Maybank Islamic Berhad v Ng Shoo Chong (JA-29NCC-577-06/2024)

Pemiutang Penghakiman (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “JC”) telah memberi kemudahan terma kepada D & Yee Trading Sdn Bhd (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Penghutang Prinsipal”) bagi jumlah RM500,000.00. Penghutang Penghakiman (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “JD”) telah menjamin pinjaman tersebut melalui Surat Jaminan bertarikh 9.5.2019.

JC telah memulakan tindakan terhadap Penghutang Prinsipal dan JD atas kemungkiran pembayaran semula dan pada 28.4.2023 JC memasukkan Penghakiman terhadap Penghutang Prinsipal dan JD. Seterusnya Penghutang Prinsipal telah digulungkan pada 29.2.2024 dan JC telah memfailkan bukti hutang terhadap Penghutang Prinsipal pada 3.4.2024.

JC seterusnya memfailkan Notis Kebankrapan terhadap JD pada 26.6.2024. Setelah itu, JC telah memfailkan Saman Dalam Kamar (Lampiran 5) bagi memohon kebenaran Mahkamah bagi meneruskan tindakan kebankrapan terhadap JD menurut seksyen 5(3)(b) Akta Insolvensi 1967 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Akta Tersebut”) pada 23.7.2024. JD membantah permohonan JC tersebut yang menjadi subjek pertikaian di Mahkamah. Analisis dan keputusan S/N 8VTVzfimhUWNzt5QhcRjg Isu Pertama: Sama ada JC seharusnya mendapatkan kebenaran Mahkamah terlebih dahulu sebelum memulakan tindakan kebankrapan terhadap JD

JD berhujah bahawa seksyen 5(3)(b) Akta Tersebut secara spesifik dan nyata memperuntukkan bahawa kebenaran Mahkamah perlu diperolehi oleh JC terlebih dahulu sebelum memulakan tindakan kebankrapan terhadap mana-mana JD yang merupakan penjamin bukan sosial. JD berhujah bahawa JC telah memfailkan Notis Kebankrapan sebelum mendapatkan kebenaran dari Mahkamah dan hanya memfailkan Saman Dalam Kamar (lampiran 5) untuk mendapatkan kebenaran tersebut selepas 28 hari dari tarikh pemfailan Notis Kebankrapan. Dengan demikian, JD berhujah bahawa tindakan JC adalah bertentangan dengan seksyen 5(3) Akta Tersebut.

Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada seksyen 5(3) Akta Tersebut yang memperuntukkan bahawa:- “(3) A petitioning creditor shall not be entitled to commence any bankruptcy action-

against a social guarantor; and

against a guarantor other than a social guarantor unless the petitioning creditor has obtained leave from the court.”

Akta Tersebut juga mentaksirkan “social guarantor” dalam seksyen 2 seperti berikut:- S/N 8VTVzfimhUWNzt5QhcRjg “"social guarantor" means a person who provides, not for the purpose of making profit, the following guarantees:

a guarantee for a loan, scholarship or grant for educational or research purposes;

a guarantee for a hire-purchase transaction of a vehicle for personal or non-business use; and

a guarantee for a housing loan transaction solely for personal dwelling”

Penelitian Mahkamah kepada pliding yang dilampirkan dalam Permintaan untuk Mengeluarkan Notis Kebankrapan (Lampiran 1) dengan jelas menunjukkan bahawa JD adalah seorang penjamin bukan sosial.

Mahkamah merujuk kepada hansard Parlimen berkenaan pindaan kepada Akta Tersebut pada 29.3.2017 di mana Menteri dalam membentangkan pindaan kepada Akta Tersebut telah menyatakan seperti berikut:- “Kerajaan amat prihatin isu-isu kebankrapan terutama di mana mereka diisytiharkan bankrap disebabkan mereka menjadi penjamin kepada peminjam yang gagal menjelaskan pinjaman. Golongan ini tidak sepatutnya dipertanggungjawabkan sepenuhnya tanpa tindakan terhadap peminjam prinsipal terlebih dahulu untuk menjelaskan pinjaman yang diambil… …Kerajaan telah mempertimbangkan lapan perubahan dasar untuk meminda Akta Kebankrapan 1967 seperti berikut:

tindakan kebankrapan tidak boleh diambil terhadap penjamin sosial. Walau bagaimanapun penjamin bukan sosial boleh dibankrapkan setelah mahkamah berpuas hati dengan tindakan-tindakan yang dibuat oleh pihak pemiutang;…”

Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada huraian kepada Rang Undang-undang untuk meminda Akta Kebankrapan 1967 (D.R. 21/2016) yang memperuntukkan seperti berikut:- “11. Fasal 12 bertujuan untuk meminda seksyen 5 Akta 360 untuk menaikkan nilai minimum hutang bagi pemfailan petisyen kebankrapan daripada tiga puluh ribu ringgit kepada lima puluh ribu ringgit. Fasal ini selanjutnya memperuntukkan bahawa pemiutang tidak boleh memulakan prosiding kebankrapan terhadap penjamin sosial. Berhubung dengan penjamin selain penjamin sosial, pemiutang tidak boleh MEMULAKAN prosiding kebankrapan melainkan jika pemiutang itu telah mendapat keizinan mahkamah.”

Dalam menjelaskan kesan pindaan kepada seksyen 5 Akta Tersebut, Mahkamah dalam kes Rusli Ab Ghani; Ex-Parte: CIMB Bank Berhad [2018] 1 LNS 1528; [2018] MLRHU 1180 memutuskan bahawa:- “[11] Subsections 5(3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) are new provisions which were inserted vide Act A1534 and came into force on 6.10.2017 and at the same time the Rules were introduced replacing the Bankruptcy Rules 1969. Prior to these amendments a petition creditor had to prove that he had exhausted all avenues to recover debts owed to him by the debtor before he could commence a bankruptcy petition against a social guarantor. However, with effect from 6.10.2017 a social guarantor is absolutely protected and cannot be made a bankrupt. That protection is now accorded to other guarantors who were not protected before the amendment… S/N 8VTVzfimhUWNzt5QhcRjg This case is still good law as the current Act gives absolute protection to social guarantor and the then safeguard is now accorded to other guarantors who were not protected under the old legislation. This simply means that a judgment creditor must ensure that all modes of execution and enforcement have been exhausted against the debtor who is the borrower before he can go against the guarantor. Once that is shown then leave will be granted by the court for the judgment creditor to commence bankruptcy petition against the guarantor.”

Berdasarkan nas-nas di atas, seseorang JC perlu mendapatkan kebenaran Mahkamah terlebih dahulu untuk memulakan tindakan kebankrapan terhadap mana-mana JD yang merupakan penjamin (bukan sosial). Dalam hal ini, adalah penting untuk menentukan tafsiran permulaan (commencement) tindakan kebankrapan.

Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Liew Hon Kong v Bank Pertanian Malaysia Bhd [2022] 1 MLJ 836; [2021] 9 CLJ 82; [2021] 6 MLRA 641; [2021] AMEJ 1158 mentaksirkan permulaan tindakan kebankrapan, seperti berikut:- “[61] Whilst we accept that bankruptcy proceedings is a two staged process, we do not accept the argument that the BN was issued "administratively" and therefore merely "kickstarts" the process… [68] Rather, as was rightly submitted by counsel for the JC, the moment an application is made for the issuance of the BN, the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is invoked and the jurisdiction continues until the very end, ie, beyond the AO and RO… [71] Next, in so far as the two-staged process ie, BN followed by CP is concerned, this merely means that there are two steps to be taken. But they are nevertheless steps within a single legal proceeding, namely, as in this case, within BC4238… In our view, bankruptcy proceedings commenced upon the issuance of the BN, and such proceedings are to be treated as "pending" for purposes of s. 60 of the Bankruptcy (Amendment) Act 2017.”

Seterusnya, JD merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Tinggi Per: Lim Sue Beng v AmBank (M) Berhad & Ors [2022] MLJU 3147; [2022] 1 LNS 2822, dimana berdasarkan tafisran Mahkamah Rayuan tersebut dalam kes Liew Hon Kong (supra), seseorang JC perlu mendapatkan kebenaran Mahkamah terlebih dahulu sebelum memfailkan Notis Kebankrapan terhadap seseorang JD yang merupakan penjamin. Dalam menjelaskan perkara ini, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[17] Based on Liew Hon Kong (supra) and a literal reading of section 5(3) of the Insolvency Act 1967 wherein:

17.1 the said express words "unless the petitioning creditor has obtained leave from the court" appears, I hold that the same is clear and unambiguous to mean that the JC has to apply for leave first from the Court before the said BN can be issued; and 17.2 the words "to commence any bankruptcy action" in the said section is to be treated as referring to the BN as the BN is the initiation of a bankruptcy action / proceedings as the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction is invoked [18] In this respect, I find that the Federal Court case of Hong Leong Bank Berhad v. Khairulnizam bin Jamaludin [2016] 7 CLJ 335; [2016] 4 MLJ 302 relied on by learned counsel for the Judgment Creditor (JC) is not applicable to the facts before me as that case was decided pre the Insolvency Act 1967. …[20] In the circumstances, the BN is in my decision pre maturely issued. I also hold that the prayer in paragraph (a) of Enclosure 12 filed by the JC ie, for leave to commence the bankruptcy proceedings against the JD, which is the subject of the appeal in Enclosure 46, is retrospective in nature as the said application was only made almost 7 months after the said BN was issued. This, in my view, is prejudicial to the JD and against the spirit of Section 5(3) of the Insolvency Act 1965 ie, the protection of guarantors and appears to be an afterthought.”

Sekiranya diteliti, keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi tersebut adalah tidak senada dengan kes Mahkamah Rayuan Hong Leong Bank Berhad v Ong Moon Huat & Another Appeal [2018] MLJU 1576; [2018] 1 LNS 1612; [2018] MLRAU 504 yang memutuskan bahawa JC berhak untuk memfailkan permohonan kebenaran memulakan tindakan kebankrapan tersebut sehingga sebelum Petisyen Pemiutang difailkan. Dalam menjelaskan prinsip tersebut, Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa:- “[15] For these reasons we are of the view that on a proper reading of Khairulnizam which is wholly relevant coupled with section 5(3)(b) as well as Rule 97 it is open to a judgment creditor to file an application for leave to proceed against a guarantor either upon the issuance of the bankruptcy notice, or even prior to that, up to and immediately PRIOR TO THE FILING OF A CREDITOR'S PETITION. This gives leeway to the judgment creditor to obtain such leave as it deems fit in the circumstances of a particular case. This will in no way prejudice the judgment debtor/guarantor who is protected by the legislation which requires such leave to be obtained as a prerequisite to the grant of receiving and adjudication orders.”

Perlu diperhatikan bahawa sebagaimana dihujahkan JC, keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes Lim Sue Beng (supra) telah diterbalikkan Mahkamah Rayuan sebagaimana dilaporkan dalam AMBANK (M) BERHAD & YANG LAIN lwn. LIM SUE BENG [2023] CLJU(O) 22 [CA] seperti berikut:- “KORAM: AZIZAH BINTI HAJI NAWAWI, HMR MARIANA BINTI HAJI YAHYA, HMR LIM CHONG FONG, HMR PADA 25 SEPTEMBER 2023 DALAM MAHKAMAH TERBUKA MELALUI PLATFORM SIDANG VIDEO SECARA ZOOM S/N 8VTVzfimhUWNzt5QhcRjg PENGHAKIMAN (Lampiran 1) RAYUAN INI ditetapkan untuk pendengaran pada hari ini dalam kehadiran Lua Ai Siew (AiliAlef Hamima binti Aznan bersamanya), peguam bagi pihak perayu-perayu dan Jasneeta Bhullar (Norazmi bin Norazman dan Ahmad Fadziy bin Abdul Gani bersamanya), peguam bagi pihak responden DAN SETELAH MEMBACA Rekod-Rekod Rayuan dan kesemuanya yang difailkan di sini DAN SETELAH MENDENGAR hujahan pihak-pihak yang tersebut MAKA ADALAH DENGAN SEBULAT SUARA INI DIPERINTAHKAN bahawa:- a) Rayuan perayu-perayu dibenarkan dengan kos global sebanyak RM20,000.00 kepada perayu-perayu untuk rayuan ini, Rayuan Sivil No. W-03(IM)(NCC)-96- 10/2022 dan Rayuan Sivil No. W-03(IM)(NCC)-97-10/2022, tertakluk kepada fi alokatur dibayar dalam rayuan ini; dan b) Kebenaran dengan ini diberikan berkenaan perenggan (a) dalam Saman Dalam Kamar bertarikh 23.07.2021 (Lampiran 12).

Mahkamah tidak terlepas pandang bahawa sesuatu Perintah tanpa sebarang alasan penghakiman pada kebiasaan tidak mengikat Mahkamah ini. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Thanesh Rao Moorthy v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors [2022] MLJU 1584; [2022] CLJU 1529 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[11] Learned counsel for the applicant referred this court to the recent cases decided by the Federal Court Izham bin Muhammad [HC 223/10/2021 (B)] and Cheng Eng Ang [HC 256-11/2021 (B)]. At the point of time, there were no grounds available. When there are no grounds available, this court is not bound to follow the decision. In the case of Vishnu Telagan v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2019] 9 CLJ 177:- S/N 8VTVzfimhUWNzt5QhcRjg [40] The respondents argue that the Federal Court there had heard a similar argument on this point and refused the detainee a writ of habeas corpus. As at the date of our decision in this appeal, no written grounds had been delivered in respect of that case and so we are therefore unable to glean any reasons why such a decision was made. Therefore, we did not see how the said judgment lent any support to the respondent's case. Surely, in arriving at our decision, we had to consider and apply the law according to the facts and circumstances of this case." [12] Hence, founded on the case of Vishu Telagan (supra) this court is no bound by the decision of the apex court if not grounds of the decision is available. Based on that principle, this court is of the view it is not bound to the decisions offered by learned counsel for the applicant from the Bar.

Namun, dengan kewujudan perintah Mahkamah Rayuan tersebut, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa Mahkamah Rayuan telah membuat keputusan yang konsisten dengan kes Ong Moon Huat (supra) bahawa seseorang Pemiutang Penghakiman boleh memfailkan permohonan untuk memohon kebenaran Mahkamah untuk membawa tindakan terhadap penjamin bukan sosial pada bila-bila masa sebelum sahaja pemfailan Petisyen Pemiutang.

Salah satu rasional untuk keputusan-keputusan tersebut adalah disebabkan oleh masalah praktikal yang dihadapi peguam dalam memfailkan permohonan memohon kebenaran tersebut tanpa intitulment, yang pada kebiasaanya hanya akan wujud dengan pemfailan Notis Kebankrapan di Mahkamah. Dalam menjelaskan isu ini, Mahkamah dalam kes Ong Moon Huat (supra) memutuskan bahawa:- S/N 8VTVzfimhUWNzt5QhcRjg “In other words there is nothing to prevent a judgment creditor from obtaining leave at a point in time prior to the commission of an act of bankruptcy i.e. soon after the issuance of the bankruptcy notice or with the application for the issuance of a bankruptcy notice. The practical difficulty is that there will be no cause papers with an intitulement to enable the judgment creditor to file a summons in chambers and affidavit in support until the bankruptcy notice is issued. Therefore most solicitors, as a matter of practice may wish to obtain leave as a matter of prudence at this juncture, rather than wait for the act of bankruptcy to be committed. This is because it leaves a very narrow window of time for the application for leave to be filed and heard…”

Maka, berdasarkan analisis di atas, hujahan JD adalah tidak bermerit. Memandangkan Penghutang Prinsipal telah digulungkan dan JC telah memfailkan bukti hutang terhadap Penghutang Prinsipal, sebagaimana dihujahkan JC, tiada lagi bentuk pelaksanaan yang dapat diteruskan JC terhadap Penghutang Prinsipal. Maka, JC berhak meneruskan tindakan kebankrapan terhadap JD sebagaimana diputuskan dalam kes Gan Khian Pin v Malayan Banking Berhad [2021] MLJU 3039; [2021] MLRHU 2879; [2021] 1 LNS 2433; [2021] AMEJ 2100 seperti berikut: - “The principal debtor has been wound-up on 13.5.2020 and Proof of Debt has been filed by the JC against the principal debtor. There is no confirmation by the Liquidator that the assets or property of the principal debtor company, if any, is sufficient to satisfy all the claims lodged by its creditors. The effect of a winding up order was to deprive the company of the beneficial ownership of all its property. See Yamamori (Hong Kong) Ltd v. Borneo Hotel Sdn Bhd & Anor [1991] 4 CLJ Rep 235. Hence, there is no avenue left for the JC to recover the debt from the principal borrower by using other modes of execution and enforcement within the meaning of s. 5(4) & (6) of the IA 1967. From the Affidavit evidence, this Court is satisfied that the JC has exhausted all modes of execution and enforcement to recover the debt owed to them by the JD. See KKRMC Trading Sdn Bhd v. Tan Tiang Lai [2020] 1 LNS 852 (HC). S/N 8VTVzfimhUWNzt5QhcRjg [8] s. 5 (3) to (6) of the IA 1967 does not contain any express provision that the liquidation of the principal borrower company must be completed and the company dissolved before leave can be granted to the JD to commence bankruptcy proceedings against the JD as guarantor. The wordings in s. 5(4) and s. 5(6) of the IA 1967 are clear and unambiguous. The Court will not read words into a statute unless clear reason for it is to be found in the statute itself. Therefore, in construing the statute, the Court will look at the words in the statute and apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in the statute. See Tebin Mostapa v. Hulba-Danyal Balia & Anor [2020] 7 CLJ 561 (FC). The plain and ordinary meaning of the words in s. 5(4) means that the Creditor must exhaust all modes of execution and enforcement to recover the debts in accordance with the law.”

Malah, Mahkamah-mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa setelah sebuah syarikat telah digulungkan, tiada bentuk pelaksanaan lain yang boleh dimulakan terhadap syarikat tersebut menurut seksyen 472(3) dan seksyen 528 Akta Syarikat 2016. Umpamanya, dalam kes Gan Khian Pin (supra) Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[9] The law does not permit any execution or enforcement against the principal debtor company after the company has been wound up. See. S. 472(3), 483(1) and 528(1) of the Companies Act 2016. The provisions of the Companies Act automatically operate to stay the hands of creditors from getting the property of the company with a view to obtaining priority payments of debts over all other creditors. The provisions also operate to stay the hands of the company from disposing its property with a view of preferring one or more of its creditors over the general body of creditors. See Lee Chiu Hing Realty Sdn Bhd v. Atlas Corporation Sdn Bhd [2009] 1 LNS 342. Hence, the Creditor need not wait until the principal creditor company is dissolved. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the deprivation of the principal debtor company of the beneficial ownership of all its property pursuant to a winding up order would suffice.”

Dalam menjelaskan prinsip yang sama, Mahkamah dalam kes In Re: Wong Choon Loong; Ex-Parte: Ambank (M) Berhad [2022] MLJU 20; [2022] 3 MLRH 27; [2022] CLJU 11; [2022] AMEJ 0035 pula memutuskan bahawa:- “[14] In any event, the Principal Debtor had been wound up vide JA-28NCC-241- 11/2018, and in accordance with section 5(6) of the Insolvency Act, all modes of execution against the Principal Debtor had been exhausted… S/N 8VTVzfimhUWNzt5QhcRjg [15] The JD attempted to distinguish the above-mentioned cases from the facts of the present case. However, in my view, the principle is the same, that is, the Principal Debtor was wound up and section 451 of the Companies Act fortified the JC's argument that resorting to bankruptcy proceedings was the correct approach, as it could no longer proceed against the Principal Debtor… [16] Furthermore, proceeding against the Principal Debtor would be going against sections 483 and 528 of the Companies Act, which read:…”

Maka, Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan JC bahawa JC telah memenuhi keperluan seksyen 5(3)(b) Akta Tersebut untuk mendapatkan kebenaran Mahkamah untuk memulakan tindakan kebankrapan terhadap JD dan dengan demikian, hujahan JD dalam isu pertama wajar ditolak. Isu Kedua: Sama ada kegagalan menyampaikan Writ Saman dan Pernyataan Tuntutan serta Penghakiman Ingkar kepada JD bersifat fatal kepada kes JC

JD berhujah bahawa Writ Saman dan Pernyataan Tuntutan tidak diserahkan secara sempurna kepada JD. JD berhujah bahawa JC telah menyampaikan Writ Saman dan Pernyataan Tuntutan secara pos AR Berdaftar pada 6.4.2023. JD berhujah bahawa tiada sebarang bukti yang dikemukakan JC bahawa kertas-kertas kausa tersebut telah diaku terima oleh JD dengan sempurna. Maka, JD berhujah bahawa serahan Writ Saman dan Pernyataan Tuntutan adalah tidak teratur dan dengan demikian, Mahkamah ini seharusnya mengetepikan Penghakiman Ingkar Kehadiran terhadap JD.

Dalam hal ini, sebagaimana dihujahkan JC, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa Mahkamah ini tidak seharusnya menyelidik keesahan Penghakiman yang diperolehi JC yang tidak pernah diketepikan mahupun digantung perlaksanaannya oleh JD. Undang-undang adalah mantap bahawa Mahkamah Kebankrapan tidak seharusnya melihat di sebalik penghakiman tersebut (cannot go behind the judgment). Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Per: Chan Wai Fong v Ex-Parte: Everest Web Sdn Bhd [2022] MLJU 1253; [2022] 1 LNS 1277; [2022] AMEJ 0733 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa :- “[7] As the said Judgment has not been stayed or overturned, the Judgment remains valid and binding and the JD must obey the said Judgment. I refer to Re Tioh Ngee Heng [2000] 1 LNS 197 where Steve Shim J (as His Lordship then was) held: "It is trite law that an order, even if irregular, is valid and enforceable until set aside. This principle is particularly relevant in bankruptcy proceedings where the court generally will not look behind the judgments or order save in very limited circumstances of fraud or illegality, etc. In Isaacs v. Robertson [1985] AC 97, Lord Diplock speaking for the Privy Council approved the proposition advanced by Romer LJ in Hadkinson v. Hadkinson [1952] 2 All ER 567 who said at p. 569:- It is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of, whom an order is made by a court of competent jurisdiction to obey it unless and until that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature of this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends even to cases where the person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or even void. Lord Cottenham, LC, said in Chuck v. Cremer [1846] 1 Coop temp Cott 338 at p 342, 47 ER 884 at p. 885): 'A party, who knows of an order, whether null or valid, regular or irregular, cannot be permitted to disobey it. It would be most dangerous to hold that the suitors, or their solicitors, could themselves judge whether an order was null or valid-whether it was regular or irregular. That they should come to the court and not take upon themselves to determine such a question. That the course of a party knowing of an order, which was null or irregular, and who might be affected by it, was plain. He should apply to the court that it might be discharged. As long as it existed it must not be disobeyed.' Such being the nature of this obligation, two consequences will, in general, follow from its breach. The first is that anyone who disobeys an order of the court is in contempt and may be punished by committal or attachment or otherwise. S/N 8VTVzfimhUWNzt5QhcRjg This principle has been followed by our Supreme Court in Sovereign General Insurance Sdn Bhd v. Koh Tian Bee [1988] 1 CLJ 277 (Rep); [1988] 1 CLJ 155; [1988] 1 MLJ 304." [8] Following from the above, this Court cannot go behind the Judgment as stated by the Supreme Court in Sovereign General Insurance Sdn Bhd v. Koh Tian Bee [1988] 1 CLJ Rep 277; [1988] 1 MLJ 304 where it was held that "In the exercise of his jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings, the learned judge cannot go behind the judgment.”

Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Re Yong Tet On, Paul, Ex Parte Chung Khiaw Bank Ltd [1996] 1 MLJ 721; [1996] 1 CLJ 836; [1995] 3 MLRH 830 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa :- "Obedience to Court Order It is established law that a person whom an order of Court has been issued is duty bound to obey that order until it is set aside. It is not open for him to decide for himself whether the order was wrongly issued and therefore does not require obedience. His duty is one of obedience until such time as the order may be set aside or varied".”

Berkenaan dakwaan JD bahawa Penghakiman Ingkar Kehadiran tidak pernah disampaikan kepada JD, undang-undang juga adalah mantap bahawa tiada keperluan bagi suatu penghakiman diserahkan kepada JD sebelum seseorang JC memulakan tindakan kebankrapan terhadap JD. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Re Mohd Taufic Ozier; Ex-Parte: Hatchery Sdn Bhd [2009] 12 MLRH 129; [2009] CLJU 1444; [2010] 8 AMR 266 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- S/N 8VTVzfimhUWNzt5QhcRjg “Finally there is no requirement in the bankruptcy rules that the judgment is to be served by the JC on the JD prior to institution of the bankruptcy proceedings. This cannot invalidate the bankruptcy proceedings.”

Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Re Tambi Nasirun; Ex-Parte: Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad [2020] MLJU 692; [2020] MLRHU 500; [2020] CLJU 572; [2020] 5 AMR 505 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[13] For this, I now turn to the service of the Amended JID on the JD. A perusal of the Rules of Court in particular, Order 42 (in relation to Judgment and orders) and Order 45 (enforcement of Judgment and Orders) of the Rules of Court 2012 does not provide in any manner that the Judgment has to be served on the JD nor does it state in what mode the Judgment has to be served. The JD himself has failed to provide any authority on this point to show that the Amended JID has to be proved to be served on the JD before the BN can be issued. In my view there is no provision in law which states that Judgment has to be proved to be served as such and received by the JD…I also find that my reasoning is in part backed by the authority of the Re: Soh Poh Sheng; Ex Parte Malayan Banking Berhad [2014] 1 LNS 1431 where his Lordship Gunalan Muniandy JC (as he then was) held that "JD's contention that the petitioner (JC) must produce proof of service of the judgment on the JD before issuing the BN is untenable in law. There is no requirement under the law for an affidavit of service of the judgment on which the BN is based to be filed commencing the bankruptcy petition."…

Mahkamah seterusnya merujuk kepada hujahan JD bahawa Penghakiman yang direkodkan terhadap JD pada 28.4.2023 bukan merupakan penghakiman muktamad dan patut dicabar kerana penghakiman tersebut direkodkan terhadap JD secara salah di sisi undang-undang.

Mahkamah tidak bersetuju dengan hujahan JD bahawa penghakiman ingkar yang dimasukkan terhadap JD adalah bukan penghakiman muktamad bagi maksud seksyen 3(1)(i) Akta Tersebut. Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa sehingga Penghakiman Ingkar tersebut diketepikan Mahkamah Perbicaraan, JC berhak untuk meneruskan dengan tindakan kebankrapan terhadap JD. Sebagai Autoriti, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Tetuan Bee Ling & Co v Vijendran Ponniah [2010] MLJU 2236; [2010] 6 CLJ 643; [2010] 1 MLRA 735; [2011] 1 AMR 363 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa:- “[26] Hakim bicara turut mendapati, dengan bersandarkan kepada kes Re: Udos; Ex Parte: Seabanc Kredit Sdn Bhd [1994] 3 CLJ 377, bahawa penghakiman ingkar dalam kes sekarang ini masih belum matang sebagai penghakiman muktamad, dan dengan yang demikian tiada prosiding kebankrapan boleh dimulakan terhadap plaintif. Dalam hal ini saya hanya perlu merujuk kepada kes Pembinaan KSY Sdn Bhd v. Lian Seng Properties Sdn Bhd [1991] 1 CLJ 263; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 343, di mana Mahkamah Agong telah memutuskan sesuatu penghakiman ingkar sehingga diketepikan adalah suatu penghakiman sah dan boleh dikuatkuasakan. Prinsip yang sama telah diikuti dalam kes Vijendran Ponniah v. Bank of Commerce [1999] 5 CLJ 69, di mana telah diputuskan bahawa sesuatu penghakiman ingkar adalah suatu penghakiman yang baik sehingga diketepikan; dan apabila jumlah di bawah sesuatu penghakiman itu tidak dibayar, maka ia boleh dikuatkuasakan, termasuk dalam bentuk prosiding kebankrapan.”

Dalam kes ini, JD mengakui telah mengetahui kewujudan Penghakiman Ingkar Kehadiran selepas menerima Notis Kebankrapan dan Permintaan untuk Mengeluarkan Notis Kebankrapan dari JC pada 25.7.2024. Namun, sehingga tarikh keputusan pada 10.1.2025, JD gagal mengemukakan sebarang perintah untuk menunjukkan bahawa Penghakiman Ingkar yang dimasukkan JC telah diketepikan. Maka, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa hujahan JD berkenaan isu ini juga wajar ditolak.

Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa permohonan JC dalam lampiran 5 wajar dibenarkan dan kos permohonan ini adalah kos dalam kausa sebagaimana dipersetujui pihak-pihak. Bertarikh: 10 Januari 2025 Disediakan oleh, ………………………………….

Tetuan Sucha Singh & Partners Peguambela & Peguamcara Peguam Pemiutang Penghakiman No.16, Jalan Lambak, 86007 Kluang, Johor (Ruj: SKL-JM/MBB/D&Yee/NSC/BN-wwy) …

Tetuan The Chambers of Waran Peguambela & Peguamcara Peguam Penghutang Penghakiman No.19, Jalan KP 1/1, Taman Kajang Prima, 43000 Kajang, Selangor (Ruj:-) … Puan Kanimoli Sivadurai S/N 8VTVzfimhUWNzt5QhcRjg Kes-kes yang dirujuk:

Rusli Ab Ghani; Ex-Parte: CIMB Bank Berhad [2018] 1 LNS 1528; [2018]

MLRHU 1180 Liew Hon Kong v Bank Pertanian Malaysia Bhd [2022] 1 MLJ 836; [2021] 9 CLJ 82; [2021] 6 MLRA 641; [2021] AMEJ 1158

Per: Lim Sue Beng v AmBank (M) Berhad & Ors [2022] MLJU 3147; [2022] 1

LNS 2822 Hong Leong Bank Berhad v Ong Moon Huat & Another Appeal [2018] MLJU 1576; [2018] 1 LNS 1612; [2018] MLRAU 504

AMBANK (M) BERHAD & YANG LAIN lwn. LIM SUE BENG [2023] CLJU(O) 22 [CA]

Thanesh Rao Moorthy v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors [2022] MLJU 1584; [2022] CLJU 1529

Gan Khian Pin v Malayan Banking Berhad [2021] MLJU 3039; [2021] MLRHU 2879; [2021] 1 LNS 2433; [2021] AMEJ 2100

In Re: Wong Choon Loong; Ex-Parte: Ambank (M) Berhad [2022] MLJU 20; [2022] 3 MLRH 27; [2022] CLJU 11; [2022] AMEJ 0035

Per: Chan Wai Fong v Ex-Parte: Everest Web Sdn Bhd [2022] MLJU 1253; [2022] 1 LNS 1277; [2022] AMEJ 0733

Re Yong Tet On, Paul, Ex Parte Chung Khiaw Bank Ltd [1996] 1 MLJ 721; [1996] 1 CLJ 836; [1995] 3 MLRH 830

Re Mohd Taufic Ozier; Ex-Parte: Hatchery Sdn Bhd [2009] 12 MLRH 129; [2009]

CLJU 1444; [2010] 8 AMR 266 Re Tambi Nasirun; Ex-Parte: Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad [2020] MLJU 692; [2020] MLRHU 500; [2020] CLJU 572; [2020] 5 AMR 505

Tetuan Bee Ling & Co v Vijendran Ponniah [2010] MLJU 2236; [2010] 6 CLJ 643; [2010] 1 MLRA 735; [2011] 1 AMR 363