Majlis Peguam Malaysia v Rajehgopal a/l Velu (02(f)-55-08/2015(B))

1 IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF MALAYSIA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CIVIL APPEAL NO 02(f)-55-08/2015(B) BETWEEN

1. MAJLIS PEGUAM MALAYSIA .. APPELLANT

1. RAJEHGOPAL A/L VELU

2. GANASHALINGAM A/L RAJAH .. RESPONDENTS [IN THE APPEAL COURT OF MALAYSIA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CIVIL APPEAL NO. B-02(W)-452-03/2015 BETWEEN RAJEHGOPAL A/L VELU .. APPELLANT GANASHALINGAM A/L RAJAH .. RESPONDENT MAJLIS PEGUAM MALAYSIA .. INTERVENER/ RESPONDENT] CORUM RICHARD MALANJUM, CJSS AHMAD BIN HJ MAAROP, FCJ ABU SAMAH BIN NORDIN, FCJ RAMLY BIN HJ ALI, FCJ ZAHARAH BINTI IBRAHIM, FCJ 2 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

1. The appellant in the present appeal before us, the Bar Council, Malaysia, was the intervener in the proceedings in the courts below. The 1st respondent was an advocate and solicitor practising under the name and style of Messrs. Rajehgopal Velu & Associates. He was found guilty of misconduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor by the Disciplinary Board (the DB) under section 94(3)(o) of the Legal Profession Act 1976 (the LPA) and was suspended from practice as an advocate and solicitor for a period of 12 months. His appeal to the High Court was dismissed, but later was allowed by the Court of Appeal. Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeal, the appellant appealed to this court. Hence the present appeal before us. We heard and allowed the appeal on 29.6.2016 but with a reduced period of suspension of 6 months with effect from 21 days from the date of the order with no order as to costs. We shall now give our reasons for the decision. 3 Factual Background 2. On 21.7.2013, the 2nd respondent, one Ganashalingam a/l Rajah wrote a letter of complaint against the conduct of the 1st respondent, to the DB (the Complaint).

3. The Complaint was about the 1st respondent who had attested 2 signatures in a property transfer form (Form 14A). The signatures were purportedly those of the late Mdm. Maheswari a/p Veerappoo (the mother of the 2nd respondent), and one Mdm. Ponnamah a/p Chinniah, as the vendors. The late Mdm. Maheswari had already passed away at the time the 1st respondent attested the alleged execution of the said Form 14A, while Mdm. Ponnamah claimed that she did not at any time sign the said Form 14A. The complainant, in his letter, claimed that there was a ‘penipuan’ committed by the 1st respondent, as a result the complainant had lost the property to one Soo Chee Ming, who was the purchaser as stated in the said Form 14A.

4. An Investigating Tribunal (IT) was appointed on 23.6.2005 to investigate into the matter. The IT had on 29.6.2005, written a 4 letter to the 1st respondent seeking his written explanation. In his letter of explanation dated 6.7.2015 to the IT, the 1st respondent stated, among others:

5.

29. The IT heard the Complaint on 2.8.2005, 29.8.2005, 14.9.2005,

9.2005 and 17.10.2005, and after considering the 1st respondent’s letter of explanation and giving him every opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses of the complainant (and indeed his solicitor had cross-examined them), recommended that there should be a formal investigation by the Disciplinary Committee (DC) on the matter.

6. On 20.3.2006, the DC was appointed and heard the Complaint on 20.6.2006 and 28.6.2006. After hearing the parties the DC made inter alia the following findings: “Apart from the fact that the respondent had attested the signatures of the transferors without seeing them, there is also the question of whether the respondent was involved in the fraud perpetrated on the owners of the property which resulted in the transfer of the property to the purchaser. On this issue, we find that there is 6 insufficient evidence to prove that the respondent has intentionally participated in the fraud perpetrated on the owners of the property. Notwithstanding that there is insufficient evidence to show that the purchaser has intentionally participated in the fraud, the fact remains that the respondent has acted unprofessionally in attesting the signatures of the owners whom he did not witness actually signing the transfer.”

7. The DC accordingly found the 1st respondent guilty of conduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor under section 94(3)(o) of the LPA and recommended that he be suspended from practice as an advocate and solicitor for a period of 6 months.

8. The DB heard the matter on 20.6.2006 and 28.6.2006 in the presence of the complainant and his counsel as well as the 1st respondent and his counsel pursuant to section 103D (2) of the LPA. The DB having agreed with the DC that the 1st respondent was guilty under section 94(3)(o) of the LPA, imposed a greater punishment and suspended the 1st 7 respondent from practice as an advocate and solicitor of the High Court of Malaya for a period of 12 months. The suspension was to take effect 21 days from the date of the order (16.5.2014). At the High Court 9. Dissatisfied with the DB’s decision, the 1st respondent appealed to the High Court. At the High Court, the 1st respondent raised the following issues:

10. On the first issue the learned trial judge found that it was not fatal and it did not hamper the defence of the 1st respondent as he was very much aware of the Complaint against him; and the Complaint itself was a sufficient notice on the matter facing him.

11. On the second issue, the trial judge found that it was of no consequence to the Complaint faced by the 1st respondent. The trial judge was of the view that whether Miss Abigail testified or not it did not take away the fact that the 1st respondent did not deny that he had attested the signatures of the vendors in their absence; and the non-denial of the 1st respondent amounted to an admission to the Complaint against him in respect of which he was given full liberty to explain, and therefore there was no breach of natural justice. 9

12. On the third issue, the trial judge, applying the provisions of section 211 of the National Land Code 1965 and the decision in Albert Chew v. Hong Leong Finance Bhd [2001] 4 CLJ 419, held that it was a mandatory requirement for the person authorised to attest a signature to ensure that the instrument in question was signed by the real person before him.

13. On this issue, the trial judge said: “I could locate no provision in the National Land Code as contended by the plaintiff (1st respondent) which allows attestation based on trust and in the absence of the person executing the document.”

14. In the upshot, the trial judge dismissed the 1st respondent’s appeal.

15. At the Court of Appeal The 1st respondent then appealed to the Court of Appeal against the decision of the High Court. At the Court of Appeal, the 1st respondent raised two main grounds, namely:

16. The Court of Appeal allowed the 1st respondent’s appeal on 4.8.2015 and held that a charge must be precisely formulated and framed to include specific accusation against the 1st respondent who had the right to know and must have notice of the very nature of the allegations against him at the first opportunity.

17. The Court of Appeal also held that the DC had acted outside the scope of powers granted to it, which was to inquire into the Complaint of fraud, when it held that the 1st respondent had acted unprofessionally and was guilty of misconduct under section 94(3)(o) of the LPA in attesting the signatures in question which was not the subject matter of the Complaint. The Court of Appeal was “constrained to hold that the DC’s decision is null and void for illegality” and therefore the decision of the DB (including the imposition of the suspension 11 order of 12 months on the 1st respondent) was also null and void.

18. Before this court Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeal, the intervener appealed to this court. At the hearing of the appeal before us parties raised 3 issues, namely-

19. It is not in dispute that a letter of complaint dated 21.7.2003 was sent by the complainant, the 2nd respondent in this 12 appeal, alleging misconduct committed by the 1st respondent as an advocate and solicitor in attesting the signatures of the alleged vendors one Mdm. Maheswari and Mdm. Ponnamah in the related Form 14A without seeing them sign in his presence.

20. To better understand the true meaning of the Complaint in detail, it is important to reproduce the full content of the letter in its original text in Bahasa Malaysia: “Ganashalingam A/L Rajah No 16, Jalan Dato’ Yusof Shahabudin 4, Taman Sentosa, 41200 Klang, Selangor Darul Ehsan Tel: 012-2176860 21/7/03 Lembaga Tatatertib Peguam-Peguam 9th Floor, Wisma Maran 28, Medan Pasar, 50050 Kuala Lumpur Tuan, Per: Aduan Tentang Salahlaku Peguam Nama: V. Rajehgopal Tempat Beramal: Rajehgopal Velu & Partners, No. 41, Mezzanine Floor, Wisma Valiappa, Jalan Dato’ Hamzah, Klang, Selangor (Tel: 03-33723804) Penipuan Penyaksian Tandatangan di atas Borang 14A Pindahmilik Hartanah di bawah hakmilik GM 434, Lot No. 343, Mukim Batang Berjuntai, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan Pemilik-Pemilik asal: Ponnamah a/p Chinniah Maheswary a/p Veerappoo _________________________________________________________ 13 Saya merujuk kepada perkara di atas. Saya mewakili ibu saya, Maheswari a/p Veerappoo yang telah meninggal dunia pada 10.9.94. Dukacita saya maklumkan kepada pihak tuan bahawa peguam yang tersebut di atas telah melakukan satu penipuan dalam menyaksikan tandatangan ibu saya (Maheswari a/p Veerappoo) dan Ponnamah a/p Chinniah bagi pindahmilik ke atas hartanah tersebut di atas. Dalam borang tersebut, dinyatakan bahawa tarikh beliau menyaksikan Ponnamah A/P Chinniah dan ibu saya menandatangani borang pindahmilik tersebut adalah pada 4.3.02. Sedangkan pada masa itu, ibu saya telah meninggal dunia. Beliau meninggal dunia pada 10.4.94. Manakala Ponnamah a/p Chinniah tersebut pada bila-bila masa tidak pernah menandatangnai borang pindahmilik tersebut. Oleh itu, tandatangan beliau dan ibu saya tersebut telah dipalsukan. Memandangkan ibu saya telah meninggal dunia pada 10.4.94 dan Ponnamah a/p Chinniah tidak pernah menandatangani borang pindahmilik terebut, maka peguam V. Rajehgopal tersebut telah melakukan satu penipuan bahawa beliau telah menyaksikan Ponnamah a/p Chinniah dan si mati menandatangani borang pindahmilik tersebut. Akibat daripada pemalsuan tersebut, hakmilik hartanah tersebut telah dipindahkan kepada seorang bernama Soo Chee Ming. Berikutan perkara ini juga, Ponnamah a/p Chinniah tersebut telah membuat laporan polis. Bersama-sama ini saya lampirkan dokumen-dokumen yang berikut untuk rujukan tuan:-

21. In essence, in the said letter of Complaint, the 2nd respondent made the following assertions:

23. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the High Court on this issue. The Court of Appeal expressed the view that: “the disciplinary proceedings initiated against an advocate and solicitor are serious and carry penal consequences such as a fine, suspension or being struck off the Roll of Advocates and Solicitors. Accordingly, we agree with the view in Abdullah Borhan v. Ketua Polis Melaka & Another (supra) that the charge 16 in question must be precisely formulated to include the specific accusation against the appellant who has the right to know and must have notice of the very nature of the charge at the first opportunity. This will enable the appellant to be forewarned with clarity and certainty the essential elements or ingredients against him in order to ensure that he can be forearmed in his defence for the purpose of directing all the evidence exclusively to the specific charge (see also the Privy Council’s opinion in B Surinder Singh Kanda v. The Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] (PC)). The view is that in a disciplinary process, the respondent is only required to respond to the charge and nothing else was approved in Lim Teng Ee Joyce v. Singapore Medical Council [2005] SGHC 129.”

24. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted before us that there was no requirement under the Legal Profession (Disciplinary Proceedings) (Investigating Tribunal and Disciplinary Committee) Rules 1994 (the 1994 Rules) requiring charges to be framed against an advocate and 17 solicitor in disciplinary proceedings; thus an omission to frame a formal charge against the 1st respondent in the present case would not amount to a breach of the LPA as there cannot a breach where no such requirement exists. The appellant contended that what was essential was that the 1st respondent is supplied with sufficient material particulars to enable him to meet the allegations made against him in the Complaint. The appellant cited (2) authorities to support this point, namely: Aziana Uda Bahari v. Gan Kong You [2009] 8 CLJ 438 (High Court) and Lau Keen Fai v. Lim Ban Kay [2011] 3 CLJ 213 (High Court).

25. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent, on the other hand, submitted that section 103B of the LPA provides that an inquiry must be carried out into a written complaint and its findings shall be made expeditiously. It was further submitted “that merely because the word “inquiry” is used in the Legal Profession Act 1976, it does not follow that no charge needs to be framed for the solicitor to answer.” 18

26. Learned counsel further submitted that the requirement for a charge to be framed was so obvious that Parliament in its wisdom did not think it necessary to say so in express terms. It was also submitted that a solicitor is entitled to know not just the facts he would have to meet but also the appropriate “head” of grave impropriety or misconduct as highlighted in section 94(3) of the LPA that he had to face in any disciplinary proceedings against him.

27. It was further submitted by learned counsel that the importance of a charge, in a case of an advocate and solicitor facing disciplinary proceedings under the LPA must be appreciated in the context of the LPA, and the courts in Malaysia and Singapore have emphasized the need and importance of framing a charge in the proceedings. To support his proposition, learned counsel relied on the following authorities, namely: Yong Nguk Fan & Anor v. Toh Boon Pin & Ors. [2006] 7 CLJ 296; Lim Teng Ee Joyce v. Singapore Medical Council [2005] 3 SLR 709; Tan Tiang Hin Jerry v. Singapore Medical Council [2000] 2 SLR 274; Abdullah Borhan v. Ketua Polis Melaka & Anor [2008] 9 CLJ 19 605; Raja Abdul Malek Muzaffar Shah bin Raja Shahruzzaman v. Setiausaha Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis & Ors. [1995] 1 MLJ 308; and Saufee A Rahman v. Che Yusof Che Ngah & Ors. [2014] 7 CLJ 691.

28. Learned counsel also submitted that even though the LPA did not have an express provision for a charge to be framed, common law will come into the picture and supply the deficiency so as not to allow a person be punished without being heard. The case of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works (1861-73) All ER Rep 1554 was cited in support of the proposition.

29. We agree with learned counsel for the appellant that there is no provision in the LPA or the 1994 Rules requiring a charge to be specifically framed or preferred against an advocate and solicitor in disciplinary proceedings.

30. We also agree that in disciplinary proceedings under the LPA, the advocate and solicitor concerned must be given an opportunity of being heard. This is a basic rule of natural justice which must be observed. The advocate and solicitor 20 concerned shall not be punished without being heard. On this point, the Privy Council in B Surinder Singh Kanda (supra) had aptly remarked (which we agree)- “If the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth anything, it must carry with it a right in the accused man to know the case which is made against him. He must know what evidence has been given and what statements have been made affecting him: and then he must be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict them.”

31. At the outset, it must be stressed that disciplinary proceedings against a solicitor under the LPA are not proceedings in a criminal court of law. The proceedings although quasi–judicial in nature need not emulate the strict adversarial procedure practised in a criminal court (see: Jerald Allen Gomez v. Shencourt Sdn Bhd (Majlis Peguam, Intervernor) [2006] 2 MLJ 343). On this point we agree with Abdull Hamid Embong J (as he then was), in Jerald Allen Gormez (supra) when his Lordship commented: “To say that, in the absence of such procedures, the disciplinary 21 committee should adhere strictly to the procedures in the proceedings of a criminal court, would be implying some requirements not intended by statute.”

32. The rules of natural justice in disciplinary proceedings should not be governed by the adversarial system of justice of criminal courts but should be inquisitorial or investigatory in nature. Inquisitorial or investigative proceedings are not inconsistent with the rules of natural justice (see: Federal Court’s decision in Lembaga Jurutera Malaysia v. Leong Pui Kun [2009] 2 MLJ 36).

33. It is a trite principle that a disciplinary committee of a professional body is entitled to conduct its disciplinary hearing in respect of a member of the body in whatever way it deems appropriate provided that the method or manner it adopts is not in breach of any specific provisions of the relevant statutes or regulations and does not result in a denial of natural justice to the member concerned.

34. In Lim Ko & Anor v. Board of Architects [1966] 2 MLJ 80, the Federal Court held, inter alia, that the proceedings of 22 disciplinary tribunals or committees conducting an inquiry are by no means bound by the strict rules which apply to criminal trials. A legalistic approach is not appropriate in those proceedings. The same principle was adopted by the Federal Court in Tan Hee Lock v. Commission of Federal Capital & Ors. [1973] 1 MLJ 2; Tanjong Jara Sdn Bhd v. Minister of Labour and Manpower & Anor [1987] 1 MLJ 124; and by the Court of Appeal in Haji Ali bin Haji Othman v. Telekom Malaysia Bhd [2003] 3 MLJ 29.

35. In the present case, we agree that the 1st respondent was entitled to know the details of the allegations made against him in the letter of Complaint at the very earliest stage, i.e. before the Investigative Tribunal started its investigation or inquiry. This would enable the 1st respondent to prepare his explanation and later to be heard at all stages of the proceedings thereafter. The statements in the letter of Complaint must convey with sufficient clarity and certainty on the nature of all the allegations made against him. The 1st respondent must be able to meet every relevant ingredient of 23 the Complaint and must be given opportunity to contradict them.

36. In Lau Keen Fai v. Lim Ban Kay [2011] 3 CLJ 213, the High Court held: “(1) The LPA does not provide specifically that the DC is required to frame a charge. Thus an omission to frame a formal charge would not amount to a breach of the LPA. There was no requirement that it ought to be framed in any particular form or that it ought to take the form of a charge framed in a criminal proceeding. What was essential was that the person against whom the misconduct was alleged was supplied with sufficient material particulars to enable him to meet the allegation. Herein, all the requirements of a charge were found in the letter of complaint that the DB had forwarded to the appellant. The appellant had sufficient notice of the complaint against him. Despite the absence of a formal charge the appellant was able to meet the complaint lodged against him. The absence of 24 a charge did not occasion any procedural unfairness or a breach of the rules of natural justice as the appellant had not been deprived of the opportunity to contradict the complaint.” We agree with the above.

37. In considering whether there was any prejudice or denial of natural justice to the 1st respondent, the court is to look at the substance, rather than the form, to determine whether the 1st respondent had been informed of all the material ingredients and facts relating to the Complaint lodged against him. It does not necessarily mean that it must only be by way of a formal charge framed against him. The 1st respondent needed to be informed sufficiently of the facts and particulars of the misconduct complained of to enable him to explain and exculpate himself. That is his right and it forms an integral part of the rules of natural justice.

38. The relevant facts and material particulars that need to be informed to the 1st respondent are particulars which, if established, are capable of showing the elements of 25 misconduct mentioned in the Complaint. In this respect, we agree with Bowen LJ in Leeson v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration [1889] 43 Ch D 366 where he said: “With respect to the charge made, the charge of which he has notice, it is a charge of infamous conduct in some professional respect, and the particulars which should be brought to his attention in order to enable him to meet that charge ought to be particulars of conduct which, if established, is capable of being viewed by honest persons as conduct which is infamous. That is all.”

39. Our view is that, any complaint against an advocate and solicitor must comply with the requirements under rule 3 of the 1994 Rules which provides: “3. Contents of Complaints

(1) A complaint shall be made in writing by the complainant or his solicitor.

(2) A complaint shall contain the following:

40. The Complaint against the 1st respondent in this case fulfilled all the above requirements under rule 3 of the 1994 Rules. It was sufficient to give opportunity to the 1st respondent to exercise his right to be heard and to explain and exculpate himself, even though it was not presented in the form of a formal charge. Even if a formal charge is drawn up, such charge would inevitably be a regurgitation of the facts and particulars contained in the letter of Complaint.

41. The 1st respondent in the present case knew fully well the details of the allegation made against him as stated in the letter of Complaint. From the records of proceedings made available to us, we find that the 1st respondent was 27 represented by his counsel at all levels of the proceedings. He took part in the proceedings. Based on the details of his participation in the proceedings and his letter of explanation dated 6.7.2005, it is clear that he had sufficient notice of all the material facts of the Complaint made against him. The conduct of the 1st respondent’s right from the beginning, was inconsistent with a person who did not have sufficient knowledge of the Complaint against him. The absence of a charge specifically framed against him did not occasion any procedural unfairness or breach of the rules of natural justice. He was not prejudiced in any manner. He was not deprived of the opportunity to contradict the Complaint against him.

42. As stated earlier, there is no requirement either under the LPA or under the 1994 Rules requiring a charge to be framed against the 1st respondent. The DB and DC was at liberty to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings against the 1st respondent without having to specifically frame a formal charge against him provided, to borrow the words of Nik Hashim FCJ, in Lembaga Jurutera Malaysia v. Leong Pui Kun (supra), “the procedure adopted was not in breach of any 28 specific provision of the Act and did not result in a denial of natural justice” to the 1st respondent.

43. Apparently, the Court of Appeal in finding that a formal charge needed to be specifically framed against the 1st respondent was relying on the authority of Abdullah Borhan v. Ketua Polis Melaka & Anor [2008] 9 CLJ 605 where the High Court in Melaka in dealing with disciplinary proceedings against a police officer ruled that “the procedural requirements in drafting a charge meant for a criminal trial would apply with equal force to a disciplinary charge such as in the instant case because both of them share the common denominator i.e. penal consequences”; and “It is trite law that the charge in question must be precisely formulated to include the specific accusation against the plaintiff who has the right to know and must have notice of the very nature of the charge at the first opportunity”. The same authority were also relied upon by the 1st respondent’s counsel in his submissions before us in the appeal. 29

44. With respect, the Court of Appeal had failed to notice that the disciplinary proceedings in that case were against a police officer based on the Police (Conduct and Discipline) (Junior Police Officers and Constables) Regulations 1970, where regulation 3(1) of the said Regulations sets out expressly a mandatory requirement that “A charge shall be framed in accordance with the offence as prescribed in the Schedule. The charge shall describe the offence briefly and identify the officer with the unlawful act or omission charged”. In the present case, we are dealing with disciplinary proceedings against an advocate and solicitor under the LPA. As stated earlier, there is no express provision either in the LPA or the 1994 Rules mandating such requirement. Therefore the issue of framing a charge such as is required under the Police (Conduct and Discipline) (Junior Police Officers and Constables) Regulation 1970 does not arise in the case before us and failure to draft such a charge against the 1st respondent does not amount to a breach of the law or relevant regulations.

45. The Court of Appeal also relied on the decision of the Privy Council in B. Surinder Singh Kanda v. The Government of the 30 Federation of Malaya [1962] MLJ 169 (PC) to support its finding on the requirement of having specific charge framed against the 1st respondent.

46. Our observation is that the Privy Council in that case did not deal with the issue of a charge to be framed against the police officer in the disciplinary proceedings. It is more of a case of a complaint by the police officer that he was not given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the disciplinary proceedings against him. On that issue the Privy Council ruled: “Applying these principles their Lordships are of opinion that Inspector Kanda was not in this case given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. They find themselves in agreement with the view expressed by Rigby J. in these words: “In my view, the furnishing of a copy of the Findings of the Board of Inquiry to the Adjudicating Officer appointed to hear the disciplinary charges, coupled with the fact that no such copy was furnished to the plaintiff amounted to such a denial of natural justice as to entitle this Court to set aside those 31 proceedings on this ground. It amounted, in my view, to a failure to afford the plaintiff a reasonable opportunity of being heard in answer to the charge preferred against him which resulted in his dismissal.”

47. The issue in that case was that a copy of the Findings of the Board of Inquiry which contained statements of the witnesses, was only given to the Adjudicating Officer but not to the officer charged. Similar complaint does not arise in the present case before us. In short, that case did not support the Court of Appeal’s finding pertaining to the requirement to frame a formal charge against the 1st respondent in the present case.

48. The Court of Appeal also relied on the case of Lim Teng Ee Joyce v. Singapore Medical Council (supra), to support its finding on the same issue relating to the framing of a specific charge against the 1st respondent and that in a disciplinary process, the 1st respondent is only required to respond to the charge and nothing else. In that case the court in Singapore was dealing with disciplinary proceedings involving a medical practitioner in Singapore. 32

49. It must be noted that it was a mandatory requirement in a disciplinary proceedings involving medical practitioners in Singapore that a charge be framed against the practitioner as required under rule 27(2) of the Medical Registration Regulations in Singapore, and the charge shall first be read out to the practitioner; and that rule 35(1) of the Regulations empowers a disciplinary tribunal to alter a charge or frame a new charge whether in substitution for or in addition to an existing charge at any time before it makes a finding. Clearly, there were statutory provisions mandating such requirement. Again, we find that this authority did not support the Court of Appeal’s finding on the issue.

50. As stated earlier, disciplinary proceeding involving an advocate and solicitor under the LPA or the 1994 Rules cannot be equated to criminal proceedings in a criminal court of law, especially relating to the framing of a formal charge against the accused person. Section 173(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code (the CPC) provides that “when the accused appears or is brought before the court a charge containing the particulars 33 of the offence of which he is accused shall be framed and read and explained to him, and he shall be asked whether he is guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.” The form of a charge, particulars as to time, place and person contained in a charge, and the manner of committing an offence to be stated in a charge are statutorily provided under sections 152, 153 and 154 of the CPC. These are mandatory statutory requirements provided for by law which must be complied with in criminal proceedings in a criminal court of law. However, there is no such requirement under the LPA or the 1994 Rules relating to disciplinary proceedings involving an advocate and solicitor. Second Issue: Whether findings of the DC and DB fall within the scope of the Complaint

51. This issue was touched upon by the Court of Appeal in its judgment. In paragraph 17 of its judgment, the Court of Appeal ruled as follows: “In this instance, the DC was appointed to conduct an inquiry into the Complaint pursuant to s. 103B of the LPA

1976. The appellant was exonerated of the Complaint of 34 fraud against him. The finding that the appellant had acted unprofessionally in attesting the signatures in question was not the subject matter of the Complaint. In our view, the DC had acted outside the terms of power granted to it, which is to inquire into the Complaint of fraud. The DC’s finding that the appellant is guilty of misconduct was made for an extraneous purpose (R Rama Chandran v. Industrial Court [1997] 1 MLJ 145; Ranjit Kaur Gopal Singh v. Hotel Excelsior [2010] 8 CLJ 1). Accordingly, we are constrained to hold that the DC’s decision is null and void for illegality.”

52. Learned counsel for the appellant in his written submissions before us submitted as follow: “The findings and recommendation made by the DC and the making of the DB Order were within the scope of the Complaint as they arose from facts based on the Complaint, which were put to and admitted by R1. The Court of Appeal erred in finding that the unprofessional manner in which R1 attested the 35 signatures on the Form 14A was not the subject matter of the Complaint. Similarly, although the DC found that there was insufficient evidence to prove that R1 had intentionally participated in the fraud, the undeniable fact remains that R1 had attested the Form 14A without the presence of R2’s late mother and Ponnamah.”

53. In order to appreciate and decide on this issue, it is necessary to refer to and read the full contents of the letter of Complaint in question.

54. The letter of Complaint in itself, does not contain the word “fraud” although the word was used throughout the proceedings right from the beginning by counsel as well the courts below. The gist of the Complaint as can be gathered and understood from the full text of the letter is that the 1st respondent as an advocate and solicitor (in its original text) “telah melakukan satu penipuan dalam menyaksikan tandatangan ibu saya (Maheswari a/p Veerapoo) dan Ponnamah a/p Chinniah bagi pindahmilik ke atas hartanah 36 tersebut di atas ….. Dalam borang tersebut, dinyatakan bahawa tarikh beliau menyaksikan Ponnamah a/p Chinniah dan ibu saya menandatangani borang pindahmilik tersebut adalah pada 4.3.2002. Sedangkan pada masa itu, ibu saya telah meninggal dunia. Beliau meninggal dunia pada 10.4.1999, manakala Ponnamah a/p Chinniah tersebut pada bila-bila masa tidak pernah menandatangani borang pindahmilik tersebut. …. maka peguam V. Rajegopal tersebut telah melakukan satu penipuan bahawa beliau telah menyaksikan Ponnamah a/p Chinniah dan si mati menandatangani borang pindah milik tersebut”. In short, the Complaint was that the 1st respondent as an advocate and solicitor had attested the relevant Form 14A for the transfer of the land in question without the presence of the late Mdm. Maheswari a/p Veerapoo and Mdm. Ponnamah a/p Chinniah. The ‘penipuan’ mentioned in that letter clearly refers to that conduct of the 1st respondent.

55. The above complaint or allegation was not disputed by the 1st respondent. He admitted attesting the relevant Form 14A without the presence of the two vendors and also admitted 37 that he had acted negligently in the circumstances. His only excuse was that he did so in trust and reliance of his freelance staff, one Rengasamy @ Balasundram a/l Veerapan, whom he had known and trusted for the past 10 years.

56. We therefore agree with learned counsel for the appellant that the findings and recommendations made by the DC and the making of the DB order that the 1st respondent was guilty of conduct which is unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor under section 94(3)(o) of the LPA in attesting the said Form 14A without the presence of the vendors were within the scope of the Complaint. The Court of Appeal erred in finding that the 1st respondent’s conduct which the DC found to fall under section 94(3)(o) of the LPA was not the subject matter of the Compliant and that the DC had acted outside the terms of power granted to it, which was to inquire into the Complaint of fraud. Therefore that finding cannot stand. Third Issue: Enhancement of punishment by the DB without giving reasons

57. This issue was raised in the 1st respondent’s submissions before us. Counsel for the 1st respondent submitted that the 38 DB erred in enhancing the punishment against the 1st respondent of suspension from practice as an advocate and solicitor of the High Court of Malaya from a period of 6 months as recommended by the DC to a period of 12 months with effect from 21 days from the date of the order (16.5.2014), without giving any reasons. This, according to learned counsel, was in breach of section 103D(1) of the LPA.

58. The facts relating to this issue from the records of the proceedings are not in dispute, i.e. the DB has not given any reasons for rejecting the DC’s recommendation and enhancing the suspension period from 6 months as recommended by the DC to 12 months. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent contended that the DB had exceeded its power for failing to give reasons and therefore the order as to the suspension period must fall. Learned counsel relied on the current provisions of section 103(1) of the LPA which in effect provides that “After consideration of the report of the Disciplinary Committee, the Disciplinary Board may make an order affirming or rejecting the finding or recommendation of the Disciplinary Committee and if the Disciplinary Board 39 rejects the finding or recommendation of the Disciplinary Committee, the Disciplinary Board shall record the reason for the rejection.”

59. We agree that under the current provisions of section 103D(1) of the LPA, the DB shall record the reasons if it rejects the recommendation made by the DC. It is a mandatory requirement. However, it must be noted that the said requirement was only inserted into the section by an amendment to the LPA vide the Legal Profession (Amendment) Act 2012 (Act A1444) which came into effect on 3.6.2014 vide P.U. (B) 262/2014. There was no indication that the amendment was to take effect retrospectively.

60. The disciplinary proceedings on the matter before the DB was conducted on 16.5.2014 (prior to the effective date of the amendment to section 103D(1) of the LPA). The suspension order was also made on 16.5.2014. At that time, there was no statutory requirement in section 103D(1) or other provisions of the LPA which required the DB to give and to record its reason if it chooses to reject the recommendation made by the 40 DC. There was no statutory duty or obligation to do so. Therefore the DB cannot be said to have exceeded its power for failing to give reasons for its rejection of the DC’s recommendation.

61. However, in the present appeal, based on the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the period of suspension of (6) months imposed on the 1st respondent as recommended by the DC, is more reasonable and appropriate. The fact that the 1st respondent had admitted to his negligent conduct in the matter question and that there was no finding of fraud on his part, coupled with the fact that he was relying on his freelance staff one Rengasamy @ Balasundram whom he had known and trusted for the past 10 years should be considered as good mitigating factors for him. Conclusion

62. In the upshot, we would answer the issues before us as follows: 41

63. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the Order of the Court of Appeal. We hold that the 1st respondent was in breach of section 94(3)(o) of the LPA. We make an order that 42 the 1st respondent be suspended from practice as an advocate and solicitor in the High Court of Malaya for a period of (6) month to take effect from 21 days from the date of this order. We make no order as to costs (as agreed by the parties). Dated: 29 JUN 2016 sgd RAMLY HJ ALI FEDERAL COURT JUDGE MALAYSIA Counsels:

1. Sean Yeow (with Hoi Jack S’ng) Messrs. Lee Hishamuddin Allen & Gledhill ... for the Appellant

2. T. Gunaseelan and Ramanathan Velu Messrs. Rama Velu & Associates … for the 1st Respondent Cases referred to:

1. Albert Chew v. Hong Leong Finance Bhd [2001] 4 CLJ 419 2. B Surinder Singh Kanda v. The Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] MLJ 169 (PC)

3. Aziana Uda Bahari v. Gan Kong You [2009] 8 CLJ 438 43

4. Lau Keen Fai v. Lim Ban Kay [2011] 3 CLJ 213 5. Yong Nguk Fan & Anor v. Toh Boon Pin & Ors. [2006] 7 CLJ 296 6. Lim Teng Ee Joyce v. Singapore Medical Council [2005] 3 SLR 709 7. Tan Tiang Hin Jerry v. Singapore Medical Council [2000] 2 SLR 274 8. Abdullah Borhan v. Ketua Polis Melaka & Anor [2008] 9 CLJ 605 9. Raja Abdul Malek Muzaffar Shah bin Raja Shahruzzaman v. Setiausaha Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis & Ors. [1995] 1 MLJ 308

10. Saufee A Rahman v. Che Yusof Che Ngah & Ors. [2014] 7 CLJ

691.

11. Jerald Allen Gomez v. Shencourt Sdn Bhd (Majlis Peguam,

12. Intervener) [2006] 2 MLJ 343 Lembaga Jurutera Malaysia v. Leong Pui Kun [2009] 2 MLJ 36

13. Lim Ko & Anor v. Board of Architects [1966] 2 MLJ 80

14. Tan Hee Lock v. Commission of Federal Capital & Ors. [1973] 1 MLJ 2

15. Tanjong Jara Sdn Bhd v. Minister of Labour and Manpower & Anor [1987] 1 MLJ 124 44

16. Haji Ali bin Haji Othman v. Telekom Malaysia Bhd [2003] 3 MLJ 29

17. Leeson v. General Council of Medical Education and

18. Registration [1889] 43 Ch D 366 Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works [1861-73] All ER Rep.

1554. Legislations Referred to:

1. Legal Profession Act 1976: section 94(3)(o), section 103D (2)

2. National Land Code 1965: section 211 3. Criminal Procedure Code: sections 152, 153, 154 and 173(a)