Marina Bay Sands Pte Ltd v Tan See Meng (WA-24-2-01/2022)

The Judgment Debtor in these proceedings is a Malaysian against whom a judgment was obtained against in the Singapore High Court. The Judgment Creditor applied for and obtained an order from this court for registration of the judgment on 8.3.2022.

The Judgment Debtor now applies in enclosure 17 to set aside the registration of the judgment on the grounds which will be elaborated further. Key background facts

The main facts upon which enclosure 17 is premised upon is not in dispute and are as follows:

The Judgment Creditor is a company incorporated under the laws of Singapore and its business includes operating a licensed casino in Singapore;

(ii) On 12.6.2019, parties entered into a Credit Agreement under which the Judgment Creditor agreed to extend credit of S$ 300,000.00 to the Judgment Debtor for the issuance of casino chips;

(iii) The credit was subsequently agreed to be increased to S$ 500,000.00;

(iv) The Judgment Debtor defaulted to repay a sum of S$ 157,302.00 which then caused the Judgment Creditor to file a suit in the Singapore High Court to recover the said amount;

On 19.8.2021, the Judgment Creditor obtained a judgment (“Singapore Judgment”) against the Judgment Debtor for the following for the sum of S$ 157,302.00 together with Interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the said S$ 157,302.00 from 7.11.2019 to the date of repayment. Costs of S$ 3,982.55 was also ordered against the Judgment Debtor;

(vi) The Judgment Creditor then applied to register the Singapore Judgment against the Judgment Debtor pursuant to s.4 of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act 1958 and Order 67 of the Rules of Court 2012. This High Court granted the Order for Registration of Foreign Judgment on 8.3.2022; and

(vii) The Order obtained on 8.3.2022 together with the Notice to Judgment Debtor of Registration of Foreign Judgment dated 9.3.2022 were served on the Judgment Debtor on 29.3.2022.

On 14.5.2025, the Judgment Debtor filed enclosure 17 to set aside the Order granted on 8.3.2022. Grounds for setting aside

The Judgment Debtor has advanced the following grounds to set aside the Order of 8.3.2022:

The enforcement of the Singapore Judgment is against public policy as it is seeking to enforce a gambling debt;

(ii) The Judgment Creditor failed to fulfil the requirements of the Evidence Act 1950 for the Singapore Judgment to be accepted; and

(iii) The service of the Notice of Registration of Foreign Judgment dated 9.3.2022 is defective. Judgment Creditor’s Response

In opposition to enclosure 17, the Judgment Creditor’s contention is two-fold. The Judgment Creditor raised a preliminary objection that enclosure 17 was filed both out of time and cited incorrect provisions.

On the merits of the enclosure 17, the Judgment Creditor contends that the ground of public policy is misconceived. The gambling debt had already been adjudicated in Singapore; what was sought under REJA was merely to register the Singapore Judgment.

With respect to the alleged failure to fulfil the requirements of the Evidence Act 1950, the Judgment Creditor submits that this ground does not fall within the prescribed grounds for setting aside under REJA. Analysis and decision The law

I shall start by stating some principles governing the registration of foreign judgments.

The enforceability of foreign judgments is given effect to pursuant to the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 (“REJA”). In See Hua Daily News Bhd v Tan Thein Chin & Ors [1986] 2 MLJ 107, the Supreme Court expressed that in providing for direct execution of foreign judgments, it obviates the necessity of first obtaining a local judgment with the attendant requirement of establishing jurisdiction over the defendant as a pre-condition. The reciprocating courts and countries are set out in the First Schedule. The Singapore High Court is expressly listed as a reciprocating court and country.

The statutory requirements for the registration of foreign judgments is set out in s. 3(3). The essential requirements are:

the foreign judgment must be final and conclusive;

(ii) the judgment must stipulate a monetary sum;

(iii) the judgment must emanate from a reciprocating country.

S. 4 sets out the circumstances in which an application for registration of the foreign judgment can be made. A judgment creditor who has obtained a foreign judgment in a reciprocating court and country may apply to the High Court to register the foreign judgment at any time within 6 years after the date of judgment, provided that a judgment shall not be registered if at the date of the application, it has been wholly satisfied or could not be enforced by execution in the country of the original court. Once the foreign judgment is registered, the registered judgment shall for the purpose of execution, be of the same force and effect as if the judgment has been a judgment originally given in the registering court and entered on the date of registration.

The provision of s. 4 is to be read together with Order 67 of the Rules of Court 2012 which lays down the procedure to be observed. The application is made by filing an exparte Originating Summons.

Once the order for registration has been given, it must be served on the judgment debtor. (See: O.67 r.5) The judgment debtor can apply to set aside an order for registration of the foreign judgment.

The grounds for setting aside are confined only to those set out in s. 5(1) which provides as follows: Cases in which registered judgments must, or may, be set aside

5.

On an application in that behalf duly made by any party against whom a registered judgment may be enforced, the registration of the judgment-

shall be set aside if the registering court is satisfied-

that the judgment is not a judgment to which this Part applies or was registered in contravention of this Act;

(ii) that the courts of the country of the original court had no jurisdiction in the circumstances of the case;

(iii) that the judgment debtor, being the defendant in the proceedings in the original court, did not (notwithstanding that process may have been duly served on him in accordance with the law of the country of the original court) receive notice of those proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend the proceedings and did not appear;

(iv) that the judgment was obtained by fraud;

that the enforcement of the judgment would be contrary to public policy in Malaysia;

(vi) that the rights under the judgment are not vested in the person by whom the application for registration was made; ….

The focus of these proceedings is paragraph (v) which the Judgment Debtor relies on in these proceedings.

I shall now deal with the issues in contention. Preliminary objection

The Judgment Creditor contends that enclosure 17 was filed some three years beyond the stipulated date. The Notice of Registration was served on the Judgment Debtor on 29.3.2022, and required him to apply to set aside within 14 days of the service on him, namely, by 12.4.2022. (See: O. 67 r. 5)

However, enclosure 17 was filed only on 14.4.2025, some 3 years later. The Judgment Debtor has sought to explain the delay. He claimed that he was not properly advised.

There are facts that belie his contention. The Judgment Creditor instituted bankruptcy proceedings in April 2022 after the registration of the Singapore Judgment. These proceedings were resisted by the Judgment Debtor. He was represented in the bankruptcy proceedings. I find it implausible that he did not receive proper legal advice.

His claim that as he had been adjudged a bankrupt on 24.3.2023, he required sanction from the Department of Insolvency before he could file the present proceedings. That is also not tenable as the Singapore Judgment was registered one year earlier and he failed to take any action.

He then claims that on 29.3.2022, the Notice of Registration which was served on him was an unsealed document. Having perused the documents which were attached to the affidavit of service affirmed by the clerk of Messrs. Shearn Delamore & Co., the solicitors of the Judgment Creditor, I find the Judgment Debtor’s claim to be untrue.

As matters stand, the Judgment Debtor is some 3 years late to file enclosure 17. His reasons for the delay are far from satisfactory. O. 67 r. 5(3) allows the court to extend the period within which an application to have the registration set aside may be made. However, I am of the view that the discretion of the court to extend time can be exercised only upon good reasons being proffered. The Judgment Debtor has not done so.

On this ground alone, enclosure 17 ought to be dismissed. However, for the sake of completeness, I shall deal with the main ground advanced to set aside the registration. Public policy

To recapitulate, the Judgment Debtor contends that to allow the registration of the Singapore Judgment is to allow a gambling debt to be enforced against him. This is against public policy and his case therefore falls within the ground housed in s. 5(1)(a)(v) of

The courts have attempted some formulation as to the meaning of public policy. In Jan De Nui (M) Sdn Bhd v Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & Anor. [2019] 1 CLJ 15, a case which concerns the setting aside of an arbitral award on grounds of public policy, the Federal Court held: [49] The term “public policy” is not defined in the AA 2005…As commonly used, the term “public policy” signifies some matter which concerns public good and public interest. It is a fundamental principle of justice in substantive and procedural aspects. … [55] …As clearly stated by the Court of Appeal in Sigur Ros (with which we agree): "The concept of public policy must be one taken in the higher sense where some fundamental principle of law or justice is engaged, some element of illegality, where enforcement of the award involves clear injury to public good or the integrity of the court's process or powers will be abused." … [58] The scope of public policy ground for setting aside an arbitral award could only be invoked in deserving case i.e in instances where it appears a violation of the most basic notions of morality and justice. It covers fundamental principles of law and justice in substantive as well as procedural respect. Instances where the upholding of an arbitral award would shock the conscience, or clearly injurious to the public good, or wholly offensive to the ordinary reasonable and fully informed member of the public, had been held by courts in various jurisdiction to fall within the category of public policy ground for setting aside an arbitral award...

The Judgment Debtor then relies heavily on the recent Federal

Court case of Dato’ Ting Ching Lee v Ting Siu Hua [2025] 4 CLJ In a suit premised on defamation by the appellant, the respondent counterclaimed to seek for the recovery of monies based on the two lines of credit in the amount of USD 1.5 million and rolling rebate of USD 193,800 or RM 6,097,680.00 which was granted to the appellant for gambling at Naga Casino, Cambodia. The question that arose for determination was whether the counterclaim was an attempt to recover gambling debts and is therefore null, illegal, and void under sections 24 and 31 of the Contracts Act 1950 and section 26 of the Civil Law Act 1956.

The Federal Court examined various decisions that have held gaming to be against public policy as it is contrary to the notion of good social behaviour and is injurious to the public welfare of society. (See: Jupiters Ltd v Lim Kin Tong [2006] 5 CLJ 277, Pet Far Eastern (M) Sdn Bhd v Tay Young Huat & Ors [1999] 5 MLJ 558, The Ritz Hotel Casino Ltd v Datuk Seri Osu Haji Sukam [2005] 6 MLJ 760, Star Cruise Services Ltd v Overseas Union Bank Ltd [1999] 2 SLR 412).

Having found gambling activities to be against public policy, the Federal Court then dismissed the counterclaim of the respondent as it arose from a gambling debt.

It leaves me now to consider if the registration of the Singapore Judgment for the purposes of enforcing it in Malaysia offends public policy.

There is one obvious distinction between Dato’ Ting Ching Lee’s case and all the other cases cited therein with the present case. The former concerned claims brought in respect of gambling debts. They were not decisions on the registration of a foreign judgment.

I am of the view that the legality of the Singapore Judgment had been adjudicated in Singapore. What remains is to enforce the judgment here by resorting to REJA. The challenge taken by the Judgment Debtor here is akin to re-litigating the merits of the Singapore Judgment. The Singapore Judgment has been decided with finality. This was the premise upon which the order to register the Singapore Judgment was made on 8.3.2022.

The merits of the Singapore Judgment is not within the purview nor consideration of this court, as the registering court. The judgment is presumed to be correct in law and in fact. Several cases have ruled on this. I shall refer to some of them as follows:

In Malayan Banking v Ng Man Heng [2005] 1 CLJ 833, the High Court held: “…in point of fact, it has been said time and again that a foreign judgment cannot be impeached on its merits. This is an established principle in conflict of laws.”

(ii) In the case of MBf Finance Bhd v Tong Yet Miaw & Anor [1991] 2 CLJ 1443, the Singapore High Court quoted the following passage from Cheshire and North’s Private International Law (11th Edn): “It is well established that in an action on a foreign judgment the English Court is not entitled to investigate the propriety of the proceedings in a foreign court. Erroneous judgments delivered by a foreign court are not void in England. The merits of the case have been argued and determined and if one of the parties is discontented with the decision his proper course is to take appellate proceedings in the forum of the judgment. The English Tribunal, in other words cannot sit as a Court of Appeal against a judgment pronounced by a court which was competent to exercise jurisdiction over the parties.”

The Court of Appeal in Mann Holdings Pte Ltd & Anor v Ung Yoke Hong [2019] 6 CLJ 475 has also affirmed the principle that the merits of the foreign judgment is to be challenged in the original court when it held: [55] In the case of judgments from a superior Court of another jurisdiction, the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 is a specific statute enacted to provide the mechanism for how such judgments from recognized jurisdictions such as the High Court of Singapore may be enforced in Malaysia. That specific mechanism involves a mandatory registration process with adequate timelines enacted for setting aside the registration, before such judgment may be enforced or executed. After such judgments are registered, it is the registration that is challenged and not the merits or propriety of the judgment. That exercise must necessarily be undertaken in the original jurisdiction where the judgment was pronounced.

In any event, I am of the view that the public policy consideration in REJA is to be applied narrowly. It applies to the registration of the foreign judgment and not to the judgment itself. The Judgment Creditor is not commencing a suit in this jurisdiction to recover the gambling debt. There is a critical distinction between the two.

Such a distinction has been drawn in the various cases which have consistently held that the registration of a foreign judgment obtained in relation to lawful gaming transaction is not considered to be against public policy. (See: Marina Bay Sands Pte Ltd v Ng Kong Seong [2017] 7 MLJ 188, Resorts World at Sentosa Pte Ltd v Lim Soo Kok [2017] 1 CLJ 363; Resorts World At Sentosa Pte Ltd v Alfie Gan Kong Tian [2024] MLJU 2960, Marina Bay Sands Pte Ltd v Khoo Soo Hean [2025] MLJU 2912).

It is not in dispute that the Judgment Creditor is a duly licensed casino operator under the Singapore Casino Control Act 2006. Even the Federal Court in Dato’ Ting Ching Lee recognised that gambling activities are permitted where the authorities have issued a license.

As there is no other reason advanced on the ground of public policy except that the Singapore Judgment arose from a gambling debt, I am of the view that the ground fails.

In respect of the other ground relied on for setting aside, i.e that the Judgment Creditor failed to fulfil the requirements of the Evidence Act 1950 for the Singapore Judgment to be accepted, this is not a ground within the ambit of s. 5 (1) of REJA.

The grounds enumerated in s. 5(1) are exhaustive. They are in no way to be expanded as that as it would run contrary to the principle of comity which is the underlying foundation of REJA. In other words, any application to set aside the registration of a foreign judgment must fall within the limited grounds in s. 5(1).

It bears emphasis that REJA is built on the principle of reciprocity and comity, by allowing foreign judgments of superior courts to be enforced as if they were originally issued from the High Court of Malaya. The Court of Appeal in Mann Holdings Pte Ltd. expressed as follows: [59] Coming then to the Act itself and its operation. The Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 is specific legislation enacted by Parliament to confer specific jurisdiction on the Courts to register judgments given by superior Courts of those reciprocating countries listed in the First Schedule to the Act. The whole basis of the Act starts with the concept or principle of comity and substantial reciprocity between nations. This is evident from the terms of section 3(2) which reads:

The Yang di-Pertuan Agong may, if he is satisfied that in the event of the benefits conferred by this Part being extended to judgments given in the superior courts of any country or territory outside Malaysia, substantial reciprocity of treatment will be assured as respects the enforcement in that country or territory of judgments given in the High Court, by order extend this Part to that country or territory and may, by the same or a different order, amend the First Schedule to add that country or territory thereto and specify what courts of that country or territory shall be deemed to be superior courts for the purposes of this Part. [61] The principle of international comity is an internationally recognized and accepted concept, especially within the Commonwealth, with the Courts striving to avoid conflicting decisions between civilized and friendly nations as amplified in the case of The Abidin Daver [1984] HL

398.

Therefore, a foreign judgment from a reciprocating country must be given effect to once it satisfies the requirements of REJA. Once registered, the onus is on the Judgment Debtor to satisfy the court that there are valid grounds to set it aside. I do not find the Judgment Debtor to have succeeded here.

In the circumstances, enclosure 17 is dismissed. I order that costs of RM 5,000.00 subject to allocatur be paid to the Judgment Creditor. Dated: 7th May 2026 -sgd-Alice Loke Yee Ching Judge High Court Kuala Lumpur Counsel for Judgment Creditor: Pn. Wong Jia Jing (Pn. Serena Azizuddin together with her) Tetuan Shearn Delamore & Co. Counsel for Judgment Debtor: Pn. Nur Amni Irdina bt Mat Ayob