The meaning of equality under Article 8 (1) of the Federal Constitution 15 does not mean all individuals must be treated equally. Article 8 (1) merely provides that the law must be applied equally to individuals, who are in similar circumstances. At pgs. 723-725, the Federal Court said as follows: “The passages just referred to read with the earlier parts of the 20 judgment reproduced previously reveals that the Court of Appeal had conducted a rigid scrutiny of s. 72 and had immediately proceeded to rule it as being unconstitutional since it is contrary to the rule of law housed within art. 8(1) in that is fails to meet the minimum standards of fairness. But that is not our law. In order to 25 appreciate our law it must first be understood that equality does not mean absolute equality of all men, which is a physical impossibility to attain (see Sheoshanker v. State of MP AIR 1951 Nag 58). In saying that equality is a legal concept which is easy to state but difficult to apply Suffian LP said in Datuk Haji Harun bin 30 Hj Idris v. Public Prosecutor [1977] 2 MLJ 155 at p. 165: 44 ... because, first, equality can only apply among equals and in real life there is little equality, and, secondly, while the concept of equality is a fine and noble one it cannot be applied wholesale without regard to the realities of life. While idealists and democrats agree that there should not be one law for the rich 5 and another for the poor nor one for the powerful and another for the weak and that on the contrary the law should be the same for everybody, in practice that is only a theory, for in real life it is generally accepted that the law should protect the poor against the rich and the weak against the strong. 10 Article 8(1) is therefore not intended to make unequals equal. As Chaudhari & Chaturvedi say in their book Law of Fundamenal Rights 4th edn at p. 15: Equality presupposes classes. Therefore, the only application of 15 the equality clause in a society of classes is by creating, abolishing, reconstituting, recognising or providing for any facility for any class, at any suitable time. It follows that the requirement for equal protection of the law does 20 not mean that all laws passed by a legislature must apply universally to all persons and that the law so passed cannot create differences as to the persons to whom they apply and the territorial limits within which they are in force (see Malaysian Bar & Anor v. Government of Malaysia [1987] CLJ 185 (Rep); [1987] 1 CLJ 459; 25 [1987] 2 MLJ 165. In Ong Ah Chuan v. PP [1980] 1 LNS 181; [1981] 1 MLJ 64 Lord Diplock said at p. 72: Equality before the law and equal protection of the law require that like should be compared with like. What art. 12(1) (our Article 8(1)) assures to the individual is the right to equal 30 treatment with other individuals in similar circumstances. Similarly as Hashim Yeop A Sani J (as he then was) said in Public Prosecutor v. Su Liang Yu [1976] 2 MLJ 128 at p. 129: 45 The dominant idea in both expressions 'equal before the law' and 'equal protection of the law' is that of equal justice. The meaning of these two expressions have been decided in a number of decisions of the US Supreme Court and also the Indian Supreme Courts and certain principles have been settled and accepted. 5 Due to the demands caused by the complexity of modern government the doctrine of classification was evolved by the courts for practical purposes and read into the equality provision. It has been accepted therefore that a legislature for the purpose of dealing with the complex problems arising out of an infinite 10 variety of human relations cannot but proceed upon some sort of selection or classification of persons upon whom the legislation is to operate. It is also useful to refer to Public Prosecutor v. Khong Teng Khen & 15 Anor [1976] 2 MLJ 166 where Suffian LP said at p. 170: The principle underlying Article 8 is that a law must operate alike on all persons under like circumstances, not simply that it must operate alike on all persons in any circumstances, nor that it 'must be general in character 20 and universal in application and that the State is no longer to have the power of distinguishing and classifying persons... for the purpose of legislation', Kedar Nath v. State of West Bengal AIR 1953 SC 404, 406. In my opinion, the law may classify persons into children, 25 juveniles and adults, and provide different criteria for determining their criminal liability or the mode of trying them or punishing them if found guilty; the law may classify persons into women and men, or into wives and husbands, and provide different rights and liabilities attaching to the 30 status of each class; the law may classify offences into different categories and provide that some offences be triable in a Magistrate's court, others in a Sessions Court, and yet others in the High Court; the law may provide that certain offences be triable even in a military court; fiscal 35 law may divide a town into different areas and provide that 46 ratepayers in one area pay a higher or lower rate than those of another area, and in the case of income tax provide that millionaires pay more tax than others; and yet in my judgment in none of these cases can the law be said to violate Article 8. All that Article 8 guarantees is that a 5 person in one class should be treated the same as another person in the same class, so that a juvenile must be tried like another juvenile, a ratepayer in one area should pay the same rate as paid by another ratepayer in the same area, and a millionaire the same income tax as another 10 millionaire, and so on.”