Meus Capital Sdn. Bhd. (Sebelum Ini Dikenali Sebagai "Setia Synergy Marketing Sdn. Bhd.) v LIM Kim Hin (CB-12BNCvC-2-05/2024)

Ini adalah rayuan terhadap keseluruhan keputusan yang dibuat oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen pada 24.04.2024 yang memutuskan bahawa tuntutan Plaintif ditolak dengan kos mengikut skala. Bagi memudahkan rayuan ini, pihak-pihak akan dirujuk sebagaimana kedudukan pihak-pihak di Mahkamah Sesyen iaitu Perayu adalah Plaintif dan Defendan adalah Responden.

Penelitian kepada pliding mendapati bahawa Plaintif adalah merupakan sebuah syarikat persendirian yang didaftarkan di bawah Akta Syarikat 2016. Defendan adalah merupakan salah seorang bekas pengarah bagi Miracle Land Holdings Berhad (“Miracle Land”).

Pada 29.04.2016 Plaintif mendakwa bahawa atas representasi Defendan, Miracle Land sedang memungut angel fund dan Miracle Land bakal disenaraikan di Bursa Saham Malaysia. Plaintif telah S/N dJPEt2mRkm95En/k9xvxw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 membeli sebanyak 39,226 unit saham dari Miracle Land dengan harga RM 250,000.00.

Plaintif telah menandatangani suatu surat jaminan pada 06.06.2016. Ia dilakukan setelah Defendan meyakinkan Plaintif berkenaan dengan penyataan di perenggan [3] di atas.

Surat jaminan tersebut menurut Plaintif menyatakan Defendan telah berjanji kepada Plaintif untuk membeli kembali saham tersebut daripada Defendan sekiranya Miracle Land tidak disenaraikan dalam pasaran saham dalam tempoh 6 tahun.

Miracle Land masih belum disenaraikan di Bursa Saham Malaysia sehingga ke hari ini. Oleh itu Plaintif telah meminta Mahkamah untuk menguatkuasakan hak Plaintif di bawah surat jaminan tersebut kepada Defendan dengan harga RM 370,000.00.

Plaintif di dalam tindakannya memohon agar Mahkamah Sesyen membuat satu deklarasi bahawa surat jaminan tersebut adalah sah, mengikat dan boleh dikuatkuasakan. Di samping itu Mahkamah Sesyen juga diminta memberi satu perintah pelaksanaan spesifik kepada Defendan di bawah surat jaminan tersebut dengan membayar RM 370,000.00 untuk membeli saham tersebut serta faedah dan kos. S/N dJPEt2mRkm95En/k9xvxw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4

Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen setelah mendengar keterangan-keterangan memutuskan bahawa tuntutan Plaintif adalah ditolak atas alasan Plaintif tidak mempunyai priviti kontrak dengan Defendan, Plaintif dan Defendan tidak mempunyai hubungan kontraktual.

Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berpendapat tiada privy kontrak di antara Plaintif dan Defendan disebabkan keterangan dan pliding yang dikemukakan tidak menunjukkan bahawa Plaintif pernah diberi atau menerima surat jaminan tersebut daripada Defendan atau daripada pihak lain. Selain daripada itu Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen juga berpendapat SP 2 dalam keterangannya menyatakan bahawa surat jaminan tersebut adalah diberikan oleh Defendan Kedua kepada Miracle Land dan bukannya kepada Plaintif atau mana-mana pelabur.

Di samping itu Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen juga berpendapat isu collateral contract yang dihujahkan oleh peguam Plaintif dan Defendan telah diputuskan tidak dapat menunjukkan terdapatnya collateral contract berdasarkan kepada kes Kluang Wood Products Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Hong Leong Finance Bhd & Anor [1999] 1 CLJ 1.

Adalah menjadi prinsip yang mantap bahawa mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan tidak sewajarnya campur tangan di dalam dapatan fakta. S/N dJPEt2mRkm95En/k9xvxw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5

Mahkamah ini perlu berhati-hati dalam meneliti keterangan tersebut dan tidak bertindak melebihi wewenang Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan daripada keputusan mahkamah bicara. Mahkamah ini tidak sewajarnya menggantikan dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen semata-mata disebabkan tidak bersetuju dengan dapatan tersebut. Sebaliknya hendaklah meneliti dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen itu dalam jurus pandang undang-undang sama ada ia wajar diganggu atau sebaliknya seperti yang dinyatakan dalam kes Watt or Thomas v Thomas [1947] AC 484 seperti berikut: “I do not find it necessary to review the many decisions of this House, for it seems to me that the principle embodied therein is a simple one, and may be stated thus: I. Where a question of fact has been tried by a judge without a jury, and there is no question of misdirection of himself by the judge, an appellate court which is disposed to come to a different conclusion on the printed evidence, should not do so unless it is satisfied that any advantage enjoyed by the trial judge by reason of having seen and heard the witnesses, could not be sufficient to explain or justify the trial judge's conclusion; II. The appellate court may take the view that, without having seen or heard the witnesses, it is not in a position to come to any satisfactory conclusion on the printed evidence; III. The appellate court, either because the reasons given by the trial judge are not satisfactory, or because it unmistakably so appears from the evidence, may be satisfied that he has not taken proper advantage of his having seen and heard S/N dJPEt2mRkm95En/k9xvxw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 the witnesses, and the matter will then become at large for the appellate court.”

Begitu juga Lord Simonds dalam kes yang sama telah menyatakan seperti berikut: “There I should be content to leave this case but for certain criticisms made by counsel for the respondent in his able and candid address. Relying on the testimony of certain witnesses called on behalf of the respondent (whom I need not name) he said that the learned Lord Ordinary had come to a conclusion which was diametrically opposed to that testimony, yet he had not explicitly stated that he did not accept them as witnesses of truth nor indeed, made any adverse comment upon them. Your Lordships were therefore invited to find that the learned judge had forgotten or ignored this evidence and to hold that his judgment was thereby vitiated. I believe this to be fundamentally unsound criticism. The trial judge has come to certain conclusions of fact; your Lordships are entitled and bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that he has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. If his conclusion is inconsistent with the evidence of certain of the witnesses but he does not, in terms, stigmatize them as false witnesses, it is not the proper or necessary inference that he has forgotten or ignored them; of this the present case is a cogent example, for I can well understand why the Lord Ordinary, while not accepting his S/N dJPEt2mRkm95En/k9xvxw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 evidence, did not think fit to comment unkindly on one at least of the witnesses in question.”

Malahan Lord Du Parcq menyatakan seperti berikut dalam kes tersebut: “All the authoritative decisions which relate to the proper attitude of an appellate court towards the findings of fact of the trial judge naturally tend to lay emphasis on one aspect of the question, either on the fact that the appellate court's duty to see justice done may constrain it to reject the judge's findings, or on the undesirability of deciding a case on a written record against the view of the judge who heard the witnesses. But, though one aspect may be emphasized, the other must always be present to the mind of the court. Thus, in Yuill v. Yuill (2), where the decision of the judge was reversed, Lord Greene M.R. said: "It can, of course, only be on the rarest occasions, and in circumstances where the appellate court is convinced by the plainest considerations, that it would be justified in finding that the trial judge had formed a wrong opinion." My Lords, I am satisfied that this is not one of those very rare occasions. There are, no doubt, cases in which it is proper to say, after reading the printed record, that, after making allowance for possible exaggeration and giving full weight to the judge's estimate of the witnesses, no conclusion is possible except that his decision was wrong.” S/N dJPEt2mRkm95En/k9xvxw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8

Prinsip yang dinyatakan berkenaan dengan campur tangan Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap keputusan mahkamah bicara seperti yang dinyatakan dalam kes Watt or Thomas v Thomas (supra) di atas telah dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Agong di United Kingdom dalam kes Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd and another [2014] 1 WLR

Lord Reed menyatakan seperti berikut: “63 In Thomas itself, Lord Thankerton, with whose reasoning Lord Macmillan, Lord Simonds and Lord du Parcq agreed, said [1947] AC 484, 487–488 that in the absence of a misdirection of himself by the trial judge, an appellate court which was disposed to come to a different conclusion on the evidence should not do so “unless it is satisfied that any advantage enjoyed by the trial judge by reason of having seen and heard the witnesses, could not be sufficient to explain or justify the trial judge’s conclusion”. 64 Lord du Parcq’s speech is to similar effect. Distinguishing the instant case from “those very rare occasions” on which an appellate court would be justified in finding that the trial judge had formed a wrong opinion, he said, at p 493: “There are, no doubt, cases in which it is proper to say, after reading the printed record, that, after making allowance for possible exaggeration and giving full weight to the judge’s estimate of the witnesses, no conclusion is possible except that his decision was wrong.” S/N dJPEt2mRkm95En/k9xvxw 65 Viscount Simon, at p 486, while disagreeing as to the result of the appeal, also emphasised the need for the appellate court to consider whether the trial judge’s decision could reasonably be regarded as justified: “If there is no evidence to support a particular conclusion (and this is really a question of law), the appellate court will not hesitate so to decide. But if the evidence as a whole can reasonably be regarded as justifying the conclusion arrived at at the trial, and especially if that conclusion has been arrived at on conflicting testimony by a tribunal which saw and heard the witnesses, the appellate court will bear in mind that it has not enjoyed this opportunity and that the view of the trial judge as to where credibility lies is entitled to great weight.” 66 These dicta are couched in different language, but they are to the same general effect, and assist in understanding what Lord Macmillan is likely to have intended when he said that the trial judge might be shown “otherwise to have gone plainly wrong”. Consistently with the approach adopted by Lord Thankerton in particular, the phrase can be understood as signifying that the decision of the trial judge cannot reasonably be explained or justified. 67 It follows that, in the absence of some other identifiable error, such as (without attempting an exhaustive account) a material error of law, or the making of a critical finding of fact which has no S/N dJPEt2mRkm95En/k9xvxw basis in the evidence, or a demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence, or a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence, an appellate court will interfere with the findings of fact made by a trial judge only if it is satisfied that his decision cannot reasonably be explained or justified. 68 This approach is consistent, as I have explained, with the Scottish authorities, and also with more recent authority in this court and in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council: see, for example, In re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2013] 1 WLR 1911, paras 52–53, per Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC. A similar approach has also been adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada (see HL v Canada (Attorney General) [2005] 1 SCR 401, paras 55–56) and by the United States Supreme Court: see Anderson v Bessemer (1985) 470 US 564, 573–574.” [16] Pendekatan campur tangan Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan terhadap dapatan dan keputusan hakim bicara ini dikenali sebagai prinsip jelas kesilapannya (plainly wrong). Mahkamah Persekutuan telahpun menjelaskan pemakaian prinsip tersebut semasa mendengar rayuan daripada mahkamah bawahan dalam kes Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator Of The Estates Of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Ors Federal Court, Putrajaya [2020] 10 CLJ 1 seperti berikut: S/N dJPEt2mRkm95En/k9xvxw [71] From the aforesaid authorities, there appears to be a difference in approach taken and applied by the UK Supreme Court and the approach taken by the Malaysian courts. Whilst Lord Reed in Henderson (supra) separated the four non exhaustive identifiable errors of a trial judge from the plainly wrong test:

a material error of law;

(ii) a critical finding of fact which has no basis in the evidence;

(iii) demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence; and

(iv) a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence; (all of which justifies appellate intervention of a trial judge's decision), this court in Gan Yook Chin (supra) effectively included them under what amount to the trial judge as being "plainly wrong". [72] The phrase "lack of judicial appreciation of evidence" used in Gan Yook Chin (supra) could very well encompass three out of four errors of a trial judge (other than the "material error of law") said to be identifiable by Lord Reed in Henderson (supra), namely:

critical factual finding which has no basis in evidence;

(ii) demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence; and

(iii) demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence. S/N dJPEt2mRkm95En/k9xvxw [73] Given that the issue at present is about identifying situations where the findings of fact by a trial court justify appellate intervention, the other identifiable error of "material error of law" listed by Lord Reed in Henderson (supra) can occur when a trial judge erroneously apply legal principles (eg rules of evidence) in the course of making a finding of fact, thus resulting in a lack of judicial appreciation of evidence. For example, when a trial judge erroneously placed a burden of proof on a party, that will lead the judge to misdirect himself when he attempts to interpret the factual matrix before him. The commission of material error of law by the trial judge in arriving at his conclusions (eg, the requirement of proof of intention in constructive trust as opposed to express trust), also justifies an appellate court reversing such conclusions. [74] Thus, whilst there is a slight difference in approach of appellate intervention, both the UK Supreme Court and our Federal Court effectively shares a common thread where it has been held that appellate intervention is justified where there is lack of judicial appreciation of evidence. [75] The Court of Appeal in Singapore applies the plainly wrong test which is similar to our Federal Court, as illustrated in Damu Jadhao v. Paras Nath Singh [1965] CLJU 30; [1965] 1 LNS 30; [1976] 1 MLJ 151, when it held: The principles under which an appellate court acts when an appellant seeks to displace the conclusion arrived at by a trial S/N dJPEt2mRkm95En/k9xvxw judge on questions of fact have been very recently restated by the Privy Council in the case of Tay Kheng Hong v. Heap Moh Steamship Co Ltd [1964] CLJU 202; [1964] 1 LNS 202; [1964] MLJ 92 and [1965] 2 MLJ 151 at 153 need only refer to a passage of the judgment of Lord Guest when dealing with the matter, where he states: Before the Court of Appeal in Singapore was entitled to reject the trial judge's estimate of the credibility of the appellant and Goh Leh they would have to be satisfied that the trial judge's view was plainly wrong and that any advantage which he enjoyed by having seen and heard the witnesses was not sufficient to explain his conclusion. This case seems to me to be completely dependent on the trial judge's estimate of the credibility of the appellant and his witnesses and nothing that counsel for the appellant has put forward in his arguments before me has persuaded me that the trial judge's view of the credibility of the witnesses before him was in any way plainly wrong. [76] What is pertinent is that, the "plainly wrong" test is not intended to be used by an appellate court as a mean to substitute its own decision for that of the trial court on the facts. [77] It is to be observed that this court in Tengku Dato' Ibrahim Petra Tengku Indra Petra (supra) had referred S/N dJPEt2mRkm95En/k9xvxw to McGraddie (supra) and Henderson (supra) and has adopted the Henderson (supra) approach of the "plainly wrong" test in determining whether the trial court's findings of fact is reversible upon appeal: Recently in Henderson v. Foxworth Investments Ltd and Another [2014] 1 WLR 2600, the United Kingdom Supreme Court held that in the absence of some other identifiable error, such as a material error of law or the making of a critical factual finding which had not interfered with the factual finding which had no basis in the evidence, an appellate court should not interfere with the factual findings of a trial judge unless it was satisfied that the decision of the trial judge was "plainly wrong" in the sense that it could not reasonably be explained or justified and so was one which no reasonable judge could have reached, and that if the appellate court was not satisfied that the decision came within that category it was irrelevant that, with whatever degree of certainty, it considered that it would have reached a different conclusion from the trial judge. (emphasis added) [78] Hence following this court's ruling in Tengku Dato' Ibrahim Petra Tengku Indra Petra (supra) an appellate court should not interfere with the factual findings of a trial judge unless it was satisfied that the decision of the trial judge was "plainly wrong" where in arriving at the decision it could not reasonably be explained or justified and so was one which no reasonable judge S/N dJPEt2mRkm95En/k9xvxw could have reached. If the decision did not fall within any of the aforesaid category, it is irrelevant, even if the appellate court thinks that with whatever degree of certainty, it considered that it would have reached a different conclusion from the trial judge.” [17] Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah juga perlu memberikan perhatian semasa meneliti rayuan Perayu bagi menentukan sama ada terdapatnya keperluan untuk mengganggu dapatan hakim bicara. Ia sejajar dengan apa yang dikenali sebagai kegagalan hakim bicara yang tidak membuat penilaian keterangan secara mencukupi (insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence). Ia perlu dilihat hubung kait di antara prinsip jelas kesilapannya (plainly wrong). Hubung kait di antara penilaian keterangan secara mencukupi (insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence) dan prinsip jelas kesilapannya (plainly wrong) telah dijelaskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Gan Yook Chin & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309 seperti berikut: “In our view, the Court of Appeal in citing these cases had clearly borne in mind the central feature of appellate intervention ie, to determine whether or not the trial court had arrived at its decision or finding correctly on the basis of the relevant law and/or the established evidence. In so doing, the Court of Appeal was perfectly entitled to examine the process of evaluation of the evidence by the trial court. Clearly, the phrase "insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence" merely related to such a process. This is reflected in the Court of Appeal's restatement that a judge who was required to adjudicate upon a dispute must arrive at his S/N dJPEt2mRkm95En/k9xvxw decision on an issue of fact by assessing, weighing and, for good reasons, either accepting or rejecting the whole or any part of the evidence placed before him. The Court of Appeal further reiterated the principle central to appellate intervention ie, that a decision arrived at by a trial court without judicial appreciation of the evidence might be set aside on appeal. This is consistent with the established plainly wrong test.” [18] Penelitian kepada alasan penghakiman dan nota keterangan dalam kes ini adalah dapat dikenalpasti bahawa terdapat isu yang timbul dalam kes ini iaitu:

adakah terdapat perjanjian jaminan di antara Plaintif dan

adakah surat jaminan itu diberikan oleh pihak Defendan kepada Miracle Land Holdings Berhad; dan

adakah sebarang pemecahan surat jaminan tersebut. [19] Mahkamah juga perlu meneliti sama ada Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah meneliti ketiga-tiga isu tersebut berdasarkan kepada keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan di Mahkamah. Di samping itu adakah Mahkamah ini wajar untuk campur tangan di dalam dapatan yang dibuat oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. S/N dJPEt2mRkm95En/k9xvxw [20] Seksyen 79 Akta Kontrak telah menyatakan kontrak jaminan seperti yang berikut: “79 “Contract of guarantee”, “surety”, “principal debtor”, and “creditor” A "contract of guarantee" is a contract to perform the promise, or discharge the liability, of a third person in case of his default. The person who gives the guarantee is called the "surety"; the person in respect of which default the guarantee is given is called the "principal debtor", and the person to whom the guarantee is given is called the "creditor". A guarantee may be either oral or written.” [21] Mahkamah Agong dalam kes South East Asia Insurance Bhd v Nasir Ibrahim [1992] 2 MLJ 355 memperjelaskan lagi maksud kontrak jaminan dengan merujuk seksyen 79 Akta tersebut dan menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “A contract of guarantee, according to s 79 of the Contracts Act 1950 ‘is a contract to perform the promise, or discharge the liability, of a third person in case of his default’. The person who gives the guarantee is called the ‘surety’; the person in respect of which default the guarantee is given is called the ‘principal debtor’, and the person to whom the guarantee is given is called the ‘creditor’.” S/N dJPEt2mRkm95En/k9xvxw [22] Di dalam Law of Contract, Fifth Edition, Volume 1, 2023 LexisNexis oleh Vissu Sinnadurai di halaman 209 telah memetik Anson’s Law of Contract 31st Edition, page 82 yang menjelaskan hakikat kontrak jaminan seperti yang berikut: “In a contract of guarantee there must be always three parties in contemplation: a principal debtor (whose liability may be actual or prospective), a creditor, and a promisor (guarantor) who promises to discharge the debtor's liability if the debtor should fail to do so. The guarantor's liability is therefore secondary to that of the principal debtor… ” [23] Penelitian kepada surat jaminan yang terdapat di muka surat 241 hingga 242 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 3 Bahagian C menunjukkan bahawa Lim Kim Hin telah memberikan jaminan untuk membeli saham daripada Setia Synergy Marketing Sdn. Bhd. seperti yang berikut: S/N dJPEt2mRkm95En/k9xvxw S/N dJPEt2mRkm95En/k9xvxw [24] Apa yang jelas daripada surat jaminan tersebut tiada tertera nama Plaintif. Inilah yang diputuskan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berdasarkan kepada dokumen surat jaminan tersebut. Apakah ia suatu dapatan yang memerlukan kepada campur tangan Mahkamah ini? S/N dJPEt2mRkm95En/k9xvxw [25] Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa pihak Plaintif berpendapat bahawa jaminan tersebut telah diberikan oleh Defendan atas kedudukannya sebagai pengarah syarikat Miracle Land Holdings Berhad telah mendorong Plaintif untuk membeli saham-saham tersebut dengan kepercayaan bahawa Miracle Land Holdings Berhad akan disenaraikan di Bursa Saham Malaysia dalam tempoh 6 tahun. Bagi Plaintif inilah jaminan yang telah diberikan oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif sehingga menyebabkan Plaintif bersetuju membeli saham-saham dari Miracle Land Holdings Berhad. Apabila syarikat Miracle Land Holdings Berhad tidak disenaraikan di pasaran saham dalam tempoh 6 tahun tersebut, maka Plaintif berpendapat jaminan yang diberikan oleh Defendan tersebut telah diingkari. Maka Defendan perlu membeli saham-saham tersebut daripada Plaintif. Namun ia tidak dapat ditunjukkan berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan dokumentari dan lisan yang telah dikemukakan di Mahkamah Sesyen. Dalam erti kata lain Plaintif tidak dapat membuktikan tuntutannya terhadap Defendan. Ini yang diputuskan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. [26] Dokumen surat jaminan yang ada hanyalah di muka surat 241 hingga 242 tersebut. Ia telah menjadi asas kepada dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. Mahkamah ini berpendapat dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tersebut adalah berdasarkan keterangan yang dikemukakan di Mahkamah serta dokumen-dokumen yang berkaitan. Mahkamah ini tidak berada dalam kedudukan untuk memutuskan sebaliknya. S/N dJPEt2mRkm95En/k9xvxw [27] Dalam erti kata lain Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah membuat dapatan berdasarkan fakta dan keterangan dan tiada kesilapan yang jelas atau kegagalan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen membuat penilaian keterangan-keterangan bagi mewajarkan campur tangan Mahkamah ini dalam isu (a), (b) dan (c) seperti yang dinyatakan di perenggan [18] di atas. [28] Akhirnya, keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen adalah disahkan. Rayuan Perayu adalah ditolak. Bertarikh: 24 hb. Januari 2025 (ROSLAN BIN MAT NOR) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR S/N dJPEt2mRkm95En/k9xvxw PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi Pihak Perayu Ng Kian Nam Tetuan Ng Kian Nam & Partners 195-1, Jalan Haruan 5/6 Pusat Komersial Oakland 2 70300 Seremban Negeri Sembilan Bagi Pihak Responden Francis Tan Jeng Lok dan Norhamizah binti Mustafa Tetuan Rosni, Francis Tan & Ho No. 50, Tingkat 1, Jalan Ahmad Shah 28000 Temerloh Pahang Darul Makmur S/N dJPEt2mRkm95En/k9xvxw