Manirajah A/l Suppiah (membela rayuan ini sebagai wakil kepada Ahli Jawatankuasa the Sri Mariamman Temple Paripalana Saba, Batu Pahat (No. Pendaftaran: PPM 004-01-24041968) bagi tahun 2022/2023)) v Kementerian Dalam Negeri Johor (JA-25-37-12/2024)

MANIRAJAH A/L SUPPIAH (NRIC No: 610624-10-5977) (commence an action as a representative to the members of Sri Mariamman Temple Paripalana Saba Committee, Batu Pahat (Registration No: PPM-004-01-240041961) for the year of 2022-2023)

DIRECTOR OF THE REGISTRATION OF SOCIETIES

REGISTRATION OF SOCIETIES DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF JOHOR ...RESPONDENTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

This is an application filed by the Applicant (Enclosure 1) for leave to file a judicial review application for a Certiorari Order to quash the Respondents’ decision dated 19.11.2024 and to stay all office bearers’ registration till the hearing and disposal of this judicial review application.

After having read the Affidavits, written submissions by the Applicant and after having heard the oral submissions of the Applicant, I allow Enclosure

1.

Below are my grounds of the decision.

The background facts in this application are gathered from the cause papers and submissions filed by the parties in chronological order.

The First Respondent (R1) was the Secretary of the Sri Mariamman Temple Paripalana Saba, Batu Pahat (Registration No.: PPM-004-01-240041961) (the “Temple Society”)’s committee for the year 2022-2023 (“Old Committee Members”). Till date, the Old Committee Members of the Temple Society serve as the interim/caretaker committees of the Temple Society and the temple which the Temple Society manages. All temple prayers, activities and events are done under their oversight.

On 27.01.2024, the Temple Society had its 49th Annual General Meeting (“AGM”) at the open hall in the temple premises. The Appellant and his supporters had wrongfully brought in non-members to participate in the 49th AGM to inflate their supports.

The Hindu Sangam official, Mr. Karupiah who was invited to oversee the conducting of the committee election and a group of the Temple Society members protested against an election going on due to the involvement of non-members, amongst others.

Mr. Karupiah then asked the attendees as to whom wanted the election to continue, the amount of those who raised their hands for the election to continue outnumbered those who did not want it to continue due to the influx of the non-members. Mr. Karupiah did not even bother filtering the members from the non-members.

Without holding an election, Mr. Karupiah straight away held that the Appellant’s team won as more individuals wanted the election to go on.

The Old Committee Members and a group of other individuals did not regard this as a valid AGM seeing as another irregularity besides the participation of non-members is that the Appellant and his deputy/ vice chairman candidate, Thiyagarajan were blacklisted under subparagraph 13(1)(c)(iv) of the Societies Act 1966 [Act 832] at the material time, which prevents them from contesting or holding any positions in a society unless they obtain the Registrar’s permission in writing under section 49 of Act 832.

The Appellant and his team then proceeded to represent at large that they are the lawfully elected committee of the Temple Society which was never acknowledged or recognized by a large group of the members of the Temple Society. A group of 54 individuals filed a civil suit in Muar High Court (Civil Suit No.: JB- 22NCvC-6-02/2024) to seek a declaration that the 49th AGM was null and void.

The intention to initiate the suit and subsequent initiation of the suit was relayed to the Second and Third Respondents (R2 and R3) on 01.02.2024 and 08.02.2024 respectively.

The Registrar of Society (“ROS”) had relayed to R1 at all material times that the ROS will leave the matter of the validity of the 49th AGM to the determination of the Court.

On 18.07.2024, during a Case Management before His Lordship Suria Kumar, the Appellant’s counsel (the Appellant who is the First Defendant in the civil suit), produced a print-out dated 17.07.2024, with the names of the 2024-2026 Committee Members of Temple Society (“New Committee Members”) registered in the ROS eroses system.

Following this, His Lordship Suria Kumar directed R1 in the civil suit to get an answer from ROS on whether this is a mere update in the register or amounts to ROS deciding that the 49th AGM is valid. If ROS has made such decision then the civil suit cannot proceed.

On the same day, R1 has contacted the ROS officer in charge of the Temple Society’s file, Puan Hazleen and queried on this where the reply was that no such decision had been made on the 49th AGM and ROS will await the Court’s determination. A letter dated 18.07.2024 (see pages 113 and 114 of Enclosure 3) was sent to the R2 and R3 to put on record what has been relayed.

R1 along with several others went to ROS Johor on 21.07.2024 to seek confirmation whether ROS still taking the same stance, i.e that ROS will await the Court’s decision and no decision on the validity of the 49th AGM was made vide the registration. As to why the registration took place despite that, R1 was asked to write to the ROS Legal Advisor in Putrajaya.

Two letters were written to the ROS’ Legal Advisor in Putrajaya, one dated 25.7.2024, confirming that ROS Johor has said that no decision on the validity was made vide the registration which has never been denied by either ROS Putrajaya and ROS Johor.

Later, another letter dated 01.08.2024 was sent to ROS’s Legal Advisor in Putrajaya to follow up with the previous letter and also highlighting them of the police reports made by Murugayah a/l P. Nallu (NRIC No.: 680227-01-5875) and Sivanesan a/l Ganapathy (NRIC No.: 780718-01-5173) of which complaints were made that their names were registered as New Committee Members without their knowledge or consent.

There was no response from the R2 and R3, and neither was there any denial of the facts stated in the letters. R1 has tried numerous times to get an appointment with R2 to seek clarification whether a decision has been made on the validity of the 49th AGM via registration. However, R1 did not manage to get an appointment.

R1 then filed an application for leave for judicial review for a formal response from ROS (Leave for Judicial Review No.: JA- 25-26-10/2024) which was withdrawn on 28.11.2024 as the decision made on 19.11.2024 essentially rendered it academic.

Finally, on 19.11.2024, R1 along with counsel, Mr. Manian K. Marappan managed to get a meeting with R2. In the meeting when queried on why the New Committee Members are registered when ROS said they would await the Court’s decision and not interfere with it where—

the R1 stated that by registering the New Committee Members, ROS has decided that the 49th AGM is valid, this is contrary to the previous stance taken all along;

when asked on what basis this decision was made, only a general statement that ROS has the power to do so was made; and

upon further querying whether the R2 and R3 have considered the following, R2 just remained quiet:

at the time of the AGM, the Appellant and Thiyagarajan were blacklisted under subparagraph 13(1)(c)(iv) of Act 832 (see pages 132 to 133 of Enclosure 3) and did not have the Registrar’s permission in writing under section 49 of Act 832;

(ii) the admissions by non-members who participated in the AGM at the behest of the Appellant (see Statutory Declaration and Notice Admitting Facts in pages 135 to 145 of Enclosure 3);

(iii) the police reports made by Murugayah a/l P. Nallu (NRIC No.: 680227-01-5875) and Sivanesan a/l Ganapathy (NRIC No.: 780718-01-5173) of which complaints were made that their names were registered as New Committee Members without their knowledge or consent (see pages 124 to 125 of Enclosure 3);

(iv) an election for the Temple Society’s committee members did not take place; and

the sudden contrary stance taken by R2 and R3 when all this while their stance was not to interfere with the validity of 49th AGM and leave it to the Court to decide.

Based on the registration of New Committee Members of the Temple Society by R2 and R3 where the Appellant, Vellasamy a/l Kumarasamy (NRIC No.: 750429-01-5727) and Saravanan a/l Kumaran (NRIC No.: 790715-01-5601) are registered as office-bearer of the Temple Society under section 9(b) of Act 832 on 02.12.2024, R1 has filed Enclosed 1 to seek the leave to file judicial review application to challenge the decisions made by R2 and R3.

The Appellant has been added as the intervener to intervene in this proceeding via a Court Order dated 15.01.2025 and has filed an appeal to appeal against this Court decision on 30.12.2024. It is to be noted that during the hearing of Enclosure 1, the Appellant was not a party to the proceedings.

COURT ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS I have identified three (3) issues below for the determination of this Court:

whether the Appellant can appeal against this Court’s decision on 30.12.2024 to grant leave for judicial review application where the Appellant has not been made a party to the proceedings at the leave stage;

what are the threshold requirements at the leave stage for judicial review application; and

whether the Court can grant the stay of the decisions of R2 and R3 pending the disposal of the judicial review application.

Whether the Appellant can appeal against this Court’s decision on 30.12.2024 to grant leave for judicial review application where the Appellant has not been made a party to the proceedings at the leave stage

Enclosure 1 was filed by R1 to seek leave for judicial review application to quash the decision made by R2 and R3 to register the New Committee Members 2024-2026 of the Temple Society and to stay all the process of registration till the disposal of the judicial review application.

R2 and R3 are named in Enclosure 1 and the cause papers were served on Attorney General Chambers (“AGC”) via email on 23.12.2024 by R1. The hearing of Enclosure 1 was fixed for hearing on 30.12.2024 based on the Certificate of Urgency filed by R1’s solicitor.

The Appellant was not parties of Enclosure 1 when Enclosure 1 was heard and decided by this Court.

On the date of hearing of Enclosure 1, R1’s solicitor informed that they were not aware that AGC has filed submission to object to this application and they were informed about the written submission by AGC when they arrived at the Court. The submission was filed on 29.12.2024 (Enclosure 9) at 9.10 pm by way of e-filling. A copy of the Enclosure 9 was never served on R1’s solicitor. The Senior Federal Counsel (“SFC”) who representing AGC did not turn up during the hearing of Enclosure 1 and only turned up around 9.50am (as usual turned up late) after the Court has given its decision on Enclosure 1.

Despite turning up late, the SFC did not apologise for her lateness and behaved disgracefully by ordering the Court to record her attendance.

When asked why she did not arrive for the hearing at the Court on time, the SFC blatantly answered that she had to go to Muar High Court to do research on the civil suit filed in the Muar High Court. I find the reasons given was not acceptable as she should have made preparation earlier and filed submission as soon as she received the notification that the case was scheduled for hearing on 30.12.2024 (Monday) at 9.00 am. During that time,

29.12.2024 (Sunday) was a working day at Johor and there was no reason for the SFC not be able to file and serve the submission on R1’s solicitor during office hours.

Due to failure of the SFC to attend the Court on time, the objection raised by AGC was not ventilated and heard by this Court. However, I have considered the written submission made by the said SFC even thought it was filed last minute, I find the submissions and objections raised by her are devoid of merits.

The SFC has misconceived the purpose and intent of Enclosure

Enclosure 1 was filed to seek leave to file judicial review application to quash the decision made by the R2 and R3 regarding the registration of New Committee Members of the Temple Society and dispute between the Appellant and R1 are still pending determination by the Muar High Court via Civil Suit No.: JB-22NCvC-6-02/2024. Therefore, subsection 40(1) of Act 832 is not applicable.

Further, the argument of the SFC regarding whether the Appellant and Thiyagarajan were blacklisted under subparagraph 13(1)(c)(iv) of Act 832 and did not obtain the Registrar’s permission in writing under section 49 Act 832 to participate in the election of 49th AGM and being elected as the President and Deputy respectively, can only be ventilated in the substantive stage.

The Appellant is not a party to the proceeding during the hearing of Enclosure 1. They did not apply to intervene during the leave stage. They only applied and obtained the order to intervene in the judicial review application after the decision of this Court on 30.12.2024. The matter was heard by Justice Noor Hisham bin Ismail. Thus, the question arises whether the Appellant has locus to appeal against the decision made 30.12.2024.

In this regard, I refer to the cases of Wealthy Growth Sdn. Bhd. v Menteri Kewangan Malaysia (Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri, proposed intervener) [2023] 8 MLJ 692 where Justice Noorin Badaruddin (as Her Ladyship then was) held that— “[14] This court disagrees with the submission. In exercising a discretionary power under O.53 r. 8 of ROC whether to allow a party to intervene and where there is no written grounds by the Court of Appeal in Puncak Niaga, the question remains whether DGIR can automatically be allowed to intervene in every application for judicial review relating to tax matters where the ‘decision’ relates to the respondent and the respondent alone at the leave stage. … [17] The court is of the same view that without the written grounds of judgement by the Court of Appeal, the ration decidendi of Puncak Niaga cannot be ascertained. It must be borne in mind that this court is not saying that the DGIR cannot intervene in the applicant’s judicial review application. It is of the considered view that the DGIR’s application should be ventilated at the substantive stage. Apart from the finding that the DGIR’s legal reasoning would not be in access to the respondent’s argument and that both their arguments will be similar, to allow the DGIR’s application at this stage will run the risk of causing a delay to the applicant’s leave application where the ordinary threshold is low with the sole questions being whether the application is frivolous and whether there is an arguable case. In MAIS, the Federal Court had highlighted the importance of the speedy disposal of such matter and the following excepts of the judgment is instructive: [4] Now, the court is blamed for the delay. The public gets frustrated. In my opinion, the court could perhaps have just gone ahead and made a decision on the application for administrative review. The question of whether the appellant should be made a party can be decided and appealed together if necessary. These delays have caused unnecessary anguish over the people for whom the appellant is supposed to be acting for. [5] Courts should be more diligent in dealing with such cases. Parties expect speedy disposal of reviews. That is why applications for review of administrative decisions are provided by way of certiorari or mandamus instead of by way of a writ. The law provides for a simple way of disposing these cases. Instead of a speedy disposal of a review application, this case has taken as long as it would in a hearing of a writ. Delays such as this can also cause a hold up in the implementation of national development and losses to the people such as the developers when there is an application for review of planning permissions granted by public authorities. … [20] Since the DGIR does not state that he is to advise the respondent or has actively involved in assisting the respondent on matters arising from the decision-making process of the latter pursuant to ss 127(3A) and/or 135 of the ITA, this court is of the considered view that the DGIR at best has only an indirect interest to the applicant’s application and that the reasons given by the DGIR are insufficient to show that he is a proper person with direct interest and any additional argument that the DGIR wishes to raise can be raised through the respondent….”. … [23] Since the current judicial review application at hand is solely to review the decision-making process of the respondent under ss 135 and/or 127(3A) of the ITA and the provisions allow any person such as the applicant to seek exemption from the Minister of Finance, the DGIR’s application at this stage is premature on the sole basis that the DGIR is not in any way involved in the decision-making process under ss 135 and/or 127(3A) of the ITA. The DGIR has no say and role in the respondent’s decision-making process. It is pertinent to note that at the leave stage, the court has yet to decide whether there is in fact a ‘decision’ made by the respondent in the first place and whether such ‘decision’ is susceptible to judicial review. It is solely between the respondent and the applicant to ventilate this issue. … [29] In Puncak Niaga as well as in the present matter, the judicial review application stems from the respondent’s failure in replying to the applicant’s letter requesting for the respondent to exercise his power vested in him under ss 127(3A) and/or 135 of the ITA and it is obvious that the DGIR was not involved in the ‘non-reply’ to the request by the applicant. Nowhere can it be shown that the DGIR is involved in the alleged ‘decision-making’ process of the respondent under ss 135 and/or 127(3A) of the ITA. As such, the DGIR cannot be said to have a direct interest in the matter and with respect, since there is no written judgment by the Court of Appeal in Puncak Niaga and relying on the Federal Court’s decision in MAIS, this court adopts the same view in Puncak Niaga. [30] It must be reiterated that the application to intervene by the DGIR should be ventilated at the substantive stage. In accordance with the Court of Appeal’s decision in Teh Guat Hong v Perbadanan Tabung Pendidikan Tinggi Nasional [2017] 4 MLJ 521; [2015] 3 AMR 35, there is no necessity to go into merits of the case at leave stage. As such, the DGIR’s application should not be allowed as the merits of case would only be raised at substantive stage.”’. [Emphasis added]

Applying the principle enunciated in the authorities above, I am of the considered view that the Appellant is not involved in the decision-making process of R2 and R3 and also not involved in the reply to the queries made by R1, the Appellant only have indirect interest in the judicial review application and the Appellant could have raised its concern through the R2 and R3 which they failed to do during the leave stage. This is between the R1 and R2 as well as R3 to ventilate the issue pertaining to the decision to register the New Committee Members by R2 and R3. Therefore, the application to intervene should be ventilated in the substantive stage.

Therefore, based on the reasons above, I find the Appellant has no locus to appeal against the Court decision made on 30.12.2024.

What are the threshold requirements at the leave stage for judicial review application

The Court of Appeal in the case of Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Tun Hj Abdul Razak v. Peguam Negara & Ors And Another Appeal [2019] MLJU 1176 held that— “[33] A court hearing a judicial review application must determine whether “prima facie there is a genuine case for review”. It is accepted that the threshold requirement is low, for leave will only be refused where an application is:

frivolous and vexatious or hopeless;

(ii) made by busybodies with misguided or trivial complaints of administrative errors;

(iii) misconceived;

(iv) unarguable or groundless;

(iv) where there is a more appropriate alternative procedure; or

where an application for judicial review is an inappropriate procedure.”. [Emphasis added]

In the instant case, I find R1 has demonstrated an arguable case based on the facts stated in paragraphs 13 to 22 above whether the New Committee Members were properly elected, involvement of non-members in the 49th AGM and whether the Appellant and Thiyagarajan who were blacklisted under subparagraph 13(1)(c)(iv) of Act 832 have obtain the Registrar’s permission in writing under section 49 Act 832 before they were elected as a President and Deputy Chairman of the Temple Society.

I refer to subsection 7 (2) of the Act 832 which empower the Registrar to refuse the registration of a local society if—

he is satisfied that such a society is a branch of any society whose registration has been cancelled under paragraph 13(1)(c); or

…

a dispute exists among the members of such local society as to the persons who are to be office-bearers or to hold or to administer any property of the society until the dispute is decided by a Court or by arbitration or by agreement between the members or otherwise.. [Emphasis added]

As such, I rule that Enclosure 1 is not frivolous and the Court will decide at the substantive stage whether there is in fact a decision made by R2 and R3 in the first place and whether such decision is susceptible to judicial review. If so, the Court will determine whether the decision-making process of R2 and R3 complies with Act 832 and whether they have exercised its powers and discretion in accordance to section 7 of Act 832.

I further rule that R1 as an Old Committee Member of the Temple Society is directly affected by any decision made by the R2 and R3 when the dispute between them and the New Committee Members have not been decided by the Muar High Court.

Based on the reasons above, I grant leave for the R1 to file a judicial review application to challenge the decisions of R2 and R3 where the Appellant, R2 as well as R3 can ventilate this matter in the substantive stage during the hearing of the judicial review.

Whether the Court can grant the stay of the decisions of R2 and

R3 pending the disposal of the judicial review application The SFC argued under Order 53 rule 3(5) Rules of Court 2012, the grant of leave shall not, unless the Judge so directs, operate as a stay of the proceedings in question.

Hence, the SFC argued that the stay of the process of the registration is as though an injunction to prevent or obstruct the R2 and R3 to register the New Committee Members and office-bearers of the Temple Society. By doing this, it will obstruct the administration of pilgrimage in the temple and cause difficulties for Hindu worshippers to perform their religious rites.

The SFC further argued that there is no special circumstance that warrant the consideration of this Court as the appointment of the office-bearers were done by the Temple Society. The application for registration was made to R3 and then acknowledged by R2 on 02.12.2024. An injunction will contradict with section 40 of Act 832 where the dispute between the members of the Temple Society shall be resolved and decided by the rules of the Temple Society.

I find the SFC has misconceived the intent and purpose of Enclosure 1. Enclosure 1 was filed by R1 to seek the leave of the Court to quash the decisions made by R2 and R3 and not to determine the dispute between the Appellant and R1. As submitted by SFC that R2 and R3 have acknowledged the registration made by the New Committee Member through eroses system and hence it has formed the basis for R1 to challenge the decision made by R2 and R3. As stated above, I am not deciding at leave stage, whether there is a decision made by R2 and R3 and whether the decision-making process by R2 and R3 were made in accordance to the established principles.

To argue stay is amounting to injunction is misconceived and erroneous. I rule that the arguments of the SFC is illogical and misconceive the application of Order 53 subrule 3(5) ROC 2012. The Court is empowered under Order 53 subrule 3(5) of ROC 2012 to grant a stay of the proceeding pending the hearing and disposal of the judicial review application.

In regard, I refer to the High Court decision in the case of Islamic Financial Services Board v Puan Marlin Fairol bt. Faroque and Anor. [2010] MLJU 653 where it was held that— “I indicated in my decision that “stay of proceedings” in the context of judicial review has a special connotation, and, although there could be overlaps in standards applied, judicial review stay is not the same as stay of execution after judgment in judicial proceedings. The wide import of judicial review stay has been recognized as well in YAM Tunku Dato’ Seri Nadzarudin ibni Tuanku Jaafar v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur [2003] 1 CLJ 210: The phrase “a stay of proceedings’ must have a wider application. It does not confine to proceedings in court only. Today, many applications for judicial review are for orders of certiorari to quash decisions of decision making bodies other than courts, including Government Ministers, local authorities and other bodies whose decisions are susceptible to judicial review. Thus the phrase “a stay of proceedings” in relation to such bodies must mean “a stay of the process by which the decision challenged has been reached, including the decision itself.” See also Sugumar Balakrishnan v Pengarah Imigresen Negeri Sabah & Anor [1998] 3 CLJ 85, where the Court of Appeal explained the effect of a stay as “temporarily suspending the effect of a public law decision pending the outcome of certiorari or prohibition proceedings brought to challenge the validity of the particular decision.” Counsel for the Applicant, Mr Lim Heng Seng, also drew my attention to the decision in R(H) v Ashworth Hospital Authority [2003] 1 WLR 127, where the English Court of Appeal has usefully and clearly explained the purpose of stay, described by counsel as the “denial of full benefit of successful challenge” test: “The purpose of stay in a judicial review is clear. It is to suspend the “proceedings” that are under challenge pending the determination of the challenge. It preserves the status quo. This will aid the judicial review process and make it more effective. It will ensure, so far as possible, that, if a party is ultimately successful in his challenge, he will not be denied the full benefit of his success…In my view it should also be given a wide interpretation so as to enhance the effectiveness of the judicial review jurisdiction.” This preservation of the status quo argument is similar to the position taken in, for example, YAM Tunku Dato’ Seri Nadzarudin ibni Tuanku Jaafar v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur (supra) that stay should be granted so as not to render the substantive motion for judicial review nugatory. The precise formula adopted by courts has not been consistent, but the test of “special circumstances” is a pragmatic test which, to my mind, can embrace even preservation of status quo or prevention of nugatory effect or prevention of the full benefits of success tests.”. [Emphasis added]

Further, the High Court in the case of CMMT Investment Ltd v Menteri Kewangan Malaysia [2022] MLJU 360 decided that— “[34] The Court of Appeal in Chang Shu Hua v. Goon Fook Hong [2008] 3 CLJ 429 acknowledged that the category of what constitutes special circumstances is not closed, and ought to be interpreted flexibly. [35] It must be accepted as trite that a stay in a judicial review application is not the same as a stay of execution after judgment in judicial proceedings. It should be given a wide interpretation so as to enhance the effectiveness of the judicial review jurisdiction. This means preserving the status quo by suspending the assessment under challenge pending the determination of the judicial review application, which as a result, will not deny the Applicant the full benefit of a successful challenge (see: Islamic Finance Services Board v Marlin Fairol Mohd Faroque & Anor [2010] 8 CLJ 173; R

(H) v Ashworth Special Hospital Authority [2003] 1 WLR 127). [36] This Court grants the stay order prayed for by the Applicant as it is of the considered view that it is essential that a stay be granted for the preservation of the status quo or prevention of a nugatory effect or prevention of the denial of the Applicant’s full benefits of success in the present application. The implementation of the Assessments if found to be wrongfully and unfairly imposed on the Applicant would result in a large and burdensome amount of taxes that should not be sanctioned by the Court as it will cause irreparable damage to the Applicant which cannot be remedied even if the Applicant eventually succeeds at the substantive stage of the judicial review application. It has been recognised by the Courts that economic and reputational losses are not losses that can be compensated merely by the refund of taxes paid. This proposition of law has been laid down by the Court in Kerajaan Malaysia v Berjaya Times Square Sdn. Bhd. [2018] 1 LNS 720, which has been unanimously upheld by the Court of Appeal.”. [Emphasis added]

Hence, applying the principles above to the instant case, I find it warrants a stay of the process by which the decision challenged has been reached, including the decision of the R2 and R3. This is to preserve the status quo and to avoid the New Committee Members disrupt the administration of the Temple Society and to prevent them from collecting contributions/donations from the members of the Temple Society. R1 claimed that the Appellant and his team have set up the collection counter to collect contributions/donations from the members and kept the contributions themselves as the Maybank account of the Temple has been frozen. The utilisation of the contributions was completely not known to the members of the Temple and were not transparent at all. The Appellant and his supporters have issued their own receipts and not in the name of the Temple Society.

I further find that if the Appellant and his supporters take over the management and administration of Temple pending the determination of the judicial review application, it would lead to irreparable harm especially with regards to financial decisions taken by them. Therefore, it is important to maintain the status quo to ensure the healthy running of the Temple Society and the Temple premises, a peaceful and conducive environment to carry out religious activities, and to prevent possibility of tampering of records and evidences of the Temple Society by the New Committee Members.

I find there is no prejudice to the Appellant, R2 and R3 in the granting of the stay and the balance of convenience lies in favour of R1 as a denial of this stay would lead to R1 and his supporters being denied the full benefit of a successful challenge.

CONCLUSION Based on the reasons above, I allow R1—

to file an application for judicial review to seek an order of Certiorari to quash the decisions of R2 and R3 —

to register the New Committee Members; and

(ii) to register the Appellant and Thiyagarajan as the office-bearers of the Temple Society;

to stay all the registration process pending the disposal of the judicial review application; and

costs in the cause. Dated 26 September 2025 ………………................. Wong Mee Ling Judge High Court of Malaya Johor Bahru Johor Darul Ta’zim. Counsel/Solicitor For the Appellant: Mr. Ravi Nekoo and Pushpa Ratnam Nekoo Messrs Nekoo Counsel/Solicitor For the 1st Respondent: Mr. Manian K. Marappan Messrs Manian K. Marappan & Company Counsel/Solicitor For the 2nd and 3rd Respondents: Puan Zahilah binti Mohammad Yusoff