(ii) from the materials available, whether the application is frivolous and if not thought as frivolous and if leave is granted, consider that the applicant has an arguable case which lean towards him obtaining the relief sought at the end of substantive hearing. [23] The principles governing applications for leave to commence judicial review proceedings have also been set out in Tang Kwor Ham & Ors v. Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd & Ors [2006] 1 MLRH 507; [2006] 1 CLJ 927; [2006] 5 MLJ 60 at 69 where Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as His Lordship then was) held: “[10] …. the High Court should not go into the merits of the case at the leave stage. Its role is only to see if the application for leave is frivolous…. So too will the court be entitled to refuse leave if it is a case where the subject matter of the review is one which by settled law (either written law or the common law) is non-justiciable.” [24] The Federal Court’s decision in SIS Forum (Malaysia) v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor; Majlis Agama Islam Selangor (Intervener) [2022] 3 MLRA 219 where Tengku Maimun Tuan Mat CJ stated: S/N Hg6o41gimkeoveMYnUuoZA “Judicial review is a core tenet of the rule of law which is inextricably linked to the notion of constitutional supremacy in a democratic form of Government. This was because a core feature of the rule of law is the doctrine of separation of powers, a corollary to which is the concept of check and balance. Judicial review - whether constitutional review or statutory review - is a fundamental aspect of check and balance and is the vehicle through which the judicial branch of Government can perform its constitutional function visa-vis the other branches of Government. The judicial power of the Federation which includes judicial review (constitutional and statutory) is vested by constitutional design solely in the two High Courts.” [25] It is the duty of the court at this stage is to conduct a quick perusal of the material to determine whether the application is frivolous or vexatious or otherwise. Findings and Decision [26] Founded on these principles, this court will proceed to analyse this application. However, before this court considers the leave application before this court, this court will first deal with the issue of the extension of time. In this regard, reference was made to Order 53 rule 3(6) of the ROC 2012 which provides: “An application for judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when the grounds of application first arose or when the decision is first communicated to the applicant.” S/N Hg6o41gimkeoveMYnUuoZA [27] Order 53 rule 3(6) of the ROC 2012 specifically states that a judicial review application must be filed promptly and at the latest within three months of the date of the decision. Hence, based on this provision, the time frame for filing a judicial review application is within 3 months. [28] Pertaining to the time frame for filing an application for judicial review, the Federal Court in the case of Ahmad Jefri bin Mohd Jahri @ Md Johari v. Pengarah Kebudayaan & Kesenian Johor & Ors [2010] 3 MLJ 145 held: “the stringent conditions imposed by Order 53 of the RHC are intended to protect those entrusted with the enforcement of public duties against groundless harassment and to reduce delays in resolving applications in the interest of good administration. In the instant case, the appellant was clearly handicapped, inter alia, through limitation of time, in applying for judicial review under Order 53 rule 3(6) (see paras 15–16); O’Reilly v. Mackman [1982] 3 All ER 1124 followed.” [29] Reference is further made to the case of Menteri Besar Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur v. Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd [2010] 4 MLJ 360 where the Court of Appeal held as follows: “[16] The High Court in its judgment was of the view that the 40 days specified under O.53 r. 3(6) was not rigid. I am of the view the judge erred in ruling that the time frame prescribed by the rules is not rigid. I am in agreement with the appellant's counsel that compliance with the time frame prescribed by the rules is fundamental as it goes to jurisdiction (See Mersing Omnibus Co. Sdn S/N Hg6o41gimkeoveMYnUuoZA Bhd v. The Minister of Labour & Manpower & Anor [1983] 2 CLJ 7; [1983] CLJ (Rep) 266). [Emphasis added] [30] Founded on the cases quoted above, it is clear that the provisions of Order 53 rule 3(6) of the ROC 2012 must be adhered to strictly. [31] Based on Applicant’s Statement in Enclosure 2 (“Statement”), applicant contended that the impugned decision was communicated to him on 28.10.2021. Whereas, the applicant’s Affidavit in Support in Enclosure 4 (“Affidavit in Support”), stated that impugned decision was communicated to him on 22.11.2021. [32] Hence, there is before this court, according to documents filed by the applicant, two different dates. Nonetheless, the application to challenge the impugned decision which was filed on 29.3.2023. Even if this court were to consider the later date of 22.11.2021 as the date the decision was communicated to the applicant, the applicant would still not have met the required 3 months’ timeline provided in Order 53 rule 3(6) of the ROC 2012. [33] It is clear and evident there is a delay in filing of this application for judicial review. [34] Nonetheless, Order 53 rule 3(7) of the ROC 2012 then goes on to state: “The Court may, upon an application, extend the time specified in rule 3(6) and if it considers that there is a good reason for doing so. Hence, the court may grant an extension of time of the S/N Hg6o41gimkeoveMYnUuoZA time specified in rule 3 (6) and if the court considers there is good reason.” [Emphasis added] [35] In order for this court to consider Order 53 rule 3(7) of the ROC 2012, there must be before this court an application to abridge time or for an extension of time. There is currently, before this court, no such application, which renders this court unable to allow an extension of time to file this application to commence judicial review proceedings. [See: Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri v. Alcatel-Lucent Malaysia Sdn Bhd & Anor [2017] 2 CLJ 1; [2017] 1 MLJ 563; Mersing Omnibus Co Sdn Bhd v. Minister of Labour and Manpower & Anor [1983] CLJ Rep 266; [1983] 2 MLJ 54] Conclusion [36] For the aforementioned reasons, specifically that this application to commence judicial review is time barred, and that there is no application for abridgement of time before this court, this application to commence judicial review is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Date: 4 July 2024 (SHAHNAZ BINTI SULAIMAN) Judge High Court of Malaya, Shah Alam S/N Hg6o41gimkeoveMYnUuoZA Counsel: For the applicant: Low Carmen Tetuan T. Harpal & Associates Advocates & Solicitors No. M3-B-5, Jalan Pandan Indah 4/3A, Pandan Indah, 55100 Kuala Lumpur. harpal.legal@gmail.com +6 034292 7799 For the respondent: Safiyyah Omar Bahagian Guaman, Jabatan Peguam Negara No. 45, Persiaran Perdana Presint 4, 62100 Putrajaya +6 03 8872 2000 S/N Hg6o41gimkeoveMYnUuoZA