to be a safeguard to this country.” [10] The learned Deputy Public Prosecutor (‘learned Deputy’) urged this Court to take a serious view of the offences committed by the appellant with regards to terrorism-related offences which warrants heavy punishment. It was submitted that the evidence from police intelligence revealed that the group had planned to use the bomb during the ‘Octoberfest’ festival. We can take cognizance that terrorism-related offences are on the rise and present a very serious threat to the security of the nation if left unchecked. A long prison sentence would conveyed a strong message of deterrence and abhorrence of society towards such crime. [11] The learned trial Judge imposed a sentence of 14 years and 5 years imprisonment to run concurrently. The question now, is the sentence harsh and manifestly excessive? We find guidance from Raja Azlan Shah Ag. LP in Bhandulananda Jayatilake v. PP [1976] 1 MLJ 83 where (as His Royal Highness then was) said at page 84: “Is the sentence harsh and manifestly excessive? We would paraphrase it in this way. As this is an appeal against the exercise by the Criminal Appeal No: W-05(SH)-530-10/2018 11 learned judge of a discretion vested in him, is the sentence so far outside the normal discretionary limits as to enable this court to say that its imposition must have involved an error of law of some description? I have had occasion to say elsewhere, that the very concept of judicial discretion involves a right to choose between more than one possible course of action upon which there is room for reasonable people to hold differing opinions as to which is to be preferred. That is quite inevitable. Human nature being what it is, different judges applying the same principles at the same time in the same country to similar facts may sometimes reach different conclusions (see Jamieson v. Jamieson). It is for that reason that some very conscientious judges have thought it their duty to visit particular crimes with exemplary sentences; whilst others equally conscientious have thought it their duty to view the same crimes with leniency. Therefore sentences do vary in apparently similar circumstances with the habit of mind of the particular judge. It is for that reason also that this court has said it again and again that it will not normally interfere with sentences, and the possibility or even the probability, that another court would have imposed a different sentence is not sufficient, per se, to warrant this court’s interference. For a discretionary judgment of this kind to be reversed by this court, it must be shown to our satisfaction that the learned judge was embarking on some unauthorised or extraneous or irrelevant exercise of discretion. We are far from convinced that any criticism of the learned judge is warranted. He took the course he did, in outweighing the plea of mitigation in favour of the public interest with a desire to uphold the dignity and authority of the law as administered in this country. We agree. That must receive the greatest weight. It is a serious offence to give false testimony, for it is in the public interest that the search for truth should, in general and always, be unfettered. The courts are the guardians of the public interest (see the Exclusive Brethren case).” Criminal Appeal No: W-05(SH)-530-10/2018 12 [12] Hashim Yeop A. Sani J (as he then was) in another often cited case of PP v. Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 2 MLJ 256 at 257 said: “In respect of sentencing there can be only general guidelines. No two cases can have exactly the same facts to the minutest detail. Facts do differ from case to case and ultimately each case has to be decided on its own merits. In practice sentences do differ not only from case to case but also from court to court. All things being equal these variations are inevitable if only because of the human element involved. But, of course, there must be limits to permissible variations. The principles to be applied in imposing sentence however are the same in every case. The High Court sitting in exercise of its revisionary powers will not normally alter the sentence unless it is satisfied that the sentence of the lower court is either manifestly inadequate or grossly excessive or illegal or otherwise not a proper sentence having regard to all the facts disclosed on the record or to all the facts which the court ought to take judicial notice of, that is to say, that the lower court clearly has erred in applying the correct principles in the assessment of the sentence. It is a firmly established practice that the court will not alter a sentence merely because it might have passed a different sentence. ………. One of the main considerations in the assessment of sentence is of course the question of public interest. On this point I need only quote a passage from the judgment of Hilbery J. in Rex v. Kenneth John Ball as follows: ̶ ̶ “In deciding the appropriate sentence a court should always be guided by certain considerations. The first and foremost is the public interest. The criminal law is publicly enforced, not only with the object of punishing crime, but also in the hope of preventing it. A Criminal Appeal No: W-05(SH)-530-10/2018 13 proper sentence, passed in public, serves the public interest in two ways. It may deter others who might be tempted to try crime as seeming to offer easy money on the supposition, that if the offender is caught and brought to justice, the punishment will be negligible. Such a sentence may also deter the particular criminal from committing a crime again, or induce him to turn from a criminal to an honest life. The public interest is indeed served, and best served, if the offender is induced to turn from criminal ways to honest living. Our law does not, therefore, fix the sentence for a particular crime, but fixes a maximum sentence and leaves it to the court to decide what is, within that maximum, the appropriate sentence for each criminal in the particular circumstances of each case. Not only in regard to each crime, but in regard to each criminal, the court has the right and the duty to decide whether to be lenient or severe.” [13] Coming back to the instant appeal before us, we had considered whether the learned trial Judge was right in imposing the sentence to run consecutively or concurrently even though the same issue was never raised before us. Undoubtedly, the two offences were the result of a series of acts as to form the same transaction. Therefore, the learned trial Judge did not err when he ordered the sentences to run concurrently. [14] On the seriousness of the offences committed by the appellant, this Court in PP v. Yazid Sufaat & Ors [2014] 2 CLJ 670 opined: “[23] An act of terrorism is a transnational phenomenon. It has no territorial limits. It transcends national borders. For instance, an act of terrorism may be planned or hatched within Malaysia with an intention to execute it outside Malaysia. The intention of SOSMA is, among others, to prevent Malaysia from being used as a terrorist haven. S. Rajendra Babu and GP Marthur JJ in People’s Union for Civil Liberties & Anor v. Criminal Appeal No: W-05(SH)-530-10/2018 14 Union of India AIR [2004] SC 456 aptly describe acts of terrorism as follows: ‘The terrorist threat that we are facing is now on an unprecedented global scale. Terrorism has become a global threat with global effects. It has become a challenge to the whole community of civilized nations. Terrorist activities in one country take on a transnational character, carrying out attacks across one border, receiving funding from private parties or a government across another, and procuring arms from multiple sources. Terrorism in a single country can readily become a threat to regional peace and security owing to its spill over effects. It is therefore difficult in the present context to draw a sharp distinction between domestic and international terrorism. Many happenings in the recent past caused the international community to focus on the issue of terrorism with renewed intensity.” [15] We also considered the trend of sentencing of the offences of terrorism-related cases of similar nature. We agreed with the learned Deputy that terrorism offences are manifestly despicable which undermine the social, public order and security of the nation in some instances. Therefore a more severe sentence is warranted in terrorism-related cases to emphasise on the elements of denunciation (see PP v. Abdul Halim Ishak & Ors [2013] 9 CLJ 559 CA). [16] We are unable to find cases of similar nature except one which was recently before us in the related case involving a co-accused. In the case of Ahmad Azmi Ahmad Rosli v. PP [2019] 1 LNS 358, the appellant was sentenced by the trial Judge to 14 years imprisonment for an offence committed under section 130FA, a term of 5 years imprisonment for an offence under section 130FB(1) and a further 3 years imprisonment for Criminal Appeal No: W-05(SH)-530-10/2018 15 another offence under section 130JB(1)(a) of the Penal Code. The first two were similar offences to the one committed by the appellant. On appeal, this Court affirmed the sentences imposed by the learned trial Judge. [17] Finally, we also considered the totality of the two custodial sentences imposed by the learned trial Judge which was only 14 years, run concurrently from the date of arrest. Having regard to all the facts of the case, the 14 years was not manifestly excessive but in our view, entirely appropriate. [18] For all the reasons above stated, we find no merit in the appellant’s appeal against sentence. The appeal is dismissed. The sentence of the High Court was affirmed. Dated: 22 July 2019 signed (KAMARDIN BIN HASHIM) Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia For the Appellant: Appellant present in person