Majlis Bandaraya Alor Setar v SOMASUNDRAM A/L ARUMUGAM (KA-11BNCvC-2-04/2025)

This is an appeal from the Magistrates’ Court for a case of statutory negligence and breach of common law duty of care by a local authority. The Appellant challenged the Magistrate’s findings on both liability and quantum, specifically contesting the 100% liability finding and the award for two injuries. Facts and Background 2. In the month of Ramadhan of the year 2023, the Appellant/ Defendant organised a Ramadhan bazaar located at Jalan Stadium, Alor Setar, Kedah. As part of its crowd-control efforts, the Appellant placed a mobile metal barrier to block vehicle access to the bazaar. The Appellant’s case at trial was that the mobile metal barrier was deployed strictly during the bazaar's operating hours, namely between 16:30 hours and 02:00 hours, when traffic wardens were also deployed. The barrier was allegedly removed from the road after the operating hours ended.

The Respondent’s pleaded case is that on 20 April 2023, at approximately 08:00 hours, when he arrived at the Darul Aman Stadium area, the Respondent was riding straight ahead when he suddenly found that his path was blocked by the metal barrier and, after failing to take evasive manoeuvres, collided with the metal barrier.

The Respondent claims to have suffered several injuries as a result of the collision as follows: S/N 9xc5hlO9kC8G4AWmFwa9w …page 3

Closed fracture left neck of 4th and 5th metacarpal;

(ii) Thin right acute subdural haemorrhage with non-displaced skull vault fracture;

(iii) Abrasion wound over right forehead, cheek and chin.

His wife, who was the pillion rider, also allegedly sustained injuries but neither filed a claim against the Appellant nor was called as a witness during the trial.

6.

Whether the Appellant had taken cautious steps and/or ensured the road was safe to be used; and

(ii) Whether the Appellant was negligent in creating a dangerous environment and causing the Respondent’s collision.

The learned Magistrate found through the testimony of the IO that the motorbike which the Respondent rode on was moved away when he arrived at the collision site. The IO exhibited a sketch of the investigated collision site, showing component fragments found on the ground at a location labelled “C”. The Magistrate believed this finding was consistent with the Plaintiff’s narrative of the location of the collision.

Further, the Magistrate found that none of the Appellant’s witnesses was present at the time of the collision and was unable to provide an explanation for the metal barrier’s location at the time of the incident. Additionally, the Defendant's witnesses conceded that, had the metal barrier been placed in a safe location under lock and key, it would not have been in the middle of the road.

For those reasons, the Magistrate found that the Appellant was unable to show that they had taken reasonable steps to ensure the road was safe for public use. Therefore, the Appellant was found to S/N 9xc5hlO9kC8G4AWmFwa9w …page 5 be 100% negligent in causing danger to the Respondent on the balance of probabilities.

The learned Magistrate then awarded the Respondent damages as follows:

RM8,000.00 for closed fracture left neck of 4th and 5th metacarpal. This was based on P6, a medical report from Hospital Sultanah Bahiyah and P7, a further medical report of the same.

(ii) RM40,000.00 for thin right acute subdural haemorrhage with non-displaced skull vault fracture;

(iii) RM2,000.00 for abrasion wound over right forehead, cheek, and chin.

In total, RM50,000.00 in damages was awarded to the Respondent over a 100% negligence contribution to the Appellant. Parties’ Submissions 13. The Appellant submitted that there was a serious error in the appreciation of evidence by relying solely on the Respondent’s version of events. Further, the Appellant had no opportunity to S/N 9xc5hlO9kC8G4AWmFwa9w …page 6 investigate the collision at the time of the suit, as the bazaar had long closed, and the police report was lodged approximately a month after the incident.

The Appellant further argued that there was contradictory evidence and circumstances that necessitated the impossibility of the Respondent’s version of events:

The Respondent claimed to have hit the middle of the barrier and that both he and his pillion rider fell onto it. However, there was no bending, breaking, or serious damage to the barrier. The only signs of damage were chipped paint near the base.

(ii) The pillion rider, the Respondent’s wife, was also injured but did not file a claim.

(iii) The fact that the report was lodged one month late despite the Respondent being hospitalised for one day.

The Appellant also submitted that the learned Magistrate had also erred in finding absolute negligence on the part of the Appellant when the Respondent failed to use reasonable skill to avoid the barrier, given the large size of the barrier (3.5 feet height and 6 to 7 feet in length), on a wide, three-lane road, in good weather at 8.00 AM in the morning. S/N 9xc5hlO9kC8G4AWmFwa9w …page 7

16.

Contradictory Evidence was not considered by the Trial Court 18. In reliance of the decision by Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) in Lee Ing Chin v Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2 CLJ 1; [2003] 1 MLRA 95 summarising a decision in Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd v Steven Phoa Chen Loon & Ors [2003] 1 MLJ 567; [2003] 1 CLJ 585, the Appellant submitted that appellate intervention is warranted if the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its decision; and where appellate intervention will take place in cases where there has been no or insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence. The Respondent, in opposition, relied on Tindok S/N 9xc5hlO9kC8G4AWmFwa9w …page 8 Besar Estate Sdn Bhd v Tinjar Co [1979] 2 MLJ 29 to argue that an appellate court should be slow to disturb findings of fact. While this Court respects that restraint, the principle is not a bar to intervention where the trial court’s appreciation of the evidence is 'plainly wrong'. For the reasons elaborated below, the failure to reconcile the barrier's physical state with the impact description meets the threshold for intervention because there has been no or insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence. As Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) further observed in Lee Ing Chin, true judicial appreciation requires a critical, multi-layered evaluation of the totality of the evidence, rather than a superficial reliance on the mere demeanour of a witness. This part of the judgment was highly descriptive, where layers upon layers of analysis are expected of a judge when deciding a fact. Most pertinently, it was described that findings made purely upon the demeanour of a witness without critically analysing the evidence run the risk of being corrected on appeal.

There was an absolute omission of judicial appreciation regarding the objective physical evidence presented at trial. Most prominently, there was no analysis of the actual location of the alleged incident, namely the metal barrier, save for the fact that fragments were found at the scene by PW1. This was adequate for the learned Magistrate to have declared that the Respondent’s version was the truth based on a balance of probabilities.

The Appellant had submitted that there was a crucial piece of evidence that directly contradicts the Respondent’s narrative and S/N 9xc5hlO9kC8G4AWmFwa9w …page 9 exposes a fatal gap in the trial court's evaluation. This crucial evidence is the condition of the metal barrier itself. Despite the Respondent's claim that he rode into the metal barrier at approximately 30 km/h and that his wife, the pillion rider, landed on top of it, the metal barrier sustained no damage at the point of impact. The Respondent's testimony is that he collided with the metal barrier squarely in the middle, but the photos presented by PW1 show only paint chipping at the base of the barrier. There was no indication of impact at the middle of the barrier, as would typically be expected from a motor vehicle ramming into a piece of metal, such as bending or even a dent. The barrier looked perfectly intact, to say the least.

The learned Magistrate erred by relying solely on the photos of the site to declare the collision occurred as told without further analysis of the evidence. PW1, under cross-examination, had testified that he was uncertain that the site labelled “C” was the actual site of the collision. While this Court is aware that fragments or shards of glass were apparently sourced from the motorbike, no evidence was adduced to link them to the Respondent’s motorbike. Furthermore, the Court takes judicial notice of the Appellant’s submission that the location of the alleged collision—Jalan Stadium—is a primary three-lane thoroughfare. It was established that the accident occurred at 8:00 AM during peak traffic. It stands to reason that had an obstruction of such significant dimensions (3.5 feet high and 7 feet long) been lying in the centre of a busy main road, it is highly improbable that no other road users would have collided with it or that the authorities would not have received prior reports of such a S/N 9xc5hlO9kC8G4AWmFwa9w …page 10 major obstruction. This adds further weight to the doubt surrounding the Respondent's narrative.

Even more peculiar is the location of the metal barrier at the time PW1 arrived at the scene. According to testimony, PW1 arrived at the scene within 10 minutes of the collision. The metal barrier was found parallel to the curb and not in the middle of the road. PW1 also confirmed that there was no eyewitness, no motorbike, and no Respondent present when he arrived at the scene. During cross-examination, there were unconfirmed allegations that the barrier had been moved by an unknown person.

It is undisputed that the metal barrier was not an ordinarily mobile object. There were no wheels installed. DW3 had testified that the barriers were usually stored in a location marked as “Y”, which was described as “inside”. DW3 also testified that the barriers were ordinarily chained together, and thus it would have been difficult for an unauthorised person to move the barrier. In the case of the specific metal barrier that the Respondent had collided with, it also served the purpose of blocking entry to the entrance of the bazaar, but according to DW2, it is left unchained and unlocked for vendors’ access to the bazaar.

These were the circumstantial evidence that led the Magistrate to be satisfied, seemingly through irresistible inference, that the collision site was conclusively at the site marked “C” in the sketch and that the collision had occurred exactly as the Respondent had S/N 9xc5hlO9kC8G4AWmFwa9w …page 11 narrated.

In their submissions, the Respondent’s counsel passionately insists that there was sufficient evidence to attribute the negligence to the Appellant, being that the metal barrier undisputedly belonged to them, and that there was no significant challenge to the narrative. It was submitted that the medical report tendered through PW2 showed that an injury was sustained in the collision; hence, res ipsa loquitor ought to be applicable. The Appellant challenged this and submitted the medical report, which only confirmed that the injury was suffered but did not necessarily mean it was caused by the collision.

The irreconcilable disparities in the evidentiary matrix severely compromise the credibility and safety of the finding that the accident occurred in the manner alleged by the Respondent. While the physical damage to the Respondent’s motorcycle points to an accident, the conclusion that the mishap was caused by a collision with the metal barrier remains purely circumstantial and uncorroborated. The record further reveals the unexplained absence of the pillion rider, who was a critical eyewitness to the impact. Consequently, her absence warrants an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950, as the failure to call her strongly implies that her testimony would not have supported the Respondent’s assertion of a head-on collision.

The Court also finds the one-month delay particularly prejudicial to S/N 9xc5hlO9kC8G4AWmFwa9w …page 12 the Appellant’s ability to mount a defence. As a public authority, the Appellant relies on contemporaneous reports to investigate hazards. By the time the Respondent lodged his report, the Bazaar had long concluded, and the opportunity for the Appellant to conduct a site inspection or verify the barrier’s placement at the material time had vanished. The learned Magistrate's failure to consider how this delay affected the weight of the evidence is a manifest error. Furthermore, the Court finds that the unexcused one-month delay in lodging the police report was highly prejudicial to the Appellant's statutory capacity to investigate the hazard. The Respondent's assertion that the delay was due to the severity of his injuries is flatly contradicted by objective medical evidence showing he was hospitalised for only one (1) day. The learned Magistrate's failure to address this irreconcilable timeline constitutes a manifest error in judicial appreciation.

Nevertheless, the fact that there was no significant challenge by the Appellant to the narrative of the accident being caused by a collision with the metal barrier must be given weight. The Appellant was unable to adduce evidence that this specific barrier was stored properly and that the Appellant, through its agents, had taken all reasonable measures to ensure the barrier was stored when the bazaar was not operating. Under cross-examination, neither DW2 nor DW3 could confirm the barriers were stored or locked. Instead, it was placed near the entrance of the bazaar and away from the road, roughly 2 metres from the curb. As to the barrier’s location at the time of the incident, they could only speculate that a third party had moved it to the middle of the road, given that members of the S/N 9xc5hlO9kC8G4AWmFwa9w …page 13 public had access to it. PW1, as the IO, had also testified that there were accounts of an unknown individual relocating the barrier. Hence, taking these factors into consideration, there was a certain possibility that the metal barrier was in the middle of the road as claimed by the Respondent. This unblemished safety record over the duration of the bazaar demonstrates that the Appellant's operational protocols were generally effective, thereby placing their conduct well below the threshold of actionable recklessness. The barrier's presence on the thoroughfare must therefore be viewed as an isolated anomaly rather than a systemic institutional failure.

On a balance of probabilities, while the physical presence of the metal barrier on the road is established as the proximate cause of the accident, the assertion that the Appellant is exclusively to blame cannot stand. Where the burden of proof rests on a balance of probabilities, the court is bound to adopt the narrative supported by proven facts rather than steer into speculation (see Chua Chong Cher v Teo Lang Keow [1970] CLJU 18). In the present case, the confluence of the physical fragments recovered at the collision site, DW2’s admission regarding public access to the unsecured barrier, and PW1’s testimony concerning its relocation collectively establish that the barrier was positioned on the road, rendering the Respondent’s account of the obstruction the more probable version. Consequently, the accident is held to have been caused by a collision with the Appellant's metal barrier. However, the local authority's failure to secure its property does not displace the proven facts of the motorist's downstream negligence, and speculative third-party theories cannot be invoked to hold the Appellant solely S/N 9xc5hlO9kC8G4AWmFwa9w …page 14 liable.

As the organising authority of the bazaar and the local government authority of the area, the Appellant owed a duty of care to the public’s wellbeing and safety. This was decided plainly by the Federal Court in Majlis Perbandaran Ampang Jaya v Steven Phoa Cheng Loon & Ors [2006] 2 MLJ 389; [2006] 2 AMR 563; [2006] 2 CLJ 1. By failing to secure the metal barrier at a safe location, the Appellant failed to ensure the safety of road users, which falls within their responsibility; the Appellant breached their duty of care and committed negligence in their duty as a public authority. Thus, the Appellant is liable for negligence. While the principle in Ampang Jaya affirms the existence of this duty of care, it is settled law that such a duty is not absolute. The existence of a public authority's duty does not absolve a road user from their reciprocal obligation to maintain a proper lookout.

The Inapplicability of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur 31. It was submitted that the medical report tendered through PW2 showed that there was an injury suffered from the collision, hence res ipsa loquitur ought to be applicable. The Appellant challenged this, contending that the doctrine cannot be used to bridge the gap in proving how the accident actually occurred.

The Respondent’s reliance on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself) is legally untenable. As established in the S/N 9xc5hlO9kC8G4AWmFwa9w …page 15 Federal Court authority of Wong Thin Yit v. Mohamed Ali [1971] 1 LNS 151, which was cited by the learned Magistrate, the foundation of any negligence action is proof. Evidence, if accepted, may result in proof, but is not necessarily proof of itself. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is merely a rule of evidence that shifts the burden of explanation to the defendant; it does not, however, absolve a plaintiff of the primary burden of proving that the event occurred in the manner alleged.

For the doctrine to apply, the instrument causing the accident must be under the exclusive control of the defendant, and the accident must be of a kind that would not occur without negligence. While the barrier belonged to the Appellant, the "exclusive control" element is significantly weakened by the evidence that the bazaar was closed, the site was unattended, and the barrier was not secured by chains or locks, allowing for the possibility of third-party intervention—an account supported by the Investigating Officer’s (PW1) testimony.

Crucially, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is unavailable where a competing, equally plausible explanation of the accident coexists with the evidence. In the present case, the "thing" (the collision with a large, stationary, brightly coloured object in broad daylight) speaks just as loudly of the Respondent’s own failure to maintain a proper lookout as it does of any negligence by the Appellant. Consistent with the principle in Inas Faiqah Bt Mohd Helmi v Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2016] 2 MLJ 1, a court must weigh the probability and improbability of an action occurring. Given the lack of damage to the barrier’s centre, the doctrine cannot be invoked to speculate S/N 9xc5hlO9kC8G4AWmFwa9w …page 16 that a collision occurred as narrated by the Respondent, when the physical evidence suggests otherwise.

The determination of liability must consequently address the issue of contributory negligence on the part of the Respondent.

Contributory Negligence of the Plaintiff was not considered by the Trial Court 36. The learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to consider the element of contributory negligence despite strong evidence that the Respondent failed to use reasonable skill to avoid the metal barrier. The grounds of judgment were completely silent on any consideration of the Respondent’s conduct.

The Federal Court in Ong Ah Long v Dr S. Underwood [1983] 2 MLJ 324; [1983] CLJ 198 evinced the test for contributory negligence as whether the plaintiff was acting as a reasonable man and with reasonable care. The test was recently reiterated in the High Court decision in Gurisha Taranjeet Kaur & Anor v Dr Premitha Damodaran & Anor [2020] 9 MLJ 409 and thus remains good law. To negate contributory negligence, it is sufficient for a plaintiff to show judgment and control to avoid the accident as may be reasonably expected of him (refer Govinda Raju & Anor v Laws [1966] 1 MLJ 188; [1965] 1 MLRH 401). S/N 9xc5hlO9kC8G4AWmFwa9w …page 17

From the evidence presented, the following was established:

The collision occurred on a straight, wide, three-lane road with good visibility and clear weather at 8:00 AM.

(ii) The barrier was described as large, measured at 3.5 feet high, 6–7 feet in length and brightly coloured with yellow and white paint.

(iii) The Plaintiff was travelling slowly at around 30–40 km/h.

It is reasonably expected that a motorist should always anticipate the possible presence of others or objects on the road and should always be able to stop within the range of his permitted vision (see Reliance Omnibus Co Sdn Bhd & Anor v Ishak Bin Mohd Jaafar & Anor [1993] 2 MLRH 669; [1993] MLJU 10). From the above description of circumstances leading up to the collision, it can be concluded there was certainly no obstruction to line of sight; the barrier was stationary, highly visible, and in plain sight; and the Respondent was at a speed capable of taking evasive manoeuvres with ample time. Logic dictates that any reasonably skilled motorist would have been able to avoid the metal barrier. This finding holds even if the Court were to accept the Respondent's contention that the barrier was 'lying flat' (terbaring) on the road at the material time. A barrier measuring 3.5 feet by 7 feet creates a substantial footprint on the asphalt. An attentive motorist, travelling at the Respondent's claimed slow speed of 30-40 km/h in clear daylight, is legally S/N 9xc5hlO9kC8G4AWmFwa9w …page 18 expected to identify and navigate around an obstruction of such significant surface area, whether it is standing upright or lying flat.

The Respondent contended that he was paralysed by the agony of the moment. This contention cannot be sustained.

Eusoff Chin J (as he then was) in Choh Nyee Ngah & Anor v Syarikat Beruntong Sdn Bhd [1989] 3 MLJ 112 acknowledged agony of the moment as a valid defence to contributory negligence. In this case, the deceased lorry driver carrying logs jumped out of his lorry before it came to a stop. There, the court did not accept the contention that the driver was contributorily negligent, as he could have possibly survived the accident had he not jumped out of the lorry. Instead, the court acknowledged that the driver had to take a chance of saving his life by jumping out of the lorry to avoid the chance that the logs would have crushed him if he had remained in the lorry.

When compared to the facts of Choh Nyee Ngah, the Respondent’s situation can be easily distinguished; there was no agony of choice. The only reasonable course of action was to avoid the metal barrier. The Respondent’s own testimony indicated that the barrier was already present on the road and had not suddenly appeared. The argument for agony of the moment is thus inapplicable. Consequently, the Respondent failed to demonstrate the baseline judgment and vehicular control reasonably expected of a motorist. S/N 9xc5hlO9kC8G4AWmFwa9w …page 19

The failure to assign any fault to the Plaintiff, given his obvious lack of attention in failing to avoid a large, clearly visible obstruction on a straight, clear road, renders the 100% liability finding plainly wrong. The Respondent’s negligence was a significant contributing factor to the collision.

Liability must be apportioned equally between the parties. The Appellant created the initial hazard by breaching its duty of care in failing to secure its property. The Respondent was negligent in failing to observe and avoid the hazard. Liability is to be apportioned at a 50:50 ratio between the parties.

Quantum 45. The award of general damages in the sum of RM40,000.00 for the thin right acute subdural haemorrhage with non-displaced skull vault fracture is similarly flawed. In the grounds of judgment, the trial court awarded the amount based on the degree of injury suffered by the Respondent, but it was not supported by cogent evidence and was instead based on a reliance on the decision in Hafify Hafiz b Saripudin v Haziman Aziz b Mohamad Diah & Anor [2009] 1 PIR

3.

The Appellant submitted that the Respondent failed to call the treating doctor from the Emergency Department. PW2 was not the treating doctor and relied solely on medical reports from Hospital Sultanah Bahiyah to substantiate the claim. The Respondent S/N 9xc5hlO9kC8G4AWmFwa9w …page 20 contends that the reports are official records and sufficient prima facie evidence of the injuries.

Most curiously, it is clearly apparent that the diagnosis for thin right acute subdural haemorrhage with non-displaced skull vault fracture only appeared in the clarification report produced by the Orthopaedic Team (P7) and not in the earlier medical report (P6). Further, the clarification report provides the following caveat: Please obtain medical report from surgical team regarding those injury as the above injury was not treated by the orthopaedic team.

PW2 was an orthopaedic surgeon from the hospital. Under cross-examination, it was admitted that PW2 based the testimony solely on medical records available for the reason that PW2 had never treated the Respondent or met him personally. The relevant physician was instead Dr Lai from the Surgical Team. At the trial, PW2 did not possess or receive any reports from other disciplines, namely the Emergency Department or the Surgical Team, to substantiate the injury. PW2 also agreed that only the Surgical Team could confirm the injuries suffered by the Respondent. Clearly, PW2 was not a witness who could testify to the insertion of an additional diagnosis for the thin right acute subdural haemorrhage with non-displaced skull vault fracture. Consequently, the Respondent’s failure to call Dr Lai from the Surgical Team creates a fatal evidentiary gap, rendering this specific head of general damages unproven. S/N 9xc5hlO9kC8G4AWmFwa9w …page 21

The learned Magistrate correctly referred to Inas Faiqah (supra) to extract the relevant principle that damages must be based on cogent evidence but erred in its application. The Respondent’s argument that the medical reports constitute prima facie proof of the specific injury cannot be sustained. Here, there is a jarring discrepancy between the two medical reports, with the latter reporting a far more serious injury than was initially diagnosed. Such a difference requires an explanation from the treating physician or corroborating evidence, e.g., imaging reports. No such evidence was adduced. In the absence of cogent evidence, this head of injury cannot be proved, and the damages awarded must consequently be set aside. Even if the injury were accepted as proven, the quantum of RM40,000.00 appears significantly disproportionate to established judicial trends. The Appellant rightly drew the Court's attention to Venk Murugayah v. Meenachi & Ors [2005] 3 PIR, where a more severe constellation of head injuries—including subarachnoid haemorrhage and cerebral oedema—attracted an award of only RM 20,000. Thus, the Magistrate’s award of RM 40,000 for a 'thin' haemorrhage, unsupported by a specialist surgical report, was manifestly excessive.

As for the award of damages for abrasions of RM 2,000, the learned Magistrate relied on the case of Devarajan Kunasekaran v Leon Ngim Chong & Anor [2023] PILRU 39. Unlike the previous head injury, this was consistently substantiated through corroborating documentary evidence in P6 and P7, where PW2’s team treated the injury. The award for abrasions is sound, proportionate, and fully supported by the contemporaneous clinical records. S/N 9xc5hlO9kC8G4AWmFwa9w …page 22

For completeness, the Appellant did not dispute the award of RM8,000 for the closed fracture of the left neck of the 4th and 5th metacarpal. Accordingly, this award is maintained.

In total, general damages are assessed at RM10,000.00. Applying a 50% reduction in liability, the Appellant shall pay the Respondent RM5,000.00 in damages. Conclusion 53. Having examined the evidence available and having considered submissions by both parties, oral and written, this appeal is allowed in part. The following orders are accordingly made:

The Magistrate’s finding that the Appellant was 100% liable is set aside. Liability is to be apportioned at a 50:50 ratio between the parties.

(ii) The award of RM40,000.00 for thin right acute subdural haemorrhage is set aside.

(iii) The total general damages of RM10,000.00 are awarded with the following breakdown before apportionment:

For closed fracture of the left neck of the 4th and 5th S/N 9xc5hlO9kC8G4AWmFwa9w …page 23 metacarpal, the sum of RM8,000.00 is awarded.

The award for abrasion over the right forehead, cheek and chin of RM2,000.00 is maintained.

(iv) After apportionment of 50% liability, the total general damages entitled is RM 5,000.00.

No orders as to costs. Dated 16th July 2026 ..................................................................................... YA Dr. Hj. John Lee Kien How @ Mohd Johan Lee Judge High Court of Malaya Alor Setar For the Appellant: Nur Hartini Binti Mansor Messrs Tam Shukri & Assoc. Advocates & Solicitors For the Respondents: Kamal Pasha Bin Jamal Messrs. S. Kuppusamy, Fadzil & Co Advocates & Solicitors S/N 9xc5hlO9kC8G4AWmFwa9w …page 24 Authorities referred to: Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd v Steven Phoa Chen Loon & Ors [2003] 1 MLJ 567; [2003] 1 CLJ 585 Choh Nyee Ngah & Anor v Syarikat Beruntong Sdn Bhd [1989] 3 MLJ 112 Chua Chong Cher v Teo Lang Keow [1970] CLJU 18 Devarajan Kunasekaran v Leon Ngim Chon & Anor [2023] PILRU 39 Govinda Raju & Anor v Laws [1966] 1 MLJ 188; [1965] 1 MLRH 401 Gurisha Taranjeet Kaur & Anor v Dr Premitha Damodaran & Anor [2020] 9 MLJ 409 Hafify Hafiz b Saripudin v Haziman Aziz b Mohamad Diah & Anor [2009] 1 PIR 3 Inas Faiqah Bt Mohd Helmi v Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2016] 2 MLJ 1 Lee Ing Chin v Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2 CLJ 1; [2003] 1 MLRA 95 Majlis Perbandaran Ampang Jaya v Steven Phoa Cheng Loon & Ors [2006] 2 MLJ 389; [2006] 2 AMR 563; [2006] 2 CLJ 1 Ong Ah Long v Dr. S. Underwood [1983] 2 MLJ 324; [1983] CLJ 198 Reliance Omnibus Co Sdn Bhd & Anor v Ishak Bin Mohd Jaafar & Anor [1993] 2 MLRH 669; [1993] MLJU 10 Tindok Besar Estate Sdn Bhd v Tinjar Co [1979] 2 MLJ 29 Venk Murugayah v. Meenachi & Ors [2005] 3 PIR Wong Thin Yit v. Mohamed Ali [1971] 1 LNS 151 S/N 9xc5hlO9kC8G4AWmFwa9w