Mazlina Zairin Binti Zulkifly @ Sofi v Tunku Marinah Ashraf Binti Tunku Abdullah (WA-22NCvC-678-11/2025)

This is the Defendant's application pursuant to Order 18 Rule 19(1)(a), (b) and (d) of the Rules of Court 2012 ("ROC 2012") to strike out the Plaintiff's Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim ("SOC") dated 24 November 2025. The Defendant seeks this relief on three distinct but interrelated grounds: first, that the SOC discloses no reasonable cause of action against the Defendant; second, that the claim is scandalous, frivolous and vexatious; and third, that the filing of the present suit constitutes an abuse of the process of this Honourable Court. The Defendant contends that each of these grounds independently warrants the striking out of the Plaintiff's claim, and that taken collectively, they present a compelling and overwhelming case for the exercise of this Court's summary jurisdiction.

The Plaintiff is the second daughter of the late Zulkifly @ Sofi Bin Haji Mustapha ("the Deceased"), who passed away on 9 March 2014. The Defendant is the widow of the Deceased and was appointed sole Administrator of the Deceased's estate by virtue of a Grant of Letters of Administration issued by the High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur on 3 September 2014. The Plaintiff's claim, in essence, is that she has not received full and fair distribution of the Deceased's estate and seeks an injunction compelling the Defendant, in her capacity as Administrator, to distribute the remaining estate assets within one month of any order made. The Defendant categorically denies these allegations and maintains that she has, at all material times, faithfully, lawfully, and in accordance with both applicable law and the mutual agreement reached among all beneficiaries of the estate, discharged her duties as Administrator.

The estate of the Deceased comprises movable and immovable assets listed in the Proposed Revised Asset List dated 17 June 2019 ("the Asset List"), which was filed in earlier proceedings under Originating Summons No. 31NCVC-837-07/2014. The declared total value of assets in that list was approximately RM3,951,981.60. The beneficiaries of the Deceased's estate, and their respective relationships with the Deceased, are as follows: the Defendant as wife; > Mazran Zamani Bin Zulkifly as the sole son; the Plaintiff as the second daughter; Mizfarah Zara Binti Zulkifly as the third daughter; and > Mazrah Zuraihan Binti Zulkifly as the youngest daughter. All five beneficiaries have at all material times been aware of their existence as beneficiaries and of the assets comprising the estate.

The agreed distribution of the estate under the principles of Faraid (Islamic law of inheritance) was as follows: the Defendant, as wife, was entitled to 5/40; the son was entitled to 14/40; and each of the three daughters, including the Plaintiff, was entitled to 7/40. The Defendant pleads, and the evidence supports, that this Faraid apportionment was known to and acknowledged by the Plaintiff at all material times. Moreover, insofar as certain assets, particularly those held in Singapore, were concerned, all beneficiaries expressly agreed to depart from the strict Faraid proportions and instead receive equal shares, which were duly distributed in or around February 2018. The Plaintiff's entitlement under Faraid from the Malaysian assets alone, based on the true total value of RM920,486.60, amounts to approximately RM161,085.16, a figure the Defendant asserts has already been exceeded by the distributions the Plaintiff has actually received.

The present suit does not arise in a vacuum. It is the second action filed by the Plaintiff against the Defendant concerning the very same estate, the very same assets, and the very same complaint of alleged non-distribution. On 5 May 2025, the Plaintiff commenced Civil Suit No. WA-22NCvC-278-05/2025 ("the First Suit") seeking, among other reliefs, an injunction compelling the Defendant to disclose the current status of distribution of all estate assets by way of an Affidavit of Disclosure, and a further order that such Affidavit be served on the Plaintiff's solicitors within seven days. In the SOC at paragraph 6, filed in the First Suit, the Plaintiff made a sweeping and emphatic assertion that she had received no distribution whatsoever from the estate, save for one immovable property asset identified as Geran 3599/M6/3/147, Lot 23783, Mukim Sungai Buloh, Daerah Petaling, Negeri Selangor. This assertion, as will be demonstrated below, was plainly false and made in bad faith.

Following the Defendant's filing of a Defence and a striking-out application under Order 18 Rule 19(1)(a), (b) and (d) ROC 2012 in the First Suit, the Plaintiff took the strategic step of filing a Notice of Discontinuance on 7 November 2025. This was done in a mere three days before the scheduled hearing of the striking-out application on 10 November 2025, and without having filed any written submissions in opposition to that application. On 10 November 2025, having considered the evidence, particularly the Supporting Affidavit, which set out in detail the distributions made from the estate, I made the following consequential orders:

(a) That the Plaintiff's application to discontinue the First Suit was allowed;

(b) That the Plaintiff was not allowed from re-filing any action against the Defendant to claim the reliefs set out in paragraphs 11(a) and 11(b) of the SOC in the First Suit, namely the relief for disclosure of asset distribution status via an Affidavit of Disclosure; and

(c) That the Plaintiff was ordered to pay costs of RM10,000.00 to the Defendant. D. THE APPLICABLE LAW

The principles governing the exercise of the Court's power under Order 18 Rule 19(1) ROC 2012 are well-established. The Supreme Court decision in Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 4 CLJ 7 SC, held: "It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule and the summary procedure can only be adopted when it can clearly be seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it 'obviously unsustainable'." The Supreme Court further held that this jurisdiction cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case to determine whether a party has a cause of action or a defence. Rather, the Court must be satisfied, upon a broad reading of the pleadings, that there is no reasonable cause of action, that the claims are frivolous or vexatious, or that the defences raised are not arguable.

The striking out jurisdiction is only appropriate when the case is "plain and obvious" and where the claim is "obviously unsustainable.", a test refined in Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Pahang (2016) 1 MLJ 1 FC, where the Federal Court emphasized that the "obviously unsustainable" test applies an objective standard requiring someone with appropriate expertise to perceive the deficiency.

The Federal Court in Tan Wei Hong v Malaysia Airlines Bhd [2018] 9 CLJ 425 FC reaffirmed that the claim must be "obviously unsustainable" on its face: "The basic test for striking out is that the claim, on the face of it, must be 'obviously unsustainable'. The stress is not only on the word 'unsustainable' but also on the word 'obviously', ie, the degree of unsustainability must appear on the face of the statement of claim without having to go into a lengthy and mature consideration in detail."

This principle was affirmed and elaborated upon in Tai Wei Hong & Ors v Malaysia Airlines Bhd & Other Appeals [2018] 9 CLJ 425 FC, where it was held that a claim is "obviously and legally unsustainable" where, even if the plaintiff were to proceed to prove all facts offered at trial, it would not be entitled to the remedy sought. In Wong Yew Kwan v Wong Yu Ke & Anor [2010] 2 CLJ 703 CA, it was further emphasised that the primary function of a SOC is to plead a reasonable cause of action against the defendant by containing all material facts relied upon by the plaintiff, disclosing the defendant's legal liability, and establishing a legal nexus between the pleaded facts and the relief sought. Where a plaintiff radically departs from its pleaded case, or where the pleadings are deficient in material particulars, the claim is liable to be struck out.

On the question of abuse of process, the Court of Appeal in Middy Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors v Arensi-Marley (M) Sdn Bhd [2012] CLJU 830 CA clarified that "abuse of process" under Rule 19(1)(d) signifies that the court's process must be used bona fide and properly, and must not be misused as a means of vexation or oppression in litigation. Where an action is not brought genuinely for the purpose of obtaining relief but serves some other ulterior or collateral purpose, the court will exercise its discretion to strike it out.

This principle operates alongside the equitable doctrine that those who seek equitable remedies must come to court with clean hands, which was applied in the context of estate administration proceedings where the court struck out the action after finding that the plaintiffs had concealed material facts and approached the court with unclean hands (see: Hassan Md Yunus & Satu Lagi Iwn. Moo Sin Ung & Yang Lain [2015] 1 LNS 194 HC).

The Defendant's primary submission is that the SOC discloses no reasonable cause of action because the Plaintiff has, in fact, received distributions from the estate that meet or exceed what she is lawfully entitled to, and she has concealed this material fact from the Court. The concealment of these facts is not merely a technical failure of pleading; it strikes at the very foundation of the Plaintiff's cause of action, because without demonstrating a genuine shortfall in distribution, there is no legal basis upon which an injunction compelling further distribution can be granted.

With respect to the Singapore assets, the Plaintiff now contends that she did not receive her full equal share and that there remains an outstanding balance of SGD25,473.77. This submission is inconsistent with the Plaintiff's own conduct in opening a Singapore bank account for the purpose of receiving the equal distribution, and with the Defendant's bank account statements showing the transfer of SGD152,000.00 to each beneficiary. The Plaintiff's belated complaint about the quantum of the Singapore distribution, raised only after the Defendant disclosed the transfer records, bears all the hallmarks of an afterthought designed to sustain a failing claim rather than a genuine grievance.

The evidence adduced by the Defendant establishes, with particularity and documentary support, the following distributions made to or for the benefit of the Plaintiff. First, with respect to the Singapore assets that comprise accounts at the Bank of Singapore (Account No. 104788, valued at RM800,000.00), HSBC Singapore Current Account (No. 052-102100-496, valued at RM460,480.18) and HSBC Singapore Savings Account (No. 052-102100-221, valued at RM1,196,678.86), it is a fact that all beneficiaries, including the Plaintiff, agreed to receive equal shares rather than based on the Faraid proportions. Pursuant to this agreement, the Defendant transferred SGD152,000.00 to each beneficiary in or around February 2018. All beneficiaries, including the Plaintiff, opened their personal Singapore bank accounts for this purpose. The Defendant's bank account statements corroborate this distribution in full (see: Exhibit TMA-3 Supporting Affidavit).

In respect of the immovable property at Geran 35991/M6/3/137, Lot 23783, Mukim Sungai Buloh, Daerah Petaling, Negeri Selangor, this is the very same property the Plaintiff acknowledged receiving in the First Suit, where all beneficiaries agreed that each would receive 1/10 of the sale proceeds. The Plaintiff received RM47,847.74, the same amount each of her sisters received (see: Exhibit TMA-4 Supporting Affidavit).

The Plaintiff contends that the asset values relied upon by the Defendant in the total of RM920,486.60 are incomplete because the Defendant omitted the immovable property at Sungai Buloh valued at RM600,000.00. I note, however, that the Defendant's stated amount pertains to specific, identifiable movable assets and does not purport to be an exhaustive account of all estate assets. The omission of the property from that amount does not undermine the Defendant's case, as the property was sold and the Plaintiff's 1/10 share of the proceeds, amounting to RM47,847.74, was duly paid to her (see: Exhibit TMA- 4 Supporting Affidavit). The Plaintiff has adduced no evidence to contradict the fact of that payment.

Regarding the Deceased's membership of the Subang National Golf Club (Member No. A107), it was transferred to the Plaintiff in 2019, with all transfer fees paid by the Defendant, acting as Administrator. The Plaintiff enjoyed the benefits of this membership until it was deactivated in 2020 for failing to comply with the club's requirements. This fact was conspicuously omitted from both the Plaintiff's pleadings and her affidavit. The Defendant obtained confirmation of this from the club in early August 2025 (see: Exhibit TMA-6 Supporting Affidavit).

The Plaintiff's position regarding the AIA Takaful policies that she did not consent to their funding from estate assets, that the policies were taken out in the Defendant's personal interest, and that she transferred RM90,000.00 to the Defendant's account upon the policies' surrender is noted. However, the WhatsApp communications and bank statements produced by the Plaintiff (see: Exhibit M-1 Supporting Affidavit), while purporting to support her position, in fact confirm that the Plaintiff transferred RM90,000.00 at the Defendant's request, following mutual communication between mother and daughter. This conduct is entirely inconsistent with the narrative of a beneficiary who had no knowledge of, and no connection to, the insurance policies in question. The argument on this point is therefore rejected because it lacks substance and credibility.

The Defendant, in her capacity as Administrator, subscribed to and paid annual premiums for two AIA Public Takaful Bhd insurance policies taken out in the Plaintiff's name i.e. Certificate Nos. S094222A08 (registered 3 January 2017, annual premium of RM28,498.18, insured sum of RM600,000.00) and S124103A10 (registered 24 August 2018, annual premium of RM27,061.08, insured sum of RM550,000.00). Similar policies were taken out for each of the other children of the Deceased. These policies conferred significant financial benefit upon the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff's claim that she was unaware of these policies and did not consent to their funding from estate assets is not credible in light of the evidence that she subsequently, upon the surrender of the policies, transferred RM90,000.00 to the Defendant's bank account at the Defendant's request. Such conduct is wholly inconsistent with a beneficiary claiming to be ignorant of those policies.

The cumulative value of all distributions received by the Plaintiff, namely from the Singapore assets, the property sale proceeds, the golf club membership, and the AIA policy benefits, far exceeds her Faraid entitlement of approximately RM161,085.16. In these circumstances, the Plaintiff's claim that she has not received a "full and fair" distribution is not merely disputed; it is demonstrably false in light of the documented evidence. A claim based on a false factual premise cannot sustain a reasonable cause of action, and the Court is not required to allow it to proceed to a full trial where it is already plain, from the face of the evidence exhibited, that the Plaintiff's allegation of non-distribution cannot be maintained.

The Plaintiff's conduct throughout these proceedings is scandalous, frivolous and vexatious within the meaning of Order 18 Rule 19(1)(b) ROC 2012, and the present suit epitomises each of those characteristics. As held in Boey Oi Leng v Trans Resources Corporation Sdn Bhd [2002] 1 CLJ 405 HC, a claim may be characterised as "frivolous" or "vexatious" where it is obviously unsustainable, where the wrong party is being sued, or where it is without merit and unjustified. The word "scandalous" connotes matter that is wholly unnecessary or irrelevant. In the present case, all three characteristics are present.

The Plaintiff's conduct is scandalous by reason of her deliberate and repeated misrepresentation of material facts to this Court. In the First Suit, the Plaintiff categorically stated in the pleadings filed with the court that she had received no distribution from the estate, save for a single property. This assertion was false. The Plaintiff was at all material times aware of the SGD152,000.00 received from the Singapore assets, the RM47,847.74 received from the sale of the Sungai Buloh property, the Subang National Golf Club membership transferred into her name, and the AIA insurance policies taken out for her benefit. The concealment of these facts from the Court is not merely a drafting oversight; it reflects a calculated and deliberate attempt to mislead the Court into granting relief to which the Plaintiff is not entitled.

The claim is frivolous because it lacks any sustainable legal or factual basis. The Defendant has discharged her duties as Administrator in accordance with the law by settling the Deceased's outstanding liabilities, including cash-flow problems in the two companies, Melewar Resources Sdn Bhd and Titik Inn Sdn Bhd, of which the Deceased was a major shareholder, amounting to nearly RM2 million, which were managed progressively between 2019 and 2022, and thereafter distributing the residuary estate to the beneficiaries. All other beneficiaries have accepted their respective distributions without complaint and without commencing any legal proceedings against the Defendant. The fact that the Plaintiff alone disputes the adequacy of the distribution, on the basis of materially false factual allegations, renders her claim frivolous.

The claim is vexatious because it represents the second attempt by the Plaintiff to ventilate the same grievance against the Defendant in respect of the same estate, having abandoned the First Suit at the eleventh hour to avoid an adverse outcome at the striking-out hearing. The present suit was filed a mere three weeks after the discontinuance of the First Suit, and it raises substantially the same factual matrix, the same estate assets, and effectively the same relief which compelled distribution against the same Defendant. Filing successive suits on the same subject matter to achieve the same objective, particularly after having been barred by court order from claiming certain reliefs in the earlier suit, constitutes the very essence of vexatious litigation. Such conduct causes the Defendant to incur disproportionate legal costs and imposes an unjustifiable burden on the resources of this Court.

It is settled law that the court's process must be used bona fide and properly, and the Court will intervene to prevent its machinery from being misused as a means of vexation and oppression (Middy Industries).

Where an action is not genuinely brought for the purpose of obtaining legitimate relief but is instead motivated by an ulterior or collateral purpose, such as to pressure or harass the opposing party, it will be struck out.

The first basis for abuse of process is the Plaintiff's deliberate circumvention of the Court order of 10 November 2025. That order expressly barred the Plaintiff from re-filing any action to claim the reliefs set out in paragraphs 11(a) and 11(b) SOC of the First Suit.

The Plaintiff argues that the filing of the present suit does not violate the Court order of 10 November 2025, as the reliefs claimed are framed differently. This Court is unable to accept that submission. Substance must prevail over form. The reliefs in both suits arise from the same cause of the Plaintiff's dissatisfaction with the administration of the same estate, and involve the same parties and the same assets. A litigant cannot evade the effect of a judicial restraint merely by recasting the same complaint in new language. To hold otherwise would render the Court's orders meaningless and would defeat the principle of finality that underpins the administration of justice.

Those reliefs concerned the disclosure of the status of asset distribution. The present suit, while framed as a claim for compelled distribution rather than disclosure, is, in substance, an attempt to relitigate the same dispute and to obtain, through a differently worded claim, what the Court had effectively prevented the Plaintiff from pursuing further. The spirit and intent of the Court's order of 10 November 2025 is plainly being circumvented, and the Court should not permit this.

The second basis for abuse of process is the Plaintiff's adoption of contradictory and shifting positions between the two suits. In the First Suit, the Plaintiff asserted that she had received nothing except one property. In the present suit, she acknowledges receiving some distributions but contends they were incomplete. This fundamental reversal of position, from receiving nothing to receiving something but not enough, is not a genuine evolution of the Plaintiff's case based on new evidence, but rather a reactive recalibration forced upon the Plaintiff by the Defendant's disclosure of evidence of actual distributions. Litigants cannot be permitted to shift their factual positions serially in successive proceedings, as it undermines the proper administration of justice and brings the integrity of the litigation process into disrepute.

The third basis for abuse of process is the Plaintiff's failure to come to this Court with clean hands. The equitable principle that "those who come to equity must come with clean hands" is a fundamental prerequisite for any party seeking equitable relief, including an injunction. As in Hassan Md Yunus, the Court struck out the claim where the plaintiffs had filed proceedings without disclosing the true facts in related earlier proceedings and had excluded a material party from the suit. The parallels with the present case are clear. The Plaintiff seeks an injunction, an equitable remedy, yet has made false representations to this Court in the First Suit, concealed material facts regarding distributions received, and deliberately omitted reference to the Court order of 10 November 2025 in her pleadings. A party whose hands are so demonstrably unclean cannot, in good conscience, invoke the equitable jurisdiction of this Court.

The comparative table below shows the abuse of process: MatterFirst Suit(WA-22NCvC-278-05/2025)Second Suit(WA-22NCvC-678-11/2025)Date Filed5 May 2025November 2025Main Relief SoughtInjunction to disclose distribution status via Affidavit of Disclosure+injunction to carry out distributionInjunction to carry out distribution of remaining assets only(no disclosure relief) MatterFirst Suit(WA-22NCvC-278-05/2025)Second Suit(WA-22NCvC-678-11/2025)Singapore AssetsNot specifically mentioned in the claimSpecifically pleaded—claims balance of SGD25,473.772 still unpaidScope of Assets ClaimedAll movable assets in the Asset List generallySpecific assets itemised one by one(bank accounts,ASB,insurance,vehicle,Tabung Haji,Singapore accounts)Costs ClaimedRM50,000(solicitor-client basis)RM50,000(same)Interest5% per annum5% per annumOutcome of SuitDiscontinued by Plaintiff on7.11.2025Still ongoingRelated Court Order—Court ordered Plaintiff barred from re-filing claims for reliefs in paragraphs11(a)和11(b) of First Suit;Plaintiff ordered to payRM10,000 costs to DefendantAdmission re: assets receivedAcknowledged receiving only one property asset(paragraph14)Acknowledged receiving some distribution but claims certain assets still not fairly distributed

Having carefully considered the pleadings, affidavits, written submissions and authorities cited by both parties, this Court is satisfied beyond doubt that the present suit is plainly and obviously unsustainable. The Plaintiff has failed to plead a reasonable cause of action by concealing material facts that go to the very foundation of her claim. Accordingly, the Defendant's application under Order 18 Rule 19(1)(a), (b) and (d) ROC 2012 is allowed. The Plaintiff's Writ of Summons and SOC dated 24 November 2025 are hereby struck out in their entirety. The Plaintiff is ordered to pay the costs of this application and of the action to the Defendant. Dated: 10 June 2026 Arziah binti Mohamed Apandi Judge Kuala Lumpur High Court NCvC 8 Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur Plaintiff's Counsel Mr. Khairul B Mukhtar Messrs Khairul Anan & Partners Shah Alam, Selangor Darul Ehsan Tel. No.: 03-5614 3808 Email: khairulmukhtar.legal@yahoo.com Defendant's Counsel : Pn. Nur Anis Messrs Sharifah Nurul Shafura Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan Tel. No.: 03-7734 4385 Email: hello@snslawyer.com / anis@snslawyer.com Cases referred Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 4 CLJ 7 SC Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Pahang (2016) 1 MLJ 1 FC Tan Wei Hong v Malaysia Airlines Bhd [2018] 9 CLJ 425 FC Tai Wei Hong & Ors v Malaysia Airlines Bhd & Other Appeals [2018] 9 CLJ 425 FC Wong Yew Kwan v Wong Yu Ke & Anor [2010] 2 CLJ 703 CA Middy Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors v Arensi-Marley (M) Sdn Bhd [2012] CLJU 830 CA Hassan Md Yunus & Satu Lagi Iwn. Moo Sin Ung & Yang Lain [2015] 1 LNS 194 HC Boey Oi Leng v Trans Resources Corporation Sdn Bhd [2002] 1 CLJ 405 HC Acts/Law referred: Order 18 Rule 19(1)(a), (b) and (d) of the Rules of Court 2012