Malayan Banking Berhad v Wong Chee Kian (BA-24FC-1253-12/2023)

Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012; ANTARA MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD (196001000142) …PLAINTIF DAN WONG CHEE KIAN (NO. K/P: 630408-08-6191) …DEFENDAN DAN

BARIAH BINTI NGALIMI

NAZLINSHA BINTI MOHD SHAHBUDDIN (NO. K/P: 820923-14-5384) …PENCELAH-PENCELAH JUDGMENT Introduction [1] In many land disputes, the fault does not necessarily rest with the contesting parties, but rather with a third party who is often no longer involved. Unfortunately, this leaves the “innocent” parties to navigate the litigation, with one ultimately suffering the unjust consequence of losing the land. This case is a clear illustration of such a scenario. [2] The relevant facts in the present application before this Court are straightforward. The Plaintiff successfully obtained an Order for Sale over a parcel of land charged to it by the Defendant. The Interveners, through a Notice of Application in Enclosure 16, have applied to the Court to set aside or stay the Order for Sale. [3] In this case, the Plaintiff and the Interveners are the contesting parties and both claim to be the “innocent” parties, with the Defendant portrayed as the wrongdoer. The Overriding Issues [4] The primary issue is whether the Interveners are entitled to have the Order for Sale set aside or stayed. [5] Arising from the above are the following secondary issues, namely:

Whether the Plaintiff is a “purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration” within the meaning of section 340(3) of the National Land Code?;

Whether there are additional duties and obligations imposed on the Plaintiff as a subsequent purchaser?; and

Whether the Plaintiff has acquired an indefeasible interest in the land? The Respective Submissions [6] The crux of the Interveners’ main ground in support of its application is premised on the argument that they are the rightful and beneficial owner of the land that has been fraudulently transferred to the Defendant, who subsequently committed further transgression in charging the land to the Plaintiff. [7] In support of their application in Enclosure 16, the Interveners alluded to a suit it had filed against the Defendant at the Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court (“Suit 340”) in which it had obtained judgment against the Defendant. [8] The Interveners also drew this Court’s attention to a separate suit that they have commenced in the Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court (“Suit 437”) against the Defendant, the Plaintiff and the Pejabat Tanah. This suit in the Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court will be transferred to the Kuala Lumpur High Court and is pending disposal. [9] Based on the above, the Interveners urged this Court to grant them the reliefs prayed for in Enclosure 16. [10] For completeness, the Interveners’ prayers and grounds as per their Notice of Application in Enclosure 16 are as follows:

Bahawa

Jualan bertarikh 20-2-2024 yang dimasukkan di dalam tindakan ini diketepikan; dan/atau

Bahawa satu Perintah Penggantungan Saman Pemula bertarikh 15-12-2023 yang difailkan di sini, diberikan sementara menantikan pelupusan penuh Writ Saman baru yang akan difailkan oleh Pencelah-Pencelah ke atas Plaintif, Defendan serta Pejabat Tanah dan Galian Selangor bagi mendapatkan perintah untuk melaksanakan Penghakiman Ingkar bertarikh 16-10-2017 di bawah Writ Saman No. WA-A52NCVC-340-06/201 dan/atau untuk memutuskan isu berkenaan penentuan ketuanpunyaan hakmilik Hartanah tersebut; dan

Kos dalam kausa; dan

Lain-lain perintah dan relif yang didapati sesuai dan manfaat oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia ini. Alasan-alasan ringkas untuk menyokong permohonan ini adalah seperti berikut:-

Pencelah-Pencelah adalah pemilik yang sah Hartanah tersebut yang telah dipindahkan secara salah dan tidak sah melalui perbuatan ‘frod’/penipuan ke atas nama Defendan.

Defendan tidak mempunyai hak yang sah untuk mengadaikan Hartanah tersebut di bawah Gadaian No. Perserahan 83109/2010 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai ‘Gadaian tersebut’) kepada Plaintif dan Gadaian tersebut yang telah dibuat oleh Plaintif adalah ke atas satu hartanah yang telah dipindahmilik melalui perbuatan ‘frod’/penipuan oleh Defendan ke atas nama beliau dari nama Pencelah-Pencelah.

Melalui tindakan Writ Saman No. WA-A52NCVC-340-06/2017 di Mahkamah Sesyen Kuala Lumpur (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai Saman tersebut’) dalam mana Pencelah-Pencelah yang telah disaman sebagai Defendan-Defendan, telah mendapatkan satu Penghakiman Ingkar bertarikh 16-10-2017 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Penghakiman tersebut’) bagi Tuntutan Balas ke atas Defendan di atas.

Mahkamah Sesyen melalui Penghakiman tersebut telah memberikan Perintah-Perintah berikut: - i) Satu Perintah Deklarasi bahawa pemindahan dan/atau penukaran dan/atau pendaftaran hakmilik Hartanah tersebut ke atas nama Defendan pada 13-4-2010 melalui no. perserahan 34685/2010 adalah tidak sah dan terbatal; dan ii) Satu Perintah untuk mendaftarkan semula nama Pencelah-Pencelah sebagai pemilik berdaftar Hartanah tersebut; dan iii) Kos sebanyak RM8,000-00 dibayar oleh Defendan kepada Pencelah-Pencelah.

Defendan telah gagal dan/atau enggan dan/atau abai untuk melaksanakan Penghakiman tersebut malahan Defendan tidak dapat dihubungi dan dijejaki langsung semenjak 5 tahun yang lalu dan semua surat-menyurat, kertas-kertas kausa dari peguamcara terdahulu Pencelah-Pencelah kepada Defendan telah gagal diserahkan dengan sempurna sehinggalah pada 15-7-2024 apabila peguamcara Pencelah-Pencelah dihubungi oleh peguamcara Defendan.

Pencelah-Pencelah tidak pernah menjual dan/atau pindahmilik hakmilik Hartanah tersebut kepada Defendan pada mana-mana masa material, oleh itu Pencelah-Pencelah telah memasukkan kaveat persendirian ke atas Hartanah tersebut untuk menghalang apa-apa transaksi lanjut yang mungkin dibuat oleh Defendan ke atas Hartanah tersebut.

Defendan telah memalsukan tandatangan Pencelah-Pencelah di atas Borang 14A dan satu Perjanjian Jualan, oleh yang demikian Pencelah Pertama telah membuat laporan poli s untuk melaporkan tindakan pemalsuan tersebut.

Makanya, disebabkan perbuatan ‘frod’/penipuan Defendan, Hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik ke atas nama Defendan secara salah dan tidak sah sedangkan Pencelah-Pencelah adalah pemilik Hartanah tersebut yang sah.

Defendan telah merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi No. WA- 12ANCVC218-12/2017 dan selanjutnya telah memasukkan satu notis usul bagi mendapatkan Kebenaran merayu Mahkamah Rayuan No. W-08-248-06/2018 ke atas Penghakiman tersebut namun rayuan dan notis usul kebenaran merayu Defendan telah ditolak dan Penghakiman tersebut kekal sah dan terpakai sehingga kini.

Pencelah-Pencelah telah sebelum ini beberapa kali memohon untuk Defendan memindahmilik Hartanah tersebut ke atas nama Pencelah-Pencelah dan/atau menyerahkan salinan hakmilik asal Hartanah tersebut kepada peguamcara terdahulu Pencelah-Pencelah namun Defendan dengan niat jahat enggan berbuat demikian.

Pencelah-Pencelah telah membayar semua cukai taksiran dan cukai tanah terkini, dan bil cukai taksiran masih di atas nama Pencelah Pertama sehingga kini.

Pencelah-Pencelah juga melalui peguamcara terdahulu telah cuba untuk mendapatkan status terkini Gadaian tersebut dari Plantif juga untuk memaklumkan mengenai Penghakiman tersebut kepada Plaintif, namun Pencelah-Pencelah dimaklumkan bahawa tiada sebarang respon diperolehi dari pihak Plaintif.

Bahawa Pencelah-Pencelah mempunyai kepentingan langsung ke atas pemilikan Hartanah tersebut, oleh yang demikian PencelahPencelah ingin mendapatkan perintah bagi mengenepikan Perintah Jualan tersebut serta mendapatkan satu Perintah Penggantungan Saman Pemula bertarikh 15- 12-2023 di dalam tindakan ini, sementara menantikan pelupusan penuh Writ Saman baru yang akan difailkan oleh Pencelah-Pencelah ke atas Plaintif, Defendan serta Pejabat Tanah dan Galian Selangor bagi mendapatkan perintah untuk melaksanakan Penghakiman Ingkar bertarikh 16-10-2017 di bawah Writ Saman No. WA-A52NCVC-340-06/201 dan/atau untuk memutuskan isu berkenaan penentuan ketuanpunyaan hakmilik Hartanah tersebut (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai ‘Writ Saman baru’).

Pencelah-Pencelah memfailkan Writ Saman baru juga untuk mendapatkan Perintah-perintah dan/atau Pelepasan-pelepasan yang berkenaan bagi mendapatkan kembali hakmilik Hartanah tersebut dan supaya ianya didaftarkan semula ke atas nama Pencelah-Pencelah.

Bahawa pemindahan Hartanah tersebut ke atas nama Defendan melibatkan tindakan ‘frod’ dan penipuan, oleh yang demikian terdapat alasan kukuh dan bermerit untuk Pencelah-Pencelah mengenepikan Perintah Jualan tersebut kerana jelas terdapatnya sebab yang bertentangan (‘cause to the contrary”) dengan alasan yang sah untuk mengenepikan Perintah Jualan tersebut. Oleh yang demikian Pencelah-Pencelah perlu diberikan perintah untuk mengenepikan Perintah Jualan tersebut oleh Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini.

Bahawa sementara menunggu pelupusan Writ Saman baru tersebut, terdapat keperluan mendesak untuk satu Perintah Penggantungan diberikan ke atas Saman Pemula bertarikh 15-12-2023 di dalam tindakan ini bagi menghalang Plaintif mendapatkan satu Perintah Jualan baru dan/atau kemudiannya menetapkan lelongan awam baru, seki ranyapun Mahkamah YangMulia ini membenarkan Perintah mengenepikan Perintah Jualan tersebut.

Sekiranya Hartanah tersebut terjual semasa lelongan awam baru maka Hartanah tersebut mungkin tidak dapat dikembalikan kepada Pencelah-Pencelah kerana pembida yang berjaya selaku pembeli yang bona fide, tidak akan terikat dengan mana-mana Perintah di bawah prosiding ini.

Bahawa jelas terdapat keadaan istimewa (‘special circumstances’) yang membolehkan perintah penggantungan perlaksanaan diberikan kerana tindakan di sini melibatkan penjualan dan/atau pelupusan Hartanah tersebut.

Bahawa keseimbangan kemudahan adalah terletak kepada Pencelah-Pencelah kerana Perintah Pengenepian Perintah Jualan tersebut dan dan Perintah Penggantungan Saman Pemula di dalam tindakan ini tidak akan menjejaskan sebarang hak Plaintif dan tiada sebarang prejudis yang akan dialami oleh Plaintif.

Bahawa gantirugi adalah remedi yang tidak mencukupi kerana perkara utama di prosiding ini akan melibatkan penjualan Hartanah tersebut ke atas Pihak Ketiga iaitu Pembeli/Pembida Bona fide, dan melibatkan isu pemindahan Hartanah tersebut yang diperolehioleh Defendan secara salah dan tidak sah dan/atau melalui perbuatan ‘frod’/ penipuan. [11] It their submission, the Interveners also claimed that there exist “cause to the contrary” within the meaning of section 256(3) of the National Land Code, relying on the case of Low Lee Lian lwn Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd [1997] 1 AMR 1036; [1997] 2 CLJ 36; [1997] 1 MLJ 77; [1996] 2 MLRA 491. [12] The Plaintiff argued that as a “subsequent purchaser” its interest “tidak boleh disangkal”. The Plaintiff acknowledged that while “the title or interest of any such person or body shall not be indefeasible” under any one of the circumstances prescribed in section 340(2) of the National Land Code, conceding that the principle of deferred indefeasibility applies under our law, it argued that it has obtained an indefeasible interest pursuant to section 340(3) of the National Land Code. [13] The Plaintiff relied on the decisions of the Federal Court in CIMB Bank Bhd v Ambank (M) Bhd & Ors [2017] 6 AMR 309; [2017] 9 CLJ 145; [2017] 5 MLJ 142; [2017] MLRA 1 (“CIMB Bank Bhd v Ambank (M) Bhd”) and See Leong Chye & Anor v United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd & Another Appeal [2021] AMEJ 0587; [2021] 6 CLJ 650; [2021] 5 MLJ 759; [2021] 4 MLRA 304 (“See Leong Chye”) for the proposition that a charge fall within the meaning of the word “purchaser” under the proviso of sub-section 340(3) of the National Land Code. More pertinent is the principle that recognises a bank/chargee as a subsequent purchaser notwithstanding the bank/chargee having derived its interest as a chargee of the land from a fraudster. [14] The Plaintiff also averred that first, it was not a party in Suit 340 (which was in 2017) and second, it was not aware of the Interveners’ interest at the time the charge was registered in 2010. The Relevant Provisions of the National Law Code [15] The applicable provisions of the National Land Code that the parties have made reference to and that are relevant include sections 89, 256(3) and 340(2) and (3). These provisions stipulate as follows: Conclusiveness of register of documents of title

Every register document of title duly registered under this Chapter shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be conclusive evidence -

that title to the land described therein is vested in the person or body for the time being named therein as proprietor; and

of the conditions, restrictions in interest and other provisions subject to which the land is for the time being held by that person or body, so far as the same are required by any provision of this Act to be specified or referred to in that document. Application to Court for order for sale

(3) On any such application, the Court shall order the sale of the land or lease to which the charge relates unless it is satisfied of the existence of cause to the contrary. Registration to confer indefeasible title or interest, except in certain circumstances

(1) The title or interest of any person or body for the time being registered as proprietor of any land, or in whose name any lease, charge or easement is for the time being registered, shall, subject to the following provisions of this section, be indefeasible.

The title or interest of any such person or body shall not be indefeasible -

in any case of fraud or misrepresentation to which the person or body, or any agent of the person or body, was a party or privy; or

where registration was obtained by forgery, or by means of an insufficient instrument or void instrument; or

where the title or interest was unlawfully acquired by the person or body in the purported exercise of any power or authority conferred by any written law.

Where the title or interest of any person or body is defeasible by reason of any of the circumstances specified in subsection (2) -

it shall be liable to be set aside in the hands of any person or body to whom it may subsequently be transferred; and

any interest subsequently granted thereout shall be liable to be set aside in the hands of any person or body in whom it is for the time being vested: Provided that nothing in this subsection shall affect any title or interest acquired by any purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration, or by any person or body claiming through or under such purchaser.

Nothing in this section shall prejudice or prevent -

the exercise in respect of any land or interest of any power of forfeiture or sale conferred by this Act or any other written law for the time being in force, or any power of avoidance conferred by any such law; or

the determination of any title or interest by operation of law. The Decision of this Court [16] It is settled law that the term “purchaser” in the proviso to section 340(3) of the National Land Code includes a chargee. (See the Federal Court in CIMB Bank Bhd v Ambank (M) Bhd and See Leong Chye.) [17] This would mean that a chargee may invoke the “protection” or defence as afforded in the proviso to section 340(3) of the National Land Code. However, the requirement of “good faith” in the proviso to section 340(3) of the National Land Code is imperative. The proviso is always understood to apply to a bona fide subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration. [18] In considering the Intervener’ present application, this Court is required to determine if the Plaintiff is a bona fide purchaser (chargee). [19] The facts before this Court are that the charge was registered in 2010 but the Interveners only commenced Suit 340 (which was against the Defendant and not the Plaintiff) in 2017. [20] It is granted the Interveners were successful in Suit 340 and the Orders made by the Sessions Court are outlined in paragraph [10] above. The effect of the decision of the Sessions Court in Suit 340 merely defeats the Defendant’s title or rendered the Defendant title as defeasible under section 340(2) of the National Land Code. However, when the Defendant charged the said land to the Plaintiff in 2010, the Plaintiff was a subsequent purchaser (chargee) within the meaning of the proviso in section 340(3) of the National Land Code. [21] This Court is aware of two recent Federal Court decisions which were not cited by the parties in this hearing. A number of questions considered by the Federal Court in these cases are germane to the present application. [22] The first is Malayan Banking Bhd v Mohd Affandi bin Ahmad [2024] CLJU 2212; [2024] MLJU 2624; [2024] MLRAU 258. Question 1 before the Federal Court was: Where there is contractual representation that the chargor is the legal and beneficial owner of the property and there is no notice of any adverse claim to the property, whether it is incumbent on the bank to investigate if there is any illegality attached to the underlying sale and purchase agreement, failing which the bank cannot qualify as a bona fide purchaser under the proviso to Section 340(3) of the National Land Code, 1965? [23] The Federal Court answered Question 1 in the negative. [24] Question 2 that was considered by the Federal Court was: In order to qualify as a subsequent purchaser in good faith under the proviso to Section 340(3) of the National Land Code 1965, whether the bank must clearly show that it was impossible for the bank to have known of the unlawfulness of the sale and purchase transaction even after proper examination and verification of the sale and purchase agreement documents between the vendor and the chargor? [25] Once again, the Federal Court answered the question in the negative. The following remarks by Zabariah Mohd Yusof FCJ are instructive: [93] We have alluded in the previous paragraphs in this judgment that, in the absence of any notice of actual fraud, deceit or dishonesty of D3, D3 was not obliged to investigate the underlying sale and purchase transaction between D1 and D2, given that D2 is the registered proprietor on the register of title, and there is no encumbrance on the land. [94] It is against the intent and purport of the Torrens System and impractical, to require D3 to clearly show that it was “impossible” for D3 to have known of the unlawfulness of the sale and purchase transaction even after proper examination and verification of the sale and purchase agreement documents between the vendor and the chargor. This requirement would create an unnecessary burden on the part of D3 and would affect the banking industry as a whole. [95] The requirement as imposed by the Court of Appeal is unreasonably high and difficult to attain. Such a requirement also renders the registration of title meaningless, as a financing institution is expected to doubt/second guess the validity of a registered title and to conduct investigations into concluded transactions which the financing institution is not privy to. [26] In the present application before this Court, there was nothing to indicate that the Plaintiff had knowledge or notice of actual fraud, deceit of dishonestly committed by the Defendant. [27] For completeness, the Federal Court also considered and answered two additional questions that were before it, namely Question 3 and Question 5. Question 3 In order to qualify as a subsequent purchaser in good faith under the proviso to Section 340(3) of the National Land Code 1965, whether the bank must critically look into the documentation, transactional documents (payments and receipts) leading up to the sale and purchase of the properties even though the sale and purchase transaction has been completed and title transferred and registered in the name of the chargor free from encumbrances prior to the creation of the charge with the consent of the vendor? Question 5 Whether the burden of proving valuable consideration of a subsequent purchaser under the proviso to Section 340(3) of the National Land Code 1965 extends to proving that valuable consideration has passed between the immediate purchaser and the vendor? [28] The Federal Court answered Question 3 in the negative. In the course or dealing with Question 3, the Federal Court held that a bank should not be obligated to further scrutinize the transactional documents to qualify as a subsequent purchaser in good faith under Section 340(3) of the NLC. [29] As for Question 5, the Federal Court also answered this question in the negative. The Federal Court explained its reasons in the following terms: [104] The proviso to Section 340(3) of the NLC protects the title of a subsequent purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration. This means that for the indefeasibility of title to be maintained, there must be valuable consideration between D2 and the subsequent purchaser (D3, the bank). [105] However, the Court of Appeal ruled that D3 must also demonstrate that valuable consideration passed from D2 to the vendor (D1), thereby imposing a burden beyond what Section 340(3) of the NLC requires. It is unwarranted to restrict the scope of section 340(3) in such a manner. [106] D3 should not be required to prove the passage of valuable consideration between the immediate purchaser and the vendor, beyond the confirmation received from the D2’s solicitors. The requirement to seek additional documentation, such as proper accounts and receipts of payment, is also unnecessary and places an undue burden on bona fide subsequent purchaser, given that D2 is registered as the proprietor on the register of title. [107] As the charge was acquired by D3 as a purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration. D3 should be accorded the protection of the proviso to section 340(3) NLC. [30] The other Federal Court decision is Setiakon Engineering Sdn Bhd v Mak Yan Tai & Anor [2024] 6 AMR 701; [2024] 8 CLJ 190; [2024] 5 MLJ 460; [2024] 5 MLRA 791 (“Setiakon Engineering’). Leave Questions 1, 2 and 3 that was before the Federal Court are apposite to the present application. The 3 Questions were as follows:

in the absence of any allegation of fraud or collusion, whether the Court of Appeal was correct in law to hold that the purchaser should have done due diligence before purchasing the subject land and had therefore failed to discharge or prove that it is a bona fide purchaser for value;

(ii) whether apart from the undertaking of a proper search in the land registry to satisfy itself that the vendor is the registered proprietor of the subject land, whether an intended purchaser is obliged to investigate the history of the vendor's title to prove that as a purchaser, it had not acted negligently and/or is a bona fide purchaser;

(iii) whether in determining if the third defendant (appellant) is a bona fide purchaser for value under s. 340(3) of the Land Code, the following are conclusive matters on which it could be held as the Court of Appeal did that a purchaser is not a bona fide purchaser, namely:

the short period of ownership of the subject land by the person who sold the subject land to the third defendant (appellant);

not conducting a formal valuation prior to purchasing the subject land;

the payment of earnest deposit by a purchaser prior to conducting a search of the subject land at the land registry; and

the early settlement of the purchase price for the subject land by a purchaser to a sale and purchase agreement. [31] By a majority decision, the Federal Court decided that the Appellant could not avail itself of the defence in section 340(3) of the National Land Code. This raises the question of whether the decision of the Federal Court in Setiakon Engineering support the present Interveners’ application. [32] This Court is of the considered view that the majority decision in Setiakon Engineering does not affect the findings by this Court and its decision. The reason for this evident from the views expressed by Abdul Rahman Sebli CJ (Sabah and Sarawak) where his Lordship said as follows: [42] … the first three questions although crafted as questions of law are in reality questions of fact seeking to overturn the finding of fact by the Court of Appeal that the appellant failed to prove its defence of good faith and for valuable consideration. Clearly, the question of whether the appellant had proved the defence must depend on the facts and circumstances of the case and this includes the question of whether the steps taken by the appellant were sufficient to discharge that burden. [33] At its core, the facts in Setiakon Engineering are clearly distinguishable from those in this present application. [34] Hence, on the question of whether the Plaintiff is a “purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration” within the meaning of section 340(3) of the National Land Code, the answer is in the affirmative. [35] On the issue pertaining to due diligence, this Court is bound by the decision of the Federal Court in Malayan Banking Bhd v Mohd Affandi bin Ahmad as per the answers to leave Questions 1, 2 and 3 in that case. [36] Based on the facts and the evidence before this Court, the Plaintiff has succeeded in raising the defence in the proviso in section 340(3) of the National Land Code. Therefore, it has acquired an indefeasible interest over the land. [37] The Interveners are not without remedy. As noted, they have succeeded in pursuing their claims against the Defendant. In the event that also succeed in Suit 437 against the Plaintiff, any loss that the appellant might sustain from the sale of their land could be compensated with damages based on the commercial value of the land. As noted by the Court of Appeal in Univein Sdn Bhd v Malaysia Building Society Bhd [2003] 4 MLJ 618, “if the lands were sold now and the appellants should succeed in the appeal, any loss that they might sustain from the sale of their lands could be compensated for by the respondents with damages based on the commercial value of the lands. There was no question that the respondents would not be able to pay the damages”. This applies with equal force to the present case. [38] However, the Interveners’ Suit against the Plaintiff in Suit 437 is not of relevance to this Court as far as the present application is concerned. [39] The Interveners’ application in Enclosure 16 is this dismissed with costs of RM3,000. This Court also allows the Plaintiff’s application for a consequential order that the private caveats entered by the Interveners to be removed. Dated: 1 December, 2024 sgd [CHOONG YEOW CHOY] Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Shah Alam Counsel: Yeap Cheng Hoe for the Plaintiff (Messrs. Yeap Maluda Cheh) Farhana Abdul Halim for the Interveners (Messrs. Farah, Farhana & Company)