If a person sits or votes as a member of the Legislative Assembly or the Legislative Council of a State... when he knows that he is not qualified or that he is disqualified for membership thereof, or that he is prohibited from so doing by the provisions of any law made by Parliament or the Legislature of the State, he shall be liable in respect of each day on which he so sits or votes to a penalty of five hundred rupees to be recovered as a debt due to the State. As has been stated already, the respondent's conviction and sentence in 1942 disqualified him both for being chosen as, and for being, a member of the Legislative Assembly under article 19(1)(e) read with section 7 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, passed by Parliament, the period of five years since his release on $ 1 5^{th} $ August, 1947, not having elapsed before the date of the election. The respondent having thus been under a disqualification since before his nomination on $ 1 5^{th} $ March, 1952, could he be said to have "become" subject to that disqualification within the meaning of article 192? The rival contentions of the parties centred round the true interpretation to be placed on that word in the context of the provisions quoted above. The Attorney-General argued that the whole fasciculus of the provisions dealing with "disqualifications of members", viz., articles 190 to 193, should be read together, and as articles 191 and 193 clearly cover both pre-existing and supervening disqualifications, articles 190 and 192 should also be similarly understood as relating to both kinds of disqualification. According to him all these provisions together constitute an integral scheme whereby disqualifications are laid down and machinery for determining questions arising in regard to them is also provided. The use of the word "become" in articles 190(3) and 192(1) is not inapt, the context, to include within its scope pre-existing disqualifications also, as becoming subject to a disqualification is predicated of "a member of a House of Legislature", and a person who, being already disqualified, gets elected, can, not inappropriately, be said to "become" subject to the disqualification as a member as soon as he is elected. The argument is more ingenious than sound. Article 191, which lays down the same set of disqualifications for election as well as for continuing as a member, and article 193 which prescribes the penalty for sitting and voting when disqualified, are naturally phrased in terms wide enough to cover both pre-existing and supervening disqualifications; but it does not necessarily follow that articles 190(3) and 192(1) must also be taken to cover both. Their meaning must depend on the language used which, we think, is reasonably plain. In our opinion these two articles go together and provide a remedy when a member incurs a disqualification after he is elected as a member. Not only do the words "becomes subject" in article 190(3) and "has become subject" in article 192(1) indicate a change in the position of the member after he was elected, but the provision that his seat is to become thereupon vacant, that is to say, the seat which the member was filling theretofore becomes vacant on his becoming disqualified, further reinforces the view that the article contemplates only a sitting member incurring the disability while so sitting. The suggestion that the language used in article 190(3) can equally be applied to a preexisting disqualification as a member can be supposed to vacate his seat the moment he is elected is a strained and farfetched construction and cannot be accepted. The Attorney-General admitted that if the word "is" were substituted for "becomes" or "has become", it would more appropriately convey the meaning contended for by him, but he was unable to say why it was not used. It was said that on the view that articles 190(3) and 192(1) deal with disqualifications incurred after election as a member, there would be no way of un-seating a member who became subject to a disqualification after his nomination and before his election, for, such a disqualification is no ground for challenging the election by an election petition under article 329 of the Constitution read with section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. If this is an anomaly, it arises out of a lacuna in the latter enactment which could easily have provided for such a contingency, and it cannot be pressed as an argument against the respondent's construction of the constitutional provisions. On the other hand, the Attorney-General's contention might, if accepted, lead to conflicting decisions by the Governor dealing with a reference under article 192 and by the Election Tribunal inquiring into an election petition under section 100 of the Parliamentary statute referred to above. For the reasons indicated we agree with the learned Judge below in holding that articles 190(3) and 192(1) are applicable only to disqualifications to which a member becomes subject after he is elected as such, and that neither the Governor nor the Commission has jurisdiction to enquire into the respondent's disqualification which arose long before his election." [81] Indeed, it would appear that the end result of the Saka Venkata case [supra] has been the peculiar and rather curious situation where Saka Venkata, who was a convict, and unpardoned as he was, when he was elected, could remain as an elected member of the honourable Legislative Council in Madras, in India. Likewise here, it was contended by the defendants that the effect of the Saka Venkata's ruling, if followed, would result in the Dewan having a person whom the Sarawak State Constitution would disqualify, as he had voluntarily acquired a foreign citizenship, namely being an Australian citizen. [82] On the other hand, granted that the Sarawak State Constitution, just like other similar constitutions, intends to disqualify a person who had voluntarily acquired a foreign citizenship from standing in a State Election, however it must not be forgotten that the same Sarawak State Constitution via Articles 16, 17, 18 and 19 also show an intent to create a 2-regime situation pertaining to where or at which stage, the issue of disqualification of a person and of an elected member is to be determined. This intention also must be given its due consideration. The Indian apex Court Justices in the Saka Venkata case [supra] gave effect to what was truly intended for as contained in Articles 190(3) and 192(1) of the Indian Constitution. My decision [83] Having considered the submissions of all learned counsel, I am of the view that the Sarawak Dewan had no jurisdiction to entertain the MM on the 12th May 2017. My reasons are summed up are as follows: (1) The language employed in Articles 18(2)(a) and 19(1)of the Sarawak State Constitution refers to disqualification of a member. The choices of the words used "has ceased" and "ceases" connote a situation where the member was properly qualified for election but has since lost that qualified status when, as a member of the Dewan, he committed an act of disqualification under Article 18(2)(a). This scenario did not happen in this case before us. The admitted factual matrix surrounding the Plaintiff did not fit into the framework as envisaged by Articles 19(1) and 18(2)(a) of the Sarawak Constitution, as his disqualification was incurred way back in 2010. He had incurred that disqualification as a person under Article 17(1)(g), not as a member of the Dewan under Article 18(2)(a) of the Sarawak State Constitution. [84] Secondly, with respect, I cannot agree that the Australian High Court decision in the Re Canavan and Ors case [supra] is of assistance to the Defendants because it would appear that as long as it is established that a sitting member of the Australian Parliament is a person caught by the words of section 44(i) of the Australian Constitution, his qualification falls and he stands disqualified. There was no issue of when that disqualification was incurred by the sitting member. In fact, some of the affected Australian MPs were not aware of their disqualifying factor, to wit, their dual citizenship status until very recently, but well before they were elected into Parliament. As such, the mere fact that, for instance, Mr. Canavan and the other affected MPs and senators had dual nationality status was fatal to their cause. It would appear that the moment dual citizenship is established, section 44(i) kicks in to bite and never let go. It would appear that although Australia recognizes dual nationality, however, for the purpose of election to her Parliament, they are incapable of standing for election into the Australian Parliament. But under the Sarawak Constitution, there is a demarcating line which differentiates between disqualification incurred before election by a person and a disqualification incurred by a member after his election into the Dewan by a sitting and elected member of the Dewan. As all parties had agreed that the Dewan had jurisdiction to determine an Article 19(1) question raised as to the status of a sitting member, the only question that is left is whether the Dewan's jurisdiction in that regard could extend to determine an alleged disqualification that was incurred long before that member was elected into the Dewan. It is my view that the Dewan is not empowered to do that. [85] Thirdly, I agree with the decision in the Saka Venkata case [supra] which is a very persuasive authority coming from the Supreme Court of India interpreting constitutional provisions in the Indian Constitution which are nearly similar with the Sarawak Constitutional provisions under consideration before us. That Saka Venkata case [supra] decided that for the Governor to exercise jurisdiction over the issue of Saka Venkata's status as a member of the Legislative Council of Madras, it must be established first that the alleged disqualification must have incurred after he was elected into the august Assembly, not before. The use of the words 'has become' and 'becomes' instead of 'is' in the relevant Articles under scrutiny must be interpreted to convey such a meaning to those Articles, in that the disqualification has got to be a supervening event which is incurred after he was elected as a member, as opposed to a disqualification which he had incurred long before he was elected. I am of the respectful view that the use of the words 'has ceased' and 'ceased' in Articles 19(1) and 18(2)(a) of the Sarawak State Constitution, must mean that the disqualification of the member in question must have been incurred by him after he was elected as a member into the august Dewan, not before. [86] Fourthly, the presence in the Perak Constitution provisions in Article XXXIV and Article 50(2) of the Federal Constitution, which would deal with the situation in this case quite summarily, despite the Legislative Chamber having power to determine the status of a member when a question on his qualification arises. To my mind, the presence of such provision as Article 50(2) of the Federal Constitution is a clear manifestation that the Dewan Rakyat has no jurisdiction to deal with a person who has been elected into the august Dewan Rakyat when he is in fact a disqualified person before he was elected. The Sarawak Constitution does not have such similar provision, definitely not in Article 18 nor 19. [87] So now, I must revert back to the MM dated $ 1 2^{th} $ May 2017 and apply to it my findings as to the implications of Articles 16, 17, 18 and 19 of the Sarawak Constitution. This MM was marked as "DA-1" It was issued by the $ 2^{nd} $ Defendant in his capacity as a Minister, under Standing Order 23(1). I noted that this MM had referred to Article 17(1)(g) as a basis to disqualify the Plaintiff. It went on to list down the impugned acts of the Plaintiff and after averring that the Plaintiff was a person "completely unqualified, unfit and untrustworthy individual to be nominated and elected to represent the people of Sarawak", the MM went on to state "AND WHEREAS as a result of his voluntary acts, Member for Pujut has ceased to be member of Dewan Undangan Negeri Sarawak due to the breaches of Article 17(1)(g) of the Constitution." [88] Then came the move to table the MM for resolution of the Dewan. It reads like so: "Member for Pujut is disqualified under Article 17(1)(g) of the State Sarawak Constitution to be a member and has ceased to be a member of the Dewan Undangan Negeri Sarawak forthwith." [89] From a perusal of this MM dated $ 1 2^{\mathrm{th}} $ May 2012, it is clear that the disqualifying act happened on 21 January 2010. It was also noted that the acts of the Plaintiff disqualified him from being nominated for election. These therefore referred to pre-election disqualifying acts. [90] But the MM had gone on to aver that the Plaintiff had ceased to be a member of the Dewan. I found that to be a matter within the province of Article 18(2)(a) of the Sarawak Constitution which is a post-election disqualification, meaning the Plaintiff must have incurred the disqualification after he was elected into the Dewan. But in truth, as revealed by the undisputed facts, the Plaintiff was a member who was elected into the Dewan with a pre-election disqualification. [91] From a consideration of the MM dated 12 May 2017 it would appear that it had moved the Dewan to declare that the Plaintiff had ceased to be a member of the Dewan because he had committed a disqualifying act under Article 17(1)(g) by having voluntarily acquired a foreign citizenship of Australia, way back in 2010. Clearly the disqualifying act was committed long before the Plaintiff's election as a member of the Dewan. The similarity with the Saka Venkata case's [supra] factual matrix in that regard cannot be more striking, where it can be readily recalled that Saka Venkata incurred his disqualification long before was elected into the Madras Legislative Council. The learned justices in the Indian Supreme Court had this to say when interpreting Articles 190(3) and 192(1) of the Indian Constitution, which though are not exactly in pari materia with Articles 19(1) and 18(2)(a) of the Sarawak Constitution, are nevertheless quite similar, like so: "Not only do the words "becomes subject" in article 190(3) and "has become subject" in article 192(1) indicate a change in the position of the member after he was elected, but the provision that his seat is to become thereupon vacant, that is to say, the seat which the member was filling theretofore becomes vacant on his becoming disqualified, further reinforces the view that the article contemplates only a sitting member incurring the disability while so sitting. The suggestion that the language used in article 190(3) can equally be applied to a pre-existing disqualification as a member can be supposed to vacate his seat the moment he is elected is a strained and farfetched construction and cannot be accepted. The Attorney-General admitted that if the word "is" were substituted for "becomes" or "has become", it would more appropriately convey the meaning contended for by him, but he was unable to say why it was not used." [Bold provided by me for emphasis.] [92] The operative words used in Article 19(1) and Article 18(2)(a) of the Sarawak Constitution are 'has ceased' and 'ceases' respectively. A plain construction of those words as they are employed in those two mentioned Articles must mean that the disqualification must have been incurred by a sitting member, post-election. Those words connote a situation when a member was qualified when he was elected into the Dewan but has since, ceased to be so qualified, as he incurred a disqualification since he was elected. Article 19(1) seeks to clothe the Dewan with the power to determine whether a member has ceased to be qualified to remain as a member in the Dewan. It does not refer to a person. Article 18(2)(a) again declares that a member ceases to be qualified for election as such a member of the Dewan, when he commits any of the disqualifying acts and that includes voluntarily acquiring a foreign citizenship during his time as a sitting member of the Dewan. [93] Therefore, the Dewan only has the jurisdiction to determine the status of a member whose alleged disqualification is incurred during the duration of his membership of the Dewan, meaning after his election into the Dewan. It is only right that the Dewan only assumes jurisdiction over its members' qualification to remain as members of the Dewan. That means disqualification must be incurred after a member had been elected as a member of the Dewan. To borrow from Chief Justice P. Sastri in the Saka Venkata case [supra] it 'indicate[s] a change in the position of the member after he was elected. To go backwards in time and then consider an incidence of disqualification prior to the election would amount to a determination of the disqualification of a person, as opposed to that of a member. With respect, in fact, to go back in time and deal with a disqualification that was incurred long before a person got elected as a member would amount to an overreach by the Dewan which, in my view can find no constitutional support or justification within the context of the Sarawak State Constitution. [94] In our country, only the Federal Constitution is supreme. All other public institutions including State Legislative Assemblies must act within the confines set out in their respective Constitutions. Even the Parliament is not above the law. This had been made clear by our apex Court in the landmark case of Ah Thian v. The Government of Malaysia (1976) 2 MLJ 112 where the learned erstwhile Lord President Suffian had this to say: "The doctrine of supremacy of Parliament does not apply in Malaysia. Here we have a written Constitution. The power of Parliament and the State legislature is limited by the Constitution and they cannot make any law as they please." [95] In other words, their powers are circumscribed and not unlimited. In yet another case of the highest authority, namely Pengarah Tanah dan Galian, Wilayah Persekutuan v Sri Lempah Enterprise SdnBhd [1979] 1 MLJ 135,Justice Raja Azlan Shah Acting CJ(Malaya) had occasion to state that every legal power must have legal limits, otherwise there is dictatorship. In the context of the present appeals before this Court, Article 19 of the Sarawak State Constitution gives power to the Dewan to determine matters pertaining to a member's qualification which may be invoked at anytime, but the exercise of such power or jurisdiction by the Dewan is limited to the question of whether a member of the Dewan has ceased to be qualified to be so elected. That must mean that the member under scrutiny must have incurred a disqualification during the currency of his tenure as an elected member of the Dewan. It does not, with respect, warrant the Dewan to extend its jurisdiction to determining an alleged disqualification which is incurred by a member of the Dewan before his election into the Dewan. As has been made clear in the preceding paragraphs of this judgement, my reading of both Articles 18 and 19 of the Sarawak State Constitution does not yield a result consistent with an interpretation that has been advocated by all learned counsel for the Defendants in these appeals before us. [See, for recent judicial reiteration of the concept, Dewan Undangan Negeri Selangor & Ors. V Mohd Hafarizam Harun & Ors [2016] 7 CLJ 143; Semenyih Jaya SdnBhd V. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat & Another [2017] 5 CLJ 526; Pembinaan Batu Jaya Sdn Bhd v Pengarah Tanah dan Galian, Selangor and anor [2016] 2 MLJ 495]. [96] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff, Mr. Chong submitted that the effect of the interplay of Articles 16, 17, 18 and 19 in the Sarawak Constitution and Article 118 of the Federal Constitution, could be as follows: "It follows therefore that if an elected candidate was under disqualification when he was elected, but no one challenges his election by election Petition, he would continue as a Member irrespective of the fact that he was under a disqualification when elected." [97] Incongruous it may sound and appear, but I do not think that he was entirely wrong in concluding the way he did, in light of the existing legal landscape surrounding the issue at hand. Unless of course there is a similar express provision like the one that exists in the Article XXXIV of the Perak State Constitution, I am not sufficiently convinced that the Sarawak Dewan had the necessary jurisdiction to examine the disqualification of the Plaintiff that was clearly incurred by in 2010, well before his election into the Sarawak Dewan in 2016 for the State seat of N74 Pujut. The extent of jurisdiction of the Dewan, upon due construction of Articles 18(2)(a) and 19(1) of the Sarawak State Constitution is limited to examining the alleged acts of disqualification committed by a sitting member during the currency of his tenure, as an elected member, namely post-election. I noted that the Perak State Constitution has similar provisions, not unlike those contained under Article 16 of the Sarawak State Constitution on the qualifications of a person desirous of standing for a state constituency in a State election. Despite this, yet Perak State Constitution has a provision like the one residing under Article XXXIV(2) within its four walls. It is my respectful view that the need for the Perak State Constitution to have such an explicit provision is because without such Article XXXIV(2) being inserted, the curious position of a disqualified person finding himself sitting in the august House, not unlike Saka Venkata sitting in the Legislative Council of Madras, would remain unresolved. It is my considered view that Article 19 of the Sarawak State Constitution, in its present form and substance, is not wide enough in its intended legislative ambit, to successfully anchor a contention in support of an argument that would clothe the Sarawak Dewan with the necessary jurisdiction to inquire into a disqualification incurred by a sitting member prior to his election into the Dewan. Such a crucial enabling jurisdiction, if indeed it was intended for the Dewan to possess, ought to have been provided for expressly and explicitly. It ought not to be left to be inferred from the reading, however creative, of the existing provisions as contained in Article 19 and related Articles, of the Sarawak State Constitution. Indeed, such a valiant attempt by the Indian Attorney General in the Saka Venkata case [supra] had been described and decried by the Supreme Court Justices as one that was 'more ingenious than sound' and 'a strained and far-fetched construction and cannot be accepted.' [98] True, as the learned SAG had submitted that there would be a lacuna if the Dewan were not empowered to determine the status of the Plaintiff who was a disqualified person to remain as a member in the Dewan, but to use the words of Chief Justice P. Sastri in the Saka Venkata case [supra], such submission "cannot be pressed as an argument against the respondent's construction of the constitutional provisions." An explicit provision like Article 50(2) of the Federal Constitution and/or Article XXXIV of the Perak State Constitution would certainly make plain as to how a person circumstanced as the Plaintiff here could be dealt with. [99] In sum, I agree with the Defendants that the Plaintiff had committed a disqualifying act as a person, under Article 17(1)(g) of the Sarawak Constitution. I agree too, that such an act incurred under the said provisions as contained in Article 17(1)(a) is one that cannot be forgiven, not even under Article 17(3) of the said Sarawak State Constitution. But that is the extent that I can agree with the Defendants. My considered view, with respect, is that the august Dewan does not have the necessary jurisdiction to determine the impugned status of the Plaintiff, despite his disqualified status, because that disqualification was incurred before he was elected as a member of the Dewan. The language employed in Articles 18 and 19 of the Sarawak State Constitution, does not confer on the Dewan the necessary jurisdiction to determine and rule on the status of the Plaintiff's disqualification. My reading of the said Articles 18 and 19 is that the Dewan is only empowered to determine and rule on the status of a member of the Dewan, who has since ceased to be qualified to be so elected. It connotes a change in the position of the member as to his qualified status. A disqualification based on an act of having voluntarily acquiring a citizenship of a foreign country outside of the Federation of Malaysia can still bite a member, but read with Article 18(2)(a), it must need be incurred after he has been elected as a member of the Dewan. In such a situation, the Dewan would be well within its jurisdiction to determine and take a decision on the matter. Such decision so taken by the Dewan shall be final and deserving of the immunity promised under Article 72 of the Federal Constitution. But the factual scenario pertaining to the Plaintiff before us did not fit into the one that is envisaged by Articles 18 and 19. His disqualification was incurred well before he was elected as a member of the Dewan. To say that the Dewan had the necessary jurisdiction, as did the Defendants, would be a contention that was, though seemingly ingenious, was nevertheless at the same time, one that is unsound, strained, far-fetched and cannot be accepted. Put simply, I find such contention to be untenable. Effect of my ruling [100] Having so decided, what would be the effect of my ruling? It would therefore mean that the proceedings in the Dewan on the MM were done without the necessary jurisdiction, as it is clear to us, is of no effect. It is of null and void. As to the effect of a nullity, in the case of Eu Finance Berhad v Lim Yoke Foo [1982] 2 MLJ 37 ("Eu Finance Berhad case") the Federal Court through the speech by Abdoolcader J had occasion to say, among others: "Where a decision is null by reason of want of jurisdiction, it cannot be cured in any appellate proceedings; failure to take advantage of this somewhat futile remedy does not affect the nullity inherent in the challenged decision. The party affected by the decision may appeal but he is not bound to (do so), because he is at liberty to treat the act as void. [Birmingham (Churhwardens and Overseers) v Shaw (1849) 10 QB 868 880; 116 ER 329 at page 880 (per Denman C.J.)] [101] The other Federal Court decision in Pow Hing & Anor v Registrar of Titles Malacca [1981] 1 MLJ 155 was also referred to with approval in the Eu Finance Berhad case [supra]. [102] As a necessary corollary thereto, I am of the view that the matter of privilege or immunity under Article 72 Federal Constitution does not arise. Despite its language, cases had been brought to Court challenging the decisions made in the various legislative chambers in our country. There is no dearth of such cases adorning our law reports and journals with pronouncements pertaining to this important legal principle. The latest decision being the Teng Cheng Khim v Badrul Hisham Abdullah and Suruhanjaya Pilihanraya Malaysia [2017] 1 LNS 468 where the Selangor's Speaker's decision in declaring the State seat of N64 Pelabuhan Klang as vacant, was challenged in Court. After delving into the state of the law on justiciability, our apex Court has this to say: "In conclusion, we are of the view that in the present case, the Speaker was acting within the limits of the power given to him under Article 69 of the Selangor Constitution when he declared the N64 Pelabuhan Klang Constituency seat vacant. Even though the declaration was made outside the SLA proceedings, it was inevitably connected with the essential business of the SLA, made within the parameters set out by Article 69 of the Selangor Constitution, and was made to regulate the internal affairs of the SLA. Consequently, we rule that the Speaker's act is non-justiciable and the Speaker is entitled to the protection of parliamentary privilege enjoyed by the SLA as provided for under Article 72(1) of the Federal Constitution." [103] With respect therefore, the point to stress here is the inescapable truth that the impugned party must act within the confines of the power which the law had conferred on it. In the context of our immediate appeals, only if the august Dewan had acted within its power as conferred on it by the Sarawak State Constitution will the cloak of immunity under article 72 of the Federal Constitution be applicable to the Dewan's acts. However, it is my considered view that on 12th May 2017 the Dewan had not acted within the power that was conferred by the Sarawak State Constitution under Article 19, and as such, there were no valid proceedings of the Dewan, that had pertained to the MM dated 12th May 2017, that would need to be immunized, in the circumstances of these appeals. It is only when the Dewan is acting within the confines of its conferred power that its proceedings and its decision shall be deserving of being immunized by Article 72 of the Federal Constitution. It would indeed be an affront to the very essence of the rule of law, if the Federal Constitution were to protect and immunize proceedings pertaining to a matter, in the Dewan which was null and void, for want of jurisdiction. [104] Also, premised on the above, I am of the view that I do not find it necessary to consider the issue on denial of natural justice as a vitiating factor. Both issues have been rendered academic by reason of the said nullity of the proceedings pertaining to the Ministerial Motion on the $ 1 2^{th} $ May 2017which I found to have been conducted by the Dewan, without proper constitutional basis. Conclusion [105] In the upshot, I therefore I dismiss all the three appeals with no order as to costs, as these appeals involved considerable public interest as they had pertained to the true construction to be given to some significant provisions contained in the Sarawak State Constitution. I affirm the decision of the learned High Court Judge, although I am not on all fours with him on all the issues. But on the paramount issue of whether the Dewan had the jurisdiction to determine the MM dated the $ 12^{\mathrm{th}} $ May 2017, I am in agreement with him in that the answer to that question must be in the negative. [106] As to deposits, if any paid, are ordered to be refunded to the respective Defendants accordingly. Dated: 13th July 2018. Sgd. ABANG ISKANDAR BIN ABANG HASHIM Judge Court of Appeal, Malaysia. Parties Appearing: For the Plaintiff: Mr. Chong Siew Chiang, together with Mr. Tan Kee Heng, Mr. Wong King Wei, Mr. Michael Kong; Messrs King Wei & Co. For the 1 $ ^{st} $ Defendant: Mr. Shankar Ram together with Mr. Daniel Ling Messrs Thomas, Shankar Ram & Co. For the 2nd Defendant: Mr. Jonathan Tay Zhi Lun, together with Mr. George Lo Kuin Fah; Messrs George Lo & Advocate. For 3rd& 4th Defendants: Dato' Talat Mahmood bin Abdul Rashid, together with Mr. Saferi bin Ali, Miss Evy Liana; State Attorney General's Chambers. For 5th Defendant: SFC Mr. Azizan Md. Arshad, together with Mr. Shamsul Bolhassan, Miss Nik Azrin Zairin binti Nik Abdullah; Attorney General's Chambers. Cases referred to: