Notwithstanding a jurisdictional challenge, the adjudicator may in his discretion proceed and complete the adjudication proceedings without prejudice to the rights of any party to apply to set aside the adjudication decision under section 15 or to oppose the application to enforce the adjudication decision under subsection 28(1).” (emphasis added). [48] Sections 5 and 6 of the CIPAA provides for the payment claim and the payment response, respectively. Sub-s 5(1) CIPAA reads: “5. (1) An unpaid party may serve a payment claim on a non-paying party for payment pursuant to a construction contract.”. S/N I5l2nqPnFUqFwxkI90d9Gw [49] The word “payment” is defined in s 4 CIPAA as “a payment for work done or services rendered under the express terms of a construction contract”. [50] In Antah Schindler Sdn Bhd v. Golden Base Construction Sdn Bhd & Another Case [2020] MLRHU 891, this Court said: “[13] As regards s 15(d) CIPAA, the Federal Court in View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2018] 2 MLJ 22 held that s 15 is predicated on CIPAA applying to the case and to an adjudication decision made under CIPAA. It was further held that the term “jurisdiction” is used in relation to matters within the scope of CIPAA i.e. as in the adjudicator 10 having acted in excess of his jurisdiction as a ground for setting aside an adjudication decision (see too, s 27 CIPAA).”. [51] By way of extension, the Federal Court in View Esteem (supra, at p 34) held that: S/N I5l2nqPnFUqFwxkI90d9Gw “[16] The term ‘jurisdiction’ under the CIPAA is not used in the administrative or public law sense but in relation to matters within the scope of the CIPAA. On this point, in Terminal Perintis Sdn Bhd v. Tan Ngee Hong Construction Sdn Bhd and another case [2017] MLRHU 144; [2017] 7 AMR 887 Lee Swee Seng J observed as follows (at para [70]): In the application of our CIPAA, we are free from the shackles of the language of administrative law and judicial review. The word ‘jurisdiction’ is used in s 15(d) as in the adjudicator having acted in ‘excess of his jurisdiction’ as a ground for setting aside an adjudication decision. It is also used in s 27(1) with respect to an adjudicator's jurisdiction being limited to the matters raised in the payment claim and the payment response. Then there is a reference to it in s 27(2) with respect to extending his jurisdiction by way of agreement in writing to deal with matters not specifically raised in the payment claim and payment response. Finally there is the reference to a ‘jurisdictional’ challenge, which when raised, does not prevent the adjudicator from proceeding and completing the S/N I5l2nqPnFUqFwxkI90d9Gw adjudication without prejudice to the rights of any party to set it aside under s 15 or to oppose its enforcement under s 28 ... [17] The learned judge also made note of the various types of jurisdictional complaints within the CIPAA which may be categorised as core jurisdiction, competence jurisdiction and contingent jurisdiction. The common feature in all of them is the presupposition that the CIPAA applies to determine if the adjudicator had kept within his jurisdiction.”. [52] In Mei He Development Sdn Bhd v. Eosh Industries Sdn Bhd & Another Case [2021] MLRHU 2554, this Court remarked that: “[59] Even though MHD made no submission as to the type of jurisdiction which is triggered in the instant application, based on the evidence that is adduced, it can safely be said that contingent jurisdiction applies in this case. This is where the existence of valid jurisdiction is dependent on further compliance with the requirements of the CIPAA in that the S/N I5l2nqPnFUqFwxkI90d9Gw dispute must be one falling within the matter raised in the payment claim and payment response as provided for in sub-s 27(1) of the CIPAA unless the parties agree in writing to extend the jurisdiction of the adjudicator to deal with these matters pursuant to sub-s 27(2) (see Terminal Perintis (supra) and Construction Adjudication in Malaysia, Second Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2018 by Lam Wai Loon and Ivan YF Loo at p 426).” (see too, para 37 in the judgment of this Court in MRCB Builders Sdn Bhd v. SMM Resources Sdn Bhd & Another Case [2021] MLRHU 1414). [53] Similarly in this case, the type of jurisdictional complaint in question is contingent jurisdiction. The applicability of sub-s 27(2) CIPAA can straightaway be dispelled as there is no evidence to suggest that the parties had made any written agreement to extend the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator. S/N I5l2nqPnFUqFwxkI90d9Gw [54] As alluded to previously, the Council had recorded the Reservation in para 2 of the Adjudication Response that PNB must not be allowed, in the Adjudication Reply, to introduce matters or documents which PNB should have introduced in its Adjudication Claim. However, this is exactly what PNB had done. As submitted by the Council, the issue of waiver in not having raised a jurisdictional objection simply does not arise in this case because of the Reservation and the Council only discovered that the Adjudicator had decided the matter on PNB’s New Claim when it was served with the AD. In such situation, the grounds for objection on a jurisdictional basis were not known or not capable of being discovered by the Council until it received the AD. [55] Moreover, it is trite that issues on the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction, whether the absolute lack thereof or an excess of jurisdiction, may be raised before or after the adjudication decision is made. The fact that the Council did not raise any jurisdictional objection during the adjudication proceedings or before the AD was delivered is immaterial as even if this was done, and the Adjudicator had decided on the same, his findings on his own jurisdiction is not conclusive (see sub-s 27(3) S/N I5l2nqPnFUqFwxkI90d9Gw CIPAA, Ritma Hebat Sdn Bhd v Kayangan Kemas Sdn Bhd and another suit [2017] MLRHU 1493, Lion Pacific Sdn Bhd v Pestech Technology Sdn Bhd and another case [2020] MLJU 2308 and Broadway Power Sdn Bhd v Eden Construction (M) Sdn Bhd [2020] MLRHU 900). [56] With regards to PNB’s argument that whatever submissions made in the Adjudication Reply are consequential or ancillary in nature and necessary to complete the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred under ss 5 and 6 CIPAA, whilst it is true that PNB’s claim remained as one for loss and expense, however, as discussed in the preceding part on s 15(b) CIPAA, there was a shift of the basis for the loss and expense claim. This was recognised by the Adjudicator himself at p 70 of the AD when he stated “However, in their Adjudication Reply on 19.04.2021 they had altered their stand and they should at the very least be entitled to RM124,738.07 for Loss and Expense incurred.”. [57] In PJ Midtown Development Sdn Bhd v Pembinaan Mitrajaya Sdn Bhd and another summons [2020] MLJU 1432, Lim Chong Fong J had to S/N I5l2nqPnFUqFwxkI90d9Gw also deal with the contention that the Adjudicator acted in excess of jurisdiction in the narrow sense by having decided on issues which were not pleaded in Mitrajaya’s payment claim and adjudication claim. His Lordship held, among others, that: “[43] Generally, the scope of an adjudicator’s contingent jurisdiction has to be discerned and ascertained from the causes of action and defences pursued by the parties as set forth in the payment claim and payment response which may be amplified in the adjudication claim, adjudication response and adjudication reply. This is distilled from the later Federal Court case of View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Berhad (supra) and applied in the case SKS Pavillion Sdn Bhd v Tasoon Injection Pile Sdn Bhd (supra). Jurisdiction is therefore not confined to matters raised by the claimant in the payment claim and adjudication claim only. … S/N I5l2nqPnFUqFwxkI90d9Gw [45] On the facts here, the new issues raised by Mitrajaya in its adjudication reply are similarly made in rebuttal to the imposition of liquidated and ascertained damages raised by PJ Midtown in its adjudication response. In the premises, I find that the Adjudicator has been amply clothed and armed with jurisdiction and powers to deal with them as he saw fit within the purview of s. 27(1) of the CIPAA notwithstanding that they have not been raised in Mitrajaya’s payment claim and adjudication claim respectively. ...”. [58] In my opinion, the above case can be distinguished with the facts in the case before this Court as the new issues in the adjudication reply in PJ Midtown Development still revolved around the same claim whereas in the instant case, PNB not only responded to the Council’s defences in the Adjudication Response, but it went further by submitting an alternative basis for the claim for loss and expense i.e. on common law principles as opposed to its contractual rights, being the alleged recurring items in the Contract Preliminaries. This is tantamount to a new claim altogether. S/N I5l2nqPnFUqFwxkI90d9Gw [59] By considering and allowing the New Claim based on Contract Preliminaries in the sum of RM124,738.07, I agree with the Council’s submission that the Adjudicator had acted in excess of his jurisdiction. [60] Proceeding next to the Adjudicator’s decision on LAD, his analysis can be seen at pp 73 - 74 of the AD when he articulated that: “57. The crux of the valid deduction of the Liquidated Ascertained Damages (LAD) lies upon the proper issuance and delivery of the Certificate of Non-Completion (CNC) which is a prerequisite for imposing LAD as per the Contract as clearly stated in Clause 40.1. If this prerequisite is safely fulfilled than the calculation for LAD is from the date of issuance of the CNC to the date of the CPC as per Clause 40.2. of the Contract. The Respondent claims that they had issued the CNC on 31.05.2019 and stated that this is confirmed by DZJ’s letter dated 8.02.2021 that the CNC had been issued to the Claimant and a copy of the CNC had also S/N I5l2nqPnFUqFwxkI90d9Gw been sent to DZJ via email. It does seem that both the Respondent and DZJ are trying to justify the CNC was successfully issued to the Claimant but via email. However, as discussed earlier all formal correspondence or Notices as per Clause 67.2 of the Contract has to be delivered via courier, registered post, or hand delivered and no email or facsimile is mentioned. Even if it was supposedly delivered via email, there is no evidence adduced to support this claim. The final extension of time given in EOT No. 5 was 31.05.2019 and there is no dispute by the parties that the CPC was issued on 9.07.2019 is accurate. Therefore, there is clearly a delay of thirty-nine (39) days and the Claimant obviously could not meet the deadline to complete the Works on 31.05.2019. However, due to the absence of confirmation that the CNC was actually delivered, the Respondent has failed to fulfil the precondition in Clause 40.1 of the Contract and thus should not be allowed to impose LAD on the S/N I5l2nqPnFUqFwxkI90d9Gw Claimant although there is clear delay in completion of the Works. Therefore, I concur with the Claimant that the LAD deducted by the Respondent as per the Interim Certificate No. 14 on 2.08.2019 was unlawful.”. [61] Lee Swee Seng J (now JCA) had considered the definitions of “payment” and “payment claim” under the CIPAA in BM City Realty (supra) in the context of a claim for LAD and His Lordship concluded that: “[86] … this Court would highlight that the LAD claim must first qualify to be a payment claim within the meaning of “payment” under s 4 of CIPAA and within the meaning of a “payment claim” under s 5 CIPAA. … [89] Clearly an LAD claim is a damages claim which would not fit into the definition of a “payment claim” that is S/N I5l2nqPnFUqFwxkI90d9Gw susceptible to adjudication under CIPAA. It is undeniably and indisputably a claim for damages for breach of contract in failure of the contractor to complete on time by the completion date and it has to be pursued by way of arbitration or litigation and not an adjudication under CIPAA.”. [62] It is common for employers in adjudication proceedings to raise claims for LAD for delays caused by contractors as a defence to a payment claim which acts as a set-off and/ or counterclaim. However, what the Adjudicator decided here was to reimburse PNB for the sum of the LAD which was deducted by the Council. This is clearly outside the ambit of the definition of “payment” in s 4 CIPAA and runs foul of sub-s 27(1) CIPAA. Therefore, the Adjudicator had acted in excess of his jurisdiction as well with regards to the LAD claim. [63] The above findings are sufficient grounds to set aside the AD pursuant to limbs (b) and (d) of s 15 CIPAA. S/N I5l2nqPnFUqFwxkI90d9Gw II. O.S No. 129: Enforcement Application [64] In the light of the above-mentioned findings in respect of the Setting Aside Application, it is a foregone conclusion that PNB’s application to enforce the AD as if it is a judgment or order of the High Court pursuant to sub-s 28(1) CIPAA must be dismissed. Pronouncement [65] Based on the foregoing reasons, the Council’s Setting Aside Application was allowed and PNB’s Enforcement Application was dismissed. [66] Datuk Anandan prayed for RM30,000.00 costs for both applications which is equivalent to the amount of cost awarded by the Adjudicator. Mr. Suren countered with an offer of RM5,000.00 costs for each application, to which this Court agreed. PNB was accordingly ordered S/N I5l2nqPnFUqFwxkI90d9Gw to pay costs of RM5,000.00 to the Council for each application, subject to allocatur. Dated: 30 November 2022 (ALIZA SULAIMAN) Judge Construction Court 2 High Court Kuala Lumpur Counsels/ Solicitors: For the Plaintiff in O.S. No. WA-24C-129-08/2021 and the Defendant in O.S. No. WA-24C-138-08/2021: Suren Anandan Rajah a/l Ganeshanandan Messrs. Rajah Chambers Advocates & Solicitors Unit B-3-3A, Gateway Kiaramas No. 1, Jalan Desa Kiara Mont Kiara 50480 Kuala Lumpur S/N I5l2nqPnFUqFwxkI90d9Gw For the Plaintiff in O.S. No. WA-24C-138-08/2021 and the Defendant in O.S. No. WA-24C-129-08/2021: Datuk Anandan P. Thatchanamoorthy (Nur Fatin Farzana Binti Mohd Redzuan with him) Messrs. Nazrin Nasir T. Anand & Co. Advocates & Solicitors Tingkat 2S, Kompleks Perhentian Bas 44000 Kuala Kubu Bharu Selangor Darul Ehsan Cases, legislation and other sources referred to in the submissions by learned counsels and in the Grounds of Judgment: Cases: ACFM Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v Esstar Vision Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2016] MLJU 1776 Aedifice Partnership Ltd v Shah [2010] EWHC 2106 (TCC) Antah Schindler Sdn Bhd v. Golden Base Construction Sdn Bhd & Another Case [2020] MLRHU 891 Ardmore Construction Ltd v Taylor Woodrow Construction Ltd [2006] CSOH 3 S/N I5l2nqPnFUqFwxkI90d9Gw BAL (1996) Ltd v Taylor Woodrow Construction Ltd [2004] All ER (D) 218 (Feb) Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd v Lambeth London Borough Council [2002] EWHC 597 (TCC) BM City Realty & Construction Sdn Bhd v. Merger Insight (M) Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2016] MLRHU 914 Broadway Power Sdn Bhd v Eden Construction (M) Sdn Bhd [2020] MLRHU 900 Cantillon Ltd v Urvasco Ltd [2008] EWHC 282 (TCC) Encorp Iskandar Development Sdn. Bhd. v Konsortium Ipmines Merz Sdn. Bhd. and another summons [2020] MLJU 1503 Enra Engineering and Fabrication Sdn Bhd v Gemula Sdn Bhd and another case [2020] 7 MLJ 482 Integral Acres Sdn Bhd v BCEG International (M) Sdn Bhd and other cases [2021] MLJU 1889 Lion Pacific Sdn Bhd v Pestech Technology Sdn Bhd and another case [2020] MLJU 2308 S/N I5l2nqPnFUqFwxkI90d9Gw London and Amsterdam Properties Ltd v Waterman Partnership Ltd [2003] EWHC 3059 (TCC) McAlpine PPS Pipeline Systems Joint Venture v Transco Plc [2004] EWHC 2030 (QB) Mecright Ltd v T.A. Morris Developments Ltd [2001] Adj.L.R. 06/22 Mei He Development Sdn Bhd v. Eosh Industries Sdn Bhd & Another Case [2021] MLRHU 2554 MRCB Builders Sdn Bhd v. SMM Resources Sdn Bhd & Another Case [2021] MLRHU 1414 OSC Building Services Ltd v Interior Dimensions Contracts Ltd [2009] All ER