MD Iskandar Bin Muhamad (JB-45A-2-09/2020)

The accused was charged with trafficking 1471 grams of Methamphetamine.

The charge against the accused read as follows: - December 30, 2024 2 “Bahawa kamu pada 6 Jun 2020 jam lebih kurang 5.00 pagi, bertempat di bahu jalan tepi Jalan Abdul Rahman menghala ke Parit Jawa, di dalam Daerah Muar, di dalam Negeri Johor Darul Ta’zim, telah didapati memperedarkan dadah berbahaya iaitu 1471.00 grams Methamphetamine. Oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama.”

The prosecution called the following 7 witnesses: -

PW1 - The Chemist.

(ii) PW2 - The Storekeeper.

(iii) PW3 - The Forensic Investigating Officer.

(iv) PW4 - The Accused wife who owns the scooter.

PW5 - The Officer from Jabatan Pengangkutan Jalan.

(vi) PW6 - The Raiding Officer/Complainant.

(vii) PW7 - The Investigating Officer. [4] The incident leading to the accused's arrest occurred on 6.6.2020 when the movement control Order was in force due to the COVID- 19 pandemic. [5] On the said date, PW6 headed a raiding team comprising 12 members from the Narcotics Investigations Department IPD Muar and the marine force. [6] PW6 briefed the team members at his office at IPD Muar, divided them into three groups and gave them separate roles. December 30, 2024 3 [7] They then proceeded to the location at Jalan Abdul Rahman, Muar, Johor by using vehicles belonging to three of the team members. [8] Upon arrival at 4.20 am, PW6 instructed his team members to take their respective positions and to make observations in the vicinity of Jalan Abdul Rahman, Muar, Johor as per his briefing. [9] At around 4.50 am, PW6 saw a motorcycle scooter type EGO LC bearing registration number JMX 9640 (“scooter”) was ridden suspiciously by a Malay man. It was ridden against the traffic heading towards Parit Jawa, Johor using the lane on the right side of Jalan Abdul Rahman. The Malay man was later identified as the accused. PW6 together with his team members SM Mohamad Akhir, Sjn Landa and Kpl Sukairi tailed the accused in a Kancil motorcar. [10] At around 5.00 am, PW6 with his said team members detained the man by the side of Jalan Abdul Rahman, Muar near an electric pole number MPJ 366. PW6 introduced himself to the suspect as a senior police officer by showing his authority card. [11] When PW6 introduced himself as a police officer, the accused looked worried and frightened. The accused fell from his scooter onto the grass verge. PW6 then asked the accused to cooperate but the accused struggled and tried to escape. However, PW6 and his team members could detain the accused during the scuffle. [12] When the accused fell from his scooter, PW6 saw something which looked like a plastic package fall from the footrest of the scooter onto the ground beside the scooter. December 30, 2024 4 [13] Although it was dark at that hour because it was around 5.00 a.m. and just after the rain, however PW6 and his team members could still see the surrounding area where they detained the accused since there were street lights. [14] PW6 then found an orange plastic packet on the ground near the footrest of the scooter (P29) and inside this plastic packet was another blue plastic packet (P30). [15] Upon inspecting inside the blue colour plastic packet, PW6 found: -

One transparent plastic packet (P7) containing another packet with the words GUANYINWANG written (P7A) that had another transparent plastic packet containing drugs suspected to be syabu weighing approximately 1050 grams (P7B).

(ii) One transparent plastic packet (P8) containing another packet with the words GUANYINWANG written (P8A) that had another transparent plastic packet containing drugs suspected to be syabu weighing approximately 1050 grams (P8B). [16] The distance between the spot where the drugs were found and the accused was only one step. [17] PW6 also seized the scooter type Yamaha EGO LC registration number JMX 9640 (P31) and its key from the accused. December 30, 2024 5 [18] After the arrest and seizure, at around 5.40 am, PW6 brought the case exhibits and the accused back to the Narcotics Investigation Department IPD Muar, Johor. [19] The case exhibits were sent to the chemist (PW1) for analysis. [20] PW1 the chemist confirmed that the case exhibits seized contained 1471 grams of Methamphetamine listed in the first schedule of the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1952. THE COURT’S DUTY AT THE CLOSE OF THE PROSECUTION’S CASE [21] At the close of the prosecution’s case, the Court must subject the evidence to maximum evaluation to determine whether a prima facie case has been made out against the accused which requires him to enter his defence. See PP v. Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2006] 1 457 and Balachandran v. PP [2005] 1 CLJ 85. [22] A prima facie case can be said to be established where the prosecution had adduced such evidence of the essential elements of the charge as are sufficient to convict the accused if he were to keep silent and the evidence is left unexplained or unrebutted. [23] In Looi Kow Chai & Anor v. PP [2003] 1 CLJ 734; [2003] 2 MLJ 65, the Court of Appeal formulated the test thus: - “It therefore follows that there is only one exercise that a judge sitting alone under s 180 of the CPC has to undertake at the close of the prosecution case. He must subject the prosecution evidence to maximum evaluation and to ask himself the question: if I decide to call December 30, 2024 6 upon the accused to enter his defence and he elects to remain silent, am I prepared to convict him on the totality of the evidence contained in the prosecution case? If the answer is in the negative then no prima facie case has been made out and the accused would be entitled to an acquittal.” EVALUATION OF THE PROSECUTION’S CASE [24] To make its case against the accused, the prosecution had to establish: -

The identity and weight of the drugs, viz, 1471 grams of

(ii) The accused had possession of the drugs; and

(iii) The accused was trafficking the drugs on the date and at the time and place as particularised in the charge. Identity and weight of drugs [25] Upon completion of her analysis, PW1 then prepared a chemist report on her findings dated 10.07.2020 (P5) which was later handed to PW7 together with the case exhibits on 24.08.2020. [26] Learned counsel for the accused did not challenge PW1 on her qualifications or experience. PW1’s evidence in her witness statement (PWS-1) as to her qualifications and experience was therefore left unchallenged. As such, it is my finding that PW4 is qualified to testify as an expert witness under Section 45 of the Evidence Act, of 1950. December 30, 2024 7 [27] The identity and type of the drugs analysed by PW1 were also not challenged by learned counsel for the accused in his submissions. [28] Neither was there any challenge to the weight of the drugs in his submissions. [29] The chemist report reveals that upon analysis, PW1 found the plastic packet marked as “A3” to contain clear crystal substances weighing 737 grams of Methamphetamine. Whereas the plastic packet marked as B3 contains clear crystal substances weighing 734 grams of Methamphetamine which are dangerous drugs listed in the First Schedule of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1952. [30] In the circumstances, the prosecution has established the first ingredient of the offence. Possession [31] To prove possession, the prosecution had to prove that the accused had knowledge of the drugs and that he had some form of control or custody of the drugs. In PP v. Muhamad Nasir bin Shaharudin [1992] 4 CLJ 2028; [1994] 2 MLJ 576 it was held: - “To prove either of these two requirements, the prosecution may either adduce direct evidence or it may rely on the relevant presumptions under s. 37 of the DDA.” [32] The meaning of custody and control has been explained by Raus Sharif CJ in Ghasem Hozouri Hassan v. PP [2018] 6 CLJ 133 thus: - December 30, 2024 8 “......when we talk about the issue of custody and control, what is crucial is that the accused must be so situated that he can deal with the proscribed drugs as if it belonged to him, and it must be shown that he had the intention of dealing with it as if it belonged to him should he see any occasion to do so (he had animus possidendi).” [33] As for knowledge of the drugs, it was held in Chan Pean Leon v. PP [1956] 1 LNS 17: - “Here again knowledge cannot be proved by direct evidence, it can only be proved by inference from the surrounding circumstances. Again, the possible variety of circumstances which will support such an inference is infinite. [emphasis added]” [34] Finally, in Anagwaonye Chukwudi Nathaniel v P.P [2020] 1 LNS 1277, it was held by the Court of Appeal: - “[8] In relation to the issue of possession, it is trite that the prosecution may establish actual possession without relying on presumed possession under section 37(d) and rely on the weight of the drugs to trigger the presumption of trafficking under section 37(da) to prove the charge under section 39B or to rely on the presumed presumption under section 37(d) and adduced affirmative evidence to prove trafficking with the aid of the definition of trafficking under section 2 of DDA 1952. [9] This matter has been lucidly explained by the Federal Court in the case of Public Prosecutor v. Abdul Manaf bin Muhamad Hassan [2006] 3 MLJ 193 at page 203, in the following words: ‘[17] It ought to be stated at the outset that the decision in Muhammad bin Hassan only prohibits the use of double presumptions under ss. 37(d) and 37(da) of the Act. It is therefore, open to the prosecution to rely on either of the presumptions. In other words, the prosecution may positively prove possession without relying on December 30, 2024 9 the presumption under s. 37(d) of the Act and go on to rely on the presumption of trafficking under 37(da) of the Act to support a charge under s. 39B of the Act. See Tunde Apatira & ors v. Public Prosecutor; Msimanga Lesaly v. Public Prosecutor [2005] 4 MLJ 314, a decision of Court of Appeal which was confirmed by this Court in Federal Court Criminal Appeal No 05 – 27 of 2004(K). Conversely, the prosecution may rely on the presumption under s. 37(d) to prove possession and seek to prove by affirmative evidence (independent of the presumption under section 37(da)) that the accused was in fact trafficking in the dangerous drugs.’ (emphasis added).” [35] To prove custody and control, the prosecution seeks to rely on the fact that only the accused was seen riding the scooter alone against the traffic heading towards Parit Jawa from Muar before he was detained by the police. According to the prosecution, when the accused fell to the ground with his scooter, PW6 saw a plastic package falling from the footrest of the accused scooter onto the ground. This plastic package contained drugs. Wherefore the case exhibits, P29, P30, P7, P7A, P7B, P8, P8A and P8B were found nearby next to the accused, i.e. one step away from the accused. PW6, the Raiding Officer demonstrated in Court how he found the drugs near the scooter’s footrest. Furthermore, the drugs were found wrapped neatly in plastic packets marked as P30 and P29. [36] Hence, the prosecution submits that the accused action in riding the scooter shows the accused had custody and control of the drugs and also the things on the scooter that fell from the footrest onto the ground. December 30, 2024 10 [37] The search conducted with JPJ reveals that the wife of the accused (PW4) is the owner of the scooter. PW4 testified that apart from her, the accused also uses the scooter. [38] As for knowledge of the drugs, the prosecution relies on the close proximity of the drugs with the accused during the arrest, the fact that the accused looked surprised, put up a struggle and tried to escape before he was arrested. [39] According to the prosecution, all this points to the fact that the accused had knowledge of the drugs. In support of their submission, the prosecution relies upon the Court of Appeal’s decision in PP v. Mohd Bandar Shah Nordin & Anor [2008] 4 CLJ 859 wherein His Lordship Gopal Sri Ram held as follows: - “[10] … We need not rehearse all the circumstances to which we have already referred in coming to this conclusion. Suffice to say that the close proximity, taken together with the evidence of flight and the possession of the motorcycle by the first respondent supports the inference that there was mens rea possession on his part… … [12] With respect to the learned judge the items of evidence he took into account as negativing common intention overlooked two critical pieces of evidence which linked the second respondent to the crime. First, his close proximity to the drug and his conduct in fleeing when the police identified themselves. These are strong and cogent evidence which when thrown into the balance render the circumstances identified by the learned judge in the foregoing paragraph of little or no weight. Only the respondents can say what they were doing at the place in question. Only the first December 30, 2024 11 respondent as the person having control of the motorcycle can say how it came to be where it was. And it is only he who can explain how the offending exhibit came to be in the carrier of the motorcycle. And it is only the respondents who can say why they were behaving in a suspicious manner as observed by the police witnesses. Unfortunately, the learned judge did not adopt this approach. Nor did he ask himself the questions that naturally arise from the totality of the evidence.” [40] The prosecution also further submitted that how the drugs were wrapped in layers of plastic packets and the plastic packets marked as P7A and P8A with the words “GUANYINWANG (Refined Chinese Tea)” on them that was heat sealed shows that the drugs were cleverly hidden to avoid detection. [41] As such, according to the prosecution, an inference can be drawn that the accused had knowledge of the drugs. In support of this submission, the prosecution relied on the following authorities discussed below. [42] Firstly, in the case of Teh Hock Leong v. PP [2008] 4 CLJ 764, the Court of Appeal held as follows: - “Turning to the facts of the present instance, we agree with the learned trial judge that the method employed to bring the drugs in question from Thailand into Malaysia was done in a most cunning fashion to escape detection by the authorities. The method employed to convey or transport a drug may sometimes furnish evidence of knowledge. For example, an attempt to carefully conceal a drug may indicate an intention to avoid detection and thereby point to knowledge. Of course, it all depends on the facts of each individual case. [Emphasis added]” December 30, 2024 12 [43] Secondly, the case of PP v. Abdul Rahman Akif [2007] 4 CLJ 337, wherein the Federal Court held that the fact that the drugs were wrapped in a newspaper does not mean an inference of the accused having knowledge cannot be made against an accused person. According to the Federal Court: - “We further agree with the prosecution that the fact that the drug was found wrapped in newspaper is no ground for saying that an inference could not be drawn against the respondent that he had the requisite knowledge. In this regard it is pertinent to refer to the observation of the Singapore Court of Appeal in Zulfikar bin Mustaffah v. PP [2001] 1 SLR 633, at p. 639…” [44] Finally, the case of Zulfikar bin Mustaffah v. PP [2001] 1 SLR that was referred to by our Federal Court in Abdul Rahman Akif (supra), the Singapore Court of Appeal held: - “While the fact that the contents of the bundles were hidden from view may have been relevant in determining whether the requisite knowledge was absent, this factor should still not be given too much weight. Otherwise, drug peddlers could escape liability simply by ensuring that any drugs coming into their possession are first securely sealed in opaque wrappings. Rather, the court must appraise the entire facts of the case to see if the accused’s claim to ignorance is credible. [Emphasis added]” [45] Hence, according to the prosecution, based on these decided cases, the fact that drugs were hidden in a plastic packet with the words “GUANYINWANG” (Refined Chinese Tea) on it and wrapped in many layers of plastic packets (P29, P30, P7, P7A, P7B, P8, P8A and P8B) points to an inference that the accused had knowledge of the drugs. December 30, 2024 13 [46] On the other hand, the learned counsel for the accused submitted that the prosecution had failed to prove that the accused had custody and control of the drugs by attacking the evidence of the Raiding Officer, PW6. [47] Firstly, on PW6’s evidence that he saw the accused looking worried and afraid, learned counsel for the accused submitted that it was only PW6’s perception since it was dark during the early hours of the morning and therefore PW6 could not have seen the accused’s reaction. In support of this contention, he relied on the Court of Appeal’s case in PP v. Majid Saleh Jahromi Amrollah [2012] 6 CLJ 236 wherein it was held: - “It is not sufficient to rely on PW5's evidence that the respondent looked fearful and restless to infer knowledge against the respondent as that is a matter of perception.” [48] Next, learned counsel for the accused mainly attacked the evidence of PW6 by submitting that there are numerous contradictions between his evidence in chief (PWS-6) with his police report (P25) as follows: -

The accused reaction looking worried and afraid is not stated in P25.

(ii) PW6 did not state in P25 that he observed and followed the accused before stopping his scooter.

(iii) PW6 did not state in P25 that he saw a plastic package falling from the scooter when the accused was stopped. December 30, 2024 14

(iv) PW6 testified in Court that the plastic package in all likelihood was hung on the scooter before it fell from the scooter onto the ground. Whereas, in his witness statement, PW6 stated that the plastic package fell from the scooter onto the ground near the footrest of the scooter.

PW6’s demonstration showing the plastic package leaning on the footrest during the inspection of the scooter at the Court premises was different from what he had stated in P25 and his witness statement (PWS6).

(vi) PW6 stated in P25 that as a result of inspecting the ground and footrest, he found the plastic package had fallen from the scooter. If PW6 had seen the plastic package falling onto the ground, there is no reason for PW6 not to state this fact in his police report. Furthermore, why then was it necessary for PW6 to inspect the surrounding areas where the scooter fell?

(vii) PW6’s demonstration during the inspection of the scooter at the Court premises that the plastic package was leaning on the footrest of the scooter contradicts his evidence that the distance between where the accused was detained and the drugs were found is only one step.

(viii) There are three different versions concerning the drugs found on the ground. Firstly, in P25. Secondly in his examination in chief (PWS-6) and finally in the demonstration by PW6 during the inspection of the scooter at the Court premises. December 30, 2024 15 [49] Learned counsel for the accused also submits that PW6 did not state in his report (P25) that the accused looked worried and frightened and this caused him to fall from the scooter. PW6 only stated that there was a struggle between the accused and the raiding team. [50] Learned counsel for the accused submits that there are material contradictions between PW6’s testimony in his witness statement (WSP6) and his police report (P25). He further submits that there are also different versions on the drug case exhibits found on the ground i.e. in PW6’s police report (P25), in his witness statement (WSP6) and in his demonstration during the inspection of the scooter at the Court premises. [51] Next, he submits that the prosecution solely relies on PW6’s evidence without calling other members of the raiding team despite the defence having challenged PW6 that he is not the person who arrested the accused on 6.6.2020. [52] In conclusion, on the issue of custody and control, learned counsel for the accused submits that possession is not proven because the evidence of the sole witness PW6, relied on by the prosecution is full of contradictions and he is not a credible witness. In support of this submission, he relies on the decision in Mohamed Bin Kasdi v. Public Prosecutor [1968] 1 LNS 78 wherein it was held by (Ali J then AG LP): - “No hard and fast rule can be laid down for determining the credibility or otherwise of a witness, but when a witness gives or makes two statements which differ in material particulars there must necessarily be ground for believing that he is not a truthful witness.” December 30, 2024 16 [53] Lastly, on the point of custody and control, learned counsel for the accused submits that since the drugs were not found on the accused but found on the ground by the police, this was why the scooter ridden by the accused was seized to link the accused to the drugs. [54] Next, on the element of knowledge, the learned counsel for the accused submits that the accused has no knowledge of the contents of the plastic packets with the word “GUANYINWANG (Refined Chinese Tea)” written on them. According to learned counsel for the accused, anyone seeing this packet without opening and looking inside will assume it only contains refined Chinese tea. [55] According to learned counsel for the accused, there is contradicting evidence from the prosecution’s witness on this issue. PW6 testified that individuals involved in syabu will surely know that the plastic packet with the word “GUANYINWANG (Refined Chinese Tea)” contains drugs type syabu whereas the Investigating Officer, PW7 said that it cannot be known to contain drugs unless one sees the contents inside. [56] Learned counsel for the accused submits that PW7’s evidence must be accepted because she is an experienced, Narcotics Investigating Officer as opposed to PW6 whose evidence is premised on assumption only or to link the accused with the drugs. Furthermore, the accused is only a fisherman without any previous records of involvement with drugs and therefore he will not have any knowledge of the contents of the plastic packets P7A and P8A. On the contradiction between the evidence of PW6 and PW7 on this point, the defence relies on the decision in Kesavan Krishnan v PP [2015] 6 CLJ 163. December 30, 2024 17 [57] Further, learned counsel for the accused also submitted that from PW6’s evidence that the accused looked worried and afraid, it cannot be inferred that the accused had knowledge of the drugs. This is because on the date of the incident, the Movement Control Order was in force and the accused must have looked worried and afraid because of being in breach of this order when stopped by the police. Furthermore, members of the police raiding team were in plain clothes. I n support of his submission, he relies on the PP v Mohd Haniff Bin Mosbah [2016] 3 CLJ 882. [58] Finally, on knowledge, learned counsel for the accused submits that based on the PW6 police report (P25) and his testimony that the drug case exhibits were found near the scooter’s footrest, this by itself does not prove possession without proving that the accused had knowledge of the drugs. He submits that in the absence of any statutory presumption, knowledge has to be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence by citing the decision of the Federal Court in Ibrahim Mohamad & Anor v PP (2011) 4 CLJ 113. He further submitted that the fact that the drug case exhibits were found one step away from the accused does not prove that the accused had possession by referring to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Low Thiam Teck v PP (2014) CLJU 1104. [59] In addition to the above, learned counsel for the accused also raised three other points. Firstly, the denial by the accused wife (PW4) that she did not leave the drug case exhibits P7A and P8A on the scooter as an afterthought to distance herself from the drugs found. [60] Secondly, the place where the drugs were found is not an exclusive area for the accused. It is an unrestricted access area to the public December 30, 2024 18 using the road. Therefore, the prosecution failed to prove that the drugs found were exclusive to the accused by relying on the decision PP v Tukiman Demin [2008] 8 CLJ 856. [61] Thirdly, the Investigating Officer (PW7) failed to do her marking on the drug case exhibits handed over to her by PW6. [62] Next, learned counsel for the accused also submitted that there was no fingerprint or DNA evidence of the accused on the case exhibits to link the accused to the drugs. According to him, these are important pieces of evidence. [63] I now come to my findings whether the prosecution has proven custody, control and knowledge of the drugs. Custody and control [64] The facts in the present case reveal that the accused was seen riding the scooter alone during the early hours of the morning when the nation was under the Movement Control Order. [65] The facts also reveal that the plastic package which contained drugs fell from the footrest of the scooter onto the ground near where the scooter fell. [66] The orange plastic package (P29) which fell onto the ground from the footrest of the scooter contained a plastic packet with the words “GUANYINWANG (Refined Chinese Tea)” written on it and it contained drugs. The distance between where this plastic package December 30, 2024 19 was found on the ground near the scooter’s footrest and the accused was only one step. [67] Whereas concerning the omissions in PW6’s police report (P25) as submitted by the defence, in my judgement, it need not particularise the details of every action taken, or observation made during the raid and arrest of the accused. PW6 had explained in his re-examination that he need not state everything in his police report. In support of this, I rely on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Timhar Jimdani Ong & Anor v PP (2010) 3 CLJ 938 where it was held: - “[1] The police report lodged by the arresting officer was merely a brief account of what had transpired in the hotel room. It was a formal procedure undertaken by the police following the arrest. It was a first information report to facilitate further investigations. Such a police report need not particularise the details of every action taken, or observation made, by the arresting officer. A first information report, or any police report, need not contain the entire case for the prosecution. Consequently, any omission or shortcoming in the said police report could not be fatal to the prosecution’s case or be held to be materially inconsistent with the prosecution’s narration of facts during the trial. The omissions did not diminish the weight of the arresting officer’s testimony or his credibility.” [68] Next on the material contradictions in PW6’s evidence concerning the accused’s reaction, the orange plastic package falling from the footrest of the scooter and later being found on the ground as submitted by the defence, in my judgement, I do not find any element of inherent improbability in his evidence save for minor contradictions. Furthermore, PW6 had satisfactorily explained the discrepancies during his re-examination. Therefore, based on the December 30, 2024 20 decision in PP v Mohamed Ali [1961] 1 MLJ 257, I accept PW6’s evidence [69] Furthermore, I had the opportunity to observe the demeanour of PW6 whilst he was testifying and also demonstrating whilst inspecting the scooter at the Court premises. In my opinion, he is a credible witness and I believe his testimony. In Liam Heng Boon v. PP [2012] 1 LNS 1455, it was held by the Court of Appeal as follows: - “Here was a case where the learned High Court Judge was confronted with two versions. One version from the prosecution and the other version was from the appellant. His Lordship preferred the prosecution’s version and he made a finding that the appellant’s version was not probable having viewed the Yamaha motorcycle himself and after considering the demonstration by the appellant of placing those exhibits in the compartment of the Yamaha motorcycle. Confronted with two divergent versions as to the recovery of the offending drugs, we recalled to mind the sage words of Thomson CJ in PP v. Mohamed Ali [1962] CLJU 129; [1962] 1 LNS 129; [1962] MLJ 257: When a police witness says something that is not inherently improbable his evidence must be in the first instance be accepted. If his evidence is contradicted by other evidence or it shaken by cross-examination then it becomes the business of the Magistrate to decide whether or not it should be accepted. In the absence of contradiction, however, and in the absence of any element of inherent probability the evidence of any witness, whether a police witness or not, who gives evidence on affirmation, should normally be accepted. For the first time in his defence under oath, the appellant testified that he worked as an unlicensed money lender in Kulai. But this was not put across to SP2, SP4 and SP5. The legal position pertaining to such a December 30, 2024 21 failure has been well articulated by Mukharji J in AEG Carapiet v. AY Derderian [1961] AIR Cal 359 where His Lordship said: The law is clear on the subject. Wherever the opponent has declined to avail himself of the opportunity to put his essential and material case in cross-examination, it must follow that he believed that the testimony given could not be disputed at all. It is wrong to think that this merely a technical rule of evidence. It is a rule of essential justice. It serves to prevent surprise at trial and miscarriage of justice, because it gives notice to the other side of the actual case that is going to be made when the turn of the party on whose behalf the cross-examination is being made comes to give and lead evidence by producing witnesses. It has been stated on high authority of the House of Lords that this much a counsel is bound to do when cross-examining that he must put to each of his opponent’s witnesses in turn, so much of his own case as concerns that particular witness or in which that witness had any share. If he asks no question with regard to this, then he must be taken to accept the plaintiff’s account in its entirety. Such failure leads to miscarriage of justice, first by springing surprise upon the party when he has finished the evidence of his witnesses and when he has no further chance to meet the new case made which was never put and secondly, because such subsequent testimony has no chance of being tested and corroborated.” [70] I find PW6’s version is believable and this Court accepts his testimony. [71] Hence, in my judgement, the accused was in control of his scooter during the material time. His proximity with the scooter and the drugs taken together with his conduct of putting up a struggle and attempting to flee during the arrest supports an inference that the accused had custody and control of the drugs. Please see PP v Mohd Bandar Shah Nordin (supra). In drawing this inference, I am December 30, 2024 22 mindful of the fact that PW6 did agree during cross-examination that the accused did not attempt to flee using his scooter. [72] Furthermore, the drugs could not have been left on the ground by someone else at that hour because the evidence shows the incident where the police stopped the accused was just after the rain. If the orange plastic package (P29) containing the drugs were left there on the ground by someone else, surely it would have got wet by the rain. However, there was no suggestion by the accused that when the police found P29, it was drenched by the rain. [73] As for knowledge, this Court is of the view that the drugs wrapped in a plastic packet with the words “GUANYINWANG (Refined Chinese Tea)” is the modus operandi by drug peddlers to avoid detection. This Court also takes judicial notice of similar modus in other drug trafficking cases. [74] Hence, in my judgement, it was an attempt to carefully conceal the drugs as refined Chinese tea by packaging it in a plastic packet with the words “GUANYINWANG (Refined Chinese Tea)” written on it. The intention was to avoid detection. Based on the authorities cited by the prosecution in Teh Hock Leong (supra), Abdul Rahman Akif (supra) and Zulfikar bin Mustaffah (supra), it can be inferred that the accused had knowledge of the drugs. [75] The accused was only seen carrying a plastic package containing two packets of “GUANYINWANG (Refined Chinese Tea)” and nothing else. So, why was the accused carrying Chinese tea or what was he doing with the Chinese tea at that hour? December 30, 2024 23 [76] Furthermore, according to PW6’s evidence and his police report (P25), the accused also put up a struggle during the arrest. In PP v Reza Mohd Shah Bin Ahmad Shah [2002] 4 MLJ 13, it was said by Augustine Paul J: - “Thus in drawing inferences from proved facts the Court is entitled to infer knowledge on the part of a person on the assumption that such a person has the ordinary understanding expected of him. The Court is not concerned with the knowledge of a reasonable man but with reasonable inferences to be drawn from a situation. There are many circumstances from which knowledge can be inferred. One instance is the inference to be drawn from the act of a person in absconding or fleeing from the scene of a crime.” [77] In this circumstance, the reasonable inference which can be drawn is that the accused knows that the plastic packets which purportedly contain “GUANYINWANG (Refined Chinese Tea)” (P7A & P8A) contain drugs and not Chinese tea. [78] Next, concerning the absence of fingerprint and DNA evidence on the drug case exhibits, in my judgement it is only corroborative evidence. In Mahendran Arivalan v. PP [2020] CLJU 1278; [2020] 1 LNS 1278; [2020] MLRAU 279, Nordin Hassan JCA (as His Lordship then was) explained: - “...it is trite that forensic evidence including DNA or fingerprints only serves as corroborative evidence. It certainly assist(s) the prosecution to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt as required under the law. However, the absence of forensic evidence does not mean that the prosecution case must collapse if there are other cogent evidence to establish its case in particular direct evidence such as in the present case.” December 30, 2024 24 [79] In my judgement, the absence of fingerprint and DNA evidence is not fatal in light of other cogent evidence that exists to prove the accused had possession of the drugs. [80] Next, I found nothing turned on in the submission by the defence that the accused wife (PW4) denied placing the drugs on the scooter. [81] Likewise, on the submission the Investigating Officer (PW7) failed to mark the case exhibits handed to her by PW6. There was no suggestion of any break in the chain of evidence. [82] In the circumstance, it's my finding that based on the direct evidence adduced by the prosecution, the accused had mens rea possession of the drugs and power to deal with the drugs at the time when he was detained because evidence shows that the plastic package containing the drugs fell from the footrest of the scooter onto the ground. [83] Further, it can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of this case that the accused had conscious knowledge of the drugs found near him on the ground. [84] In the foregoing, it’s my finding that the prosecution has successfully established the element of possession for the charge based on the discussion above. [85] The prosecution relies on the presumption of trafficking under Section 37(da)(xvi) DDA, 1952 based on the quantity of drugs December 30, 2024 25 having exceeded the minimum quantity of 50 grams under this Section i.e. 1471 grams. [86] The prosecution submits that an inference must be drawn that this large quantity of drugs must be for purposes of trafficking and not for personal consumption. [87] Furthermore, the act of transporting the drugs using the scooter itself is an act of direct trafficking as defined under Section 2 DDA,

[88] Concerning the act of transporting the drugs and direct trafficking in Ariff Arhannan Che Udin v PP [2022] 4 CLJ 1 the Federal Court was of the following view: - “[15] Thus, where there is evidence, direct or circumstantial of the accused’s knowledge of the drug, thereby proving “possession”, the presumption of trafficking under s. 37(da) of the DDA must be invoked by the trial court as it is “a deduction which the law requires the trial court to make”. The court has no discretion not to invoke the presumption once possession with knowledge or mens rea possession has been proved against the accused at the close of the prosecution case. By using the word “shall” instead of “may” and underscoring it by using the words “until the contrary is proved”, it is clear that Parliament intended the presumption to be mandatory. [16] It is wrong to say that the presumption only applies where the prosecution adduces no evidence of “direct trafficking” and that it has no application where there is such evidence of direct trafficking, on the ground that the presumption is meant to assist the prosecution where there is no evidence of direct trafficking but not where there is such evidence. The fallacy of the argument lies December 30, 2024 26 in the fact that if it were so, a person who carries a large amount of dangerous drug far in excess of the prescribed minimum weight will not be subject to the presumption as his act of “carrying” is itself an act of direct “trafficking” by s. 2. Such construction will not only defeat the object behind the provision but will render it completely otiose and bereft of all meaning, which is contrary to the trite principle that Parliament does not legislate in vain. [Emphasis added]” [89] Whereas in Parlan Dadeh v PP [2009]1 CLJ 717, it was held by the Federal Court as follows: - “……….. It is the combined effect of all the surrounding circumstances that must be considered. Having addressed our minds to the cumulative force of the facts adduced by the prosecution, we are entirely satisfied that the learned judge was amply justified in holding that the accused had mens rea possession and that the case came within section 37(da) of the Act so that the accused was presumed to be a trafficker of the drug in question………” [90] Finally, having subjected the evidence at the close of the prosecution’s case to maximum evaluation, the Court found that the prosecution had made out a prima facie case against the accused for trafficking the drugs. The accused was accordingly ordered to enter his defence. EVALUATION OF THE DEFENCE CASE [91] The duty of the court at the end of a trial is set out in Section 182A of the Criminal Procedure Code which reads as follows: - “182A – Procedure at the conclusion of the trial December 30, 2024 27

At the conclusion of the trial, the Court shall consider all the evidence adduced before it and shall decide whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. [Emphasis added]” In Md Zainudin bin Raujan v. Public Prosecutor [2013] 3 MLJ 773 the Federal Court stated: - “At the conclusion of the trial, s. 182A of the Criminal Procedure Code imposes a duty on the trial court to consider all the evidence adduced before it and to decide whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The defence of the accused must be considered in the totality of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, as well as in the light of the well – established principles enunciated in Mat v. Public Prosecutor [1963] 1 MLJ 263 with regard to the approach to be taken in evaluating the evidence of the defence.” [92] The accused elected to give evidence on oath. He called another witness, his brother. [93] The accused evidence is that on 6.6.2020 at 5.00 am, he went out of his rented house in Parit Kassim using his wife’s scooter to the Parit Kassim jetty. His purpose was to release the water in his boat which was docked there after the downpour to avoid the boat from sinking. [94] The accused rode the scooter to his father’s house located at Parit Samsu about 800 meters away from his house to take a flashlight before heading to the jetty where his boat was docked. [95] According to the accused, the scooter was newly purchased by his wife on 4.6.2020 and the first time he rode the scooter was on December 30, 2024 28

6.6.2020. He further testified that when he left his father’s house, he saw a Kancil car parked in the dark by the side of the road heading towards Parit Jawa from the direction of Bandar Muar, Jalan Abdul Rahman. [96] The accused then rode his motorcycle towards the side of this Kancil car intending to ask the owner why he was sitting in the dark. However, upon reaching the driver’s door, suddenly the driver opened the door and pushed him which caused the accused to fall from his motorcycle lying face downwards on the ground. [97] The accused then suddenly felt his hand was pulled to the back and handcuffed. The driver then asked the accused where Rashid was. Thereafter the accused heard the driver speaking to someone on the phone and saying “dapat tangkap”. [98] Within two to three minutes, another car type Alza/Unser arrived. The accused was brought into the back passenger seat of this car. The accused saw the driver of the car was a bald headed Malay man. Next, according to the accused the individual who arrested him opened the back door of this car again, chucked one plastic package at his feet and said “ini barang kau”. [99] According to the accused, the individual who arrested him was only one person which was the driver of the Kancil car. He was a Malay man and the accused identified him as L/Kpl Amirul Syamer. L/Kpl Amirul Syamer was offered by the prosecution to the defence. [100] The accused says he is sure that the person who arrested him is not Inspector Usairi (PW6) because the first time he saw PW6 was at December 30, 2024 29 the Narcotics Department, IPD Muar. The accused says he doesn’t know why he was arrested and at the Narcotics Department, PW6 cut open a plastic package as shown in the photograph either in P23(3) or P23(4) and told him that it contained drugs. [101] The accused further testified that when he left his house at Parit Kassim by riding his wife’s scooter, he did not bring anything along or any plastic package as shown by PW6. Neither did he see this plastic package before his arrest on 6.6.2020 at 5.00 am. [102] Finally, the accused testified that 6.6.2020 was the period when our nation was hit by the COVID-19 pandemic and the Movement Control Order was in force. The accused says as a fisherman, he still had to work to support his family. Further, he is illiterate and doesn’t know how to read. He had stopped schooling at standard six (6) because he no longer had any interest and didn’t know how to read. [103] The accused also called his brother DW2 as his witness. DW2 confirmed that the accused only studied up to standard six (6) and thereafter stopped schooling because he could not read. According to DW2, the accused started fishing in the sea at the age of 13 years old. [104] DW2 further testified that before the accused was arrested on 6.6.2020, he was working as a fisherman at the Parit Kassim, jetty Muar and owned a fishing boat. This boat was later sold by his family to raise finance towards paying the legal fees in defending the accused in this case. December 30, 2024 30 [105] DW2 also confirmed that at the time when the accused was arrested, the nation was hit by the Covid-19 pandemic and the Movement Control Order was in force. Fishermen were allowed to go out with letters from Fisherman’s Associates and the police. [106] The accused version is that it was the marine officers who were part of the raiding team that arrested the accused and not PW6. [107] However, the defence elected not to call any of the prosecution witnesses offered to them to establish this fact but made an application under Section 425 CPC to recall the Investigating Officer (PW7) to ascertain whether she had recorded statements in the course of her investigation under Section 112 CPC from two of the witness offered to the defence who were part of the raiding team. They were from the marine force i.e. Sjn Mohamad Landa bin Sahari and L/Kpl Amirul Syamer bin Abdullah. [108] Learned counsel for the accused made this application after his request for copies of the Section 112 statement for Sjn Mohamad Landa bin Sahari, Sjn Norazli Sham bin Che Ahmad, D/Sjn John Ley Anak Bohap and L/Kpl Amirul Syamer bin Abdullah did not materialize because the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor had confirmed that based on the investigation papers, no statements were recorded from these police officers who were part of the raiding team. [109] The defence application to recall the Investigating Officer was objected to by the prosecution on the grounds it was frivolous and vexatious. The prosecution also submitted that it would amount to a second bite of the cherry. In support of their objection, the December 30, 2024 31 prosecution relied on the decisions in Hassan v. Public Prosecutor [1962] 28 MLJ 323, Ong Boon Siang & Ors v. PP [1961] MLJ 4, PP v Mohamed Azmin Ali [2000] 7 CLJ 628 and Suhani Binti Mat Daud v Public Prosecutor [2011] MLJU 655 2. [110] Upon considering the reasons put forward by learned counsel for the accused and the objections by the learned DPP and the authorities cited by both parties, this Court ruled that upon evaluating the evidence of PW7 during the prosecution’s case and the questions put to PW7 in cross-examination, the additional evidence which the accused seeks to adduce through PW7 is not essential to assist the Court to arrive at a just decision of the case. [111] Furthermore, learned counsel for the accused had already questioned PW7 during her cross-examination whether she had recorded statements in the course of her investigation under Section 112 CPC from Sjn Mohamad Landa bin Sahari and L/Kpl Amirul Syamer bin Abdullah. [112] In arriving at this ruling, this Court had referred to the Court of Appeal’s authority in Saravanan Rajagopal & Anor v. PP & Another Appeal [2019] 7 CLJ 202 which held: - “The basis for the exercise of the discretion is essentiality of the additional evidence of the recalled witness to the just decision of the case.” Please also see the decision in Phon Nam v. Public Prosecutor [1991] 1 CLJ Rep 381 and Public Prosecutor v. Johari Abdul Kadir [1987] CLJ Rep 889. December 30, 2024 32 [113] I will now examine the defence put forward by the accused. [114] It is apparent from the accused defence that there are two versions before the Court concerning which police officer arrested the accused and the place where the drugs were found. [115] According to the accused, the police officer who arrested him is L/Kpl 199940 Amirul Syamer bin Abdullah from the marine force and the plastic package containing drugs was thrown by L/Kpl Amirul at his feet after he was arrested and brought into the car driven by the police. [116] As the presumption of trafficking was invoked against the accused, the onus is on the accused to rebut the presumption of trafficking. [117] In Abdullah Atan v PP & Other Appeals [2020] 9 CLJ 151, the Federal Court explained the role of presumption: - “The role of presumptions in the wider context of the criminal legal system may be simplified thus: where a statutory presumption is invoked to presume the existence of certain fact as being the ingredient of the offence, the onus then shifts to the accused to disprove the presumed fact on the balance of probabilities and to thereby exculpate himself from the charge. If he does so, he earns an acquittal. If he does not, he is guilty of the charge.” [118] It is trite that the accused has to discharge this burden on the balance of probabilities as explained by Lord Diplock in PP v. Yuvaraj [1968] 1 LNS 116; [1969] 2 MLJ 89 on how a statutory presumption can be disproved: - December 30, 2024 33 “Generally speaking, no onus lies upon a defendant in criminal proceedings to prove or disprove any fact: it is sufficient for his acquittal if any of the facts which if they existed would constitute the offence with which he is charged are “not proved”. But exceptionally, as in the present case, an enactment creating an offence expressly provides that if other facts are proved, a particular fact, the existence of which is a necessary factual ingredient of the offence, shall be presumed or deemed to exist “unless the contrary is proved”. In such a case the consequence of finding that that particular fact is “disproved” will be an acquittal, whereas the absence of such a finding will have the consequence of a conviction. Where this is the consequence of a (sic) fact’s being “disproved” there can be no grounds in public policy for requiring that exceptional degree of certainty as excludes all reasonable doubt that that fact does not exist. In their Lordships’ opinion the general rule applies in such a case and it is sufficient if the court considers that upon the evidence before it, it is more likely than not that the fact does not exist. The test is the same as that applied in civil proceedings: the balance of probabilities.” [119] Please also see Neo Koon Cheo v Regina [1959] CLJU 64 where Ambrose J was of the view all that was required by an accused to rebut the presumption was to establish the probability of that which he was required to prove. [120] Concerning where there are two versions of stories, Spenser-Wilkinson J in Mohamed Yatin bin Abu Bakar v. Public Prosecutor [1949] 1 LNS 50 as follows: - “Reading the learned President’s grounds of decision as a whole it seems to me that he tended to approach the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused on the basis of deciding which of two stories he should believe. In my opinion this is not the correct approach to a decision in a criminal trial except, perhaps, in those cases where the law casts the burden of proof upon the accused. In such cases the accused December 30, 2024 34 discharges the burden upon him if he establishes a balance of probability in his favour Ng Lam v. PP [1939] FMSLR 8; [1940] MLJ 74. … In an ordinary case, where no special burden of proof or explanation is by law cast upon the accused, his position is more favourable than it is in those cases where the law presumes something against him. The principle laid down in the recent English cases, particularly Mancini v. Director of Public Prosecutions appears to me to be that, where no special onus is cast by law upon the accused, then, if his story has the effect of raising a reasonable doubt as to the truth of the prosecution case, he is entitled to an acquittal; and this is the “ordinary rule” which is referred to in the passage above quoted from Rex v. Garth. In this country, at the close of the case for the prosecution the Court will not call upon the accused for his defence unless the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is, in the first instance, believed. If, when called upon for his defence the accused gives evidence, then the question is, not which story is to be believed, but whether, even if the Court is not inclined to accept all that the accused has said, his evidence does not raise a reasonable doubt as to the truth of the prosecution evidence or as to the accused’s guilt.” [121] Therefore, since the presumption of trafficking casts the burden of proof on the accused to discharge on the balance of probabilities, it is incumbent upon this Court to decide which version is believable. [122] PW6 in his examination in chief in paragraphs 7 and 8 of PWS6 testified that he arrested the accused during the incident. [123] Learned counsel for the accused repeatedly questioned PW6 and put to him that he did not arrest the accused but it was L/Kpl Amirul Syamer who arrested the accused. However, PW6 was consistent December 30, 2024 35 in his testimony by answering he disagreed with learned counsel for the accused suggestion. This can be seen as follows: - “S : Saya katakan penyataan kamu dalam para 7 dan para 8 penyata saksi adalah rekaan semata-mata? : Tak setuju. : Insp Usairi, ini arahan saya. Kamu bukanlah orang yang membuat tangkapan terhadap OKT pada 6 haribulan 6, setuju? : Tak setuju. : Orang yang membuat tangkapan adalah anggota marin iaitu L/Kpl Amirul, setuju? : Tak setuju. : Saya cadangkan sebenarnya kamu bukannya orang yang menahan. Orang yang menahan adalah L/Kpl Amirul, anggota marin? : Tak setuju. : Saya cadangkan sebenarnya kamu bukan orang yang membuat tangkapan. Sekali lagi anggota marin L/Kpl Amirul yang buat tangkapan iaitu tiba-tiba menolak dia jatuh. Saya cadangkan. : Tak setuju.” [124] The defence also raised the issue that the prosecution’s failure to call two of the marine police officers who were part of the raiding team involved in arresting the accused as testified by PW7 is fatal to the accused’s case. [125] I find no merit in the accused’s argument because under Section 134 of the Evidence Act 1950, no particular number of witnesses December 30, 2024 36 shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact. Please see Selvam Arjunan v PP 2012 1 LNS 1411. Goswani J in Badri v. State of Rajasthan [1976] 1 SCC 442, at p. 447, made these pertinent observations: - “Since under the Evidence Act no particular number of witnesses are required for the proof of any fact, it is a sound and well-established rule of law that quality and not quantity of evidence matters. In each case the court has to consider whether it can be reasonably satisfied to act even upon the testimony of a single witness for the purpose of convicting a person.” [126] Furthermore, it is the prerogative of the prosecution to decide whom to call as their witnesses. [127] Based on my finding that PW6 is a credible witness, I do not find the accused version that he was arrested by L/Kpl Amirul Syamer from the marine police and not by PW6 believable. [128] Whereas the accused version that the plastic package was thrown at his feet by L/Kpl Amirul Syamer was not raised during the prosecution's case or put to the Raiding Officer, PW6 during his cross-examination. It was only raised for the first time at the defence stage. [129] During the prosecution’s case, it was only put to PW6 by the defence that the plastic package containing the drugs was found on the ground near the motorcycle and not found on the motorcycle itself. This can be seen as follows: - December 30, 2024 37 “En.RK Bala: Insp Usairi, ini saya cadangkan jika pun kamu buat tangkapan kali pertama beg bungkusan warna jingga kamu lihat adalah di atas tanah? Mahkamah: Beg bungkusan jingga? : Kamu jumpai dadah atas tanah berdekatan dengan motosikal, itu sahajakan bukan pada motosikal, betul? : Betul, pada motosikal tiada.” [130] Learned counsel for the accused also raised the issue that there are now all together five versions concerning where the drug case exhibits before it fell to the ground as opposed to three versions during the prosecution’s case. [131] One additional version is based on PW6’s testimony during his re-examination that he saw the plastic package falling onto the ground and therefore in all likelihood, it must have been hanging from the scooter. The other version was when it was put by the prosecution to the accused that drug case exhibits were on the scooter that the accused was riding. [132] In my judgement the defence contention on the existence of these different versions as to where the drugs were found has no merit. The fact remains that there is a close proximity between the drugs found on the ground with the accused scooter that fell on the ground. Surely, if the plastic package containing the drugs were placed on the scooter’s footrest, naturally it would also fall onto the ground when the scooter fell. [133] The final ground raised by the learned counsel for the accused is that the prosecution failed to cross-examine the accused whether December 30, 2024 38 he knows or not the contents of the plastic packet with the words Guanyinwang refined Chinese Tea (P7A) and (P8A) written on it which contains drugs type syabu. [134] However, I note that the prosecution did cross-examine the accused on the contents of P7 and P8 and put it to him that it contained drugs. This can be seen as follows: - “S : Keterangan kamu semalam, kamu tak pasti samada P7 atau P8 yang digunting depan kamu, betul? : Betul. : Saya cadangkan polis telah gunting kedua-duanya dan tunjukkan kepada kamu isi kandungannya dan kamu angguk tanda faham bahawa isi kandungan P7 dan P8 adalah merupakan dadah yang ingin kamu jual kepada orang lain, setuju tak? : Tidak setuju.” [135] In the foregoing, I am not convinced and satisfied with the accused defence that his purpose of going out at 5.00 am on 6.6.2020 was to release the water in his boat after the downpour. If that was the case, what was he doing with packets of GUANYINWANG refined Chinese tea alone during the early morning hours on 6.6.2020 when the movement control order was in force? These plastic packets were later found to contain the impugned drugs. [136] Furthermore, apart from the packets of GUANYINWANG refined Chinese tea found on the accused, no other things were found on him. The accused also put up a struggle during the arrest. December 30, 2024 39 [137] Hence, I am not convinced of the defence suggestion that because the accused is illiterate and doesn’t know how to read, therefore he wouldn’t know whether the packets of GUANYINWANG refined Chinese tea contain tea or drugs. [138] Finally concerning the accused explanation that he went out during the early hours of the morning to release the water from his boat after the rain, it’s my finding that apart from the oral testimony of the accused and his brother (DW2) confirming that the accused owned a boat, no other evidence was produced to substantiate the same. [139] In any event, in my opinion, this fact is immaterial considering the impugned drugs were found in close proximity to the accused who was seen alone on the scooter before his arrest. [140] Based on the reasons stated above, it is my finding that the accused story that the impugned drugs were thrown at his feet after he was arrested and brought inside the police car is not probable and true. In my judgement, the accused defence is not probable. [141] Therefore, I find the accused has failed to raise a reasonable doubt as to possession of the impugned drugs and failed to rebut the statutory presumption of trafficking on a balance of probabilities under section 37(da) DDA in respect of the charge. [142] After considering all the evidence I find that the prosecution had successfully proven their case in respect of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt pursuant to Section 182A 2) CPC against the accused. December 30, 2024 40 [143] I therefore find the accused guilty of the charge of trafficking under Section 39B(1)(a) DDA and convict the accused. SENTENCE [144] The prosecution did not press for the death sentence. Learned counsel for the accused urged the Court not to impose the death sentence by mitigating that the accused is 41 years old, a first offender, only works as a fisherman and has cooperated with the police. [145] I exercised my discretion not to impose the death sentence and sentenced the accused to a term of life imprisonment which is defined as 30 years under section 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 1953. The sentence was ordered to run from the date of arrest. It was further ordered that the accused undergo a minimum of twelve (12) strokes of whipping. Dated this 30th December 2024 at Muar in the State of Johore. t.t. SURIA KUMAR DJ PAUL Judge High Court of Malaya Muar Johore Darul Ta’zim December 30, 2024 41 Counsels: For the Accused : Balakrishnan a/l Raman Kutty For the Respondent : Putera Amirool Faez Bin Suhasi Solicitors: For the Accused Messrs R.K. Bala & Associates Advocates & Solicitors No. 9, 1st Floor Jalan Seri Temenggong 26/1 84000 Muar Johor [Ref. No. : RKB/CR-0140/2020] For the Respondent Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Pejabat Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Daerah Muar No. 16, Jalan Petri Muar Trade Centre 84000 Muar Johor [Ref. No. : TPRJH(MR)68/19] December 30, 2024 42 Hearing Date : 28th October 2020, 21st December 2020, 2nd January 2023, 2nd January 2024, 3rd January 2024, 4th January 2024, 31st January 2024, 1st February 2024, 4th April 2024, 8th May 2024, 30th May 2024, 10th September 2024, 11th September 2024, 18th September 2024, 3rd November 2024, 10th November 2024 Decision Date : 30th December 2024