Maybank Islamic Berhad v Nim AI Huat (JA-29NCC-485-05/2024)

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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM, MALAYSIA DALAM PERKARA KEBANKRAPAN NO JA-29NCC-485-05/2024 PERKARA : NIM AI HUAT … PENGHUTANG PENGHAKIMAN EX-PARTE : MAYBANK ISLAMIC BERHAD … PEMIUTANG PENGHAKIMAN ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Pengenalan

Lampiran

Lampiran 3 tersebut yang dicabar JD menjadi subjek pertikaian di hadapan Mahkamah. Analisis dan keputusan Mahkamah Isu Pertama: JC telah gagal mematuhi keperluan seksyen 5 Akta Insolvensi 1967 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Akta Tersebut”) 5. JD merujuk kepada seksyen 5(3)(b) Akta Tersebut yang memperuntukkan bahawa:- “(3) A petitioning creditor shall not be entitled to commence any bankruptcy action- (b) against a guarantor other than a social guarantor unless the petitioning creditor has obtained leave from the court.” 6. Seterusnya JD juga antara lain merujuk kepada seksyen 5(4) dan 5(6) Akta Tersebut yang masing-masing memperuntukkan bahawa:- “(4) Before granting leave referred to in paragraph (3)(b), the court shall satisfy itself that the petitioning creditor has exhausted all modes of execution and enforcement to recover debts owed to him by the debtor. (6) For the purposes of subsection (4), modes of execution and enforcement include seizure and sale, judgment debtor summon, garnishment and bankruptcy or winding up proceedings against the borrower.” 7. JD berhujah bahawa sebelum Mahkamah memberi kebenaran menurut seksyen 5(3)(b) Akta Tersebut, Mahkamah hendaklah berpuas hati bahawa JC telah melengkapkan kesemua cara pelaksanaan dan penguatkuasaan untuk mendapatkan semula hutang dari Peminjam Utama. 8. Secara ringkas, JD berhujah bahawa JC hanya memfailkan Prosiding Penggulungan Syarikat terhadap Peminjam Utama dan seterusnya telah memfailkan Bukti Hutang dalam Borang Am bertarikh 25.6.2024 kepada Jabatan Insolvensi Shah Alam. JD mendakwa, JC gagal membekalkan apa-apa dokumen jawapan dari Jabatan Insolvensi Shah Alam berkenaan jumlah tuntutan hutang JC dalam borang bukti hutang tersebut yang diperakui Jabatan tersebut. 9. JD berhujah bahawa JC perlu menunggu jawapan dari Jabatan Insolvensi Shah Alam untuk mengetahui sama ada tuntutan JC melalui Bukti Hutang dalam Borang Am bertarikh 25.6.2024 adalah dibenarkan atau ditolak atau dibenarkan separuh. Sekiranya tuntutan JC ditolak oleh Jabatan Insolvensi Shah Alam, barulah JC dibenarkan membuat tuntutan terhadap JD. 10. JD juga berhujah bahawa sekiranya permohonan kebenaran bagi prosiding kebankrapan dibenarkan, perkara tersebut akan mengakibatkan tuntutan berganda, kerana JC akan mendapat jumlah penghakiman tersebut dari JD dan juga melalui Bukti Hutang dalam Borang Am bertarikh 25.6.2024. JD tidak mengemukakan sebarang autoriti bagi menyokong hujahan JD tersebut di atas. 11. Berkenaan hujahan ini, JC berhujah bahawa tiada keperluan undang-undang yang mewajibkan JC untuk menunggu sehingga pembayaran dividen dari pihak Insolvensi setelah Peminjam Utama digulungkan. JC berhujah bahawa penghakiman yang diperolehi terhadap JD adalah secara bersesama dan berasingan dengan Penghutang-penghutang yang lain. 12. JC merujuk kepada kes Re Malaya Bin Sibuku; Ex-Parte Kaya Karisma Sdn Bhd [2021] 10 MLJ 118; [2021] MLRHU 173; [2021] 5 CLJ 403; [2022] AMEJ 1418 dan kes In Re: Wong Choon Loong; Ex-Parte: Ambank (M) Berhad [2022] MLJU 20; [2022] 3 MLRH 27; [2022] CLJU 11; [2022] AMEJ 0035 sebagai autoriti bagi hujahan JC. JC juga berhujah bahawa setelah Peminjam Utama digulungkan, tiada apa-apa mod pelaksanaan dan penguatkuasaan Penghakiman yang boleh dijalankan terhadap Peminjam Utama memandangkan perkara tersebut akan bertentangan dengan seksyen 472(3) dan seksyen 528 Akta Syarikat 2016. 13. Niat Parlimen dalam menggubal seksyen 5(3) dan (4) Akta Tersebut adalah untuk melindungi penjamin bukan sosial dari diambil tindakan kebankrapan sebelum tindakan pelaksanaan selesai diambil terhadap peminjam utama. Perkara ini dijelaskan dalam kes Re: Rusli Ab Ghani; Ex-Parte: CIMB Bank Bhd [2018] MLRHU 1180; [2018] 1 LNS 1528 di mana dalam mentaksirkan peruntukan di bawah seksyen 5 Akta Tersebut, mahkamah memutuskan bahawa: “[11] Sub-ss. 5(3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) are new provisions which were inserted vide Act A1534 and came into force on 6 October 2017 and at the same time the Rules were introduced replacing the Bankruptcy Rules 1969. Prior to these amendments a petition creditor had to prove that he had exhausted all avenues to recover debts owed to him by the debtor before he could commence a bankruptcy petition against a social guarantor. However, with effect from 6 October 2017 a social guarantor is absolutely protected and cannot be made a bankrupt. That protection is now accorded to other guarantors who were not protected before the amendment... This simply means that a judgment creditor must ensure that all modes of execution and enforcement have been exhausted against the debtor who is the borrower before he can go against the guarantor. Once that is shown then leave will be granted by the court for the judgment creditor to commence bankruptcy petition against the guarantor.” 14. Manakala, Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Hong Leong Bank Bhd v. Ong Moon Huat & Another Appeal [2018] MLJU 1576; [2018] MLRAU 504; [2018] 1 LNS 1612 memutuskan bahawa: “[3] A purposive construction of the section as a whole discloses that the section seeks to introduce protection for the guarantor against whom bankruptcy proceedings are to be brought. The protection comes in the form of ensuring that enforcement has been exhausted in respect of the principal debtor prior to proceeding against the guarantor. It is to remedy the mischief of judgment creditors proceeding against the guarantors directly in bankruptcy rather than executing and enforcing against the principal debtor.” 15. Persoalan yang timbul dalam kes ini adalah sama ada tindakan JC dalam memfailkan tindakan kebankrapan terhadap JD sebelum mendapat maklum balas dari Jabatan Insolvensi sama ada tuntutan JC terhadap Peminjam Utama melalui borang bukti hutang adalah diperakui atau tidak, bertindak bertentangan dengan seksyen 5 Akta Tersebut. 16. Mahkamah berpendapat sebagaimana dihujahkan JC, Mahkamah-mahkamah atasan telahpun memutuskan isu ini dalam beberapa kes. Berdasarkan nas-nas yang diputuskan, tidak terdapat peruntukan khusus yang memerlukan proses penggulungan syarikat atau pembubaran syarikat diselesaikan sepenuhnya sebelum kebenaran di bawah seksyen 5(4) Akta Tersebut dibenarkan Mahkamah. Sekiranya Parlimen berhasrat sedekimian, maka perkara tersebut sememangnya telah dinyatakan secara nyata dalam seksyen 5 Akta Tersebut. Dalam ketiadaan peruntukan nyata tersebut, adalah salah untuk Mahkamah menambah keperluan tersebut dalam seksyen tersebut. Umpamanya, dalam kes Re Malaya Bin Sibuku (supra), Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[30] In Hong Leong Bank Berhad v. Ong Moon Huat (above), the Court of Appeal in allowing the appeal and granting leave to the Creditor, did not hold that the creditor was required to wait until the liquidation of the principal debtor's company assets had been realised or completed before the creditor could proceed with bankruptcy proceedings against the guarantor. [31] If the legislature intended that the liquidation of the principal borrower company must be "completed" and that the company is "dissolved" before leave could be granted under s 5(4) of the Insolvency Act 1967, one would expect Parliament to have spelt out that requirement in an express and clear provision to that effect. See Hong Leong Bank Bhd v. Khairulnizam Jamaludin [2016] 4 MLRA 603; [2016] 4 MLJ 302; [2016] 7 CLJ 335; [2016] 4 AMR 246 (FC). [32] Section 5(3) to (6) of the Insolvency Act 1967 is clear and unambiguous. It does not contain any express provision that require such "completion" of liquidation or "dissolution" of the company before leave may be granted under s 5(4) of the Insolvency Act 1967. This protection for the guarantor is to remedy the mischief of Judgment Creditors proceeding against the guarantor directly in bankruptcy instead of executing against the principal debtor. [33] In the present case, the principal debtor, Dunggon Jaya has been wound up and the co guarantor or Judgment debtor has been declared a bankrupt in 2019. The Creditor did not proceed directly against the guarantor (Debtor) in bankruptcy to enforce the said Judgment. Applying the principles enunciated in the aforesaid authorities and from the evidence in the Affidavit in Support (Encl 2), this Court finds that the Creditor has exhausted all modes of execution against Dunggon Jaya and Elvis and the requirement for leave under s 5(4) of the Insolvency Act 1967 is satisfied.” 17. Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Gan Khian Pin v Malayan Banking Berhad [2021] MLJU 3039; [2021] MLRHU 2879; [2021] 1 LNS 2433; [2021] AMEJ 2100 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “The principal debtor has been wound-up on 13.5.2020 and Proof of Debt has been filed by the JC against the principal debtor. There is no confirmation by the Liquidator that the assets or property of the principal debtor company, if any, is sufficient to satisfy all the claims lodged by its creditors. The effect of a winding up order was to deprive the company of the beneficial ownership of all its property. See Yamamori (Hong Kong) Ltd v. Borneo Hotel Sdn Bhd & Anor [1991] 4 CLJ Rep 235. Hence, there is no avenue left for the JC to recover the debt from the principal borrower by using other modes of execution and enforcement within the meaning of s. 5(4) & (6) of the IA 1967. From the Affidavit evidence, this Court is satisfied that the JC has exhausted all modes of execution and enforcement to recover the debt owed to them by the JD. See KKRMC Trading Sdn Bhd v. Tan Tiang Lai [2020] 1 LNS 852 (HC). [8] s. 5 (3) to (6) of the IA 1967 does not contain any express provision that the liquidation of the principal borrower company must be completed and the company dissolved before leave can be granted to the JD to commence bankruptcy proceedings against the JD as guarantor. The wordings in s. 5(4) and s. 5(6) of the IA 1967 are clear and unambiguous. The Court will not read words into a statute unless clear reason for it is to be found in the statute itself. Therefore, in construing the statute, the Court will look at the words in the statute and apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in the statute. See Tebin Mostapa v. Hulba-Danyal Balia & Anor [2020] 7 CLJ 561 (FC). The plain and ordinary meaning of the words in s. 5(4) means that the Creditor must exhaust all modes of execution and enforcement to recover the debts in accordance with the law.” 18. Malah, sebagaimana dihujahkan JC, Mahkamah-mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa setelah sebuah syarikat telah digulungkan, tiada bentuk mod pelaksanaan lain yang boleh dimulakan terhadap syarikat tersebut menurut seksyen 472(3) dan seksyen 528 Akta Syarikat 2016. Umpamanya, dalam kes Gan Khian Pin (supra), Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[9] The law does not permit any execution or enforcement against the principal debtor company after the company has been wound up. See. S. 472(3), 483(1) and 528(1) of the Companies Act 2016. The provisions of the Companies Act automatically operate to stay the hands of creditors from getting the property of the company with a view to obtaining priority payments of debts over all other creditors. The provisions also operate to stay the hands of the company from disposing its property with a view of preferring one or more of its creditors over the general body of creditors. See Lee Chiu Hing Realty Sdn Bhd v. Atlas Corporation Sdn Bhd [2009] 1 LNS 342. Hence, the Creditor need not wait until the principal creditor company is dissolved. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the deprivation of the principal debtor company of the beneficial ownership of all its property pursuant to a winding up order would suffice.” 19. Dalam menjelaskan prinsip ini, Mahkamah dalam kes In Re: Wong Choon Loong (supra) pula memutuskan bahawa:- “[14] In any event, the Principal Debtor had been wound up vide JA-28NCC-241- 11/2018, and in accordance with section 5(6) of the Insolvency Act, all modes of execution against the Principal Debtor had been exhausted… [15] The JD attempted to distinguish the above-mentioned cases from the facts of the present case. However, in my view, the principle is the same, that is, the Principal Debtor was wound up and section 451 of the Companies Act fortified the JC's argument that resorting to bankruptcy proceedings was the correct approach, as it could no longer proceed against the Principal Debtor… [16] Furthermore, proceeding against the Principal Debtor would be going against sections 483 and 528 of the Companies Act, which read:… 20. Berdasarkan nas-nas di atas, dan dengan ketiadaan mana-mana autoriti untuk menyokong hujahan JD tersebut, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa setelah seseorang JC telah menggulungkan peminjam utama dan memfailkan Borang Bukti Hutang, maka tiada pelaksanaan lain yang boleh dilaksanakan oleh JC terhadap JD (penjamin) menurut sekysen 472(3) dan seksyen 528 Akta Syarikat 2016. Malah, tiada peruntukan undang-undang yang memerlukan JC untuk menunggu Jabatan Insolvensi untuk membuat pengesahan bahawa Borang Bukti Hutang yang telah difailkan JC telah diperakui atau sebaliknya ditolak. 21. Dalam apa jua keadaan, Penghakiman Ingkar yang dimasukkan JC terhadap JD telah menetapkan JD bertanggungan “bersesama dan berasingan” dengan Defendan-defendan lain. Penghakiman Ingkar tersebut berbunyi:- “MAKA ADALAH PADA HARI INI DIHAKIMKAN bahawa Defendan Pertama, Ke-2 dan Ke-3 secara bersesama dan berasingan membayar kepada Plaintif…” 22. Kesan frasa “bersesama dan berasingan” yang tertera dalam Penghakiman tersebut ada dibincangkan Alliance Bank Malaysia Bhd v Mukhriz Mahathir & Anor [2006] 4 MLJ 451; [2006] 1 MLRH 295; [2006] 2 CLJ 723; [2006] 3 AMR 580 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[32] The words "jointly and severally" is defined as "persons who are jointly and severally bound render themselves liable not only to a joint action against them, but also to a separate actions against them individually." (see:A Dictionary of Law L.B. Curzon) [33] When the letters of guarantee provide for 'joint and several' liability what they meant is that the plaintiff has a cause of action against both the defendants as guarantors not only to a joint action against them but also to separate action against them individually. In such situation, the plaintiff can proceed with one action against both of them at the same time or 2 separate actions against both of them individually. The effect is that, either way, the cause of action against any one of them is not discharged if judgment is entered against the other one.” 23. Berdasarkan nas di atas, kausa tindakan terhadap JD adalah bebas (independent) dengan defendan-defendan lain. Maka, atas alasan-alasan di atas, Mahkamah menolak bantahan JD berkenaan isu ini. Isu Kedua: Penghakiman Ingkar yang direkodkan terhadap JD adalah tidak sah dan harus diketepikan 24. JD berhujah bahawa Penghakiman Ingkar Kehadiran (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “JID”) yang direkodkan terhadap JD adalah tidak sah dan harus diketepikan. Hal ini adalah kerana JD tidak pernah menerima dan/atau mempunyai pengetahuan mengenai JID tersebut. JD mendakwa penyampaian Writ Saman dan Pernyataan Tuntutan terhadap JD adalah defektif dan dengan demikian, JID yang direkodkan adalah tidak sah dan harus diketepikan. 25. JD juga mendakwa bahawa JC tidak menunjukkan alamat yang dipersetujui kedua-dua pihak dalam kontrak adalah alamat serahan Writ Saman, Pernyataan Tuntutan dan JID tersebut. 26. Berkenaan isu ini, JC berhujah bahawa JID telah diserahkan kepada JD melalui surat bertarikh 14.9.2023 secara pos berdaftar pada 15.9.2023. JC berhujah bahawa salah satu alamat yang tertera dalam surat tersebut adalah alamat yang digunakan JD semasa mendeposkan Afidavit Jawapan JD. JC juga berhujah bahawa penyampaian Writ Saman dan Pernyataan Tuntutan juga telah dibuat ke alamat-alamat JD sebagaimana dalam alamat serahan JID sebagaimana ditunjukkan dalam Perakuan Ketidakhadiran. 27. JC juga berhujah bahawa JID tersebut adalah teratur, sah dan tidak digantung pelaksanaannya. JID tersebut masih berkuatkuasa dan tidak diketepikan oleh Mahkamah Sivil. Maka, Mahkamah Kebankrapan tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk menyingkap tabir di sebalik JID yang dimeteraikan oleh Mahkamah. 28. Dalam hal ini, sebagaimana dihujahkan oleh JC, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa Mahkamah ini tidak seharusnya menyelidik keesahan Penghakiman yang diperolehi JC yang tidak pernah diketepikan mahupun digantung perlaksanaannya oleh JD. Undang-undang adalah mantap bahawa Mahkamah Kebankrapan tidak seharusnya melihat di sebalik penghakiman tersebut (cannot go behind the judgment). Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Per: Chan Wai Fong v Ex-Parte: Everest Web Sdn Bhd [2022] MLJU 1253; [2022] 1 LNS 1277; [2022] AMEJ 0733 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa :- “[7] As the said Judgment has not been stayed or overturned, the Judgment remains valid and binding and the JD must obey the said Judgment. I refer to Re Tioh Ngee Heng [2000] 1 LNS 197 where Steve Shim J (as His Lordship then was) held: "It is trite law that an order, even if irregular, is valid and enforceable until set aside. This principle is particularly relevant in bankruptcy proceedings where the court generally will not look behind the judgments or order save in very limited circumstances of fraud or illegality, etc. In Isaacs v. Robertson [1985] AC 97, Lord Diplock speaking for the Privy Council approved the proposition advanced by Romer LJ in Hadkinson v. Hadkinson [1952] 2 All ER 567 who said at p. 569:- It is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of, whom an order is made by a court of competent jurisdiction to obey it unless and until that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature of this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends even to cases where the person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or even void. Lord Cottenham, LC, said in Chuck v. Cremer [1846] 1 Coop temp Cott 338 at p 342, 47 ER 884 at p. 885): 'A party, who knows of an order, whether null or valid, regular or irregular, cannot be permitted to disobey it. It would be most dangerous to hold that the suitors, or their solicitors, could themselves judge whether an order was null or valid-whether it was regular or irregular. That they should come to the court and not take upon themselves to determine such a question. That the course of a party knowing of an order, which was null or irregular, and who might be affected by it, was plain. He should apply to the court that it might be discharged. As long as it existed it must not be disobeyed.' Such being the nature of this obligation, two consequences will, in general, follow from its breach. The first is that anyone who disobeys an order of the court is in contempt and may be punished by committal or attachment or otherwise. This principle has been followed by our Supreme Court in Sovereign General Insurance Sdn Bhd v. Koh Tian Bee [1988] 1 CLJ 277 (Rep); [1988] 1 CLJ 155; [1988] 1 MLJ 304." [8] Following from the above, this Court cannot go behind the Judgment as stated by the Supreme Court in Sovereign General Insurance Sdn Bhd v. Koh Tian Bee [1988] 1 CLJ Rep 277; [1988] 1 MLJ 304 where it was held that "In the exercise of his jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings, the learned judge cannot go behind the judgment.” 29. Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Re Yong Tet On, Paul, Ex Parte Chung Khiaw Bank Ltd [1996] 1 MLJ 721; [1996] 1 CLJ 836; [1995] 3 MLRH 830 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa :- "Obedience to Court Order It is established law that a person whom an order of Court has been issued is duty bound to obey that order until it is set aside. It is not open for him to decide for himself whether the order was wrongly issued and therefore does not require obedience. His duty is one of obedience until such time as the order may be set aside or varied".” 30. Malah, memandangkan JD telah menghujahkan bahawa JD sedang menyediakan dokumen-dokumen untuk memfailkan permohonan untuk mengetepikan JID tersebut, adalah tidak wajar bagi Mahkamah ini yang merupakan Mahkamah pelaksanaan untuk mengkaji merit JID tersebut, termasuk berkenaan penyampaian Writ Saman dan Pernyataan Tuntutan kepada JD dalam tindakan kebankrapan ini. 31. Berkenaan dakwaan JID tersebut tidak pernah disampaikan kepada JD, undang-undang juga adalah mantap bahawa tiada keperluan bagi suatu penghakiman diserahkan kepada JD sebelum seseorang JC memulakan tindakan kebankrapan terhadap JD. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Re Mohd Taufic Ozier; Ex-Parte: Hatchery Sdn Bhd [2009] 12 MLRH 129; [2009] CLJU 1444; [2010] 8 AMR 266 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “Finally there is no requirement in the bankruptcy rules that the judgment is to be served by the JC on the JD prior to institution of the bankruptcy proceedings. This cannot invalidate the bankruptcy proceedings.” 32. Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Re Tambi Nasirun; Ex-Parte: Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad [2020] MLJU 692; [2020] MLRHU 500; [2020] CLJU 572; [2020] 5 AMR 505 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[13] For this, I now turn to the service of the Amended JID on the JD. A perusal of the Rules of Court in particular, Order 42 (in relation to Judgment and orders) and Order 45 (enforcement of Judgment and Orders) of the Rules of Court 2012 does not provide in any manner that the Judgment has to be served on the JD nor does it state in what mode the Judgment has to be served. The JD himself has failed to provide any authority on this point to show that the Amended JID has to be proved to be served on the JD before the BN can be issued. In my view there is no provision in law which states that Judgment has to be proved to be served as such and received by the JD. I find that the JD has been served the Amended JID by way of the JC's posting of the same and that the Certificate of Posting is evidence of such posting being made by the JC. I also find that my reasoning is in part backed by the authority of the Re: Soh Poh Sheng; Ex Parte Malayan Banking Berhad [2014] 1 LNS 1431 where his Lordship Gunalan Muniandy JC (as he then was) held that "D's contention that the petitioner (JC) must produce proof of service of the judgment on the JD before issuing the BN is untenable in law. There is no requirement under the law for an affidavit of service of the judgment on which the BN is based to be filed commencing the bankruptcy petition."… 33. Dalam apa jua keadaan, JC telah mendeposkan di perenggan 11 Afidavit Sokongan (Lampiran 4) bahawa JID tersebut telah diserahkan kepada JD melalui surat bertarikh 14.9.2023 secara Pos Berdaftar. Penelitian Mahkamah kepada surat tersebut menunjukkan salah satu alamat yang penyampaian JID tersebut dibuat adalah di No.73, Jalan Ekoflora 1/10, Taman Ekoflora 1, 81100 Johor Bahru, Johor iaitu alamat sama yang digunakan JD dalam mendeposkan Afidavit Jawapan JD dalam lampiran 10. Undang-undang adalah mantap bahawa tiada keperluan untuk JID tersebut diserahkan kediri kepada JD. Mahkamah dalam hal ini merujuk kepada kes Arab-Malaysian Credit Berhad v Nationwide Industries Sdn Bhd & Anor [2021] 1 LNS 2430; [2021] AMEJ 2092 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[12] There is no express provision in the ROC 2012 that requires a Judgment must be served personally. Therefore, the default Judgment need not be served personally on the 3rd Defendant. See. O. 62 r. 1 ROC 2012. The service may be effected by prepaid registered post. See O. 62 r. 6(1) (c) ROC 2012. See CIMB Bank Berhad v. Comsa Layer Farms Sdn Bhd & Anor [2009] 1 LNS 1677. There is insufficient evidence from the 3rd Defendant to rebut the service of the default Judgment by prepaid registered post. Neither is there any letter from the 3rd Defendant informing the Plaintiff of his purported change of address to West Malaysia exhibited in the 3rd Defendant's Affidavit, Encl. 62.” 34. Maka, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa hujahan-hujahan JD dalam isu ini juga adalah tidak bermerit. Kesimpulan: 35. Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah membenarkan permohonan JC dalam lampiran 3 iaitu permohonan JC untuk memulakan tindakan kebankrapan terhadap JD menurut seksyen 5(3)(b) Akta Tersebut sebagaimana dipohon dalam lampiran 3. Mahkmah memerintahkan supaya JD membayar kos permohonan ini berjumlah RM1,000.00 kepada JC tertakluk kepada fi alokatur. Bertarikh: 25 November 2024 Disediakan oleh, …………………………………. ARUN A/L NOVAL DASS Timbalan Pendaftar Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Johor Bahru Pihak-pihak: 1. Tetuan Yong Dan Rakan-rakan Peguambela & Peguamcara Peguam Pemiutang Penghakiman No.12-1, Tingkat 1, Jalan Tiara 2D/KU1, Bandar Baru Klang, 41150 Klang, Selangor (Ruj: MBB(LMCJB)JBLMSB/NAH(BN)33802/2023/G(3)) … Puan Suraya Binti Sanusi 2. Tetuan Wong & Eng Peguambela & Peguamcara Peguam Penghutang Penghakiman No.12A-3, Jalan Radin Bagus 8, Bandar Baru Sri Petaling, 57000 Kuala Lumpur (Ruj: IW/L/1020/2024) … Puan Chu Cia Min (Menyebut bagi pihak) Kes-kes yang dirujuk: 1. Re Malaya Bin Sibuku; Ex-Parte Kaya Karisma Sdn Bhd [2021] 10 MLJ 118; [2021] MLRHU 173; [2021] 5 CLJ 403; [2022] AMEJ 1418 2. In Re: Wong Choon Loong; Ex-Parte: Ambank (M) Berhad [2022] MLJU 20; [2022] 3 MLRH 27; [2022] CLJU 11; [2022] AMEJ 0035 3. Re: Rusli Ab Ghani; Ex-Parte: CIMB Bank Bhd [2018] MLRHU 1180; [2018] 1 4. LNS 1528 Hong Leong Bank Bhd v. Ong Moon Huat & Another Appeal [2018] MLJU 1576; [2018] MLRAU 504; [2018] 1 LNS 1612 5. Gan Khian Pin v Malayan Banking Berhad [2021] MLJU 3039; [2021] MLRHU 2879; [2021] 1 LNS 2433; [2021] AMEJ 2100 6. Alliance Bank Malaysia Bhd v Mukhriz Mahathir & Anor [2006] 4 MLJ 451; [2006] 1 MLRH 295; [2006] 2 CLJ 723; [2006] 3 AMR 580 7. Per: Chan Wai Fong v Ex-Parte: Everest Web Sdn Bhd [2022] MLJU 1253; [2022] 1 LNS 1277; [2022] AMEJ 0733 8. Re Yong Tet On, Paul, Ex Parte Chung Khiaw Bank Ltd [1996] 1 MLJ 721; [1996] 1 CLJ 836; [1995] 3 MLRH 830 9. Re Mohd Taufic Ozier; Ex-Parte: Hatchery Sdn Bhd [2009] 12 MLRH 129; [2009] 10. CLJU 1444; [2010] 8 AMR 266 Re Tambi Nasirun; Ex-Parte: Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad [2020] MLJU 692; [2020] MLRHU 500; [2020] CLJU 572; [2020] 5 AMR 505 11. Arab-Malaysian Credit Berhad v Nationwide Industries Sdn Bhd & Anor [2021] 1 LNS 2430; [2021] AMEJ 2092